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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTKATION
OF THE INTEENAL SECUEITY ACT AND OTHEE
INTEENAL SECUEITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 5
OCTOBER 12, 17, 18, AND 19, 1951
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
■atiwci*-*--
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INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
HEARINGS
BEFORE TUK
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INYESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER
INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
PART 5
OCTOBER 12, 17, 18, AND 19, 1951
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22848 " WASHINGTvJN : 1951
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PAT McCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
HARLBY M. KILGORE, West Virginia ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi WILLIAM LANGER, North Daltota
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, Wasliington HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. O'CONOR, Maryland WILLIAM B. JENNER, Indiana
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, New Jersey
J. G. SouKWiNE, Counsel
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Inteenai- Secueitt
Act and Other Internal Secukity Laws
PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada, Chairman
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
HERBERT R. OCONOR, Maryland WILLIAM E. JENNER, Indiana
WILLIS SMITH, North Carolina ARTHUR V. WATKINS, Utah
Subcommittee Investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
PAT MCCARRAN, Nevada HOMER FERGUSON, Michigan
Robert Morris, Special Counsel
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research
n
C O N T E N 1 S
Testimony of— Page
Alsop, Joseph 1 403
Colegrove, Kenneth C 1277
Cooke, Charles Maynard, Admiral USN (retired) 1491
Stassen, Harold E 1252
Wallace, Henry A - 1297
Appendix — Transcript of Round Table Discussion on American Policy
toward China held in Department of State, October 6, 7, and 8, 1949 1551
m
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS
• FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration
OF the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, of the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met at 10 : 30 a. m., pursuant to call, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pat McCarran (chairman) presiding..
Present: Senators McCarran, Smith, and Ferguson.
Also present : Senator Millikin ; J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel ;
Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of
research ; and Prof. Kenneth Colegrove, Northwestern University.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Morris, you may proceed.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I believe Governor Stassen has been
sworn.
The Chairman. Governor Stassen has been sworn, not once, but
twice to my certain knowledge.
Mr. Morris. And pursuant to direction we had Governor Stassen
recalled in order that he might make an analysis of the transcript
which was released yesterday by the State Department and make com-
parisons between the transcript and his testimony, and for that reason
he has been called here this morning, to show whether or not the tran-
script justifies his testimony.
The Chairman. Governor, you may proceed.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, this- letter that you prepared is now
ready, and it bears on this matter, so I think it would be just as well to
read it at the outset. [Reading :]
October 12, 1951.
Hon. Dean Acheson,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.
My Dear Mb. Secretary : Thank you for making available to the Internal Secu-
rity Subcommittee a transcript of the October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, round-table con-
ference.
I notice that the list of questions submitted to the conferees does not appear
in the transcript. Inasmuch as this is an integral part of the record, will you
make this available?
The Internal Security Subcommittee vpould also like to have a copy of the
memoranda submitted by individuals, together with a list of those submitting
memoranda, and a list of those invited to the conference.
Your kind cooperation will be appreciated.
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Morris. Governor Stassen, have you had an opportunity to
study the transcript made available to you?
1251
1252 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
TESTIMONY OF HAEOLD E. STASSEN, PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. Stassen. I had a limited opportunity to study it last night, Mr.
Morris and Senator, and we have gone through it quite thoroughly
within the limitations of time.
Mr. Morris. Governor Stassen, will you point out to us that portion
of the transcript which bears out the testimony that you have given
before this subcommittee? * ,
Mr. Stassen. Senator and gentlemen of the committee, I would like
to state first that I appear in response to your request that I return
for further examination by you upon the transcript which is now re-
leased of the October 6, 7, and 8, 1949, conference at the State Depart-
ment.
I wish to commend you, if I may, sir, on your successful effort in
getting this to be a public record, and I would respectfully suggest for
your consideration that it ought at some time to become printed so that
it would be available in the academic circles in the country as a mini-
mum.
I say to you again that I will endeavor to answer your questions
fairly and objectively from the facts as I know them. I will refer
frequently to the transcript this morning, and as a witness I will not
assess motives to anyone. I am not here as an associate of anyone
else, nor for the purpose of attacking anyone else. I responded to
your subpena, and I wull answer fully and carefully because of the
great importance of the subject under inquiry.
You will recall that I testified on October 1, 1951, that the prevail-
ing group in the conference was led in the discussions by Mr. Owen
Lattimore and Mr. Lawrence Eosinger. You will also recall that the
State Department on the next morning issued a press release which
denied my testimony and that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger also
issued press releases which denied my testimony ; and you will also be
aware that this morning the papers carry a State Department press
release which says that I am "factually incorrect."
Therefore, I will proceed to carefully analyze the transcript in
relation to my previous testimony, but more important than that, also
in relation to the basic issues which were then and are now before
the country, because I should like to state, sir, that my greatest inter-
est in this matter is because of my extreme concern that I can see now
in its early stages a similar w^orld-wide pattern of action which would
have as its consequence the undermining of the Congress Party of
India and of Premier Nehru and the turning of India to the domi-
nation of the Communist Party of India, and all over the world men
who participated in the pattern of action with relation to China are
now shifting to India, so that is the background from which we now
proceed, with your permission, Senator, in this very careful analysis
of this paper on our China policy.
The transcript, now at long last released, clearly proves the correct-
ness of my memory of the conference and the truth of my description
of it. I testified as this prevailing group, and I might just make this
first comment, not that this in itself is important proof, but it is a
detail.
Tlirough this transcript you will find, sir, that Mr, Owen Lattimore,
exclusive of questions during the briefing by the military, spoke 19
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1253
times, of which 8 times were substantial, and that Mr. Lawrence Ros-
inger spoke 11 times, of which 5 times were substantial, and you will
not find any twin participation in major degree similar to that on the
part of any other of the 30 or so participants.
That, of course, is just broad background for the analysis that I
now present.
Mr. Morris. And that shows, Governor Stassen, that they led the
conference; is that right, sir?
Mr. Stassen. That is just one factor to consider, of course. The
volubility alone would not be proof of leading a discussion, as we all
know, but it is one factor. It does, though, bear out the testimony
that I gave earlier on your examination at a time when I did not have
the transcript. You asked how frequently did Lattimore speak while
I was present, and I said, "I would say eight or nine times and Rosinger
five or six times," so the transcript now released bears out that testi-
mony of mine and the testimony of Dr. Colegrove, which was given
before I appeared on the scene, before you subpenaed me.
Mr. Morris.- And you were present 2 of the 3 days, were you not?
Mr. Stassen. That is right.
I testified before you, sir, on October 1 that this prevailing group
recommended that the United States should recognize the Communist
People's Republic Government of China under the leadership of Mao
Tse-tung at an early date. The key session of the conference on this
subject was on the third day, October 8, 1949, beginning at 9 a. m.
The transcript has an ink number, No. 15-E — I don't know what
that means — but in any event it is the transcript under date of October
8, 1949, beginning at 9 a. m,, and in this transcript, if you turn beyond
where General Marshall was speaking, you come down to the point
at w^hich the most important section of the transcript on this par-
ticular issue and on some other issues is found.
The Chairman. That is on what page of the transcript, Governor?
Mr. Stassen. We now turn to page 31 of this transcript for the
8th of October, beginning at 9 a. m., page 31 on the right-hand side,
B-1 in the center. It has a double label. The chairman who is speak-
ing here is Dr. Jessup, so on top of the page where it says "Chairman"
that is Dr. Jessup, and you will see that he says this :
Gentlemen, in the time whicli is left to us, with your permission what I would
like to do would be to see if we can get your views rather specifically on a number
of issues. * * *
And then you run down to the beginning of the second paragraph
and he said :
I would like to suggest that we might have a few minutes taking up the question
of the recognition of the Communist Government in China. * * *
So that this discussion which follows arose as the direct result of the
request of Dr. Jessup that we focus on that specific issue. You will
recall that many releases and statements have indicated that the dis-
cussion of recognition was a sort of incidental thing while 30 men were
discussing many problems.
This then definitely pins that this discussion came about as the re-
quest of Dr. Jessup focusing the whole group specifically on this
problem, and I think this record should also show that in the testi-
mony before the Sparkman committee Dr. Jessup testified that the
United States had not considered or contemplated — he used both
words — the recognition of Communist China.
1254 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Now, then, the key discussion of this follows in these pages and for
any real analysis everything from this page 31 on through should be
read, but I will now point to high lights in order to focus on what is
involved.
On page 40 Dr. Nathaniel Peffer on the bottom of the page begins
some of the most significant statements. You will see that Mr. Nath-
aniel Peffer says this :
I would also make it a matter of timing and I would wait. I would wait 4
weeks or 5 or 6 weeks * * *.
Then he goes on to say :
I don't know when the Communists will get to Canton, but I would guess not
over 6 or 7 weeks. The only other Chinese regime will be in Formosa, which
is, at least technically, not Chinese territory. It is still Japanese.
Then he goes on.
On page 43 you find an important thing. Now, some of those who
were arguing against recognition as they saw the prevailing opinion
developing the other way urged that furthermore, beyond everything
else, there was a strong opinion in the country and in Congress against
the recognition.
This was not the sole basis of opposition to the recognition, but it
was one of the arguments advanced, so here you see Mr. Peffer taking
up that argument. He says on page 43, the second paragraph, page
B-13, second paragraph :
If this country — the most powerful in the world at the most dangerous time
in the world — is at a stage in which the Government is hog-tied against its bet-
ter judgment because some people are going to blow up, then God alone help the
Republic. That is all.
And then the stenographer records applause to that. In other
words, this was a sharp rejoinder to those in the minority who had
pleaded that there should not be recognition, and the stenographer
records applause, and applause was of course rare — in fact, almost
unheard of — in this kind of a conference with 30 men sitting around
the table.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other occasions where there
was an applause?
Mr. Stassen". There was one time. There was a comment of "Hear,
hear," or something of a similar vein from the floor.
Senator Ferguson. But no applause like this ?
Mr. Stassen. I think there was an applause when General Mar-
shall concluded his report; instances of that kind. I do not know
of any other instance than this one and the "Hear, hear", when a sub-
stantive statement of policy was greeted with applause as distin-
guished from greeting some individual with applause or some courtesy
with applause.
If I may just conclude that, on page 42 you find that Mr. Peffer says :
Let us say that there is an American Congress — and I don't know that they
are synonymous — and suppose it is true the State of Oregon blows up. Well,
it will settle * * *.
And on page 43, the end of the first paragraph, you will find him
saying this :
There is no real argument against real recognition except that a lot of people
are going to blow up.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1255
It is after he has said these things and concludes that there is the
applause from this conference.
Senator Smith. I want to ask you about an item on page 41, the
beginning of the paragraph on that page :
Another matter. Tell me, is not the burden o'f proving on those who don't want
to recognize? The Communists are there. They are going to take 20, 30, 40
years. Who knows? What do you lose by recognizing?
1 was wondering if that was part of the statement that got the
applause.
Mr. Stassen. Those two and a half pages was his statement, and
what you just read was included, which winds up with the applause.
If I may, I would like to go- on to page 48 where Owen Lattimore
is speaking, and he opens it up :
Mr. Chairman —
they are addressing Dr. Jessup —
I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this morning,
which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from subjective
attitudes. * * *
The Chairman. What page is that ?
Mr. Stassen. Page 48, C-1.
The Chairman. Some of them are not numbered the same.
Mr. Stassen. It says :
Chairman. Mr. Lattimore.
He is being called on, and his first sentence is :
Mr. Chairman, I think I am definitely encouraged by the evident trend this
morning, which shows that we should proceed from facts rather than from sub-
jective attitudes. I hope the Department feels its hand strengthened, but
if we * * *.
And so on, and then he goes on with his argument.
Mr. Morris. Does he argue that we should recognize Communist
China at that point ?
Mr. Stassen. Clearly in the context, and then he goes beyond that.
I might say the State Department release this morning admits that
Mr. Lattimore did urge recognition.
Then on the bottom of page 49, about eight lines up from the bottom,
he says :
Overhaste in recognizing the new situation might indicate panic * * *.
And he goes on and discusses that, and then he says :
On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our
prestige in Asia that in the long run would be more damaging to us because
there would be the feeling that while a new situation has developed and in spite
of the fact, as Mr. Peffer cogently pointed out —
I might say that refers directly back to the discussion just a few min-
utes earlier by Mr. Peffer that we have been discussing —
that that really doesn't alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the
United Nations ; for instance, the veto ratio is changed but the veto situation is
not changed * * *.
In other words, it was another argument against that of those op-
posing recognition had made, that that was not just a question of rec-
ognizing the country, but you would hand to that Communist govern-
ment a veto in the United Nations as one of the major nations in the
1256 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
world, that that was a serious matter, and this argument, along with
the others in here, was —
Well, after all, Russia had one veto now. What if you did give the Communists
two vetoes? Two vetoes wouldn't do them any more good than one in that we
still had one veto —
so that Mr. Lattimore directly associates himself with the argument
that while this would give the Communists two vetoes, that, as he
puts it —
that doesn't really alter the mechanics of how we handle things in the United
Nations ; for instance, the veto ratio is changed —
which means two vetoes for the Communists instead of one —
but the veto situation is not changed —
because they could still veto with only one veto.
That is trying to demolish our own insistence that there shouldnot
be prompt recognition because it would be very upsetting in the United
Nations.
Senator Smith. On page 49, and you read a part of it :
Overhaste in recognizing the new situation * * *.
That meant the recognition of Communist China? Is that what
that meant?
Mr. Stassen. That is right.
Senator Smith. There is no doubt about that?
Mr. Stassen. As I say, I really would urge that any of yoii gen-
tlemen, any editor who is going to analyze or comment on this as a
student, ought to take this morning's session, and from the time Gen-
eral Marshall finishes to the close of the session, and read every line
of it.
Senator Smith. Then he says in the next sentence :
On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our
prestige in Asia * * *.
That means too much delay in the recognition ; is that right ?
Mr. Stassen. That's right.
Mr. MoRKis. Governor Stassen, your reference to the veto is to the
fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council do have
the right to veto and that China is one of the five nations with that
veto power.
Mr. Stassen. That is right. You see, there had been references in
the discussion to the old recognition policy in relationship to South
American countries, and so forth, and some of us presented the plea
that that did not apply when you were considering a major nation
with two contesting governments and with the matter of a veto seat.
We said there was no real precedent for this ; this has to be analyzed
on the basis of the current world situation and what you knew about
China.
Senator Ferguson. You felt that recognition of Communist China
by the United States was in effect a recognition that they were entitled
to the seat because we would have to break off the recognition of the
Nationalist Government, which would give them no place in the
United Nations as far as we were concerned ?
Mr. Stassen. I not only felt that. Senator, but I said it very specifi-
cally before that morning session was over, and you will find it later
in the transcript. I said it very directly on that point.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1257
Senator Ferguson. Therefore in effect you had two recognitions.
If you recognized them as a nation and as a government, it meant that
following that you would by necessity have to recognize them in the
United Nations and they would become part of the Security Council
with the right of the veto ?
Mr. Stassen. That is right.
Then following through on page 54, you find comments by Mr. Wil-
liam S. Robertson, and he associates himself with those who are recom-
mending recognition, and then on page 55 he reads a letter, which is a
significant document. Starting before that, he said :
We have in China, as our chief executive, a man named Paul Hopliins, who
is knovi^n, I think, to a good many of the people here. I think while his chief
interest, of course, lies in us, I am quite sure from my knowledge of him that he
is a good, loyal, and patriotic American, and he has no particular reason to like
the Communists.
If I may, I would like to read to you, confidentially, from a letter which I
got from him under date of September 21, which gives something of his expe-
rience in dealing with the Communists in connection with our own business. I
thought it might be illuminating if that sort of thing might be put in the record.
After talking about our own affairs, he says :
"The authorities are all significantly honest, hard-worliing individuals who
live on the barest essentials of food and clothing. They practice austerity to
the point of not using electric fans or elevators in the buildings which they occupy
as offices or residences. In my opinion, the extreme privation of these officers
will have serious effect upon their health, particularly those with tubercular
tendencies. I have found them all intelligent, very frank in discussing prob-
lems and most of them with a good sense of humor.
"There is no question but that it is a new type of people who, if not subject
to outside pressure, will ultimately bring great progress to China.
"To my mind, the pessimistic future stems from the increasing breach which
has developed between China and America. There are arguments on both sides,
but, in my opinion, the passage of time has seemed to confuse the issue and
eliminate realistic thinking, which bodes ill for everyone. I may be too close
to the picture and has lost perspective. The almost daily bombing activity of
the KMT—
which was the China Nationalist Force —
"and the increased miseries caused the Chinese people by those activities against
nonmilitary objectives constantly irritate an open sore. Grant it be un-Anglo-
Saxon to deny an ex-war partner, but evidence would seem adequate that that
partner has for several years served its people so ill that it has been rejected
by its own people. America is now contributing indirectly to the miseries of
those people. Kecognition should be withdrawn —
that is recognition from the China Nationalists —
"and the blockade of the coast broken." I thought that might be useful to the
committee.
Of course, reiterating what I said before, I do not know the motives
of the man who wrote the letter. I do not know whether he wrote it
while he was himself under Communist domination in a Chinese city,
whether he was then mistaken or mistakenly advised, or what.
Mr. Morris. Would that not appear to be from the expressions of
Mr. Rosinger ? At the very end there it says, "Thank you very much,
Mr. Rosinger."
Mr. Stassen. No. He is calling Mr. Rosinger next. The Chair-
man is thanking Mr. Robertson and then he calls on Mr. Rosinger.
That is the way you interpret that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Governor Stassen, are you about to go to a new
point ?
Mr. Stassen. A new individual on the same point.
J 258 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. I do not mean to interrupt your train of thought,
and I had a question I would like to ask about it.
Would it interrupt you if I did so ?
Mr. Stassen. No. . , . -,
Mr. SouRWiNE. On page 53 Mr. Talbot was recognized and said :
I merely wanted to ask a question as to what the relations may be between
this question of recognition of China, the Chinese Communist regime, and the
Japanese Peace Treaty.
And the Chairman said :
I am not quite sure that I understand your point.
Was Mr. Jessup in the chair at that time ? Mr. Talbot said :
I am sorry. I was wondering whether the negotiation of a Japanese peace
treaty would be materially affected by the question of whether or not we recog-
nize, before negotiating that peace treaty, the Communist regime in China.
And the Chairman said :
Could we hold that a minute until I go through my list, and come back to your
question?
And then he recognized Mr. Herod. Could you tell me whether
he did come back to Mr. Talbot's question ?
Mr. Stassen. He did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. When you come to that point will you comment
on this ?
Mr. Stassen. Yes, I will. I might say, as is indicated right here
and will be found in other places, Mr. Talbot was one of those who
expressed the gravest concern about the recognition recommendations.
He was also one of those who made a really brilliant presentation
regarding India and Nehru, which was then counterattacked by
others.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, the State Department has just sent
down a list of questions submitted to the conferees to the conference.
They just arrived this minute.
Mr. Stassen. I might say I have a copy of that list of questions,
too.
On page 57 we come to the comment on this particular session by
Mr. Kosinger, and he starts up on the middle of page 57 :
I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this
table that we should extend recognition. My own personal feeling is that the
recognition should come as early as possible * * *
Then he goes on with his discussion.
On page 59 you will find in the middle of the page, and the sentence
starts in the middle :
I, personally, as I have suggested, would be in favor of recognizing at the
earliest feasible moment.
And then he continues on top of page 60 regarding the Isbrandtsen
ships.
The Chairman. I think, Governor Stassen, that the expression
following what you quoted on page 59 is significant :
I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for
recognition, there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists,
which can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent that we
disentangle ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists, we lay the basis for
recognition.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1259
. Mr. Stassen. That is right.
On page 61 he goes into the matter of the Isbrandtsen ships and
down about eight lines you will find him saying this — remember,
these Isbrandtsen ships were taking supplies, including military sup-
plies, to the Chinese Communists through the blockade or port closure
which the Chinese Nationalists were then enforcing — and Mr. Rosinger
there says :
Had action been taken — again I won't try to define it, I don't know the
technical details — but had action been taken to defend the right of these
American ships to trade through a blockade, which is not a blockade but tech-
nically a i)ort closure, a port closure which we have already asserted we don't
recognize as a blockade, had action been taken to defend the right of these
ships to go through, I think it would have been very difficult for any opponents
of the process of moving toward recognition to say "this shall not be
done," * * *.
Then, on the bottom of that page Dr. Jessup makes a comment.
Right at the bottom he said :
Gentlemen, I hate to suggest any limitation on our discussion because it is
extremely valuable and I think this morning has been very much to the point
and extremely useful, but we do want to cover a number of other topics before
we break up. I would suggest that, if we could proceed under informal, 5-minute
rule and make our remarks as concentrated as possible, we can finish up this
recognition question. I thought when I opened it we'd do it in half an hour —
we have already spent little over an hour on it — but I don't want to cut off the
others who have indicated they want to speak. I would just ask their indulgence
in winding it up quickly.
Senator Ferguson. Up to that point. Governor, was the majority
discussion for recognition, or against recognition ?
Mr. Stassen. Overwhelmingly for recognition and I myself and
most of those who opposed it had not yet been recognized to speak
and that was when the 5-minute rule was put into effect.
Senator Smith. Just preceding the part that you quoted, Governor,
Mr. Rosinger is shown, as I understand his testimony :
Therefore, I'd like to suggest —
that is at the bottom of page 61 —
as a generalization, that the process of disentanglement be carried forward
as rapidly as we can carry it forward, as a basis for preparing public opinion
as a basis for early recognition.
Mr. Stassen. That is right. That is Mr. Rosinger, who I said was
one of the leaders of the Communists.
Senator Smith. Right after that Mr. Jessup spoke. That is what
you quoted.
Mr. Stassen. That is right.
Then on page 65 Mr. Reischauer speaks, at the bottom of the page.
He begins there, and the significant sentence — it is all in line with
this — but on the bottom of the page, that is, page 66, the sixth line up,
he says this :
We seem to be in very general agreement about the desirability of recognizing
the Communist government in China and recognizing it fairly soon.
I trust you will recall that it was denied when I said that there
was a prevailing opinion in this direction in this conference.
Senator Ferguson. On page 65 at the bottom it says that the Com-
niunist govermnent is a de facto government and be prepared to recog-
nize it whether we like it or not.
1260 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Stassen. Yes. I might say further that there was no question
involved here of de factor or de jure recognition. I, of course, have
noticed that some of the press have endeavored to interpret some of
these comments that it might have been de facto. Dr. Jessup himself
clearly indicated at the opening of this discussion that it had to be
de jure, that you could not consider de facto of a Communist regime
because they would not accept a de facto recognition.
Senator Ferguson. This was only speaking, though, about a de
facto government?
Mr. Stassen. That is right, but it was speaking of a de jure recog-
nition of a de facto government.
On page 33, to go back just on this point since you raise it, on the
bottom of the page Dr. Jessup is speaking. Mr. Staley has raised the
question. He said just ahead of that :
I think some of us assumed there might be some difference as alternatives
between de facto and de jure recognition, but from what he said —
that is, referring back to Butterworth —
I gather it comes down to whether we go whole hog or not —
this is before all this discussion takes place —
that is, he indicated that the Chinese Communists would not play ball on any
other basis but the full de jure recognition, so that was really the only alterna-
tive open to us.
Now, this is before all this discussion, so it is clear from this whole
transcript that all this discussion of recognition is on the basis of a
de jure recognition of the Chinese Communists, and the chairman
himself says at that point. Dr. Jessup :
I think in terms of what we know about the Communist position it is true
what we have had frequently in the past is a situation in which by admitting
certain authorities are de facto authorities in the area you can do business with
them and we have operated through consular officers and so de facto basis with
us involves a question of de jure recognition.
Now, there seems to be some words skipped there ; and then he says
this:
It is indicated by the current Chinese Communist position that they are not
ready to shift their attitude. They refuse to acknowledge representatives or
foreign consular authorities on any basis on de facto basis in Shanghai — in that
or any other place — and until the de jure recognition is extended they will con-
tinue their policy of discrimination.
There is further discussion of that, but I think anyone can read
through a number of pages, and it is very clear that this whole dis-
cussion as indicated by Dr. Jessup himself was of de jure recognition.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Governor, you read a moment ago a statement by
Mr. Reischauer. Who was Mr. Reischauer?
Mr. Stassen. He is a professor, the department of far eastern lan-
guages, at Harvard ; on the faculty there.
Going over to page 66, I read to you that "We seem to be in very
general agreement * * *" and so on.
Mr. Morris. And that was from the testimony of Mr.
Mr. Stassen. Reischauer.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1261
Then comes a significant section from him on page 67, the second
paragi^aph :
I'd like to offer one practical suggestion, would it be possible to act in con-
junction with a country like India? I think tliut would make it more palatable
to our own people and more palatable in Asia, * * *
The next thing of significance is on page 70 by Mr. Benjamin Kizer.
Mr. Kizer says in the middle of the page :
I should like to follow Mr. Lattimore with the suggestion to go on trading
before recognition.
This was a matter of continuing the American trade of goods to
Commiuiist China in the period of the weeks before you recognized.
Mr. Morris. Are you now going into a second point?
Mr. Stassen. They are so interlocked; I will come back and tie
them together.
Then he said — here is another part you will find in here. Dr. Hol-
combe of Harvard, had suggested that before we go on and recognize
this government we ought to insist on some reform, some assurance
that the minority parties in China will have a chance, that they will
not all be liquidated — and Mr. Kizer says :
I couldn't go as far as Dr. Holcombe's suggestion that they reform their govern-
ment by recognizing various parties.
He said :
That is a matter of scuttling recognition and introducing conflict where we
should introduce agreement.
In other words, he does not want to introduce a conflict with Chinese
Communists by insisting that they have to have some minority party
representation. He wants to have agreement with the Chinese Com-
munists.
Senator FEROusoisr. They seem to, down at the bottom, also say that
you recognize a country and you lift the iron curtain as far as that
country is concerned.
Mr. Stassen. He made an argTiment of that.-
Senator Ferguson (reading) :
If we long withhold recognition, we shall be contributing to an iron curtain
between ourselves and China ; therefore, I would like to see that recognition come
just as quickly as the facts of life reached by Congress and the American people
permit it.
The American people will rather quickly adapt themselves to it.
As a matter of fact, that has not happened in the country?
Mr. Stassen. It was pointed out by others in the conference that
recognition did not open up iron curtains, that many countries recog-
nized that where the curtain had been at that time it continued to cut
us off from them.
Then on page 71, the second paragraph, still Mr. Kizer speaking,
he says :
One thing further, and here I follow Mr. Robertson.
You remember the letter I read you on that matter of trade —
I think we should make a public disavowal of the blockade Chiang Kai-shek is
conducting with respect to China, and I would like to see that followed up at an
early date with the withdrawal of recognition.
2262 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
That means withdrawal of recognition from Chiang Kai-shek and
the China Nationalists. It was after all of this that I then spoke on
the top of page 73. I refer to it now simply to confirm that I had
directly raised these issues and spoken at that time.
In the third paragraph down of my first direct comment on it, I
said :
On some of the related discussion this morning that has been advanced along
with recognition or steps we ought to take, which I say frankly to me could be
best characterized as steps that would hasten the victory of the Communists in
China and basten the complete liquidation of the Nationalist Government.
There confirmed in the official State Department transcript now
released to the committee are those words of mine spoken across the
•table following all the things we have covered in this transcript this
morning, and you can search this transcript and you will find no one
deny at that time or counter my characterization at that time of the
steps that were taken being advocated.
Then I say :
To me that would be a very sad mistake in our world policy.
This goes to the point that Senator Ferguson made a moment ago.
It is on the top of page 74.
If we recognize the Communist government of China, now clearly that does
mean we must at the same time not only withdraw recognition of the other
government, the Nationalist Government, but we must then join in an affirm-
ative action to throw the Nationalist Government out of the United Nations.
There are no half-way measures on this. You cannot be recognizing a govern-
ment in one way and then in the United Nations tribunal, in which we are a
great and leading Nation, take a different position to that ; nor should we possibly
abstain. That would be a cowardly and weak position to take. So we would
then be in the position of going into the United Nations with our great prestige
and throw out from that United Nations the representatives or whatever you may
wish to call them, the remnants of a former government that still has now, and
I think for some foreseeable time, the effective jurisdiction over one-third of
the area of China, one-third of its people, and that is continuing to put up some
form of resistance of the Communist areas.
Then I continue to put ourselves in that position, which in my mind
cannot be countenanced.
Gentlemen, from an extensive, even though rapid, analysis of this
transcript since it was released I make these comments which I believe
are carefully objective and factual. It will be found throughout
the transcript that a group of men stayed very close together and
that Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Rosinger led their discussion with the
numbers of times spoken, as I indicated, and that these men frequently
supported each other directly with comments. They never differed
with one another in the 3 days on any important point.
These men were about 12 in number. In the most active part of
them, those that made the sharpest statements and spoke the most
repeatedly, are Mr. Lattimore, Mr. Lawrence Rosinger, Mr. Nathaniel
Peffer, Mr. William S. Robertson, Mr. Edmund Reischauer, and Mr.
Benjamin Kizer.
On presenting these facts to you I say again that I do not attempt
to assess motives. I specifically decline to do so. I am bringing these
facts out because not only that they have been challenged in these
deceptive releases by the State Department, but because these same
men in part are now active in writing about India and have been play-
ing a part in Indian affairs.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1263
Senator Smith. Governor, you said about a dozen of those men who
participated in that conference did not vary in their feeling ?
Mr. Stassen. That is correct.
Senator Smith. Do you interpret that as meaning that they had,
prior to this conference, discussed these matters and reached a common
conclusion for a course they should pursue in discussion ?
Mr. Stassen. I do not draw any conclusion. I do not feel it is my
place as a witness to draw conclusions. I am testifying simply as to
fact and endeavoring to do it as objectively as I can in view of my
great feeling in this issue affecting our country.
I might say here again what I said to the Sparkman committee the
other day as to these participants in the pattern of action that has led
to this disaster for our country and for China. I said then there can
be no question but that many of the participants had the best of inten-
tions and good motives. There can be no question that many of the .
participants — this was not the total pattern of action I am tallying
about— but there can be no question that many of the participants
were such, due to ignorance or misunderstanding of the vital facts,
and there can be no question that many of the participants were patri-
otic citizens of this country who made errors of judgment.
There can be no question but that many of the participants were
knowing associates of the Communist design in connection with the
pattern.
Those are the four classifications which I believe are comprehensive
as to the way in which men could play a part in a pattern of action
which has led to a major disaster for our country.
Senator Ferguson, Governor, I noticed in your remarks now you
have indicated that you did not want to draw any inference on the
relation to these men who were before the conference. But when you
came to the question of what the State Department has done recently
do you feel the same way about their conduct in the releases they have
made on your testimony ?
Mr. Stassen. I feel as a witness that I am not to draw conclusions ;
that I can state the simple fact that during the last 10 days it has
now been proved and admitted that a whole series of statements in
State Department releases were false and deceptive when they were
made.
Senator, we have now sort of brought into focus this crucial point of
recognition and one of the central points in my testimony, and I had
some of the leading development in the prevailing group in my testi-
mony.
With your permission I would like to go through and tie together
the other points of the 10 which I said came up to the surface during
this discussion. From a standpoint of this analysis, as you are aware,
I took up the matter of recognition first because it seemed to fit the
best in the analysis of the transcript.
My first presentation of the 10 points I gave is as to the fourth
point. Then as the fifth point I said at that time that the United
States, this group had urged, should encourage the recognition of
the Communist People's Republic government by Britain and India
and follow with its own recognition soon thereafter.
22848— 52— pt. 5-
1264 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. Governor, before you go into that, I would like to
ask a question following your last statement.
During the course of your statements you have stated that at one
time at a recess you said to the chairman, Dr. Jessup, and I am express-
ing it liberally and not quoting, that you hoped that this movement
of recognition would not prevail.
And he said to you in return that the greater logic was in favor of
those who favored recognition. That is the substance of what you
said. Did you at any time during the course of that hearing hear Dr.
Jessup make any further statement along that same line?
Mr. Stassen. No, Senator. That discussion took place following
this comment that we have gone into here this morning. In other
words, everything that I have thus far given you and more came into
this morning's session — I can give you the point of the break for
luncheon. This was the third day.
You recall on page 61 Dr. Jessup said, after there had been much of
this prorecognition talk —
I hate to suggest any limitation on yonr discussion because it is extremely
valuable, and I think this morning has been very much to the point and ex-
tremely useful, but we do want to cover a number of other subjects before we
break up.
Then that was approaching noon. I am looking for the point in
the record. I do not see it immediately..
But after that presentation we have been covering, as I testified on
October 1, and my feeling is reflected in what I had said, and my feel-
ing is my alarm was raised by this statement we just read that Dr.
Jessup had made at the conference. I stepped up and said I hoped
they would not follow the line developed by the Lattimore group.
That is when he said to me he felt the greater logic was in that
group. Then I pleaded with him not to proceed with that without
first going out to see General Mac Arthur. That was when I made that
plea then, at noon hour on this day of C>ctober 8.
Senator FERCusoisr. Did you ever cor.tend that was on the record ?
Mr. Stassen. No. I made it clear here it was in recess when I
stepped up to him.
Senator Ferguson. I find a headline in the newspaper — I don't
find the part of the text of the article — but it is in the fourth headline :
"Round-table transcript fails to suj)port Stassen's charge of softness
by Jessup."
Had you ever contended outside of the statement here in regard to
your discussion with Jessup that more logic was with the opposing
force ?
Mr. Stassen. No. I developed these facts in the first hearing ; that
that conversation took place at recess and that the supplementary im-
plementation of what was recommended by the opposing group was a
further fact indicating they did move to implement the opposing
group.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever contended that the transcript
did show the Jessup was soft ?
Mr. Stassen. Quite the contrary ; I made it clear this was a recess
discussion.
Senator Ferguson. That it never was on the transcript?
Mr. Stassen. That is right.
Senator Smith. Had you better not point that out ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1265
The Chairman. That is the page of his own testimony.
Senator Smith. That would indicate he was talking at a recess, not
on the record.
Senator Feeguson. I assume this headline was not written by the
man who wrote the article because it is not in the article.
M,r. Stassen. That is a continuing problem with reporters and the
press and everybody else.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This whole document is the morning session on Sat-
urday, the 8th, is it not ?
Mr. Stassen. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The adjournment was at the end of this particular
document ?
Mr. Stassen. Yes; I see that now.
The Chairman. I had one other question I wanted to ask the Gov-
ernor following the former question.
Did you ever hear Dr. Jessup during the course of those hearings,
or during the course of those meetings, recede from the position that
he had evinced to you when he said that the greater logic was in favor
of the other side ?
Mr. Stassen. No. In fact, he never expressed any opinion different
than that he said that the greater logic was on that side. As I say, I
followed closely in the succeeding months what was happening and
concluded then that they were moving to implement that other group
policy that has been advanced.
I think we can demonstrate that more this morning. This finally
led me by April of the next year to ask Senator Connally whether I
could not come to the executive session of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on this matter. My feeling is they were moving to implement
the opposing group, and it is not a feeling I now have alone. It is a
feeling that I had as the events moved, and I demonstrated I had it by
pleading with Senator Connally to hear me on it.
Mr. Sourwine. Governor, if the statement Mr. Jessup made to you
in response to your statement to him about who had the logic occurred
at the end of the morning session on Saturday, the 8th, it then occurred
after the conclusion of this entire conference ?
The Chairman. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Was not the morning session of Saturday the last
session of the conference ?
Mr. Stassen. I believe it ran over a bit. I don't think we came back.
I am not quite sure on that.
Mr. Sourwine. The transcript shows the adjournment was at 12 : 55
and concludes by words from Dr. Jessup which appear to be a sort of a
bon voyage to the conferees.
Mr. Stassen. Yes ; you are right, adjourned at 12 : 55. We ran over
about an hour in order to conclude. That concluded it at 12 : 55.
Mr. Sourwine. So what he said was at the conclusion of the entire
conference ?
Mr. Stassen. That is right. ^
Senator Ferguson. Did you cite your previous testimony showing
that you did not contend that the conversation with Jessup about the
logic of the argument was on the record, but you specifically stated it
was off the record ?
The Chairman. No ; he did not. He was looking for the place.
Mr. Morris. It is on page 17.
1266 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Stassen. Of your mimeographed copy.
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Mr. Stassen. I know it was touched on a number of times. On
page 17 of the mimeographed transcript Mr. Morris says :
It was subsequent to all of this that you say that Ambassador Jessup said he
thought greater logic was on the side of Lattimore and Rosinger?
Mr. Stassen. I think you have sensed some of my feelings.
I stepped up to Dr. Jessup and the conversation I earlier described
took place.
The Chairman. That was on your first day here before this com-
mittee ?
Mr. Stassen. Yes, on Monday, October 1.
Senator Ferguson. So you never did contend it took place on the
record ?
Mr. Stassen. I always made it clear it was a recess discussion.
Senator Smith. Did Dr. Jessup ever deny such a conversation took
place?
Mr. Stassen. He testified to the Sparkman committee — you had
better get that exact testimony. I believe he said he had no recollec-
tion of such a conversation. I believe he also said that it could not
have taken place because he was always against recognition of Com-
munist China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not present at the Sparkman committee
hearings ?
Mr. Stassen. Not when he was there. I was there later. I em-
phasize : You ought to get the exact testimony.
The second point that I would like to take up is what I call point
No. 5 because it ties in logically that this group developed that the
United States should encourage the recognition of the Communist
People's Republic Government by Britain and Indian and follow
with its own recognition soon thereafter.
On October 6, 1949, the a. m. transcript on page 29, the second page
numbered 29, the third paragraph, you have Mr. Kizer, whom you will
recall is one of those I have stated was one of this leading prevailing
group. As I say, this is October 6. It is the opening transcript. Mr.
Kizer speaks, in the third paragraph :
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask Mr. Butterworth a question. I'm wondering
if there would not be an advantage to the United States and to relationships
if we were to say to the British at the appropriate moment we are not ready
to recognize the Communist Government, but since your interests are larger than
ours, there may be some advantage in your recognizing it because of your in-
terests there. Then we will take out time with it ourselves.
Then on the discussion we had just been in you will recall the mov-
ing with India by Dr. Reischauer on page 65 of the other transcript,
that is, the transcript of October 8, a. m. session.
Mr, Morris. Are you going to come back to the blockade part of it
later?
Mr. Stassen. Yes.
Rdschauer starts on the bottom of the page, and you go over to
page 67.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1267
Senator Smith. That is October 6 ?
Mr. Stassen. That is October 8, 1949. At the end of Reischauer's
testimony, page 67 :
I'd like to offer one practical suggestion. Would it be possible to act in
conjunction with a country like India? I think that would make it more palat-
able to our own people and more palatable in Asia.
You will find a couple of other minor references to moving with
Britain and India. Those are the most direct. You will find that
Mr. Decker, who was there through the 3 days, commented, page G-3,
124, in other words, near the end of the transcript of October 8. He
refers back to Dr. Reischauer's recommendation that in the recog-
nition of the Chinese Government very great care should be taken to
at least consult with India beforehand.
Then he said :
I am very certain —
on the bottom of that page —
that is in the minds of the officers of the State Department, that every effort
will be made to keep the great English-speaking peoples in step, which is, I
think, a very important objective to be sought.
Senator Ferguson. Have you ever seen a news item in relation to
Italy's recognition that it was claimed that we had no objection to
Italy recognizing Communist China ?
Mr. Stassen. I have not seen that, but we have found out interesting
evidence. In the discussions of the House of Commons on April 6,
1950, page 1385 of the British reports of the discussions, and remember,
that it was January 5, 1950, the British had recognized Red China and
Parliament was not in session. It came in session some time not long
before April 5, 1950. I think it was in March.
At that time Mr. Thomas Reicl, who is a member of the Labor Party
and somewhat of a specialist on far-eastern affairs — he had long serv-
ice in the Indian and eastern civil service, and he said, on page 1385 :
As I understand it, the American Government was consulted from start to
finish, and I think I am right in saying that the American Government raised
no opposition at all to the recognition of the Communist Government by Britain.
We have followed through those debates on that day, and we find no
dissent from any of the Ministers or anybody to that comment on the
floor of the House of Commons by one of the well-informed Labor
M. P.'s in the Far Eastern Section.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to put in the record at tiiis place
the New York Times article of Saturday, November 11, 1950. I do
not necessarily want to put the headlines in, but I would like to put
the article in. It is from Rome. However, I will read the headlines,
"Sforza Hints Soviet Offered Italy-China U. N. Entry Deal."
I ask that the entire article be made part of the record.
The Chairman. Do you want the whole article ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, and take the headlines, too. I said not
necessarily, but take them.
The Chairman. It will go in.
1268 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The article referred to is as follows :)
Sforza Hints Soviet Offered Italy-China U. N. Entry Deal
Rome, November 10. — Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza told the Chamber
of Deputies today that the Italian Government had been considering recogni-
tion of Mao Tse-tung's regime, but that after the intervention of Communist Chi-
nese troops in Korea it had postponed a final decision.
The Italian attitude on that question. Count Sforza indicated, also had been
influenced strongly by some alluring suggestions he said had been made to him
by "very responsible quarters" during his trip to the United States last September.
These suggestions, he continued, were that the Soviet Union would not veto Italy's
admission to the United Nations if the United States and other member States
would not veto the admission of Communist China.
Count Sforza abstained from saying who was the author of the suggestion, but
he made it clear that the Italian Government had not yet abandoned the hope of
overcoming the Soviet opposition. Italy, he said, felt that the Peiping regime
was "undoubtedly the government representing the overwhelming majority of
the Chinese people." There were two other reasons, he continued, that had deter-
mined the Italian attitude: commercial interests and plight of Roman Catliolie
missions in China.
Commercially, Italy had an appreciable volume of trade with China that she
would like to reestablish. Count Sforza said. He did not explain why diplomatic-
relations with Communist China would affect the religious missions, but it was
assumed that he was concerned with the fate of many Italian-born n. embers
of the Catholic clergy who are now without protection of any kind because of
the lack of Italian repi'esentation in China.
A motion by the extreme left wing designed to reopen the whole question of
Italy's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty caused today's foreign policy
debate. 'The motion was defeated, 268 to 132.
The Foreign Minister denied Communist contentions that the Italian Govern-
ment has assumed new political and military commitments during Atlantic
Pact meetings held recently in Washington. Both he and Randolfo Pacciardi,
Minister of Defense, merely acted in accordance with the spirit and letter of the
Atlantic Treaty, he said.
Italy, be continued, was one of the countries most exposed in case of aggres-
sion and she therefore was deeply interested in promoting European defense.
Count Sforza asserted the Communist idea was that in case Italy or any other
Atlantic nation were attacked the Italian Parliament should decide whether ag-
gression really existed. This would- enable the Communist parliamentary mi-
nority to use obstructionist tactics and permit the aggressor to take advantage of
Italian military inactivity, he added.
"If there is aggression, it is clear that the first task and the supreme duty of
the Government is that of defense, both individual and collective, in accordance
with the treat.y," he said. "Parliament, of course, will discuss the situation and
the political decisions that must be made, as envisaged by the Italian Constitution,
which gives it that supreme right. But this cannot retard — as the Communists
desire — the deployment of military forces, which alone would enable us not to be
defeated immediately at the opening of hostilities."
Mr. Morris. The point here is this paragraph which reads :
The Italian attitude on that question, Count Sforza indicated, also had been
influenced strongly by some alluring suggestions he said had been made to him by
"very responsible quarters" during his trip to the United States last September.
These suggestions, he continued, were that the Soviet Union would not veto
Italy's admission to the United Nations if the United States and other member
states would not veto the admission of Communist China.
That is the pertinent paragraph.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Stassen. I further stated as one of the 10 points, in fact No.
10 of the points, that no aid should be sent to the non-Communist
Chinese guerrillas as were in the south of China, nor to the Chiang
Kai-shek forces and the military supplies en route to them should be
cut off. That was another one of those 10 points urged by this pre-
vailing group.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1269
Mr. Chairman, you have already picked up this comment of Mr.
Rosinger on page 60 of the October 8 transcript. At the bottom of
page 59 :
I think, though, that in terms of preparing American public opinion for recog-
nition there is a process of disentanglement from the Chinese Nationalists which
can be carried out in the weeks ahead, and I think to the extent we disentangle
ourselves from the Chinese Nationalists we lay the basis for recognition.
As a matter of fact, if we were to recognize today, assuming that were possible,
we would be in a highly contradictory situation of recognizing at the time that
we were delivering through EGA supplies to Formosa —
and so on.
We have not yet cleared ourselves from the entanglement, from the National-
ists. I'd like to suggest, although I am not informed on the technical questions
and the problems of carrying out some of these actions, that we end our ECA
assistance as soon as possible to the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists.
That is Lawrence Rosinger on the top of page 60 of this transcript.
I say here again : You can search this prevailing group through this
conference, and you will find no dissent from this that is advanced by
Mr. Rosinger,
Mr. Morris. Governor, do you recall that Paul Hoffman, who was
the head of ECA, had made a similar recommendation publicly ?
Mr. Stassen. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know he made a speech in which he ad-
vocated the furnishing of aid to Communist China ? I would like to
get the date and put it in the record.
Mr. Stassen. I do not know of that. I do not know that I want to
associate myself with that comment because I don't recall it. I think
there was a conference.
Senator Ferguson. I will put the date in later, Mr. Chairman.
(The information referred to is as follows:)
December 13, 1948.
Mr. Stassen. Are you sure that was not part of the earlier situation ?
Senator Ferguson. In 1948.
Mr. Stassen. There were some major conferences at different times
about aid to China. I don't recall it in this period. I was watching
things very closely in this period.
Senator Ferguson. I think it was December 1948.
Mr. Stassen. I want to be sure not to associate myself with that
characterization.
Senator Ferguson. I just take it as part of the policy that was being
advocated.
Mr. Stassen. I am not sure it was in the period subsequent to
October 1949's conference.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to get that information and put it
in, as I said before.
The Chairman. Very well.
Governor Stassen, do you know of your own knowledge or from any
information given to you that is authentic as to how Dr. Jessup came
to be chairman of this meeting that took place ?
Mr. Stassen. It was publicly announced that on July 27, 1949, Dr.
Jessup would be in charge of a review of our policy in China and the
Far East, and the announcement was by Dean Acheson. Then a few
days later it was announced that Dr. Fosdick and Dr. Case would
assist him as a committee of three in the review.
1270 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The Chairman. But as to his presiding over the meeting:, did you
know anything further as to how it was brought about? In other
words, was there any action ?
Mr. Stassen. There was testimony from Jessup in the Sparkman
hearings on it. I would prefer you get that testimony of his as to
how the conference was developed and how he chairmaned it.
Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the fact there had been
another conference on this question where members of labor were called
in and consulted ?
Mr. Stassen, I had no information on that until I was informed
here at the committee hearing the other day there had been another
conference with labor. I had never heard of it.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask counsel if we have received
the statements taken at that conference ?
Mr. Morris. We have asked the State Department to make that
transcript available, but as yet we have not had a reply. That letter,
T believe, went out someday last week.
The Chairman. Senator Smith, the chairman must go on the floor.
Would you kindly take the Chair ?
Mr. Stassen. You will recall as the first two points that I said
that the prevailing group had developed in the recommendations was
that Asia should be approached as a long-term problem to be studied
and deferred ; that the Russian Communist attention was concentrated
first on Western Europe with its industrial strength ; that the United
States should likewise give priority to Europe and, second, that an
aid to Asia program should not be started by the United States until
after long and careful study because of the complexity of Asia and the
dangers of a Communist charge of United States imperialism.
Then further, to evaluate that part of the transcript, the transcri])t
does show, as I stated, that I had urged a prompt aid to Asi^i program
with the headquarters in Bangkok and a parallel to the Marshall plan
to fill the vacuum that existed in south Asia and had expressed the
view that the Communists would be pushing in if any such vacuum
were left.
Mr. Nathaniel Peffer on October 7, 19^49, in the a. m. session directly
begins to counter my proposal. Mr. Lattimore had also begun to
counter it the day before. Mr. Peffer steps in on October 7, 1949,
in the a. m. session, page E-9, the third paragraph. I might say the
discussion sort of varied between the matter of an association together
and an economic group like the Marshall plan, the forming of some
kind of an alliance, but there was considerable discussion of some
positive action linking together in some way the non-Communist na-
tions of south Asia and strengthening them against the Communist
threat.
Here is what Mr. Peffer said :
Would there be any chance of such an alliance?
He goes on to discuss it. He says, at the bottom of the page :
You ask yourself : "Would there be any such a pact without our encourage-
ment and support?"
He means American encouragement and support.
If there would not be, I should say that would fairly well deline it as un-
natural and not very likely to survive, in which case we are associated with
something that is going down. J think we ought to give up. If it goes on its
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1271
own momentum, if it grows out of its Asian Congress, well and good ; but other-
wise, no. We ought to keep out until it is started under its own genius and
power.
I recall the whole beginning of the Marshall plan because of Secre-
tary Marshall's address at Harvard that gave the impetus and the
push to that development there. Here is the opposing statement that
we should stay out unless it develops, et cetera.
Following that through on page E-11 immediately after that Dr.
Coons says this :
May I conclude that this discussion with reference to regional association is
almost entirely at the political level and that we really haven't discussed the
question of the economic side that there is conceivably much to be said on the
aspect of a regional economic approach, somewhat after the manner of what we
were talking yesterday in reply to Mr. Stassen's discussion.
Chairman Jessup said :
We might come back to that after lunch.
Then after lunch Mr. S. C. Brown is brought in as an official of the
State Department to breif the conference on this matter of the re-
gional-economic-aid approach. You will find that on the p. m. session
of October 7, page A-3. Here, of course, I am very greatly concerned
because here we are moving right over into the Indian situation, which
is the matter that gives me the greater concern at this time,
Mr. Morris. Excuse me, Governor. You did not testify concerning
this particular phase.
Mr. Stassen. Yes, I did. I said that the prevailing group recom-
mended 10 points.
Mr. Morris. But this afternoon session of the 7th, were you present
at that time ?
Mr. Stassen. No; but in the subsequent discussions, and of course
in the briefing that I received as I would come back from being out
of the room, there were men. Dr. Talbot particularly, so then I kept
a sequence of the development of the whole discussion, even though I
had to move out and in a bit.
On page A-3 as Mr. Brown begins his briefing, down at the bottom
he says :
Now, the other thing which has appeared to us in our consideration of the
matter is this —
this is now talking about south Asia regional economic action —
That, as Mr. DuBois said this morning, the economies of those areas are not
interdependent in the same way that economies of Europe are, for instance, and
you would not in all probability get in those areas through the expenditure of
aid funds on a large scale the accumulative and multiplying effect that you get
by expenditure of similar funds in Europe?
Then I continue on page A-5. He gives a considerable discussion
of reasons and down on line 9 he says :
Now for these reasons, among others, we have been inclined, I think, to go slow
in that concept of an over-all program of the Marshall type in that part of the
world. The reasons may not be conclusive. I don't know. But I just wanted
to indicate that we have given that type of thing some consideration.
There was the "go slow," and you will find it in the expressions of
'Tt is very complex, and it is very confused," that you must go slow,
and the total transcript read will confirm that the prevailing opinion
was to go slow on aid and the organization of a regional program in the
south of Asia against communism.
1272 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
«
Of course, as I countered that, I directly pointed out while we
were going slow the Communists were going fast, and that was the
thing that bothered me so much at that time.
My recollection of the point that the Russian Communists were not
as aggressive as Hitler and would not be apt to take direct military
action to expand their empire had its origin in Mr. Kennan's briefing
on the first morning, page 19. He says :
I think there is a distinction between these Russian leaders and people like
Hitler and the Japanese leaders of the twenties and thirties.
On page B-17 he said :
* * * never in Russian history have the Russians ever, that I can remember,
been enthused about any deliberate aggressive action of their own outside of
Russia.
Then he discusses the different ideologies and the policies in relation
thereto.
Then jou will find in my response to Mr. Kennan at that time I
said that I felt that they were just as aggressive as Hitler and would
prove to be so.
On the Indian point, page 8, that Prime Minister Nehru had shown
reactionary and arbitrary tendencies and should not be leaned on or
assisted as a leader of non-Communist forces in Asia, we find in
October 8, 1949, the a. m. session — I would first like to point out that
Mr. Talbot, beginning on page 110 makes a brilliant presentation, I
feel, of the India situation and of the policy we ought to have toward
India ; that his presentation goes on. through a number of pages.
Then as he concludes, Mr. Murphy, on page 122, says this :
As a minor note of warning with respect to Mr. Nehru's visit here next week
I would like to say that, in my opinion, and it is an obvious remark, the Indian
people are not strong and practical people in our definition as we define it here
and that despite Mr. Talbot's glowing presentation of the opportunities and the
resources and the potentialities in India, nevertheless * * *.
And he goes into an international-bank question, and so on.
On page 123 he said, down at the bottom, that —
* * * Yet with respect to the three problems that they now have at issue
with Pakistan, of Kashmir, of the refugee properties and the water rights in
west Punjab, in each of those three preponderantly it seems to me the Indians
are acting in an arbitrary manner, reactionary and arbitrary manner.
Then I say I want to associate myself with Dr. Talbot, and so on.
Then on the top of the page 122 you will find that after that discussion
by Dr. Talbot of the importance of moving affirmatively on India and
of developing a favorable Indian reaction, Mr. Lattimore says:
In Mongolian in the expression of gi'atitude a grateful man is practically
indistinguishable from the expression "a pack animal loaded with a burden."
Mr. MoRKis. Wliat is the point of that ?
Mr. Stassen. It is a very negative kind of comment regarding Dr.
Talbot's very able presentation. That is the only response that came
at that time to that plea for moving forward in India. Then Mr.
Murpliy follows up with this note of warning and this comment
about reactionary and arbitrary.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1273
On Formosa you will find Mr. Fairbank on October 6, 1949, in the
p. m. session, page B-11, saying :
To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response in
China. * * *
* * * * * * *
I wouldn't hold Formosa —
And so on. You will find none of this prevailing group at any time
urging that we hold Formosa. The whole implication is to the con-
trary.
Then that it should be United States policy to permit the Chinese
Communists to take Hong Kong if they inisted. You will find one of
the questions put up to us specifically "was: What should be the atti-
tude of the United States toward the status of Hong Kong ? You will
find I made a strong plea that we must back up the British in their
decision. It is in the October 6 transcript.
You will find Mr. Butterworth says that the British had not asked
us to help them in Hong Kong. October 6, 1949, the a. m. session, page
C-3:
The British "have not sought any particular assistance through us" for the
defense of Hong Kong.
Mr. Morris. Was that in response to the point you made?
Mr. Stassen. It was in response to the question raised in the ad-
vance questions that were put out and in response to the general dis-
cussion of how firm an attitude should the United States be taking in
Asia at that time.
Mr. Morris. You had advocated a strong position ?
Mr. Stassen, That is right. My advocation of a strong position
came later.
Another reason I had advocated the strong position was the story
2 days before in the New York Times by Mr. James Reston, who, as
I said the other day, I always found was a very accurate reporter in
foreign policy. The story on that day said :
There is no reason to believe that the United States will participate in any
show of force in the protection of Hong Kong, the British possession ofC the
coast of China, but respect for the sovereignty of this base certainly will be
I'egarded as one of the tests employed by the United States to determine whether
the Chinese Communists are prepared to respect the undertakings of China under
the Charter of the United Nations.
You will find in the general discussions in the committee the whole
atmosphere of the United States not taking a firm stand aaginst the
Communist advance in China. Hong Kong was one of the specific
points in regard to that.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, I have made reference to all of these 10
points. Tliere are many corroborating references in here. I might,
for example, point to the October 7 p. m. session, page D-19, the
middle of the page, where Dr. Fairbank says :
For the record, also, the line of anticommunism in Asia is not a very good line.
It is a subjective projection of our own view. The main question, it is much
better to be anti-Kussian and a few other things to be anti. That is just an
example of what Mr. Taylor was talking about.
1274 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
On page B-12 Mr. McNaughton says this :
We will never get this world going unless we start trade, and I would start
trade with Communists in China until I found out they were impossible to do
business with.
Mr. Murphy says :
I feel that if we don't trade with the Communists in China it is pretty obvious
that since they have a very crying need for goods it simply amounts to forcing
them to trade with Russia on Russia's terms.
I think, Senator, in my first necessarily concentrated work on this
transcript that fairly completes my presentation this morning in re-
sponse to your inquiry. I respectfully submit that as to all of these
comments I have today testified to from the transcript of these other
gentlemen, when I first appeared here I was testifying from a recol-
lection of a conference 2 years old.
I believe that I have now demonstrated by recitation to the official
transcript now at this late date released that every factor in my recol-
lection can be substantiated from the direct references to recorded
statements made at the time, even getting into such details as this mat-
ter of encouraging Britain and India to lead off and matters of
stopping the supplies to the Chinese Nationalists in that remaining
period, and factors of that kind.
As I say, I respectfully submit that if careful students of an im-
partial nature are set to work to read through this entire transcript
that they will not find that this key group in the discussion ever dif-
fered with each other on any important point, and they will find that
they, in various ways, gave support to one another, and that the total
policy there recommended added up on each of the 10 points that I
had originally presented from recollection that I now have confirmed
by referring to the transcript.
Senator Smith. In other words, Governor, your statement there
means so far as j^^ou have been able to ascertain, from examining the
transcript in the short space of time you had there are no discrepancies
in substance between what you testified to at your first appearance
before this committee and what the transcript now bears out?
Mr. Stassen. None whatsoever, not only no discrepancies but a
great amount of corroboration.
Senator Smith. May I ask one question which may or not be con-
nected with this conference?
Was it shortly thereafter someone in the State Department made a
speech about the defense perimeter of America not including Formosa
or certain portions of China, Hong Kong, and Korea ?
Mr. Stassen. That is right. Secretary Acheson made that speech.
Senator Ferguson. It was January 20, was it not?
Mr. Stassen. January 12, I believe, 1950, right after the British
recognition. I went into that sequence of supplementary events con-
siderably in my first testimony, but it does have a relevancy now that
we have reestablished from the transcript what this conference's
recommendations were.
For example, on the matter of the protests on the Isbrandtsen Line
ships and not recognizing the Chinese Nationalists' blockade, you will
find that Secretary Acheson did those very things in the following
months. On November 16, 1949— in other words, 6 weeks after this
conference Mr. Acheson protested the Nationalists' firing on the Fly-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1275
ing Cloud running the blockade, which is directly what Mr. Kizer
suggested during the conference.
Again on December 5, 1949, Mr. Acheson said that the United States
did not recognize the legality of the Nationalist blockade and pro-
tested the shelling of the United States ship of the Isbrandtsen
Line.
On December 23, 1949, that very controversial statement to the Voice
of America and the information service about the anticipated fall of
Formosa was given. On January 5, 1950, the President and Mr.
Acheson announced :
The United States had no intention of providing military aid or advice to the
Nationalists on Formosa or of using its Armed Forces to interfere there.
That was then characterized as the abandonment of Formosa, which
was in line with what Dr. Fairbank and others said at this con-
ference.
On January 12, I believe, a speech at the Press Club here in Wash-
ington was made that the line was drawn that left Formosa on the
other side of the line.
Senator Smith. Those five as I counted them — those five instances
seemed to carry out the principles that had been discussed and agreed
to by this group at this conference that you have been testifying
about ?
Mr. Stassen. There were more. There was then the basic fact
that the aid-to-Asia program did not move. That disturbed me more
than anything in that period. There was nothing really forthcoming.
Then Mr. Jessup made his trip leaving the west coast, I think, about
December 21, 1949, getting into Tokyo about January 5, 1950, going
on through Asia and around the world with a conference in Bangkok
and getting back in March.
In the latter part of March 1950 they had the conference at the
State Department of organization leaders, which I testified the other
day I then went and attended in my relationship to the Council of
Religious Education, because I was so concerned to know what was
going to be the policy.
When that conference ended with no definitive recognition of really
moving forward in an Asia program, that is when I wrote to Senator
Connally and subsequently to Senator Vandenberg that I was so
deeply concerned we were moving in the wrong direction in Asia,
that there was a vacuum that the Communists would move in.
Senator Smith. After this conference what if anything did Dr.
Jessup say or do relating back to this conference if you recall?
Mr. Stassen. Well, his report to the State Department conference
in March of organized leaders, to .the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and then publicly was in substantial accord so far as the
Asiatic situation was concerned with this conference on the economic
subjects. That is, with this prevailing group in the conference.
As I recall, at that time Mr. Reston characterized that speech as be-
ing that very little could be done for India and Pakistan and that
whole atmosphere came from Mr. Jessup's report when he returned.
It was right in the subsequent period that the matters came up in the
United Nations as to the resolutions of the Chinese Nationalists over
this issue of recognition.
1276 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Dr. Jessiip was on the floor of the United Nations speaking on those
issues November 28, 1949. In other words, I do feel that it is a fact
that up to the outbreak of the Korean war Dr. Jessup said or did
nothing that was inconsistent with the 10 points made by the prevail-
ing group that I know of publicly.
Of course, I mean studying the public reflections of this situation.
Mr. Morris. Governor, I don't know whether you read in the papers
or not, but we have issued a subpena for the Vandenberg diaries from
January 1, 1947, to July 1950. We have not as yet issued a subpena
for the Forrestal diaries. We are deciding who the addresses in that
case will be. I do want to let you know we have subpenaed the
Vandenberg diaries. You originally made the recommendation.
Mr. Stassen. I made the recommendation that you ask for the day
of February 5, 1949. If you would permit me to do so, I would not
want to think you would want to call that entire diary out of the
hands of Mr. Arthur Vandenberg, Jr., who is working over it for
publication. I don't think it would be reasonable you should pull the
whole diary out of his hands. I think it should be for specific days,
February 5, 1949. Then when it was published in the Herald Tribune
I suggest you send for a photostatic copy of that page. I would think
that would be a better procedure.
Mr. Morris. The whole thing is within the scope of the committee,
and any individual item can then be brought into the record. In this
case if it is the one particular conference we can use that.
Senator Smith. He was talking about the inconvenience to Mr.
Vandenberg.
Mr. Stassen. Yes ; plus the matter of reasonableness of asking for
the diary for a whole period. The same thing is true for the For-
restal diary. I think those dates around November 1948 and things
like that we know from the published diary are significant, and it
would be important to have someone look at the original Forrestal
diary in this period.
I notice in Mr. Acheson's most recent press statement where he now
admits the correctness of the question I posed to him on October 2 when
their Department had first denied he knew anything about such a
conference. In the most recent press release he says Mr. Forrestal, on
February 2, 1949, had brought the matter to the National Security
Council. Mr. Forrestal was notified that his resignation was going to
be accepted. He got the notice on January 28 of 1949. So I would
think that period and in view of all the other revelations of mistaken
press releases from the State Department, Mr. Forrestal's diary ought
to be collected very carefully.
Mr. Morris. If we have these legally within the jurisdiction of the
committee, then we may take any one particular item we wish. That
is why we have it over a long period.
Mr. Stassen. The committee decisions are your decisions, but I
want to make it clear my suggestion was that you ask for Senator
Vandenberg's diary of February 5, 1949, which corroborates the
essential basic policy facts of my original recollection of what Sena-
tor Vandenberg told me, but which did not indicate who was present.
Senator Smith. Do you have any opinion as to whether or not the
speech of Secretary Acheson of January 5, 1950, in which he outlined
the defense perimeter, did not extend to Formosa and Korea, and
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1277
maybe he mentioned Hong Kong or some other island— do you think
that had any effect on the Communists moving into Korea?
Mr. Stassen. Senator, as a witness I would prefer not to endeavor
to give conclusions but more to confine myself to facts. There are
other occasions when I think I can properly draw inferences and
discuss conclusions, but I don't think this is one of them.
Senator Smith. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. I have no questions.
Mr. SouRwiNE. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stassen. I might say on the other question that arose out of
your subpena of me obliquely the matter of February 5, 1949, confer-
ences, and then the entire question of Mr. Jessup, that we are pursuing
our investigation of those points. The may lead to further testimony
before the Sparkman committee next week.
Senator Ferguson. May it be understood if the Governor finds in
a resurvey of these documents, since he just had overnight to look
into them, that he wants to put something else into the record that
he may do so ?
Mr. Stassen. I would put it the other way. If you hear from any
other witnesses that cause this committee to have any doubt of the
accuracy and fairness of what I have testified to, then I would respond
to your summons to return to you. These are very grave matters of
policy. I opened them in the first instance on your subpena because
of my grave concern for our country's future. I will continue to
function as close to that as I possibly can in the buffeting situation
that naturally arises in the country at this period.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Professor Colegrove did not receive
a copy of the transcript until between 10 and 10 : 30" this morning.
He is now here. When is it your wish to hear him ?
Senator Smith. We will recess until 2 : 30 and hear him then.
(Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p. m. Friday, October 12, 1951, the hearing
was recessed until 2 : 30 p. m. of the same day.)
afternoon session
Senator Smith (presiding) . The hearing will come to order. Pro-
ceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. I think we might have the witness sworn, although he
had been sworn before.
Senator Smith. You solemnly swear the testimony you are about to
give in this hearing of the Judiciary Committee of the United States
Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God ?
Mr. Colegrove. I do. .
TESTIMONY OF KENNETH C. COLEGROVE, NORTHWESTERN
UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, ILL.
Mr. Morris. I would like the record to show that Professor Cole-
grove was called last night and asked to come down here and testify in
connection with the transcript released by the State Department
yesterday.
1278 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Professor Colegrove traveled all night and did not see the transcript
until 10 o'clock this morning.
I would like the record to show that at the outset.
Professor, did you testify before this committee on the 25th of
September 1951?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Did you testify on that occasion. Professor, that there
was a group present at the 3-day round table conference at the State
Department that was "sympathetic to Red Cliina," that this group
dominated the conference?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes, Mr. Morris. That is in the record. I so
testified.
By using that term, I did not say any of these gentlemen were Com-
munists. I said their advice was pro-Communist.
Mr. Morris. I used your words there. Professor Colegrove.
You said on page 1719 :
I felt that the group that was sympathetic to Red China dominated the con-
ference.
Mr. Colegrove. That is the fact.
Mr. Morris. Professor, have you had an opportunity to examine
the transcript and are you in a position to state now whether or not
the transcript does, in effect, show that was the case?
Mr. Colegrove. Mr. Chairman, I have examined the transcript as
rapidly as I could since 10 o'clock this morning, at the same time
listening to Governor Stassen as he testified. It appears to me that my
testimony is consistent with the transcript.
I might also add that the brilliant testimony of Governor Stassen
this morning was also consistent with the transcript.
Mr. Morris. Professor Colegrove, you testified that in that group
that did dominate the conference. Prof. Owen Lattimore was the leader
of that group ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Have you checked on that fact ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes; I have checked on that fact, Mr. Counsel.
My first impression is also my second impression : that Owen Latti-
more was the leader of the group well admitted by Mr. Kosinger.
Mr. Morris. Is there anything you can point out to us at this time
to support that testimony where Governor Stassen this morning noted
that Lattimore had spoken 19 times at the conference? Have you
made any such check ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes ; I checked, too. I thought that Governor
Stassen 's checking was correct. I believe that Governor Stassen indi-
cated that the group which gave pro-Communist advice includes Latti-
more, Eosinger, Professor Peffer, William* S. Robertson, Professor
Reischauer, and Benjamin Kizer.
Mr. Morris. Professor, would it not be better if we took the group
you mentioned in your testimony, and I will ask you questions and
find out whether or not the testimony actually supports your testimony
on that occasion. May I do it that way ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes,
Mr. Morris. The purpose is to determine — your testimony concides
with the transcript. May I follow your open testimony ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1279
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes.
Mr. ]MoRRis. I have here page 1716 of your open testimony. Senator
Eastland says :
Who was that group?
That is, the group sympathetic to Communist China.
Mr. CoLEGRovE. I would say the leader of that group, if you considered he was
a leader, was Professor Lattimore.
May we address ourselves to that? I will go into the other names
as they come up.
Mr. CoLEGROvE. I checked the transcript, and I would agree that
the statements which Mr. Lattimore made in the conference indicate
that his views were consistently pro-Communist, and this advice was
given on a number of occasions.
Senator Smith. When you refer to the transcript, you mean the
State Department transcript ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Of the conference.
The statement by Mr. Lattimore in volume 3, page C-2, which reads :
On the other hand, too much delay might have a deteriorating effect on our
prestige in Asia —
he is asking for early recognition.
Mr. Morris. Of Communist China ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. I won't read the whole passage, but the record
of the State Department conference indicates that Mr. Lattimore was
in favor of very early recognition of Red China.
There are quite a number of references that could be made to Mr.
Lattimore's testimony, but I think that is sufficient.
Mr. Morris. You also put in this group, Lawrence K. Rosinger ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Have you had a chance to look at the transcript to
determine whether or not Lawrence Rosinger did take the position you
have testified in open session ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes, Mr. Counsel. Mr. Rosinger, in volume 3
[October 8, 1949], page C-10, used the following words:
I'd like to associate myself with the view frequently expressed around this
table that we should extend recognition.
He means to Red China. [Continues reading:]
My own personal feeling is that the recognition should come as early as
possible —
he then says.
Then, on page 59, he again repeats :
As I have suggested, the recognition should come at the earliest feasible
moment.
On the same page, Mr. Rosinger proposes that we should end all
ECA assistance to the Chinese Nationalists immediately. You recall
from the testimony he, of course, made a strong plea for breaking
the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai.
There are numerous other references; but, since Governor Stassen
covered the same material, it would be repetitious to give the whole
list.
2284S— 52— i)t. 3- 3
1280 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. You say the third person you put in that group with
the qualification more or less was Prof. John K. Fairbank. You said
he was more or less in that particular prevailing group ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Could you dwell upon that ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I included John K. Fairbank in this list. I believe
that Governor Stassen did not include him in his entire list. Let me
call attention to Fairbank's proposal to abandon Formosa. That is
made in volume 1, pages B-10 and B-11. Would you want me to read
that?
Mr. Morris. If you will, please, Professor.
"When Professor Colegrove testified in open session, he did not have
the benefit of any notes or any transcript, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. You are trying to confirm what he said by the
transcript from the State Department?
Mr. Morris. We are asking him if iiow that he sees the transcript
does it bear out his recollection of the meeting as he testified in open
session on September 25, 1951. He had testified previously in execu-
tive session.
Mr. Colegrove. I dislike to take the time of the committee in check-
ing my notes here. I have had only 2 hours to go over this. I fear
that I have made an error in my notations in regard to volume No. 1,
pages B-10 and B-11.
Mr. Morris. Was there a reference- to Formosa, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Colegrove. If one of my students at the university made notes
such as I have here, I would flunk him.
I guess this is volume 2. .
Senator Smith. I can testify for you. There is a little confusion
the way these volumes are numbered. If you need any witness to
help you out, let me know.
Mr. Colegrove. I must say the State Department has not helped
us much in this pagination.
It was volume No. 2 [October G, 1949, p. m. session] page B-10.
Professor Fairbank says:
To try to hold Formosa with troops would give so much ideological ammuni-
tion to the Chinese Communists that it would unite China more readily against
US. The more pressure we bring, the more we can expect hostility in return.
Then he goes on on the next page to say :
To hold Formosa would defeat our ends by a miscalculation of the response
in China, just as our military support of Chiang Kai-shek defeated our ends
because we couldn't foresee his inefficiency and that Chiang would have a lack
of support.
I think that indicates clearly enough that Professor Fairbank was
in favor of immediate abandonment of the Nationalist Government on
Formosa.
Mr. Morris. Do you care to say anything more on that score, Pro-
fessor Colegrove ?
Mr. Colegrove. I don't think it is necessai^ to take the time of the
committee. ^ There are other citations that can be made, but that is
characteristic.
Mr. Morris. Did you hear the testimony of Mr. Stassen this
morning?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. I listened to that testimony. I thought that
was an excellent analysis.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1281
Mr. Morris. Would that confirm the testimony that you gave in
open session here ?
Mr. CoiiEGROvE. Decidedly so. I thought everything that Governor
Stassen testified to, this moiling, completely corroborated my testi-
mony when I first appeared before this committee.
Mr. Morris. In other words, you feel that your testimony and his
originally was very much along the same lines ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You heard him give instances from the transcript today
in support of his testimony and you feel they also, ipso facto, would
support yours?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You say, on page 1716 :
To some extent Professor Reischauer of Harvard and Professor Peffer of
Columbia University expressed views that vpere favorable to the Chinese
Communists.
Mr. Colegrove. As to the views of Professor Reischauer, I must
say that I regretted to find that he and I differed so frequently. We
are graduates from the same university. Professor Reischauer took
the position on October 7, 1949, at the morning conference, on page
C-15, where he uses these expressions :
I VFOuld certainly agree with Mr. Rosinger about the importance of deeds.
He is referring here to the abandonment of the Nationalist Govern-
ment on Formosa.
I think that was somewhat typical of all of the testimony of Pro-
fessor Reischauer.
Mr. Morris. Did you hear Governor Stassen's testimony this morn-
ing about Professor Reischauer ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes ; I did.
Mr. Morris. You mentioned that Benjamin Kizer of the west coast
generally was in that group. Have you been able to find anything in
the transcript that would support your testimony along those lines,
Professor ?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes, Mr. Counsel. Benjamin Kizer, on October 7,
1949 [a. m. session], on page B-23, used the following expression:
I tend to go along with what Mr. Peffer has well said, not that we should go
whole hog in recognition — neither Mr. Peffer nor myself meant that — but when
it becomes apparent, as I think it has become apparent in Indochina, that the
days of France are numbered, and that the revolution is on its way toward con-
trol, we ought to be sensitive and not take sides in any such situation.
In other words, he is arguing for recognition of the revolutionary
government as soon as possible.
Mr. Morris. Is there anything else you would like to have us take
notice of on that score ?
Mr. Colegrove. I thought that characteristic of Mr. Kizer's state-
ment. I have not had opportunity to check every one of them. That
is the only one I have been able in my limited time to select.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we are confronted with tlib problem of
what to do about this transcript. Should we put that all in our record,
the entire transcript ?
Senator Smith. You mean the State Department transcript?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
1282 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. It will be available to be included. Why do we
not consider that the transcript is available for the record if and when
it is decided it should be put in? We can treat it as we treated those
other volumes. We will not actually copy it into the record.
Mr. Morris. In fairness to everybody, Mr. Chairman, the whole
transcript of what everybody said should be in our records.
Senator Smith. You mean the State Department transcript?
Mr. Morris. Yes. That does not mean that we have to print it here
in the first instance.
Senator Smith. All right.
(The material referred to appears in the appendix of this part.)
Mr. Morris. I think we sliould have everybody's remarks in the
record.
Another point in your open testimony. Professor, you said that a
briefing done by Cora Dubois was a briefing very sympathetic toward
the Communists. Cora Dubois was the State Department officer who
briefed the conferees.
Can you find anything there in the testimony to support that testi-
mony, Professor Colegrove?
Mr. CoLEGRO^'E. Mr. Morris, I was disappointed in the briefing by
Dr. Dubois. Her briefing occurred at the opening of the second
session.
It was a brilliant and scintillating analysis of the problem situation
in southeast Asia, and it presented to the uninitiated every appearance
of objectivity, but nevertheless it was a very decided slanted testi-
mony.
Mr. Morris. Can vou develop that for us?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes. The briefing played down Soviet Russia and
the Chinese Communist influence in southeast Asia. It implied that
the revolution in southeast Asia was a wholly native spontaneous rev-
olution with no leadership from the Soviet Russian Government or Red
(^hina.
I will quote you from volume 3 [October 7, 1949, a. m. session J , page
A-3. Dr. Dubois says :
Despite the diversity which does occur "in Southeast Asia," a few generali-
zations, it seems to me, can be risked The first and the broadest is one which
was discussed at the very beginning of yesterday's meeting and agreed upon,
namely, that there is a revolution in progress in southeast Asia, and that that
revolution is not coevil with United States-U. S. S. R. tensions. It is a revolution
certainly of 50 years' duration.
I will not go on any further.
We will have to say from the study of history that this revolution
was also going on in China probably for a hundred years, the T'ai P'ing
rebellion and the revolution under Sun Yat-sen.
But in China, everyone would agree the revolution was captured
by the Chinese Communists. They took over the revolution, Mao Tze-
tung and the Chinese Communists.
In this briefing that Dr. Dubois made, she says nothing about Ho
Chi Minh, the Moscow-trained Chinese Communists who has taken
over revolution in the Viet-Nam in Indochina. I was amazed at a
briefing on southeast Asia that had no mention whatsoever of the
Chinese Communist leaders whose personalities men respect as great
as Mao Tze-tung and who directs the revolution in southeast Asia.
He is a European, Moscow and French-trained Communist and
directs that revolution.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1283
Mr. Morris. What is the next sentence, there? It ahnost negates
its existence, does it not ?
Mr. CoLEGROv'E. You mean "it has affected more or less * * *" ?
Mr. Morris (reading) :
For the United States to interpret the southeast Asian scene solely in terms of
its own preoccupation with anticommunism is to run the risk of seriously mis-
understanding the forces at work in southeast Asia and thereby of alienating
the all-important leadership of the area.
Mr. CoLEGROvE. It is simply amazing that statement should be made
of what was supposedly the scholarly presentation of the situation.
Again, let me call attention to page A-19 where the briefing refers
to the United States and Communist China. The briefing reads as
follows :
The U. S. S. R. and Communist China are still only potential forces perhaps
brighter for being less manifest —
which is an amazing statement. The French who have been fighting
the Communists in Indochina, I think, will hardly believe an American
scholar would make such a statement as that, because it is so complet-
ely in disagreement with the facts.
Let me go back to page A-12. On page A-12, Dr. Dubois says :
Communist propaganda from Peiping is ineffective.
Reports that we have from the press indicate the propaganda was
effective from the very beginning, the beginning of the so-called
people's govermnent of China.
With reference to this briefing, Mr. Morris, 1 was regretful to see
Dr. Dubois belittle Governor Stassen's proposal of a propaganda cen-
ter in Bangkok. That was an important feature of the program which
Governor Stassen laid before the conference. This proposal is ridi-
culed in this briefing.
I think I need not take more time in indicating the character of this
briefing. It was a very clever statement but very definitely slanted.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, if the entire transcript is not going into
the record, may the briefing go in the record ?
That runs no more than — how many pages?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. The conversation about it runs 26 pages.
Senator Smith. You mean, to be copied in the record?
Mr. Morris. That would be printed in the record. It wouldn't be
printed here. We will lay it in here, because when these hearings are
being prepared, it will be printed.
Senator Smith. All right.
(The material referred to follows:)
Miss DtTBOis. Unfortunately the discussion which you carried on yesterday
seemed to me so lively and so excellent that it cut the ground out pretty com-
pletely from under this briefing paper which I had prepared. I shall go ahead
with it, however, largely as a r6sum§ and as a summary of most of the points
that you raised yesterday and then we can go on from there.
The countries of Southeast Asia vary so greatly that it seems to me any
estimate of that or any specific program of action in Southeast Asia which can
be phrased, which is phrased for the region as a whole, will need reinterpreta-
tion when applied to a particular country. It seems to me that a simple pro-
gram or estimate for Indonesia and Thailand would be as inappropriate as a
single estimate or program for, let's say, Korea and Japan. The differences
are of that magnitude.
Despite the diversity which does occur, a few generalizations, it seems to me,
can be risked. The first and the broadest is one which was discussed at the
1284 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
very beginning of yesterday's meeting, and agreed upon, namely, that there
is a revolution in progress in Southeast Asia and that that revolution is not
coeval with U. S.-U. S. S. R. tensions. It is a revolution certainly of 50 years
duration. It has affected more or less acutely all functions of the cultural lives
of these disparate peoples. Yet it is a revolution which has not always been
disorderly and simultaneously, I think one should remember in dealing with
Southeast Asia that not all disorders are necessarily revolutionary. For the
United States to interpret the Southeast Asia scene solely in terms of
its own preoccupations with anticommunism is to run the risk of seriously
misunderstanding the forces at work in Southeast Asia and thereby of alienat-
ing the all-important leadership of the area.
Fortunately the U. S. S. R. seems to be making this very error in Southeast
Asia. The reasons, we may assume, are the doctrinaire quality of its Southeast
Asian advisers who impress one as being either fairly incompetent or too in-
timidating to render an honest judgment on the scene.
Now the revolution which is taking place in Southeast Asia can be sub-
sumed under three major blanket terms : Nationalism in its political thinking,
socialism in its economic aspirations, and humanitarianism in its social pro-
gram. These, of course, are direct reflections of western democratic thought,
although certainly their appearance in contemporary Southeast Asia lags be-
hind their fullest manifestations in Europe. That these three major trends are
western European in origin gives the United States a tremendous psychological
advantage in dealing with Southeast Asian leaders. However, I think it would
be a mistake to expect no mutations in these major trends in the course of being
transplanted.
Thus, the nationalism which is at the moment the major preoccupation is still
phrased to a large extent as ahtiimperialism. Furthermore, nationalist leaders
have problems of unifying the nations that they aspire to create which are as
great, certainly, as our forebears had in the eighteenth century. Sovereignty
neither in its internal nor external aspects is yet a deeply experienced and
internal force. I would expect, therefore, that their nationalism would be
easily directed into international channels as soon as the threats of imperialism
are removed and hypersensitivities on this score are respected. Once unity in
these severely splintered countries — and I exclude the Philippines and Thailand —
is established, international preoccupations will appear more consistently and
frequently. However, until that time internal problems will seem more urgent
than external ones in each of these countries. This complicates the situation.
It means that the United States has to deal with five or six separate entities
instead of one. It may retard cooperation between the countries of this area,
and then, of course, there is the danger that splintered nations may more easily
be exploited by those who enjoy fishing irresponsibly in troubled waters.
Socialism — to take the second main theme in Southeast Asia — is still more an
aspiration than a fact. It is closely associated with the desix-e, however unrealis-
tic, to industrialize and achieve some degree of autarchy. In part, tliese desires
stem from the realization of how vulnerable the export economy developed by
European nations have made these areas to fluctuations in the world market.
I need scarcely say the depressions of the 1930's was a very bitter experience
in this part of the world. Another contributing factor is the knowledge that they
lack investment capital and they need such capital from European sources, but
that in acquiring it they do not wish to exchange economic controls for the
political freedom which they have just acquired. On the whole, therefore, the
preference is for intergovernment loans and government-controlled enterprises.
The third main strain in the Southeast Asian revolution, the humanitarian
one, is for the moment represented by a remarkable eagerness for education and
for the development of literacy in the area. This, of course, was of value in
the European nations where most of the southeastern leadership studied. It
appears to them a sine qua non of intelligent and enlightened sovereignty. It is
a force which, I believe, most nearly represents a mass movement in contempo-
rary Southeast Asia today. That highly literate populations like those of Ger-
many and .Tapan have been no insurance against political abuse seems to escape
most people's attention.
Associated with this trend is, of course, the desire for a higher standard of
living and great admiration for American technology. I feel that our propa-
ganda does not need to stress our technical competence or our standard of living
anywhere in the world. It has already been sold and resold. It is a revolutionary
force, some writers claim, which makes communism a pale and reactionary
phenomenon by comparison. Although we do not need to sell the superiority of
our technology it may be wise of us in Southeast Asia not to rub in the dif-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1285
ferences in standards of livinfr. and above all not to appear niggardly in sharing
our greatly admired know-how. It may be unwise to arouse envy and unde-
sirable to trade on strength which, though greatly admired, is admired in
Southeast Asia when well encased in velvet.
If the main elements then of the Southeast Asian revolution have been cor-
rectly appraised, the next question which arises is, "Where are the fulcrums for
the effective exercise of influence by the United States?"
In terms of the class structure the major locus of power is the present leader-
ship. It is predominantly western educated and western oriented in its thinking.
The overt leaders who fell under the leadership of Moscow and remained there
can be counted practically on the fingers of both hands. Furthermore, the peasant
masses of Southeast Asia are still largely politically unawakened, although that
situation is changing faster than we may like to realize in countries like Indo-
china and Indonesia, which have had to fight for their independence. In dealing
with these leaders we shall have to appreciate that they, like all politicians, will
be under local pressures from their own peoples, which we here in the United
States only vaguely understand and probably frequently do not appreciate. We
must realize, however, that the greatest danger to us in Southeast Asia is that
tlie armed and aroused peasants may escape from under the control of leaders
essentially friendly to the west and become the pawns of Communist agitators.
An early and equitable settlement of disorders in Southeast Asia and every
effort to strengthen the present leadership in its unification of these countries
appears to me to be an essential to United States interests. It is recognized
that such leadership may not always be to our taste, however.
A second point d'appui open to the United States has already been suggested.
It is the generous sharing of our technology. Here a generous technical assistance
program was conceived. The realization by our economists that on its present
scale it will not fundamentally alter even in a generation the Southeast Asian
standard of living had led to the suggestion that private capital is needed but
naturally it must be provided safeguards. Actually whether such safeguards
will coax American capital into underdeveloped areas may be worth pondering.
The Bell Act which has been a thorn in Philippine national pride has not deluged
the Philippines with American enterprises. In any event, the United States
with its evaluation of private enterprise runs squarely against the state socialism
of Southeast Asian leadership. Already fears have been expressed in the region
about our intentions on that score. Undoubtedly to secure our assistance the
Southeast Asians will temporize with their aspirations, but the attendant
frustrations and resentments should not be ignored, should be carefully weighed
against the chances of success in getting American private capital into the area.
A third and closely related lever available to the United States in Southeast
Asia is the previously mentioned desire for education. The Fulbright Act was
probably one of the most constructive long-run measures for Southeast Asia
enacted in postwar years. However, it is limited to only three countries in the
region, it has been slow in getting under way, it has been loosely coordinated
with other policies subsequently developed like the technical assistance program,
and has been nibbled away by other interests, lack of suitable personnel, and the
innumerable difficulties that always seem to beset the best of intentions. The
Fulbright Act, however, is miniscule by comparison to the needs and aspirations
of these areas. I feel that any guidance that this group could offer in refining
and enlarging our United States informational and educational program and in
enlisting our private educational groups in a multitude of both advanced and
elementary programs, an education might be amply repaid in terms of long-run
national interests.
Now these are some of the assets we possess in Southeast Asia. Where, then,
are the weak points in our potentialities? Here I would like to consider two types
of weaknesses, those which are inherent in Southeast Asia and those which are
inherently our t)wn.
It seems a .iustifiable assumption that the Chinese Communists will continue
their push into the neighboring countries of Southeast Asia. What their reactions
will be will depend upon the nature of the push. Let us suppose that it would
be directly military and would he limited to the land approaches.
Mr. Furnivall. an outstanding British expert sympathetic to the present
Burmese Government, is convinced nothing would heal the present schisms
in Burma more effectively than an armed Chinese incursion along the northern
Sino-Burmese border.
In Indochina the dislike of the Chinese is traditional. It has been reinforced
by the postwar Chinese occupation of northern Indochina. Any Vietnamese
Communist leadei'ship in the Republic of Vietnam which would encourage or
1286 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
condone Chinese military incursions would be widely discredited and might make
more friends for Bao Dai than the French or the Emperor himself have yet been
able to win.
Thailand's traditional nationalism and anti-Chinese position is presently more
overt than ever under the authoritarian Premier Phibul. In fact, I'hibul has
recently stated that Thailand would welcome British and American troops on
Thai soil in the event of a Communist invasion.
All of these factors are not unknown to the Chinese Communists and it seems
improbably, therefore, that they would take the risks involved in direct military
action even though they might be militarily successful. Also, it is still far from
clear that the U. S. S. R. trusts the Chinese Communists sufficiently to use them as
their "running dogs" in Southeast Asia.
Obviously, however, direct military incursion is not the only instrument at the
disposal of the Chinese Communists. Chinese governments have traditionally
taken a proprietary attitude toward their 6,000,000 overseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia. Such attentions have never been welcomed by the government of any
region. Among the people of the area, .justly or unjustly, the Chinese have always
been suspect. This position is intensified at present for the Chinese have held
aloof from the nationalist struggle. The increased nationalist sensitivities in
these countries since the war is likely to make Chinese Communists' appeals to
their overseas dependents as obnoxious as those of Nationalist China. This,
however, is certainly no adequate discouragement to the Chinese Communists.
If no direct military action is likely, what are the Chinese Communist poten-
tials? Opening propaganda, which has already been launched from Peiping on
Southeast Asia will undoubtedly be intensified, but in my estimation it is of
dubious effectiveness. I suspect — and this is highly Intuitive judgment — that
shrill propaganda may be one of those self-defeating techniques whose effective-
ness is already largely exhausted. However, it may be unwise to underestimate
it too soon at least in these so-called marginal areas of the world, but our own
information services, expanded, more astute — certainly more repetitive — would
probably stalemate the line coming out of Moscow and Peiping.
Far more sinister, it seems to me, tire the possibilities of clandestine infiltration
,tnd activities whose goal will be to intensify destructively every possible griev-
ance, racial discrimination, minority frictions, pay differentials, poverty, police
measures, national aspirations, and that whole host of evils which exist today
in Southeast Asia.
These clandestine efforts will certainly be facilitated if the countries of
Southeast Asia will recognize the Peoples Republic of China. Chinese Com-
munists diplomats will afford the opportunity to shout at clandestine operators,
to bribe and to terrorize the resident Chinese in Southeast Asia who have always
been noted for their practicality in such matters rather than for the strength
of their moral convictions. Furthermore, to the extent that the Peoples Republic
of China gains a position on the international forum its strident eachoes of the
U. S. S. R. on the subject of Anglo-American imperialism will have the weight
of an Asian voice which has been "successful" in its revolution. I think that
we should not underestimate the fact that the Communist success in China is
seen as a successful revolution in many parts of Asia. It seems to be that
in a case of that sort on the international forum our best defense will be the
kind of diplomatic astuteness which Mr. Henderson has had in India and above all
our actual record about which it seems to me we insist on being far too
modest.
In my opinion this question of the overseas Chinese and the opportunity they
offer Communist China for clandestine and diplomatic infiltrations in Southeast
Asia is one of the greatest hazards to United States interests in the area. Un-
fortunately, in terms of other considerations, recognition may have to be granted
to the Peoples Republic and the attendant liabilities reckoned with.
In addition to the difficulties posed by the overseas Chinese and the recogni-
tion of Communist China which are immediate there are long-range difficulties.
The population problem, particularly in relation to the food supply, is perhaps
one of the major ones. The Far East as a whole occupies a unique position
in world economies by being predominantly agricultural, and yet being on the
whole a food-deficit area. Based with this gross problem the impulse is to en-
courage rice-producing areas like Thailand to produce as great as exportable
surplus as possible. If the Office of Intelligence Research estimates are correct
there is little likelihood that any foreseeable amount of encouragement to rice
production will result in more rice than the Far East can sell at a good price until
1960. However, by 1970 it is estimated the population and food production may
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1287
once more be unbalanced as they are today. It is also estimated that the Chinese
Communists will still be in control in China in 1970. It is here again that bold
new plans seem as urgent to the United States interests as they are urgent to
Asian leadership.
Here, perhaps, modest industrialization and economic diversification might
concern us with equal seriousness and simultaneously with the food-population
equation. Certainly in an area as large and diversified as Southeast Asia any
simple unilateral approach would not be adequate.
Now it is not my function to dwell elaborately on the difficulties inherent
in the Southeast Asian scene. It may be more appropriate now to pass on to
inherently American difficulties when we operate in the region. The first two
difficulties seem to me closely related — indifference and commitments elsewhere.
At the beginning of World War II, China "specialists' were practically a dime
a dozen compared to those on South Asia. Since the war Japan "specialists"
seem to outnumber even those on China. Persons interested in the Far East are
termed "specialists" while every fifth person in the United States has no hesitancy
about speaking authoritatively on Europe. He may do it even in fluent French or
German. It is not astonishing, therefore, that in both our war and peace strategies
our concei-n has been primarily for Europe. It is undoubtedly both practically
and emotionally an area requiring urgent and vigorous effort. If, however, we
are not to go on waiting for crises to develop before we become aware of them
it will be necessary to act like the U. S. S. K. on a global basis. In respect to
Southeast Asia we are on the fringes of crisis. The initiative I consider is
still narrowed on our side. Specifically, what this may mean is Will the United
States — and here I don't mean just the policy makers — be rich enough and above
all willing and foresighted enough to apply preventive measures before South
Asian opportunities are squandered?
In our preoccupations with Europe and our heavy and legitimate responsi-
bilities there the weight of European arguments may cloud our .judgments. For
example, the interests and stability of France and the Netherlands, close and
familiar as they are, may serve to throw out of persiiective our very real inter-
ests in Indochina and Indonesia. Traditionally British preeminence in South
Asia may have made us careless of developments in the region.
To continue with this weighing of Europe versus Asia, the question of the
Pacific versus the Atlantic Pact is another case in point. If the Atlantic Pact
is obviously in our immediate interest is a Pacific Pact less in our long-range
interest? Or, to narrow the matter down, can we judse whether military sup-
port to the Northeast Asian group, Korea, Formosa, Japan, and the Philippines
is more effective than support to the Southwest Pacific group, Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, perhaps plus other commonwealth nations? Or,
thirdly, is it more effective to support the more nebulous Indian Ocean bloc?
Do United States interests lie in consolidating the Indian Ocean bloc with the
two Pacifiic arcs or do our interests lie in two or more such aggregations in the
far eastern periphery? If one or the other courses seems wise to us what
means can be applied to implement them? These are questions which I assume
this group will discuss in the course of the day.
In discussing United States weaknesses in the Far East I have raised two
related issues, our preponderant interest in Europe and therefore the degree to
which we have as a people concentrated our eggs in one basket.
The last point I should like to raise in respect to Southeast Asia is even more
unabashedly a valued judgment. It has to do with our moral leadership in
the area. If we wish to be seriously hard-headed about the Southeast Asian
scene it is necessary to realize that their moral values are still potent and
prized factors. Their leadership was primarily trained in our founding faith.
The streets of Saigon and Batavia were plastered with slogans from Jefferson,
from Lincoln, from the Declaration of Independence, from the Constitution and
from the Atlantic Charter when the allied troops arrived in September 1945.
In our commitments to Europe and our antagonism to the U. S. S. R. we may
appear in that area to have temporized with the idealistic and perhaps naive
expectations of Southeast Asians. Whether it was avoidable or unavoidable
we certainly lost much of our influence in the area. Whether or not we per-
sonally as individuals prize our traditional morality or have been won over
to real politik is not relevant sociologically. What is relevant is to the extent
that the United States temporizes with its own principles it is abandoning an
instrument of great political force in Southeast Asia. The U. S. S. R., were
it in a similar position of active responsibility, would undoubtedly be even more
gross by contrast, but so far we are in Southeast Asia, at least to some extent.
1288 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
We have the initiative. The U. S. S. R. and Communist China are still only
potential forces, perhaps brighter for being less manifest.
This much is clear : Whatever our priorities in the short run, however coldly
calculated in power terms, they must be compensated for by long-range encour-
agement, reassurances and planning with and for the South Asians if we are to
counteract Communist intrusions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Miss DuBois.
Mr. Morris. Professor, did you testify whatever at any time during
your open session testimony, about Ruppert Emerson ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. No. I never mentioned the name of Prof. Ruppert
Emerson. I am very sure that I did not hear that name mentioned by
any of the Senators on the subcommittee.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, have you prepared a careful scrutiny
of Professor Colegrove's open testimony ?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Does the name Ruppert Emerson appear ?
Mr. Mandel. It does not appear anywhere in his testimony.
Mr. CoLEGRO\T.. I was amazed to have a deluge of letters from my
colleagues at Harvard University, including Professor Emerson him-
self, bitterly chiding me for having mentioned his name as a member
of the conlerence. I was testifying, Mr. Morris, with a list of the
membership before me, so it would seem almost impossible to give his
name.
Senator Smith. How did his name come in?
Mr. Morris. Considerable ]Dress report the next day reported Pro-
fessor Colegrove said Prof. Ruppert Emerson was among the pro-
Chinese Communist group. Professor Emerson wrote a letter of pro-
test to the committee.
We informed him that his name had not come up in the testimony
and that we would put the letter in the record to show that fact.
Senator Smith. Do you know how, his name got into the paper ?
Mr. Morris. Apparently, it must have been a mistake. Professor
Colegrove wanted the record to show he did not mention his name. We
put the list of the 25 people who did attend the conference in and Rud-
peit Emerson's name was not on that.
Mr. Colegrove. It was not a mistake in the record.
Mr. Morris. No.
Is there anything else about your testimony, Professor Colegrove,
in your open testimony? I have tried to take the high lights.
Mr. Colegrove. Would it be permissible, Mr. Chairman, for me to
make a few remarks reoardino- mv own remarks at the conference?
Would it be in order for me to illustrate the reactions to some of my
own remarks in the conference?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; I think that is appropriate. In other words, you
want to show that your testimony concerning your own remarks at
the conference was borne out by reading the transcript?
Mr. Colegrove. Yes.
In the first session, which was on October 6, 1949, page D-10, Mr.
McNaughton, who was one of the members of the conference, made a
very pessimistic speech in which he said :
I think we are all washed up in China.
He proposes getting out of all of China, and he intended to include
Formosa, too. That gave a very pessimistic beginning to the discus-
sion. This was practically at the beginning of the conference, be-
cause others agreed with him. I took exception to this view.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1289
I said :
Dr. Fosdick —
who was presiding —
I would not agree at all that we are washed up in China nor that the Nationalist
Government on Formosa is washed up.
I went on to point out that there were spots of resistance in China
at this time, and I called attention to General Chennault's plan for
assisting Chiang Kai-shek logistically to make a landing on Fukien
and the continent of China and to assist the elements of revolt against
the Communists there existing.
This view that I proposed then was rather warmly condemned by
several members of the conference, and in particular by Mr. Murphy
and by Owen Lattimore.
I won't go into the quotations, except to say that Mr. Murphy
and Owen Lattimore at very considerable length took exception to
my proposal that we give military aid to Chiang Kai-shek to assist
him to recover the southern part of China and to neutralize the
Chinese Communists.
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I suggested to the chairman of the
conference that the conference ought to have a briefing on the military
situation in China.
Shortly afterward, we were given a briefing by an officer — I am not
sure whether he was from the Army or whether he was from the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency. He was Colonel McCann.
At another point, it seemed to me that the State Department was
making the best of a bad situation with reference to the withdrawal
of our consulates from China.
This discussion occurs in volume 1, page C-8. It involves a short
controversy between myself and Mr. Butterworth, who was speaking
for the State Department in this matter.
It seemed to me that the withdrawal of our consulates in China
left us in a very awkward position. We lost listening posts. There
were, of course, and still are, adventurous young men in the Foreign
Service who would have been willing to stay on and try to serve their
Government and collect information.
Mr. Morris. This came up in the transcript?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes. This comes up in the transcript.
Discussion begins in volume 1, page C-8.
Again, we have quite a number of facets concerning the recogni-
tion of Red China in volume 5, page B-4, and again at page 34, covers
part of this controversy. Let me read one section here. These vol-
umes are not easily handled.
The question has arisen with reference to possible recognition of Red
China de facto or de jure. My position had been that we should not
accord them either de facto or de jure recognition. A.t the same time,
however, I felt that the situation in Japan was such that there would
have to be eventually some trade between China or North China and
Japan because Japan has been, for years, dependent upon certain re-
sources from Manchuria. In order to avoid a recognition of Red
China but at the same time permit trade between Japan and China,
I proposed a modus vivendi which might be an arrangament from day
to day, week to week, or month to month, for exchange of raw ma-
1290 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
terials and finished products between Manchuria and Japan wiMiout
recognition.
In the matter of recognizing Red China, I tried to make the point
that recognizing a Communist government would not bring about the
blessings which so many people fondly expected to accrue from such
recognition. Communist countries do not subscribe to the underlying
principle of our international society, namely, sanctity of treaties and
good faith in observing treaties.
I pointed out that the State Department itself in the person of Chip
Bohlen, a specialist in Russia, had indicated that the philosophy of
Soviet Russia and the philosophy of Marxian countries was such that
they did not subscribe to the sanctity of treaties.
That being the case, what advantage could there be from recogni-
tion of a country which would not admit that it was bound by laws
of international law ?
Still, again, one thing that amazed me in this conference which was
on China, there was so little reference to the traditional American
policy in Asia. That traditional policy Avas the open-door polic3\
IMr. Morris. Is this your conclusion after reading the transcript, or
just your recollection?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I am referring to my argument that recognition of
Red China would not insure that the open-door policy would be ob-
served by Red China and it was useless, therefore, to recognize her,
because we would have none of the advantages of former policy which
was generally accepted by the nations.
Mr. Morris. Does the transcript bear out your recollection ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Yes. Do you want me to read it ?
Mr. Morris. No.
Mr. CoLEGROVE. It covers pages 32 and 35.
I might add, Mr. Morris, it is also carried on to pages 68 and 69. •
Mr. Morris. You testify that there was no discussion encouraging
the State Department's white paper. Does reading the ti-anscript
bear out that testimony ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, I was looking for that point just as
the hearing began. ' I have not had time to verify all of these. My
recollection was that Mr. Jessup or, rather, Mr, Fosdick who pre-
sided over the first session, told the conference that the State Depart-
ment was not interested in getting our views on the white paper of
China.
Mr. Morris. You have not found that in the transcript ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I have not found it. Probably in a minute or two,
I could find it.
Mr. Morris. You can point it out to us later.
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I can probably find it.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. Are there any other points in your testimony that are
borne out by the transcript ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Mr. Counsel, there is nothing else. I agree heartily
with the analysis which Governor Stassen made this morning.
I thought that analysis was very complete and very accurate.
Mr. Morris. AYe will have some letters to go into the record.
Senator Smith. After this conference, do you recall that you or
Governor Stassen discussed this meeting, or was it not supposed to
be discussed publicly ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1291
Mr. CoLEGROVE. It was not supposed to be discussed. The presiding
officer, Dr. Fosdick, the first morning, indicated that the discussions
were to be confidential.
Senator Smith. At or about that time there were a great many other
American citizens besides Dr. Jessup, Dr. Lattimore, and the people
there, who were advocating the same thing they were advocating,
were there not ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes.
Senator Smith. In other words, a great many people had gotten,
as we would say in common parlance, disgusted with the Nationalist
Government because of the cliicanery and the defaults and promises
by reason of embezzlements and those things ?
Mr. CoLEGROMs. That is right.
Senator Smith. Is not that one of the things that caused some
citizens to feel that the Nationalists could not be trusted any more
than the Communist government ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. I felt that a great deal of what was said about
Chiang Kai-shek was pure propaganda.
Of course, there was the Chinese squeeze. The Chinese squeeze
is two or three thousand years old. I may say in talking about poli-
tics that in Chicago I find there is a Chicago squeeze, too.
Senator Smith. We are talking about Chinese politics now ?
Mr. CoLEGROvE. There was a squeeze in Chicago just as there is a
Chinese squeeze.
Senator Smith. What I mean is this: xVs to the position that
you took a,nd Governor Stassen took, a great many people have taken
that position, and likewise a great many people have taken the op-
posite position.
Mr. CoLEGROvE. Yes.
Senator Smith. And that, in itself, does not mean too much one
way or another, except that those were the views of groups.
Mr. CoLEGREVE. I was rather surprised when I came to Washington
to attend this conference to find so many members of the conference
who had been among the group who were partly responsible for the
fall of Chiang Kai-snek and the victory of the Communists.
Senator Smith. All right. *
Now, did you feel that conference was rigged, so as to have that
type or that group predominate ? Was that your feeling at the time?
Mr. CoLEGRO^^:. Definitely, Senator, that was my feeling. I thought
the conference should have included quite a number of men who were
left out, but who were, you might say, in favor of the Chiang Kai-
shek government, men like Stanley Hornbeck, who had long experi-
ence, and were available, or men like William McGovern, or Eugene
Dooman, or a Yale professor by the name of David Rowe.
I expected to see a more even balance.
Senator Smith. Did you have the feeling at that time that those
men or those types of men had been purposely left out so as not
to have a full argument on the other side ?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Definitely so.
Senator Smith. Now, did you have any specific evidence that would
justify you, other than just the general feeling?
Mr. CoLEGROVE. Well, the only evidence would be the number of pro-
Communist experts invited to the conference and the smallness of
Ihe number of anti-Communist experts on the other side.
1292 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. Did you have anything further ?
Mr. Morris. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
We have some letters I would like to introduce into the record.
Senator Smith. Will you identify them properly ?
Mr. Morris. Yes. There is one that I think should be read, Mr.
Chairman, because it bears on this.
Senator Smith. There is one other question I wanted to ask you,
Mr, Colegrove.
Did you or Governor Stassen, so far as you know, make any public
speeches or write anything in magazines or newspapers or give any
press releases that bore out your ideas about this situation; without
referring to the conference, I meant ?
Mr. Colegrove. Oh, yes, very frequently. And numerous talks. In
numerous talks that I have made I have expressed my views, with ref-
erence to aid to the Nationalist Government.
I think that most of the members of the conference never quoted
what was said in the conference until some of us were asked under
oath and under subpena to appear before this committee and indicate
what the discussions were.
Senator Smith. You know, there is such a thing as hindsight and
foresight, and I was just trying to get to the point as to whether
there was any expression by you or Governor Stassen at that time
that would indicate that that was then your opinion, and that you so
expressed it.
Mr. Colegrove. Outside the conference?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. Colegrove. Oh, yes. I can't speak for Governor Stassen, but
I would say his numerous speeches reiterated the very same thing he
said at the conference.
And I am sure my addresses have done the same thing.
Senator Smith. In other words, it is possible, though, and that
is what I was pointing up to, that a great many things said about
Russia, before Russia became our ally, were things which the people
recanted after Russia became our ally, and then when it became the
enemy they took up the old line.
Mr. Colegrove. Yes, that commonly occurs.
Senator Smith. So what I want to do is to get this oriented in the
light of what was the condition at that time.
Mr. Colegrove. Well, I think the opinions expressed at the confer-
ence were frequently and publicly expressed by almost every member
of the conference.
Senator Smith. Now, then, what is the next thing?
Mr. Morris. Will you read our letter of October 5, Mr. Mandel?
Mr. Mandel. This is a letter of October 5, 1951, to Hon. Dean
Acheson, Secretary of State:
My Dear Mr. Secretary: Will you make available to the Senate Internal
becunty Subcommittee a transcript of the minutes of a conference held by the
Jes^p Commission, presided over by PhiUp C. Jessup, on September 14, 1949,
m Washington, at which were present Messrs. Meaney, Delanv, and Lovestone
of the American Federation of Labor, and Messrs. Carev and Ross of the CIO?
Your cooperation in this matter will be appreciated
Sincerely,
Pat McCarran, Chairman.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1293
Letter of October 11, 1951, on letterhead of the Department of
State :
My Dear Senator McCakuan : I have your letter of October 5 to the Secretary
requesting "a transcript of the minutes of a conference held by the Jessup Com-
mission, presided over by Pliilip C. Jessup, on September 14, 1!J49, in Washington,
at which were present Messrs. M^aney, Delany, and Lovestone of the American
Federation of Labor, and Messrs. Carey and Ross of the CIO."
No stenographic transcript of this meeting was made, but the Department's
files do contain a four-page summary record of the conference in the form of
a memorandum, subject: Views of Organized Labor With Respect to United
States Policy in Asia. This brief summary memorandum does not quote any
participants directly nor does it spell out in detail the views and opinions
of individual participants. It is in fact merely an informal record of the sense
of the meeting and hence has not even been verified by the participants.
The September 14, 1949, meeting was called by the Department as a means
of conferring with representatives of organized labor and of obtaining their
concrete suggestions for United States policy in Asia.
The Department has followed the practice of conducting such conferences
with representative groups in regard to each area of the world in order to
ascertain the views of experts and open leaders in all walks of American life.
The Department has learned from experience that great benefit is derived from
face-to-face Informal conferences with truly representative persons from busi-
ness, farm, labor, veterans, religious, and other important groups. To ignore
the contribution these citizens are capable of making, in the Department's judg-
ment, is to encourage "ivory tower" policy making and narrowness of view.
It is also pointed out that since the sole purpose of these meetings is to obtain
the best private thinking available on various problems of foreign affairs and
not to either formulate or to promote policies, a completely frank and un-
inhil)ited exchange of views and ideas is essential. This can be made possible
only if the participants are assured that their remarks will be held in com-
plete confidence. The Department has provided this assurance and has done
so in good faith.
Under the>-e circumstances, the Department would be guilty of a breach of
confidence were the informal record of the September 1949 conference made
available to the committee without the prior approval of the participants.
Should the committee wish the Department to place the matter before the organ-
ized labor representatives who attended the meeting, however, the Department
will do so.
Sincerely yours,
Carlisle H. Humelsine.
Senator Smith. What is the purpose of that letter in this record?
Just to show you have called for this memorandum and did not get
it?
]\Ir. Morris. The idea is that the committee may decide to take some
testimony on what happened at that conference.
Senator Smith. I suppose we can do that, can we not ?
iVIr. Morris. Yes.
Senator Smith. I mean, what is the point of putting that letter
in here?
Mr. jNIorris. Well, the request is in the record, Senator, and I think
since the request is in, we should have the answer of the State De-
partment.
Slenator Smith. I do not see how that serves as evidence in this hear-
ing, except that you may want to call on them and have a hearing,
subpena these witnesses, and so on.
But what point does that serve in having it go in here ?
Mr. Morris. If the request of Senator McCarran asking for that is
in the record, I think in all fairness to everybody, the reply on the
part of the State Department shoidd go in.
][294 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. I have no objection to having it go in, but I do not
see any point in it, particularly.
Mr. Morris. It is the background, Senator. If the decision is now
made that we should have to take some testimony, it is because we were
not able to get the transcript.
You see, in connection with this, Senator, if this transcript had
been made available to the committee some weeks ago, when we brought
Mr. Colegrove down three times and Mr. Stassen three times, to testify
as to what happened at this particular conference, all of that would
not have been necessary. It all could have been obviated if we had
had the transcripts.
S'enator Smith. What else do you have ?
Mr. Mandel. On September 25, 1951, exhibits 266 and 267 were two
letters, one addressed by Senator McCarran to Hon. Dean Acheson,
asking for details in reference to a conference held on October 12,
1942, m regard to which we have received testimony.
Then the reply was also made an exhibit, dated September 1, 1951,
and in this reply the Department letter, signed by Jack K. McFall,
says that :
These efforts to obtain information respecting the meeting were complicated by
the fact that the departmental officers who reportedly participated were no
longer with the Department.
The Department will again examine its files with a view to obtaining informa-
tion bearing on the specific questions in your letter of August 27 and will write
you further upon completion of this reexamination.
Now, we have received a letter with regard to that conference, signed
by Sumner Welles on his own personal letterhead. This letter has been
directed to Mr. Victor Lasky, and we have a letter from Mr. Victor
Lasky permitting us to make this part of our records, and if you will
permit, I will read the excerpt from the letter of Mr. Welles pertaining
to this conference.
Senator Smith. What conference was that ?
Mr. Morris. That came up in previous testimony, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Has that been referred to heretofore ?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; several witnesses have testified, and this letter is
probative, has some evidentiary bearing on that testimony.
Senator Smith. Has the other letter been challenged by the State
Department ?
Mr. Morris. No; the only trouble is that no records of it can be
found.
Senator Smith. All right.
Mr. Mandel. This is the letter of Sumner Welles, addressed to Mr.
Victor Lasky, dated August 24, 1950, and I read a part of the letter :
To the best of my recollection I saw Mr. Earl Browder, whom I had not pre-
viously met, twice at my office in the State Department, the first time at my
request and the second time at his request.
We were very much interested in the State Department at that time
Senator Smith. It says "concerned."
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
We were very much concerned in the State Department at that time lest
the armies of the Chinese Nationalist Government and the armed forces opposed
to the Nationalist Government expend their energies on fighting each other
rather than on fighting the Japanese invaders. My recollection is that the first
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1295
interview with Mr. Browder was suggested by the White House as a result of an
article that had appeared in the Daily Worker, which gave a wholly false account
of A,merican policy with regard to China and which it was believed might do
harm in China by provoking an even more acute crisis between the Nationalist
Government and the Chinese Communists. It was for that purpose that Mr.
Browder was requested to come to see me. My recollection furtlier is that a cor-
rection was, in fact, later made in the Daily Worker. I believe further that my
second and final interview with Mr. Browder had to do with the same matter
and was held after the correction in the Daily Worker had been made.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, will you accept those into the record ?
Senator Smith. I do not see much point to it, but anyhow, they
can go in.
(The communications referred to were marked "Exhibit 336" and
are as follows:)
Exhibit No. 336
OCTOBEK 10, 1951.
Robert Morris,
Senate Judiciary Committee,
Senate Office Building, Washinfffon, D. C.
Dear Mr. Morris : Concerning your letter of October 7, in which you request
correspondence sent me by Mr. Sumner Welles, please find enclosed said corre-
spondence. I have no hesitation about turning it over to you as Mr. Welles, I be-
lieve, understood that it was meant for publication. However, I would appreciate
your notifying Mr. Welles that you liave obtained same.
Sincerely,
Victor Lasky.
Bar Harbor, Maine, August 24, 1950.
Mr. Victor Lasky,
New York, N. Y.
My Dear Mr. Lasky: Your letter of August 17 has been forwarded to me.
Since I am here in Maine and all of my personal memoranda and files are at my
house in Maryland, it is not possible for me to consult the latter with regard to
the inquiry you make of me. After my return home early in October I will be
glad to give you the detailed information which you request if that will not be
too late for your purposes.
As you will understand after an interval of some 10 years I do not remember
the details offhand.
To the best of my recollection I saw Mr. Earl Browder, whom I had not pre-
viously met, twice at my oflSce in the State Department, the first time at my
request and the second time at his request.
We were very much concerned in the State Department at that time lest the
armies of the Chinese Nationalist Government and the armed forces opposed to
the Nationalist Government expend their energies on fighting each other rather
than on fighting the Japanese invaders. My recollection is that the first inter-
view with Mr. Browder was suggested by the White House as a result of an
article that had appeared in the Daily Worker, which gave a wholly false account
of American policy with regard to China and which it was believed might do
harm in China by provoking an even more acute crisis between the Nationalist
Government and the Chinese Communists. It was for that purpose that Mr.
Browder was requested to come to see me. My recollection further is that a cor-
rection was, in fact, later made in the Daily Worker. I believe further that my
second and fi;nal interview with Mr. Browder had to do with the same matter
and was held after the correction in the Daily Worker had been made.
Believe me.
Sincerely yours,
Sumner Welles.
Mr. Morris. I think that is all we have today, then, Mr. Chairman.
The full Judiciary Committee meets tomorrow, I understand, and
Monday, and we have four executive sessions scheduled for Tuesday,
22848— 521— pt. 5 4
1296 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
SO I think the next open hearing we will be able to have will be
Wednesday.
Mr. Wallace and Mr. Alsop have both asked that they be permitted
to appear in open session, and I think Senator McCarran is trying to
work out an open hearing for them on Wednesday.
Senator Smith. If they have any information to give us, all right.
If there is nothing further, then, the hearing is in recess.
( Wliereupon, at 4 : 05 p. m., the hearing was recessed, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee to Inv^estigate the Administration
or THE Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws of the Commiitee on the Judiciary
Washington^ D. G.
The subcommittee met at 10 : 15 a. m., pursuant to notice, in room
424, Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman)
presiding.
Present : Senators McCarran, Eastland, O'Conor, Smith, Ferguson,
and Jenner.
Also present : Senators McMahon and McCarthy ; J. G. Sourwine,
committee counsel ; Kobert Morris, subcommittee counsel ; and Ben-
jamin Mandel, director of research.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
I am sorry the room has to be crowded as much as it is. I hope
you will assist us in keeping it as quiet as possible.
Let me say at the outset that it is quite customary where two or
more witnesses are to be in attendance under a general orderly pro-
cedure to have the witnesses not before the tribunal or before the
committee excluded from the room. It is the judgment of the com-
mittee that in this case that rule will be waived. Mr. Alsop is here,
and he may remain here.
You may proceed, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace has not been sworn, Senator.
The Chairman. You do solemnly swear the testimony you are
about to give before the Judiciary Committee of the United States
Senate will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you God ?
Mr. Wallace. I do.
TESTIMONY OF HENKY A. WALLACE, SALEM, N. Y., ACCOMPANIED
BY GEORGE W. BALL, COUNSEL
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, is it true that you asked to come before
this body because public testimony has been given to the effect that
you were guided by Communists ?
Mr. Wallace. That is my understanding of the testimony of Mr.
Budenz.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I am asking if you will receive in
evidence today the testimony of Mr. Wallace for that limited purpose,
namely, Mr. Wallace feels that testimony before this committee is of
1297
1298 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
such a nature that his character and reputation has been damaged, and
he would like to testify before this body.
The Chairman. Very well, he has that right.
Mr. Morris. In addition. Senator, there are certain aspects of Mr.
Wallace's testimony that relate to the Institute of Pacific Relations,
and we would like to have that accepted in the ordinary course of this
hearing.
The Chairman. You can bring that up in your questions as you
see fit.
Mr. Morris. I think, Senator, I would like to go into the latter at
the outset.
Mr. Wallace, did you write a booklet for the Institute of Pacific
Relations at any time?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, in April and May of 1944 I wrote a booklet
entitled "Our Job in the Pacific."
Mr. Morris. Will you relate to us the circumstances preceding your
writing that booklet?
Mr. Wallace. After it had become public knowledge that I had
been designated by President Roosevelt to go on a mission to China,
a representative or representatives of the Institute, and I do not know
which
Mr. Morris. You do not know who they were ?
Mr. Wallace. I do not know which, whether it was one or whether
it was more than one who called on me, and I do not have any way
of ascertaining unless that could be obtained from the institute.
I do remember very clearly that sometime in March or early April
Mrs. Lattimore did call on me with the proposal that I write the
pamphlet, and I indicated that I was very short of time with this trip
coming on, that I couldn't take the time to write the pamphlet, that
I did have certain ideas that I would very much wish to get on the
record, that I was honored by the — I am not sure I said that I was
honored by it, but in retrospect I would say I was honored by the
request.
Senator Ferguson. Did she indicate she was representing the In-
stitute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Wallace. Yes; that was very clear she was representing the
Institute of Pacific Relations.
So we did work together. I dictated quite a mass of material to
Mrs. Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. You dictated it to Mrs. Lattimore?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Did she take it down in shorthand ?
Mr. Wallace. No, she took it down in outline. I don't think she
is an expert in shorthand. She may be. I don't know as to that.
Anyhow, I did dictate a mass of material in outline to Mrs. Latti-
more. I got various friends to work on certain other aspects of tJie
important investment problem in China, that is, people who had been
in tlie Board of Economic Warfare Avhen I was there.
Mr. Morris. Will you identify those for the committee, Mr. Wal-
lace?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember their names. I remember they
were in the Board of Economic Warfare. It may be that I just sent
the word out to get that material. I don't think it is relevant to what
you are after here because I don't think there is any discussion with
INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS 1299
regard to the nature of that material and the section on investment.
So far as I know, there is not, so I think it would be quite proper not
to go into that side of it.
Mr, ]\IoRRis. Mr. Wallace, one of the issues here concerning the
testimony was whether or not you were guided by Communists.
Mr. Wallace. I can assure you that nobody who gave me this in-
formation on investments was a Commnnist or ever mentioned as a
Communist, I can assure you that.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether there were any in your
department ?
Mr. Wallace. The Board of Economic Warfare?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. I did not know at the time. I have been told since
that there were. As a matter of fact, I have been trying to get infor-
mation on that on this trip, but so far I have not been able to do it.
I do know that Mr. Dies alleged there were. I do know one of the
men he mentioned threatened suit against Mr. Dies, and Mr. Dies
withdrew the allegation on the floor of the House, and the House
recompensed him to the extent of attorney's fees amount to $800 or
$900 for the damage he had done this man.
Senator Ferguson. Was that one of the men who furnished any of
the material?
Mr. Wallace. I don't think this man was. I am quite sure he was
not because he was in an administrative position.
Mr. Morris. In view of what we have just said, you will agree that
was a proper inquiry ?
Mr. Wallace. I will agree that it is a proper inquiry, but I am sure
3'ou will also agree that in a public hearing damage could be done to
any people that might be mentioned in connection with this particu-
lar matter even though there is absolutely nothing that is valid, abso-
lutely nothing, and I think if you will read the section on investment
you will agree.
There is no valid criticism or there can be no suggestion by anyone
there is anything of a Communist nature in the section on investments.
As a matter of fact, it stands out quite clearly, you might say, as a
free-enterprise proposal with regard to investments.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have no fear, have you, that the naming of
someone as a person who helped you prepare material for this booklet
would damage that person in any way ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, I would say, with the type of publicity that has
been current and with the atmosphere that exists in Washington today,
that would tend to be the net effect. That is really what I feel.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you want the committee to understand that you
are going to decline to answer questions with regard to matters which
you do not consider relevant?
Mr. Wallace. Now I certainly shall not do anything to stand in
contempt of the committee or, as a matter of fact, to make a statement
which the committee would feel is not cooperative. I just urge on this
com^mittee this point of view, and I think the committee will agree
it is a just view.
The Chairman. Just a minute. With reference to counsel, you
have a right, but you are not going to sit alongside of the witness and
whisper to him what his answers are going to be.
1300 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, I know that we do not want to have
a continual disturbance here, and I am sure counsel does not want to,
either. What about having counsel sit at some little distance from
the witness so he can object at the proper time when anything is asked
and do it on the record ?
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Smith. Mr. Wallace, you said just then, and I quite appre-
ciate what you have in mind, that whenever you make a statement, a
public record, it could hurt somebody under the present state of the
public mind.
Now does that not in your opinion, as has been the opinion of the
committee, justify some sessions of this committee in executive
session for the purpose of seeing whether or not there is any real
background ?
Mr. Wallace. I quite appreciate the feeling of the committee with
regard to holding closed sessions in order to protect the reputations
of people, and I have heard the committee so state, and the counsel
of the committee so state. I think it is a fine thing that the committee
is taking this enlightened position, and in accordance with this en-
lightened position I feel if the committee feels there is anything in
this section dealing with investments that bears on the case in point,
why, I shall certainly be most glad to answer.
But unless you do feel that, I would hope that you will let my
refusal to answer stand.
Senator Smith. In other words, in that connection there may be
instances in which you would feel that a public disclosure of a person's
name might do him some damage, and therefore you would prefer to
answer a question of that sort in executive session where he could be
protected ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes; I think that would be fair to the people in-
volved.
Senator Ferguson. May I inquire as to whether Mrs. Lattimore, or
anyone in the Institute of Pacific Relations, indicated what they
wanted you to write about?
• Mr. Wallace. I don't remember exactly what she or they, as the
case may have been, might have said. I do know that I had long had
an interest in this part of the world.
As a matter of fact, it is my recollection I gave to President Roose-
velt back in 1933 or 1934 a book by one of the witnesses before this
committee, Professor McGovern, an outline of the history of China.
It is my recollection he was the author of this particular book, and I
called attention to certain segments of this book dealing with China.
So my interest was long standing.
So when I was going to go on this trip to China, I felt it was a
unique opportunity, since the institute had indicated their interest, to
put certain of my vieAvs on the record.
Senator Ferguson. But they came to you and initiated the project ?
Mr. Wallace. They initiated it. I did not initiate it.
Mr. Morris. So that the record may be accurate on this, Mr. Wallace,
I think the question addressed -to you was. Do you know the names of
the people who supplied this information from the Board of Economic
Warfare ?
The Chairman. Just a moment.
Senator McMahon, will you have that seat at that separate table?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1301
Mr. Wallace. I can remember one name.
Mr. Morris. Will you give us that name in executive session?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, of course I will give you that name in executive
session.
Mr. Morris. Do you recall any other names ?
Mr. Wallace. No, I don't. He worked with the various people.
Of course, at that time it was the FEA; it was not the Board of Eco-
nomic Warfare. He may have consulted with men who were in the
FEA. I don't know whether he was in FEA at that time or not—
I have forgotten — but he had been in FEA, I know, and in the Board
of Economic Warfare, and I wanted to get this highly technical
material. This man saw that I did get it.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman, in that connection I think we ought
to have a clear understanding about this. Mr. Wallace has said that
he will give this name and other names in executive session. I presume
that all of us understand that anything given in executive session may,
upon a decision by the committee, be thereafter used, after considera-
tion is given to it ?
The Chairman. That is correct, the witness should know that.
Senator Ferguson. Otherwise we could not write a report.
Mr. Wallace. I may say, however, that you will find in reading over
this section there is no reason in the world for incorporating it in any
report of any nature. I think you will agree with me, if you will look
into the facts, that there is absolutely no purpose to be served, and I
suspect you will not care to press the matter in executive session if you
will look into the data in this particular segment.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, in justice to Mr. Wallace, I think it
should be made clear that he has not refused to tell the committee here.
He has simply requested the opportunity to defer that answer until
we have an executive session.
The Chairman. That is very clear and very well understood.
Senator Smith. If that is his judgment, I am willing to abide by
that for the present in order that those persons may be protected.
The Chairman, The very aim and object of the committee in hold-
ing executive sessions was to weed out and eliminate any possible testi-
mony that might do injury to an innocent person. We have been
criticized for that procedure very severely. But we will persist in that
procedure nevertheless with the hope tliat we may eventually work
out something that the American public and the Congress of the
United States may have confidence in.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read the designated sections from
that pamphlet that we have introduced in executive session ?
Mr. Mandel. I read from page 14 of Our Job in the Pacific, by
Henry A. Wallace :
Today the peoples of the east are on the march. We can date the beginning
of that march from 1911 when the revolutionary movement among the Chinese
people, inspired by the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, overthrew the Manchu dynasty
and established a republic. This was the fiist time in the vast and culturally
rich history of Asia that an Asiatic people turned its back on the whole principle
of monarchy and hereditary rule and, in spite of the diflSculties and obstacles
that still remained, set out courageously toward the attainment of democracy —
government of the people, by the people, for the people, through the elected
representatives of the people. The march was joined later by the Russians, and
the many non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union who link Europe with Asia
across the greatest land mass of the earth, when the October revolution opened
the way for the peasant to move in and begin to take over his own land.
2302 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Will you continue reading those excerpts, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. On page 24 of the same pamphlet, speaking of free
Asia when the war ends :
Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a great
area of freedom, potentially a "freedom bloc," which it is to our interest to
have become a freedom bloc in fact.
Then on page 28 :
The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their
willingness to refrain from intervening in China's internal affairs.
Then on page 30 :
Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, I understand from your testimony in
executive session that there are certain passages in that pamphlet you
would like to call to the attention of the committee.
Mr. Wallace. Following the hearing in executive session — let me
put it this way — in the first place, not all these passages were intro-
duced in executive session.
Mr. Morris. You did read from your pamphlet in executive session?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I did read in response to a question from Sena-
tor Watkins, I believe, who read the first part of the section quoted on
page 14, and I read the remaining part, as is my recollection.
The other pages were not introduced in executive session, I think
you will find, although 1 think it is your intent to have them, and I
think it is quite agreeable to me to comment on them now.
Pursuant to the question raised by Senator Watkins, who felt that
this. must not be my idea but must be somebody else's, I wrote him a
letter on October 11. I suggest that this letter be introduced in the
record, and now might be a proper time to introduce it in the record.
Dear Senator Watkins : I feel I must clear up any question of my responsi-
bility for the thoughts expressed on page 14 of the pamphlet Our Job in the
Pacific.
If you can have your secretary get from the Congressional Library the little
pamphlet the Price of Free World Victory, by Henry A. Wallace, you will note
on page 15 a very similar idea expressed. Then if you will read the comments
at the end of this very short pamphlet [it was really a reprint of my May 8, 1942,
speech] you will gather from George Fielding Elliott, Raymond Clapper, and
Dorothy Thompson an insight into the temper of the times.
We were fighting for our lives, and the Senate of the United States had author-
ized the President to do everything he could in cooperation with England and
Russia to defeat Germany.
As it is put on page 525 of Henry Stimson's book on active service : "The central
political decision of World War II was that it must be fought in an alliance as
close as possible with Great Britain and Soviet Russia." Not once during the
war was this decision questioned or any modification of it seriously considered
by Stimson or by any man whose views he knew among the leaders of the
administration.
The three nations and America form the indispensable team for victory over
Germany together. With or without welcomed and helpful accessions of strength
from smaller nations they could not lose. Apart or at cross purposes or with
any of them defeated, they could —
there is a word left out here —
hardly fail to win. It was thus the constiant purpose of the American Govern-
ment to do all that would achieve a cherished cordial unity of action and so to
reinforce its two great allies from the vast American reservoir of material
wealth, that each w^ould press on with increasing power to a final combined
victory.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1303
I did all I could to "achieve a cherished cordial unity of action." In so doing
I was carrying out the policy of the Commander in Chief of the United States
and the Senate.
Today the situation has changed radically in many ways. We must remember
that 1942, 1943, and 1944 were totally different in policy requirements than either
1933 or 1951.
Sincerely yours.
Now, gentlemen, if you wish me to quote with regard to this par-
ticular section, which you will find has a remarkable likeness to my
speech of May 8, 1942.
Now, the next part you call attention to is on page 24. This, as I
remember, had been brought up by witnesses before the committee but
not called to my attention in executive session. I will now deal with it.
Where did your quotation begin, Mr. Mandel?
Mr. Mandel. The second paragraph.
Mr. Wallace. Now if you will read the whole page, you will dis-
cover it is the third paragraph I used the words "subject Asia" as
synonymous with "colonial Asia" and this whole discussion is in terms
of whether or not a land is in a colonial possession.
You will also note with regard to the freedom of individual peoples,
that that is to some degree at least — the word can be used in different
senses, but with regard to freedom of individual peoples, that to some
extent was in my mind because I say in the part ]Mr. Mandel quoted :
Free Asia will include, first of all, China and Soviet Russia, which will form a
great area of freedom, and potentially a freedom bloc, which is to our interest
to have a freedom bloc in fact.
Certainly the Soviet Union, although I was not fully aware of it at
that time — I was to a considerable extent aware of it — but the Soviet
Union was certainly not practicing freedom with regard to many mil-
lions of individuals in Soviet Asia.
Mr. Morris. You did not say that, though, Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Wallace. No, but what I am saying here is "which is to our
interest to have a freedom bloc in fact." I do say it is not a freedom
bloc. The' inference is that there is not a freedom bloc at that time,
but it is to our interest to have a freedom bloc in fact.
Obviously, if the object of all my endeavors at this time was what
Stimson said his object was, to create maximum and cordial unity, I
would not, while in the process of fighting a war authorized by the
United States Senate in cooperation with Eussia, go out of my way to
antagonize that nation.
That simply was not in the cards in 1944. I just was not going to
do that. So I think the sense in which "free" is used here, you will
find if you read it over, is referring to whether or not a country is in a
colonial status.
Now what was 'the other page ?
Mr. Mandel. Page 28.
Mr. Wallace. Where does that begin?
Mr. Mandel. The first paragraph.
Mr. Wallace. You mean —
The Kussians had demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by i-e-
fraining from intervening in China's internal affairs.
That was definitely true at that time.
Mr. Morris. What about the activities of the Chinese Communist
Party. Do you not feel they were the actions of the Soviet Govern-
ment i
1304 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. That would require a great deal of testimony by
people who have been on the ground a long time, and then^ is con-
flicting testimony, very definitely conflicting testimony. That is, there
is testimony to the effect that Stalin did not like Mao Tse-timi^ at tliis
time at all. You can find testimony from the very highest sources
that Stalin called the Chinese Communists "brigands, robbers, and
Fascists," and many other names.
I am not going to quote this highest authority, but I can assure you
this quotation is an accurate one from the very highest authority.
Mr. Morris. At least you concede there is a conflict on this ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't say there is a conflict with regard to Russia's
interfering in China's internal affairs at that time. I don't think
there is conflict with regard to the accuracy of the statement appear-
ing in the pamphlet.
You are asking the question : "Were the Chinese Communists in 1944
controlled from Russia?"
In reply to your question, not with regard to what is in the pamph-
let, but in reply to your question, I will say there is conflict of testi-
mony as to the extent to which Chinese Communists at that time were
controlled from Russia. I think you ought to have somebody much
more expert than I in that field testify on that particular point.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, you say here
The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by their
willingness to refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs.
The question is, did not the activities of the Chinese Communists at
that particular time represent intervention on the part of the Soviets ?
Your answer is unqualifiedly "No." You later say there is conflict in
testimony. Did that conflict exist as of that time or is it a conflict
which exists at the present time ?
Mr. Wallace. The American observers, so far as I knoA^ — as far as
I can remember talking with them at the American Embassy — did not
feel that the Chinese Communists were under the control of Russia.
Now that is the best authority I know.
The Chairman. Wliat time was this ?
Mr. Wallace. That was in June of 1944. That was the feeling they
had at the Embassy, that they were not under the control of Russia.
It may be that they were. I just don't know.
Mr. Morris. You made the flat assertion in that booklet.
Mr. Wallace. That is the best knowledge I had. I did know tliat
the Russians had pulled out of Sinkian^, and it was to the best of my
knowledge that the Russians were not interfering at that time, that
the Chinese Communists were more or less autonomous.
Now subsequently events have happened more reoentlv. and T don't
think they have a bearing on what I wrote there. Subsequently
events indicate that in many cases Chinese Communists that people
thought were independent have not proved to be independent. I am
quite willing to say that. But at this time this was my belief, that
Russia was not intervening in the internal affairs of Cliina, and you
can find very reputable testimony to that effect, I am sure.
Senator Smith. Mr. Wallace mentioned the Embassy. Do vou mean
the American Embassy ?
Mr. Walt^ce. In Chungking.
Senator Smith. Was there any division of opinion among the people
at the Embassy? t, i f
INSTITUTE OP PACIFIC RELATIONS 1305
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember any on this particular point.
Mr. MoKRis. Who are the people who advocated the interpretation
you rendered ?
Mr. Wallace. Of course, when you try to reconstruct the specific
conversations 7 years ago, you can't.
Mr. MoRKis. We do not want you to do that.
Mr. Wallace. It would be my recollection that Ambassador Gauss
believed this very strongly. That is Ambassador Clarence E. Gauss,
our Ambassador at Chungking. That would be my recollection. Of
course, I did not have the benefit of his judgment at this date because
this was written in Apjril of 1944.
Mr. Morris. Before you went to China ?
Mr. Wallace. Before I went to China, so that does not enter into
this picture. I think we really ought to confine it to a discussion of the
pamphlet and the information I had available to me at that time.
The Chairman. Who, if anyone, accompanied you on that Chinese
trip?
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Chairman, should we finish up the other points
with regard to the pamphlet or not ? I am quite willing to go over this
if you wish.
The Chairman. That is all right. I have to leave. I want to ask
that question, who, if anyone, accompanied you on that trip?
Mr. Wallace. There was the crew of the plane. There was Owen
Lattimore. There was John Carter Vincent. There was John Hazard.
Those were the three I remember.
The Chairman. For some portion of the trip Mr. Alsop accom-
panied you ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes; he was on the plane, as I remember it, when
we flew from Kunming to Kweilin.
The Chairman. Alsop was designated by General Chennault, was
he not ?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
The Chairman. They accompanied you on this trip ?
Mr. Wallace. The only air part of the trip they accompanied me
on, so far as I recollect, is from Kunming to Kweilin.
The Chairman. Who in that group you mentioned were most in
yonr company during the entire trip?
Mr. Wallace. I would say John Carter Vincent was for most of
my trip. When we went through Soviet Asia John Hazard was most
of my company.
Senator Smith. Did they all leave with you, or did you meet some
of them over there?
Mr. Wallace. These three gentlemen left on May 20 here in Wash-
ington on the airplane to go over there.
Senator Smith. From questions asked it sounded like they might
have met you on the way.
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Alsop met me at Kunming and accompanied me
to Kweilin and back.
The Chairman. I ask to be excused. I have to make a call.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, at some time before Mr. Wallace
leaves the question of the pamphlet and without breaking into Mr.
Morris' questions, I have a series of questions to ask.
Senator Smith. You may reserve your right to ask them. '
Mr. Wallace. Now what was the next page?
1306 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Mandel. Page 30, Russian interest.
Mr. Wallace. Where is that on the page ?
Mr. Mandel. Right in the middle of the page.
Mr. Wallace. Yes; the third paragraph.
Russian interest in the Far East is not likely to be that of territorial expansion
Mr. Morris. Will you read the next sentence?
Mr. Wallace (reading) :
The Russians certainly want a friendly government in China and a friendly
government in Korea just as we do.
You see, at that time and for a number of years thereafter I felt
it altogether improbable that the Chinese and the Russians would
join up. I felt it improbable because I studied the history of that
part of the world to some extent and assumed that the Chinese having
seen the Russians in that steady march across Siberia, taking over
some land that had been inhabited by Chinese, would feel with re-
gard to Russia, especially the Northern Chinese would feel with regard
to Russia, in the same way that the Mexican people have felt in regard
to the United States ; and that from any long-run point of view it
was altogether improbable that there would be an effective continu-
ing cooperation between the Chinese and the Russians. .
I felt that very strongly, and I felt at this time very strongly that
the Russians, knowing the attitude of the Northern Chinese with
regard to them and liaving had that experience under Borodin inter-
fering in Chinese affairs, an experience that proved very disastrous
from the Russian point of view, would not engage in any type of
territorial expansion which Avould awaken the sleeping might of
China.
It begins to look, for the time being at any rate, that my size-up
as made in 1944 was incorrect. However, history is not yet fully
in, and there are fundamental forces at work there which I think are
yet to express themselves.
Now with regard to the Russians certainly wanting a friendly
government in China and a friendly government in Korea just as
we do, that means exactly what it says, and I think with regard to its
signifiicance we only have to think of our own situation where we
would like to have friendly governments on our borders, and we can
postulate that another great nation would feel the same way.
I go further and say. that we, the United States, also want a friendly
government in China and Korea. I think it is important that the
governments of China and Korea be as friendly, if there is going to
be peace in the world, be as friendly to the United States as Russia.
Russia will continue to insist on friendly governments, but we
also should insist on friendly governments there, if we can do it
without the loss of American boys.
Is there another page', by the way, Mr. Mandel ?
Mr. Mandel. No.
Mr. Wallace. Are there any other questions on Our Job in the
Pacific?
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony that you were not influenced in
any way by Communist propaganda by writing that pamphlet?
Mr. Wallace. The ideas are my own, so far as I can discover. I
have no reason for thinking that Mrs. Lattimore influenced what I
I
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1307
said in the direction of Communist propaganda, and I would cite
specifically the same thing I cited in the executive hearing.
Mr. Morris. You mean to imply, Mr. Wallace, that any influence
Mrs. Lattimore may have had on your writing would be Communist
propaganda?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't mean to insinuate
Mr. Morris. I think the record would give that impression.
Mr. Wallace. I certainly want to straighten that out because I
don't have any reason whatsoever for thinking that Mrs. Lattimore
was representing Communist propaganda. You gentlemen have met
her face to face, and I think you will agree she makes a very favorable
impression face to face.
I should like to introduce in the record at this time as an indi-
cation that if there was any Communist influence on the pamphlet,
and I don't see any evidence of it, that surely they were not influenc-
ing what I said about Chiang Kai-shek on page 29, in which I say :
The steadfast leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek, which has already
made China a world power, is an assurance that China's political aspirations
are not limited to her own, but stand for the hopes and the progress of all
Asiatic peoples.
Again it is a little hard to believe that if there were a Communist
in some mysterious way, not Mrs. Lattimore but say somebody else,
somebody elsewhere in the institute might have been reading the
manuscript proof and decided to eliminate or insert something, it is
a little hard to see how they could, if they were really on the job,
how they could have let get by on page 40 my statement with regard
to our strategic needs where I say :
It is probably safe to assume that the thought uppermost in the minds of our
Navy after the war will concern the importance of securing naval and air bases
which will insure our strategic control of the Pacific. Such bases would in all
likelihood be situated on small islands like the Japanese mandate.
These bases need not become an imperial menace to Asia. Our liberation
of the Philippines will outweigh our acquisition of new islands, and, unlike Japan,
we have neither the will nor the interest to project control over the mainland
of Asia.
Neither would our new island possessions mean a new colonialism, for their
population is so small and scattered that instead of problems of local national-
ism we would have problems of local trusteeship and economic welfare.
That is, I can't imagine anyone, who was really representing Russia
anywhere, wanting me to come out on the eve of this trip across from
Soviet Asia to China, with a statement for American bases on the
Japanese mandated islands.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I should like to have in the record at
this time the official Communist estimate, at least the estimate of the
pamphlet we have been discussing as it appeared in the Daily Worker
under the byline of Frederick V. Field.
Mr. Mandel, will you read from the article ?
Mr. Mandel. I read from the Daily Worker of June 24, 1944, page
7, headed "Today's guest column, Vice President Wallace's pamphlet
on the Pacific, by Frederick V. Field." I quote :
Vice President Wallace's pamphlet, Our Job in the Pacific, just published by
the Institute of Pacific Relations, is a progressive and statesmanlike approach
to problems of our foreign policy.
1308 INSTITUTE OF PACmC RELATIONS
He says that there is a "free Asia" and a "subject Asia" or "colonial Asia."
"It is to our advantage," Mr. Wallace says, "not to perpetuate this division but
to see an orderly process of transition so that the area of free Asia will grow and
the area of subject Asia continuallv diminish."
Then further Mr. Field says : .
I have studied and compared these sections of the Wallace pamphlet with
the chapter on national liberation in Asia in Earl Browder's Teheran, Our
Past in War and Peace. Both stand for the most rapid reconstruction of the
colonial system consistent with the maintenance of unity among the United
Nations.
Mr. Browder, however, carries the analysis several steps beyond where the
Vice President leaves off.
And finally in this review :
These two publications —
meaning Mr. Browder's and Mr. Wallace's —
mark an advance in the American thinking on the highly controversial problem
of colonies.
Mr. Wallace. I might say with regard to this, which was read
from the Daily Worker, first, that I never read the Daily Worker;
I couldn't have read this at this particular time even if somebody
had called it to my attention.
Mr. Morris. You say you could not have read it if someone had
called it to your attention ?
Mr. Wallace. I couldn't have read it even if someone had called
it to my attention because I wasn't in the country. Occasionally
people have called my attention to something that is in the Daily
Worker, but I have never read it myself, and they might have called
this to my attention if I had been in the country, but it was not called
to my attention. This is the first time I have heard it.
I might say that the indication is that Mr. Field was following
the Wallace line and not Mr. Wallace following the Field line, be-
cause most of that is a direct quotation from the pamphlet itself.
Now it is not a new thing for the Communists to try to get aboard
something and ride it for all they can. Anything which they may
think is respectable they will get aboard and try to ride it if they
can do so. So I attach nothing significant whatsoever to Mr. Field's
effort.
Senator Smith. You had not heard that before ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Senator Smith. Do you know whether Mr. Budenz at that time was
editor of the Daily Worker?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, Mr. Budenz was editor of the Daily Worker
in 1944. I have discovered that in some of my recent researches.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Mr. Wallace, there may be some confusion in the
minds of those who will read this record between the question of the
influence which the Institute of Pacific Relations had on this pamphlet
and the influence which the Communists had on the pamphlet.
I should like to direct myself, without any statement or implica-
tion as to the relationship between those two questions, solely to
the question of the influence of the Institute of Pacific Relations on
this pamphlet.
Mr. Wallace. I hope you will also ask what influence I had on the
pamphlet.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I think there are some loose ends hanging, sir.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1309
Mr. Wallace, Certainly.
Mr. SouRwiNE. CoiiM Mrs. Lattimore have been the first person
to contact you about this pamphlet?
Mr. Wallace. Frankly I don't know. She is the first person I
happened to remember, but I just don't know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I think you stated in executive session you could not
say whether she was or whether she was not.
Mr. Wallace. She was the first person I remember.
Mr. SotJRWiNE. She could have made the initial contact?
Mr. Wallace. She could have.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you known Mrs. Lattimore before the time she
contacted you ?
Mr. Wallace. To the best of my recollection I did not. I might
have met her socially.
Mr. Sourwine. When she came to you initially in comiection with
this pamphlet, so far as you recall now, was the first time you had met
her?
Mr. Wallace. That would be my impression.
Mr. Sourwine. Just when was it that you were asked by Mrs. Latti-
more or someone else on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations to
write this pamphlet?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say the precise date, but I would say in late
March or early April.
Mr. Sourwine. Of 1944?
Mr. Wallace. Of 1944.
Mr. Sourwine. You gathered a substantial amount of statistics in
connection with your portion of the pamphlet about the national in-
come as it affects the amount of imports into the United States and
exports from the United States to the Orient ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct. That was not done through Mrs.
Lattimore.
Mr. Sourwine. No, sir ; it is understood that was not, but I think
you testified you did do considerable research in the work.
Mr. Wallace. It was a field in which I personally was very much
interested. You see, I have had the view for many years, ever since
1909, in fact, that eventually the west coast would have as gi'eat a
significance for this Nation as the east coast. I gained that in talking
with a Mr. Beard, of the Sacramento Bee, who had served on the Coun-
try Life Commission with my grandfather in 1908.
I traveled through the West, and in talking with Mr. Beard he let
his imagination loose as to what would have happened if the Pilgrim
Fathers had landed on the west coast. I have always believed that
the west coast will have as great a significance to this Nation as the
east coast.
I had studied the figures very carefully as to the mounting per-
centage of our imports coming from the Far East and the possibility
of our exports to the Far East mounting through the west coast ports,
and entering into the rate of growth would be the volume of our cap-
ital exports because obviously the United States would be the only
country that could furnish the volume of capital exports that would
get this area of the world really clicking in a way it should click.
So that and the discussion of agriculture I very much wanted to
get across in this pamphlet in the most vigorous way possible.
1310 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. You have expressed in this pamphlet your theories
about the west coast and its probable ascendancy over the east coast?
Mr. Wallace. No, I don't put it that way.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Since it is entirely collateral to this discussion, may
I go on just a minute? I was only interested in the question of the
fact.
Mr. Wallace. I am not saying ascendency; I am saying equally
important.
Mr. SouRW^NE. But that question which you have now dis-
cussed
Mr. Wallace. Was a little bit to one side.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is not contained in the pamphlet.
Mr. Wallace. I don't believe so. It was in my motivation. I
guess you don't care to discuss motivation.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I have no objection, but at the moment I should
like to go ahead with these questions which I believe can be answered
rather quickly.
It took you how long, would you say, to gather these statistics (hat
you used in this pamphlet ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say roughly 2 or 3 weeks.
Mr. SouRAViNE. Can you tell us how long it took you to dictate the
pamphlet to Mrs. Lattimore?
Mr. Wallace. No. I was with her I would guess four different
times.
. Mr. SouRwiNE. About four times?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. It is a guess.
Mr. SouRWiNE. She came to see you on four different occasions?
Mr. Wall.\ce. I would say roughly. Of course when you are
under oath you get a little cautious about precise numbers.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right, and all we want is your best rec-
ollection. Was it a full day's session each time or a half -day or after-
noon?
Mr. Wallace. I would say roughly 2 or 3 hours would be my guess.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Two or three hours at a session ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. So you had 8 to 12 hours of dictation to her approxi-
mately ?
Mr. Wallace. That would be my rough recollection.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Over what period of time did you dictate to her?
Was it all consecutive, day after day ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did she come once or twice a week ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember. It was strung throughout the
month of April, it would be my recollection, and early May.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, there is a slight conflict in your testimony here
and your testimony in the executive session with regard to the matter
of whether Mrs. Lattimore took down what you said, and with the
permission of the chairman I should like to read about a quarter of a
page from the executive session testimony and ask the witness to com-
ment upon it.
Mr. Morris. Do you have the original manuscript, the original draft of your
dictation on this, by any chance, Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Wallace. I do not. I am positive I don't have.
^Ir. Morris. You do not remember to whom you dictated it first?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1311
Mr. Wallace. To Mrs. Lattimore.
Mr. Morris. She took it down?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
That is on pages 21 and 22.
Would you comment on that testimony ?
Mr. Wallace. That is accurate.
Mr. SouRwixE. By "she took it down" you do not mean she took it
down verbatim, that she took down verbatim what you dictated ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. SouB^viNE. She was simply making notes with regard to what
you had told her your views were ?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Your testimony today makes it clear that that was
what you intended.
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Now, sir, did Mrs. Lattimore thereafter produce in
draft form a draft comprising her expansion of what you had given
her as the ideas you wanted to go in the pamphlet?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Can you recall when she gave that to you, sir?
Mr. Wallace. No. I would say it finally was finished up along, I
would think, about the 10th of May. That is very rough.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you, sir, have her draft for your examination
before this thing went into proof ?
Mr. Wallace. It is my recollection that it was in manuscript form.
It might possibly have been in proof form, but I would think it was
in manuscript form because the time factor was very close, and it
was not finally published until after I had gone on my trip.
Mr. SouRwiNE. There was only one draft then, probably in manu-
script, but either in manuscript or in proof ?
Mr. Wallace. That is right. I w^ouldn't say one draft. Maybe
there was a carbon copy. I don't know as to that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not mean that. Carbons would still be the
same draft. I do not want to quibble with you. I am trying to find
out whether it is possible you saw both a draft and a proof. I
believe you established at the executive session that you saw only one
and you thought it was a manuscript draft.
Mr. Wallace. I think it was a manuscript draft.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not see both the manuscript and the
proof?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say positively on that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You remember only one?
Mr. Wallace. I just don't know. It was one or the other or both.
I think we will have to leave it that way.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That was submitted to you about the 10th of May ?
Mr. Wallace. Shortly before I left is all I can say.
Mr. Sourwine. When did you leave?
Mr. Wallace. On May 20.
Mr. Sourwine. Now how long did it take you to go over that draft
after it was submitted to you, Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I have no idea.
Mr. Sourwine. Did it take you a matter of weeks?
Mr. Wallace. Obviously not.
22848— 52— pt. & 5
1312 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did it take you a matter of days ?
Mr. Wallace. My guess is that I spent an evening or two eve-
nings on it; that is the way I usually do that kind of thing. That
is all I can say. That is my ordinary custom.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you make extensive changes in it ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you remember any changes you made ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say whether you did make any changes?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say "yes" or "no." I just don't remember.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You cannot say you did not make any ?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say I made any.
Mr. Sourwine. In other words, it is possible that j'-ou made no
changes in the draft which was submitted to you ?
Mr. Wallace. It is possible I did not.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. So it is possible that beginning with your dictation
over a period of 8 to 12 hours to Mrs. Lattimore of the ideas which you
wanted expressed in this, she subsequently returned with a draft on
which you spent an evening, and in which you may not
Mr. Wallace. An evening or two. I just have no recollection of it.
I am simply reconstituting this as best as I can from my habits, not
from positive recollection. I almost invariably do make changes in
this kind of thing — almost invariably do.
I would say on this occasion I did. After 7 years you cannot swear
positively as to just exactly what you did.
Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been Mr. Owen Lattimore who first
asked you to do this pamphlet for the institute ?
Mr. Wallace. I really don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. In other words, it could have been?
Mr. Wallace. It could have been ; I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you know anyone else in the Institute of Pacific
Relations besides Mr. and Mrs. Lattimore ?
Mr. Wallace. The only other person I remember knowing was Ed-
ward C. Carter, whom I had known since 1929.
Mr. Sourwine. Was it Mr. Carter who asked you to do this work ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't think so. He might have instigated it because
he did know me, and I think he had a respect for my agricultural
interest in the Far East.
Mr. Sourwine. You said you had not known Mrs. Lattimore before
she came to you with regard to this pamphlet?
Mr. Wallace. I don't think I had met her.
Mr. Sourwine. Had you known Mr. Lattimore before then ?
Mr. Wallace. I had met him once just before he went as adviser to
Chiang Kai-shek. So far as I know, that is the only time I met him.
Mr. Sourwine, That covers the point I wanted in the record, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, can you recall where these evening ses-
sions took place?
Mr. Wallace. I said I must have read it over— no, as far as I can
recollect the meetings with Mrs. Lattimore were in mv office here in
the Senate Office Building or over in the office in the Capitol. I don't
remember specifically which. Mrs. Lattimore was not with me when
I read over the manuscript, as neaj-ly as I can remember.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
1313
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, that is all we have on the question of
the booklet.
Mr. Wallace, you have been a member of the board of trustees of the
Institute of Pacific Relations?
Mr. Wallace. I was so informed. I have never checked this for
myself. I have never attended any board meeting. I was informed
by Alfred Kohlberg. He had written me in August 1950, that I had
been a trustee of the Board of the Institute of Pacific Relations for at
least 2 years.
In '1950, when he wrote me, I had no recollection of it whatsoever
and wrote him to that effect I had none. He said I had been in 1946
and one other year. I suppose in that case it might have been 1945,
and probably they asked me to go on as a result of the trip to Asia.
I do know that a list of the board of trustees in 1947 shows I was not
a member, and apparently when I retired from the Cabinet they felt
I was no longer of service to them and dropped me from membership
at that time. I never attended any meeting of the trustees of the
institute.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, purely for the purpose of the record, I
would like to introduce a photostatic copy of the list of the board of
trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations for the year 1946, which
shows, among many others, Henry A. Wallace under the heading
"Board of Trustees."
Senator Smith. All right.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 337" and is as
follows :)
Exhibit No. 337
American Council Institute of Pacific Relations
Chairman : Robert Gordon Sproul, Ex-
ecutive vice cliairman : Edward C.
Carter, Treasurer : Brooks Emeny,
Assistant Treasurer : Tillie G. Shahn,
Secretary: Marguerite Ann Stewart,
Chairman, research advisory commit-
tee: Owen Lattimore
Vice chairman, research advisory com-
mittee: Eugene Staley
Edward W. Allen
Raymond B. Allen
Christian Arndt
Paul S. Bachman
Pearl S. Buck
George Cameron
Edward C. Carter
Joseph P. Chamberlain
Allen E. Charles
Laughlin Currie
John L. Curtis
Joseph S. Davis
A. L. Dean
Len De Caux
Dorothy Douglas
Brooks Emeny
Frederick V. Field
Henry Field
BOABD OF TBUSTEES
Galen M. Fisher
G. W. Fisher
Charles K. Gamble
Mrs. Frank Gerbode
Huntington Gilchrist
Carrington Goodrich
Henry F. Grady
Mortimer Graves
John W. Greenslade
William R. Herod
John Hersey
Paul G. Hoffman
William C. Johnstone
Owen Lattimore
Herbert S. Little
Charles F. Loomis
Henry R. Luce
Charles E. Martin
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin
Abbott Low Moffat
Harriet L. Moore
George Abbot Morison
Lawrence Morris
A. W. Robertson
Chester Rowell
Robert Gordon Sproul
G. Nye Steiger
Donald Straus
George E. Taylor
Juan Trippe
Henry A. Wallace
Sumner Welles
Lynn White, Jr.
Bray ton Wilbur
Herbert J. Wood
Mrs. Louise L. Wright
1314
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
INTERNATIONAL OFFICERS
Grayson Kirk, Chairman,
Committee
Program
Edward C. Carter, Chairman, Finance
Committee
William L. Holland, Secretary
General
Percy E. Corbett, Chairman, Pacific
Council
Sir George Sansom, Chairman,
Research Committee
J. J. L. Duyvendak, Vice Chairman,
Research Committee
Mr. Wallace. May I add many other respectable names.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, have you written a book entitled "Soviet
Asia Mission"?
Mr. Wallace. I have.
Mr. Morris. Will you address yourself to the author's note? Will
you read that for us, please?
Mr. Wallace (reading) :
In acknowledgement of invaluable assistance in preparing the manuschipt
of Soviet Asia Mission, my sincere thanks are extended to : John Hazard, Owen
Lattimore, and Capt. Kennith Knowles for intimate observations of life in east
Asia today; Joseph Barnes, Harriet Moore, Albert Rhys Williams, Dr. Tred-
well Smith, and Myra Jordan for reading the text and offering editorial sug-
gestions ; and to Andrew J. Steiger, who compiled the book from the diary I
wrote during the trip and from the other factual material supplied him by me.
Henry A. Wallace.
Mr. Morris. Is your testimony that the people named in this
author's note did aid in the preparation of this book ?
Mr. Wallace. All I know is what Steiger told me. I did not take
the manuscript to any of these people myself. Steiger took it.
Mr. Morris. Do you know, Mr. Wallace, there is testimony before
this committee that four of the people so named there are
Communists ?
Mr. Wallace. You have so stated. I did not so know.
Mr. Morris. Do you wish to make any observation one way or the
other on that ?
Mr. Wallace. I merely say I myself did not come in contact with
these people and did not know three of these people; had never met
them, and to the best of my knowledge still have never met them.
Senator Smith. Is that sworn testimony ?
Mr. Morris. Yes, before this committee.
Senator Smith. It did not come by way of letters ?
Mr. Morris. That is sworn testimony before the committee.
Mr. Wallace, therefore, is it your testimony that this author's note
is not your own testimony, but it is what Andrew J. Steiger told you
about the preparation of this book ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct. Andrew J. Steiger got the informa-
tion for this book — you will note that the foreword says "with the
collaboration of Andrew J. Steiger."
The part of this book I wrote in its entirety has to do with
agriculture.
Mr. :Morris. Other than that, everything in the book was written
bv Mr. Steiger?
Mr. Wallace. I wrote, I think, a part of the introductory notes and
one or two other spots, but the part that I remember I did write in
its entirety has to do with agriculture.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1315
Steiger for the rest not merely relied on the notes that I furnished
him, but also used notes that he could get from other people on the
trip and anybodj^ else that he felt was an expert in this field. It was
in that connection apparently he had gone to these various people
and got them to read the manuscript to find if this was accurate or that
was accurate.
I did not take the manuscript to any of these people myself.
Mr, Morris. Why did you select Andrew J. Steiger to prepare a
book that was going to be published in your name?
Mr. Wallace. Andrew J. Steiger came to me as a newspaperman
and a broadcaster who had lived for some years in the Soviet Union
as a correspondent for certain of the American press, and I don't
remember now. I looked him up to this degree : to find who his ante-
cedents had been, and they were Americans for some generations, and
that he had been raised in the Lutheran Church, and I think had been
with either the Evangelical or Lutheran Evangelical Church.
He seemed to be a man of deep religious convictions and felt that
bringing out my observations on this trip across the Soviet Union
would further the friendly relationship between the United States
and Russia.
I felt very strongly on that subject myself, that everything possible
should be done to cultivate the friendly attitude in the postwar period,
and agreed with him that something of the sort would be helpful.
I don't just know when he came to see me. It was probably in late
1944 or early 1945.
Mr. Morris. Did anyone recommend him to you?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. It was a newspaper publisher who recom-
mended him to me.
Mr. Morris. Who was that?
Mr. Wallace. I again hate to embarrass anybody, but the news-
paper publisher who did recommend him to me was a Mr. Charles
Marsh, who publishes a number of papers in the South. Mr. Charles
Marsh had called my attention to a book by Steiger. This was prior
to my trip ; that Mr. Steiger had written a book with regard to the
growth of industry in the Soviet Asia in collaboration with somebody
else, whose name I have forgotten.
As I remember it, he gave me a copy of this book.
Mr. Morris. You don't know the name of that book ?
Mr. Wallace. No. It can readily be ascertained. It dealt with
the rapid expansion of population and industry and agriculture. I
have not read it since 1944.
After I returned, this newspaperman said —
I have gotten in touch with this man who wrote that book about the Soviet
Asia, and he would like very much to take any notes that you may have and
bring history up to date.
So, it rather embarrassed me. As I said in executive session, the
first draft of this which must have been gotten together sometime in
early 1945 was altogether unacceptable to the publisher and was un-
acceptable to me because it was bad English.
It was not because of any particular bias one way or the other.
That is from my point of view, because I was for cultivating the maxi-
mum friendly relations with Russia at that time, very strongly for it.
So, he did the job over again. He put a great deal of time on it.
1316 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
As I stated in executive session, it is my recollection I turned over
to him any royalties that had come from the book because he had done
practically all the work on it.
Mr. Morris. In your check of Andrew J. Steiger, did you discover
that he had written for the Daily Worker?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be appropriate if we
put an article by Andrew J. Steiger appearing in the Daily Worker in
the record, preceding the time of this incident we are taking testimony
on now. Would you accept into the record an item entitled "May Day
at Magnitogorsk""— and it is dated x\pril 28, 1934, page 11, of the
Daily Worker?
Senator Smith. For the purpose of identifying what?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace has testified he made a check of the quali-
fications of Andrew J. Steiger to prepare a book in Mr. Wallace's
name.
I asked Mr. Wallace if in making that check he had known that
Andrew J. Steiger had written for the Daily Worker. Mr. Wallace
said he did not.
I think it is appropriate that that article should go into the record
at this time.
Mr. Sourwine. To establish you were not asking a question about a
fact that was nonexistent.
Mr. Morris. That is right.
Senator Smith. Not for the purpose of connecting Mr. Wallace with
this particular article.
Mr. Morris. To bear on the pertinency of my question.
Senator Smith. That is all right.
(Document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 338" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 338
[From, the Daily Worker, New York, April 28, 1934]
May Day at Magnitogorsk
(By Andrew J, Steiger)
Magnitogorsk in bold relief is charted by a mountain, a blast furnace, and
workers. A metallurgist could estimate the quality of magnetic ore in its
mountain ; an engineer would evaluate the technical excellence of the blast fur-
nace, which is smelting the mountain of ore ; but a visiting traveler singles out the
workers, the builders and operators of the ore crushers, blast furnaces, rolling
mill, railroad yards, coke plant, and socialist city. This is especially true if one
visits Magnitogorsk on May Day, the international holiday of labor.
triumphant evening
The celebration of May Day begins the evening before May 1, a time of sober
reflections, exchange of compliments, awarding of honors for work well done. By
9 p. m. the workers of Magnitogorsk are gathered in the circular auditorium of the
circus. Lusty voiced young pioneers, on one side of the circus ring, sing out the
Song of the Drummer, The baritone voices of German foreign workers, stand-
ing with upraised fist, answer them from the opposite side, singing the Rote
Front. Speches begin, but somehow, content is unimportant; while the cere-
mony of the celebration impresses the workers and engrosses the visitors. Repre-
sentatives of the Society of Old Bolsheviks present a banner to the Magitogorsk
group of young Communists (Komsomols).
Comrade Sverdlova tells the Komsomols : "We cannot build slowly and easily
in the present day ; we must build quickly, insanely fast. The deepening crises
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1317
abroad, the threat of war, the quickened tempo of life, all demand that we work
speedily and create that which will counteract the dangers around us."
This fighter of the old generation of Bolsheviks challenges the eager youngsters
of the new.
Fadeev, leader of the local branch of the Young Communist League, responds,
"In our ranks," he says, "there is not one member who has failed to fulfill his
duties. All have gone over the work norms set up for them in the production
plan. The lowest percentage we have made is 123 percent and the highest is
190 percent. The brigade of Komsomols working on the excavator are the best
workers in the plant. Our members have done exemplary work in mastering
new knowledge and getting familiar with the new technique."
Tlie banner to be presented to the Komsomols bears a quotation from Lenin,
the slogan, "Learn to build ; in building, learn."
AN OLD BOLSHEVIK SPEAKS
Koksovaret, a whiskered warrior of the old generation, presents the banner.
With ardent fervor, he exclaims: "As I rode across the vacant steppe toward
Magnitogorsk and passed the ridge of the mountain, from where the smoking
forest of your furnace chimneys hove into view spreading over the rolling plain,
I was filled with ecstasy. This city of 250,000 persons, this expanse of mills,
factories, furnaces, have all appeared since I was last here in 1928 : when, with
other Bolshevik planners, I looked across a naked plain sloping away to the west
from an ore-ridged mountain. I thought of how governments built fortresses
to secure political fortunes, and of how we have built here an immense industrial
stronghold, ribbed by iron mountains, surrounded by treeless steppe. But, the
work of building is nearly over, now ; as patrons of Magnitogorsk Kombinat, w©
we must set new tasks for you. You now face the job of maintaing pig iron
production in the front ranks of world producers."
The ceremonial part of the celebration was concluded by Mueshkov, head of
Magnitogorsk Kombinat, who said:
"All the duties set us by the Society of Bolshevik Veterans will be uncondition-
ally fulfilled. Although our plan this year was larger than in 1931, we fulfilled
it 106 percent by April. "We now bend every effort to complete the rolling mill
so that we may turn the pig iron into rails and other fabricated steel products.
We plan to make many products now imported from abroad."
The ceremony of the giving of the banner is brief. The workers are awarded
for a task well done, the completion of the construction of a steel plant as large as
the United States Steel Corporation's plants in Gary, Ind. Those workers who
have built this giant of the 5-year plan, in the past 4 years now face a new
period in their collective life, a period in which they will master the huge pro-
ductive equipment which they have built.
Time slips by at 12 o'clock, a new day, May Day, begins with an artistic per-
formance. A pageant is staged portraying the history of May Day in the growth
of the working-class movements. It was a Red Day of struggle, sorrow, and
oppression. In pantomime the players depict the arrest of workers who dis-
tribute leaflets advertising May Day celebrations, show the raids of police
on May Day picnic outings of workers held in the forests, and the shooting of
workers in a street demonstration. Such was the past, but not all. For the first
May Day celebration at Magnitogorsk was held 4 years ago ; not a long time
since that day, when the pioneer workers gathered here to celebrate May Day
on the empty steppe where they were to build this roaring giant. May Day at
Mangnitogorsk in 1933 is suggested by a triumphal procession of workers led by
children, pioneers, and Komsomols. Youth takes the lead in this young Socialist
city with its young blast furnace ; youth celebrates the victory of the proletariat.
We file out the doors of the circus at 2 : 30 a. m., May 1. Clouds of smoke float
over the city and the stars of a clear night are thinly veiled. The noise of gas
exhausts and steam blowers is heard. An Iridescent glow from molten metal,
fired to a high temperature, lights up the outlines of the blast furnace. This
child of technique, born in the womb of the 5-year plan, charges on day and
night in the first flush of fiery youth, not stopping to rest or celebrate. The
workers who attend it this night are paid double wages.
THE DEMONSTRATION
In no other country can one see peaceful parades of workers, marching men
and women, where mere size, mere bulk of living bodies is so impressive. We,
visitors, stand on the grandstand with the party leaders and the plant managers.
1318 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Along the unpaved road on the right hillside, a marching line comes swinging
down, a line of people two and a half kilometers long. In the bright morning
sunshine, they march and sing, men, women, children ; pregnant women, women
with babes in arms, youth ; rarely does one see an old or crippled person.
All are young, with flushed and eager faces, with healthy, muscled bodies
dressed in bright garments and sport costumes. They march in from the left
across the center of the square. They come from all directions, along unpaved
roads whose mud is hard-stamped by the pounding of many feet. They file by
the grandstand in a line four abreast, in a steady stream for 1 hour and a quarter,
a line of 90,000 persons, over one-half the population of Magnitogorsk, an as-
sembly of the labor force which operates this great blast furnace, this mechanical
tool for smelting one-third the pig iron cast in the Urals.
MANY GROUPS TAKE PART
Looking steadily into the moving stream of persons passing by in front of the
grandstand, one sees banners flare up, sees the mass of people break down to
individuals, till separate groups of workers are identified and hailed by those on
the reviewing stand. The physical culturists in blue jerseys and dark trunks
pass by with springing steps or pedaling bicycles. Next, the metal workers ap-
pear, those workers who are rushing the rolling-mill section to completion. A
rousing cheer is raised for them. Then come the workers who built a dam more
than a kilometer long and 10 meters high, taking only 465 days to do it or less
by 3 months of the time given them to do it. The dam forms a lake 25
kilometers long; when building it, these men, working knee-deep in mud and
water, and when the temperature went as low as 35 below zero, poured con-
crete into the dam foundations which had been heated by steam pressure.
A group of assemblers file past, the welders who, hanging onto icy scaffolds
and facing a bitter winter wind that tore in from the open steppe, welded the
joints for the blast furnace gas lines. Some of them had slipped off and did not
march today; they were killed outright on the scrap iron cluttered about the
construction. Another one of those absent today had fallen off the scaffold
Unnoticed by the night shift and froze to death before aid reached him in the
morning. The section hands file past, builders of railroads and in their midst
are the Mongolian, oval faces of the Khirghizes, nomads of the steppes of the
Urals, and of Kazakstan, tribesmen of Ghenghis Khan who, caught in the en-
thusiasm of socialist construction, drifted to Magnitogorsk and now flow past
in this demonstration of the power of the workers' government.
FOREIGN WORKERS MARCH
Here comes the American, German, Polish, Italian workers and specialists,
who likewise were absorbed in the new fever of construction which goes on here
and everywhere in the Soviet Union. The first-aid ambulance goes by, represen-
tatives of medical science stamping out filth and vermin, the breeders of typhus,
that dread disease which raked the population of the Socialist city. Although
there is a circus here also, with camels and band wagons, the children are not
following it. The children are ahead, they lead the parade, they form perhaps
one-third of all those marching, they come from nurseries, kindergartens, 7-year
schools, factory-workshop schools, Technikums, etc.
Going by the grandstand, they proudly lift their banners, on which are inscribed
their school records, exhibited for the inspection of Comrade Tarakanova of the
city committee of the Communist Party. He shouts from the grandstand, "be
prepared." A roar of strident voices from the marching line answers back,
"Always ready."
Watching this demonstration, which lacks all suggestion of cheap exhibitionism,
with ears tuned to the strains of brass bands and the steady beat of marching
feet, one catches notes struck off the holiday key. A locomotive whistles on the
mountain to the left ; a trainload of crushed ore is ready to descend to the blast
furnace. The ore crushers rmnble faintly in the distance ; they dig into the
mountain of magnetic ore estimated to last for 40 to 70 years. The blowing of
gas pipes and the signals of the skip hoist mingle with the beat of marching
worlcers' feet. The blast furnace, a colt in years, is snorting and blowing,
charging into the mountain of ore ; it has a generation to smelt it down to pig
iron and fabricated steel. One feels the throb of tremendous forces let loose
on this prairielike parade ground. The ore will be smelted by the power of the
toiling masses who march by in this seemingly inexhaustible stream of humanity.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1319
WORLD PROLETARIAT
On the evening of May 1 the foreign workers and specialists gather with
Russian comrades to celebrate International May Day. They gather in a large
banquet hall, where pickled fish and cold meats are spread out beside bottles of
beers and light wines. The evening is one of noise making; yet, withall, a few
speeches are made and heard. An Italian specialist speaks in Italian. Although
none could understand more than two words of what he said, these two words
were enough to understand what he meant. He denounced the "fasciato" fiercely
and pleaded for the "proletariata." When the speech was translated into
English and German and Russian all were reassured that the ideas of fascism
and communism are sufficiently opposed and international to have meanings above
barriers of language and country.
A German worker speaks, an American, a Russian, all give a toast to Inter-
national May Day and wish long life to the world proletariat. They point out
that workers abroad were not free to celebrate as we do today ; that the work-
ing class there is still under the heel of capitalism ; while here, the proletariat
is creating a new society, a new industrial order. Notes of warning are struck
off. Wreckers had been discovered amidst those engaged in socialist construc-
tion. They charged all to be on their guard against the enemy abroad and
within the gates ; to be vigilant against those who would destroy the creations
of the proletariat. The banquet ends ; the music strikes up ; the guests dance
in hilarious fun making.
ON TO NEW YORK
Three of us go out into the cool night air. May 1 is over. It is 12 o'clock. We
walk toward the glow of the blast furnace. A guard halts us. We are without
passes. The Russian comrade speaks to the guard ; we pass on. At the furnace,
the gas exhausts thunder, deafening the -cars. One cannot hear a human voice
shouted within 3 inches of the ear. The molten stream of metal is pouring from
the belly of the plugged giant, a stream of molten iron so hot it burns through
steel columns, iron rails, concrete blocks ; anything but fire clay it ignites and
reduces to ashes. The furnace has been working all day, it does not sleep at
night, nor do the guardians of the workers' land.
An official comes in. He lifts a telephone receiver and informs headquarters :
"Today, May 1, the first shift poured 476 tons of pig iron and the second shift
poured 625 tons." Over 1,000 tons of pig iron poured while the workers were
on their holidays. While they rested and celebrated, the blast furnace was
busy smelting, smelting a mountain of ore, and the OGPU watched how many
tons it melted. We are dismissed. The blast furnace steams and smokes, blows
and flames, gobbles up carloads of ore and pours out a stream of molten iron.
When all four units are in operation it will melt in 1 year enough pig iron to
lay a railroad track around the world or more track than existed in all Russia
before the Revolution.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Might this be a good place to revert just a moment
to another matter which could be taken up, with Mr. Morris' per-
mission ?
If I may distract your attention from that, Mr. Wallace for
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; go right ahead.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I want to give you the opportunity to comment
upon one short excerpt of your executive testimony with respect to
which there might be some confusion in the face of your testimony
today, and ask you to comment on it.
In executive session Mr. Morris asked :
How is it that Eleanor Lattimore came into the picture?
Mr. Wallace. I don't really know. She came to see me, I know. She must
have been speaking for someone higher up in the institute, but who I don't know,
saying what a fine thing it would be to come out with my general expression
of views.
Then just a couple of questions after that, Mr. Wallace, I asked
you:
Could it have been Mr. Wallace, that Mrs. Lattimore was the first person
to contact you about this book on behalf of the Institute of Pacific Relations?
2320 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. It could be.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Had you known her before?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
That appears to be a conflict.
Mr. Wallace. I don't know that I knew her before. I think there
mnst have been an error because I couldn't have said "yes," and I
couldn't have been positive. It is probable I didn't know her before.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That should be pointed out.
Mr. Wallace. I think that should be corrected.
Mr. Morris. I would also like to point out the pertinency of this
book to the inquiries into the Institute of Pacific Relations.
The acknowledgment here mentions Owen Lattimore, Joseph
Barnes, and Harriett Moore. That has already been read.
As a result of this trip, and this book is purportedly a report on
that trip, Mr. Wallace, havino; become a member of the board of
trustees of the Institute of Pacific Relations
Mr. Wallace. Did you say I became a member of the board of
trustees as a result of this book ?
Mr. Morris. As a result of the trip. Didn't you say, Mr. Wallace,
that you supposed because of the fact you were taking this trip the
institute had asked you to become a member of the board of trustees ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; that is what I said. Possibly it is stating it a
little too bluntly. Should we say because of my sudden emergence
because of the trip I had begun to appear in their eyes as someone
that would be good to have on the board of trustees.
I also testified in executive session, you may remember, that Edward
Carter had asked me to go to a meeting of the institute in 1929 in
Japan. So perhaps it was not exclusively as a result of the trip, be-
cause Edward Carter had felt that I was an appropriate person to be
connected with the institute for a number of years, apparently.
It goes back as early as 1929.
Mr. Morris. Also, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wallace, I would like to
point out, has asked for this hearing today principally because of
some testimony concerning the trip of which this book is a report.
Mr. Wallace. However, this book is a report not of the section
concerning which I asked to be heard. This book is a report of the
trip through Soviet Asia and the part which has been brought up
before this committee has to do with my trip in China. The book says
very little about the trip to China.
Senator Smith. Have you finished, Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Wallace. I was making the point that I am not coming here
as a result of what I am writing, what is written in this book on the
mission to Soviet Asia. My appearance before the committee is be-
cause of certain statements that have been made with regard to my
trip to China, not with regard to my trip to Soviet Asia.
Mr. Morris. I do not think your testimony restricted your trip to
China. We are talking about the fact that there were Communists
guiding you on your trip. I do not think the testimony restricted
any part of the trip.
I think it referred to the whole trip.
Mr. Wallace, I have not had the advantage of going over the
testimony in detail. I had my counsel consult the record to get certain
points, to get as much as they could in the short space of time avail-
able.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1321
So I am not familiar with your full record.
Mr. Morris. You purported to quote from the testimony of one of
the witnesses concerning this trip,
]Mr. Wallace. Yes. I got from the newspapers a certain amount
of the testimony, but it seemed to have to do with China rather than
witli my trip to Soviet Asia.
That was the part I had.
Senator Smith. Can we not have the understanding that if, upon
further examination of the record, there is anything in there that
Mr. Wallace wishes to testify about, that he will be given an opportu-
nity to do so ?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read certain portions of that
book that we have decided to put into the record today ?
Mr. Mandel. I read from Soviet Asia Mission, by Henry A. Wal-
lace, published in 1946, page 117.
Mr. Wallace. On the front it is by Henry A. Wallace "with the
collaboration of Andrew J. Steiger." That is the way it appears here,
if you will notice.
Mr. Mandel. The portion reads :
The spirit and meaning of life in Siberia today is certainly not to be compared
to that of the old exile days.
Mr. Morris. What page is that ?
Mr. Mandel. Page 117. [Eeading:]
Before 1900 one foreign gentleman of respected nationality visited Siberia and
returned to the Western World converted to the benefits of the Czarist system of
exile. The political prisoners, he maintained, were a shiftless lot of vagabonds
who, to avoid the righteous discipline of hard work, ^ed into the woods v.here
they did notliing but rest. (Stalin escaped from exile seven times.) The Rus-
sians generally, this gentleman felt, were a lazy people without enough seichas
in them. Even in the Siberian mines he found this true ; the convicts loafed in
chains. To his way of thinking Czarism was too soft in its treatment. The con-
victs should be forced to work harder. To be whipped was good for their erring
souls, the reverend gentleman said. The people of Siberia today are a hearty,
vigorous race, but not because they are whipped into submission. The only whip
driving them is the necessity to master a vast new land. In the past all of
Russia, not just the miserable convicts in Siberia, was beaten lime and again as
Stalin has never ceased saying, by its economic and political backwardness, by
being -50 years behind the times. The need to catch up with the advanced in-
dustrial nations is the force behind the great stirring movement among all the
people of today's Soviet Asia. Awareness of that need is what makes them work
so hard. But they also know how to laugh and play and sing, as we learned
during our leisure hours among them.
Mr. Wallace. Could I comment seriatim instead of having a lot of
it piled up ?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. I may say, so far as I know, this was written by An-
drew Steiger. He was the one who used the phrase ''seichas," con-
tinually. He used it in several places in the book. Just what pre-
cisely the translation of "seichas" is, I don't know. It is a very clear
indication to me that Andrew Steiger wrote this as he did practically
all of the book.
I may say, to me when I read the book over, as I read it over on
the job in the Pacific that this reflected the situation as I saw it when
I was there.
I may say that the book by Elinor Lipper, I have no doubt is sub-
stantially correct.
1322 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Incidentally, I may say the original book in German is a much fairer
book, so far as I am concerned, than the translation into English. I
have had that checked.
With regard to slave-labor camps in Magadan, she calls it Potemkin
Village in the German, which is the correct name. She does not indi-
cate anyway in which I could have known that there was slave labor at
Magadan.
My object on the trip in conformity with the spirit indicated by Sec-
retary Stimson was to promulgate the maximum of friendship and
the maximum of war effort on the part of the Russians.
I was not going out of my way to find slave labor, even if I had
thought there was slave labor there at that time. There was no evi-
dence that I could see slave labor at Magadan where Elinor Lipper
was. I do not question the accuracy of Elinor Lipper's testimony.
There is no question whatever but what the Russians did every-
thing they could to impress the Vice President of the Nation which
had helped them save their lives, as in fact, we had by otir many
billion dollars of lend-lease. They were going all out to impress me.
I don't know to what extent they saw that at every stage of the
road there were people present who could convey this kind of im-
pression, but they did wherever I was.
I visited experiment station after experiment station, and collective
farm after collective farm. Always it created a favorable and a free
impression that — well, Willkie testified in exactly the same way that
they were a pioneer people just like the kind of people he had known
in the Middle West back in the time of his boyhood ; that Mike Cowles,
who accompanied Wendell Willkie, testified they were a magnificent
pioneer race.
So this statement of Andrew Steiger is not necessarily the exclusive
possession as of 1944 of Communists. This attitude is not necessarily
the exclusive possession of Communists because you know from talking
with Willkie and Mike Cowles on their return that they had an atti-
tude very similar to that.
Mr. Morris. Who else was with them?
Mr. Wallace. Joe Barnes was with them. It may be Joe Barnes
politically and utterly subverted Wendell Willkie. There is always
that possibility. I don't think we ought to agree to that offhand.
Mr. Morris. You made reference to Elinor Lipper's book. I would
like to read into the record that portion of a book that relates to your
trip to Magadan.
Mr. Wallace. I might say that after you introduce that, I would
like to introduce into the record an article in the Catholic Digest that
it printed in justice to me with regard to Elinor Lipper, the Catholic
Digest of October. It is up at the farm. I would like to get it to you
to introduce.
I see that I have a copy here. I can turn it over to the committee.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you read the portions designated in
that extract of the Lipper book ?
Mr. Mandel. I read from a reprint from the Reader's Digest of
June 1951 from an article entitled "Eleven Years in Soviet Prison
Camps," a condensation from the book by Elinor Lipper. I read from
pages 12 and 13 :
No other visit ever aroused so much excitement as Henry Wallace's visit to
Kolyma during the war. Some time before, a persistent rumor warmed the
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1323
souls 0/ the freezing prisoners ; in return for help in the war, the Soviet Union
was going to cede Kolyma to the United States. Even the soberest and most
reasonable of the prisoners conceded the possibility, and long discussions were
held as to whether the prisoners would also be turned over to America. It was
a typical prisoners' fairy tale, as absurd as it was tenacious. And it received a
tremendous stimulus when news came of the impending visit of the American
Vice President.
The NKVD carried off its job with flying colors — Mr. Wallace saw nothing
at all of this frozen hell with its hundreds of thousands of the damned. In
honor of Mr. Wallace the wooden watchtowers were razed in a single night.
Every one of the thousand prisoners in the camp at the port of Magadan at
the time owed Mr. Wallace a debt of gratitude. For it was owing to his visit
that for the first and last time the prisoners had three successive holidays.
During his stay, not a single prisoner was allowed to leave the camp.
This was not enough. Although the route for Mr. Wallace and his suite was
carefully prepared in advance, there was still the possibility that by mischance
the visitor would catch sight of the prisoners iu the camp yard — which would
not have been an edifying spectacle. Therefore, on orders from above, movies
were shown to the prisoners from morning till night for 3 days. No prisoners
went walking in the yard.
Then further, I read :
Mr. Wallace was also gratified to note the rich assortment of Russian mer-
chandise in the shop windows of Magadan. He made a point of going into a
store to examine the Russian products. But the citizenry of Magadan were
even more amazed than Mr. Wallace at the Russian goods that appeared over-
night in the shop windows, because for the past 2 years all the — strictly rationed — •
goods which could be bought had been of American origin.
Then further :
In his book Soviet Asia Mission, Mr. Wallace speaks with admiration of the
mushroom growth of Magadan; he does not say — or does not know — that this
city was built solely by prisoners working under inhuman conditions. He also
admires the 350-mile Kolyma Road that runs from the port northward over
the mountains ; he does not say — or does not know — that tens of thousands of
prisoners had given their lives in building it.
Mr. Wallace says that NKVD Camp Commander Ivan Nikishov "gamboled
about, enjoying the wonderful air immensely." It is too bad that Wallace never
saw him "gamboling about" on one of his drunken rages around the prison
camps ; raining filthy, savage language upon the heads of the exhausted starving
prisoners; having them locked up in solitary confinement for no offense
whatsoever.
Further :
In the party accompanying Mr. Wallace was Dr. Owen Lattimore, who rep-
resented the Office of War Information.
An article New Road to Asia, written by Dr. Lattimore, was published several
months after his return in the National Geographic Magazine (December 1944).
In it Dr. Lattimore says :
"Political oppression under the czars
Mr. W.\LLACE. Could I interrupt to ask you if it is really pertinent
to read that about Lattimore?
Mr. Morris. Yes, it is.
Senator SMrrii. We will see in a minute.
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
"Political oppression under the czars was so harsh that the mildest liberals
were often sent into distant exile. For this reason university professors, doc-
tors, and scientists and intellectuals of all kinds were among the earliest exile
prisoners of Siberia."
If Dr. Lattimore was really interested in political oppression, why did he not
inspect the hundreds of camps in Kolyma where contemporary "pioneers of
Siberia" are starving to death? Why did he not ask the present-day "inteUec-
tuals of all kinds" why they are being physically and mentally crushed in the
gold mines of Kolyma? Nowhere on the face of the earth is there a country
1324 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
like Kolyma, where the entire population is made up of victims of Qolitical
oppression.
Senator Smith. Who wrote that?
Mr. Mandel. That is a condensation from a book by Elinor Lipper.
We have the book. It is entitled "Eleven Years in Soviet Prison
Camps."
Senator Smith. She was an inmate?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
Senator Smith. She wrote that after?
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
Senator Smith. After reading Mr. Wallace's book?
Mr. Mandel. Yes. She is now in this country.
Senator Smith. We are not going to charge her statements in there
against Mr. Wallace, are we? What has that got to do with this
particular inquiry?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wallace has asked to testify con-
cerning the fact that Communists guided him on his trip through
Asia and China. This is one episode in Mr. Wallace's trip through
Asia. It bears on that point.
Senator Smith. I was thinking that might be comparable to one
of us being conducted through one of the Federal prison camps. Cer-
•tainly the keepers of the prison would not show us the disagreeable
things — those things they would not want us to see.
Mr. Wallace. I think it is right to have this in the record, provided
I am allowed to make a comment.
Senator Smith. Certainly. I am trying to get the connection of
her statement with this hearing.
Mr. Wallace. I am glad to have it in the record.
Mr. Morris. I think we should have that last section more fully,
the part about Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Mandei.. I read from page 114 of the book, "Eleven Years in
Soviet Prison Camps", by Elinor Lipper, entitled "Owen Lattimore's
Report" :
An article New Road to Asia, written by Dr. Lattimore, was published several
months after his return in the National Geographic Magazine, December 1944,
pages 641 to 676. If his report to the Office of War Information was in sub-
stance the same as this article, the Office could scarcely have profited by his
work. Since it cannot be assumed that Lattimore is naturally a poor observer,
he must on this trip have voluntarily refrained from making use of his talent
for observation. Instead of telling us what he has seen, he hands out unexamined
Soviet propaganda.
Mr. Morris. This, Mr. Chairman, bears on whether or not on this
trij) Mr. Wallace was subjected to Communist influence.
Senator Smith. This woman is not sworn here. She had not been
brought here to testify where she got this information.
Mr. Morris. This is a narrative of her experiences in the camp.
Senator Smith. It is unsworn. If it is of any probative value at
all, and I have not seen where it is — maybe it does have some relation-
ship— should we not have the woman sworn rather than taking her
unsupported statement ?
Mr. Morris. We called her yesterday and asked if necessary would
she be available for testimony. Actually the International Relief
Committee now is taking her around the country. They have protested
our calling her.
If you so direct, I will send a sub])ena to her and have her come in.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1325
Senator Smith. They are going to take her around and show her the
good parts.
If Mr. Wallace has no objection and wants to answer, he may.
Mr. Morris. If Mr. Wallace thinks it is necessary, we will have
her come in.
Mr. Wallace. I do not think it is necessary to have her come in. I
do not question the accuracy of what she testified.
There is only one point and that was not read, the accuracy of which
I would question. That is where she says I was deceived by certain
of the people on a hog farm. I know something about hogs and I do
not think Mrs. Lipper was there at the hog farm. I think she is a little
bit outside her field of competence on that.
Aside from that I don't have any reason to doubt her testimony.
Senator Smith. She is trying to hit you on your strong point.
Mr. Wallace. The point I wanted to make was there was an article
on page 44 of the Catholic Digest of last July which in the way it was
handled indicated that I should have been able to see the eviclence of
slave labor at Magadan. It was essentially the same article that ap-
peared in the Reader's Digest, but there was some caption that indi-
cated I should have been able to see what was going on.
I went around out West to see Father Bussard who published the
Catholic Digest at St. Paul and talked with him. I found him a very
fine gentleman. He agreed to publish my statement and indicated that
he himself had been at Buchenwald before World War came and it
was all remarkably sanitary and fine and there was no way to tell at
that time what it was later to be.
It was one of the German concentration camps. He was in complete
sympathy with what I had said. This is what he printed on page 44
of the October issue of the Catholic Digest, headed, "Henry Wallace
states the facts." [Reading:]
(The article, Wallace in Sovietlancl, in the July Catholic Digest, p. 46, implied
that the slave-labor camps should have been recognized by the American party
that visited it. This note from Mr. Wallace explains why it was not. — Ed.)
There was not the slightest evidence of a slave-labor camp at Magadan when
I was there in May of 1944. Elinor Lipper is very careful to avoid saying that I
saw or could have seen any evidence of a slave-labor camp. I am sure that the
editors of the Catholic Digest could not have seen any evidence of a slave-labor
camp if they had been in our party.
I went to Magadan on my way to China in 1944 because John Hazard, liaison
officer of the Division of Soviet Supply in Lend-Lease, wanted to see how it was
being handled. Hazard spoke Russian, and we went together to the warehouses
and docks to see how the material was being handled. Undoubtedly the Russians
went all out to make a favorable impression on the Vice President of the Nation
which had supplied them with so many billions of dollars of vital goods in their
hour of greatest need.
Owen Lattimore was not a member of my personal staff. He was selected and
sent with us by Elmer Davis to represent the Office of War Information.
In those days, Roosevelt, not knowing whether the atom bomb would go off and
not knowing whether the second front in France would be a success, was gravely
concerned as to what would happen to our long-time, over-all strategy if Russo-
Jap hostilities broke out before Germany was defeated. My purpose in visiting
China via Soviet Asia in 1944 was to win the war against Germany and Japan
and not to engage in espionage nor investigate slave-labor camps. It was not
until long afterward that testimony began to pile up from those who had formerly
been in these camps. It now seems to be clear that the Soviets treat political
prisoners in a severer way than the czarist regime.
Mr. Morris. Have you any questions in connection with Mr. Wal-
lace's trip, Mr. Sourwine ?
1326 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have a few questions in connection with the trip.
Thej do not have anything to do with Magadan.
How long before May 20 when you left did you know you were
going to go ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say it would be early March that I learned
that I was going to go.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You knew you were going to go before you were
approached with regard to this pamphlet ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, definitely.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You mentioned the name of Joe Barnes a moment
ago and his presence with Mr. Willkie on his trip around the world.
I believe in executive session you testified that you had seen Mr.
Barnes only two or three times between the time of his return from
the Willkie trip and the time when he visited you just before you left
on your trip.
Mr. Wallace. That would be my recollection.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr, Barnes was not a close friend of yours?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us why Mr. Barnes visited you just
before you left on your trip ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember. The only thing I remember about
it was we spent our time talking about Alaska. That was because he
had brought in the general who had constructed the Alcan Highway
in Alaska. I have forgotten his name. The general had left with me
the diary of the man who had built the telegraph line in 1866 or there-
abouts across Alaska and also in Soviet Asia with the idea that they
were going to get communications across that way instead of by the
under-water cable that was a little later laid.
His contact with me at that time was with regard to Alaska, which
he knew was a passion with me, that I felt it was vital we get Alaska
filled up with people as fast as we could.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Barnes' visit, then, did not have anything to
do with your forthcoming mission ?
Mr. Walt^ce. No. I can't say that positively. I have no recollec-
tion of anything except Alaska with regard to him.
Mr. Sourwine. You testified in executive session, did you not, that
you saw Mr. Lattimore in connection with your China mission in April
1944?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; I think I must have seen him in April 1944.
Mr. Sourwine. At that time did you know he was going with you ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know when I learned. I know very early in
the game President Roosevelt suggested he was a great expert on that
long boundary line and the way in which the tribes had operated back
and forth across that line would likely affect the future peace of the
world. He thought Lattimore was a great expert in that field. I am
sure Roosevelt suggested Lattimore's coming with me, that he was the
first. I am sure he was the first to suggest that Lattimore go with me.
Mr. Sourwine. That was, you think, perhaps as early as April or
before that time?
Mr. Wallace. I would think it would be some time in April. It
might have been in March. He was very keen about Lattimore going.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Lattimore's contact with you in 1944, then,
which you testified, was his first contact since 1941 and was a renewal
in contemplation of the trip you were to make together?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1327
Mr. Wallace. Of course.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall any other Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions people who came along to see you about that time?
Mr. Wallace. I was not acquainted with the group aside from Ed-
ward Carter and one contact with Owen Lattimore, then the contact
with Mrs. Lattimore.
I do not know that I could name any others I knew at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You knew Mrs. Lattimore was IPR, of course?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Mr. Lattimore was IPR?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't think of him in that connection. I couldn't
say positively I knew he was IPR at that time. It would seem
to me in retrospect I ought to have known and possibly did know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you know Mr. Barnes was connected?
Mr. Wallace. No, until you stated in executive session.
Mr. Sourwine. It is your testimony now you do not recall any
other persons who came to see you about that time whom you knew
to be connected with the IPR ?
Mr. Wallace. No. I can't remember a single point.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, there are several other extracts I
would like to have read at this time and one in particular I should
like to have Mr. Wallace answer some questions on.
Senator Smith. All right.
Mr. Mandel. I read from page 142 of the same book, Soviet Asia
Mission. These are excerpts from an address on June 15, 1944.
Preceding that, we find that it says in printing this talk the Soviet
press noted tliat the audience follow^ed it with rapt attention and
. greeted the concluding words with prolonged applause. The speech
says, in part :
Under Marshal Stalin's wise leadership and inspired by the patriotic will to
improve the life of the homeland the multinational Soviet peoples have shown
that for them nothing is impossible. For a long time the world has known
of their high morale and democratic aspirations. In your land you have cher-
ished science, literature, and art, raising them to unrivaled heights, and the
great men you respect belong to all humanity.
Mr. Wallace. Please continue to read the next paragraph, if you
will.
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
People everywhere in the world honor Mendeleyev, Machnikov, Pushkin, Leo
Tolstoy, Glinka, Moussorgsky, Tschaikovsky.
I mi^ht say these are all non-Soviet writers and artists.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Mandel, will you identify the book from which
you are reading?
]Mr. Mandel. I am reading from Soviet Asia Mission, by Henry A.
Wallace and Andrew J. Steiger.
Mr. Wallace. Page 142.
Mr. Mandel. Yes.
I read now from page 147 of the same book.
Alma-Ata, June 19 (Tass).- — The Vice President of the United States of
America released the following statement for publication in the press :
"On my departure from your hospitable country, I want to express my hearty
thanks for the cordial reception shown me everywhere. I am especially grate-
ful for the thoughtful courtesy shown by S. A. Goglidze, representing the Khaba-
rovsk Territorial Executive Committee ; by L. A. Malinin, representing the Novo-
122848— 52— pt. 5 6
1328 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Sibirsk oblast Executive Committee ; by A. Z. Kobulov, representing the Uzbek
Government, and by D. S. Chuvakhin and G. G. Dolbin, representing the Min-
istry for Foreign Affairs."
Mr. MoEKis. Will you read that part about the toast that Mr. Gog-
lidze proposed?
Mr. jMandel. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. Shall we clean this up first ?
Mr. Morris. Go ahead.
Mr. Wallace. These are extracts from speeches I made with the
object of cultivating the greatest possible friendship with the Russian
people in order to get them to put forth the greatest magnitude of war
effort. They had been pushed back so far in European Russia that it
was especially important to strengthen the morale in Asiatic Russia.
I was going all out to do that in the kind of language which they
understand, which is a very extravagant kind of language. That is
exactly what I was doing here. I don't think there is any other com-
ment necessary except it was completely in line, except what I thought
was necessary for the war effort.
Senator Ferguson. What was the date of that release ?
Mr. Wallace. The date of the release
Mr. Mandel. June 19, 1944.
Mr. Wallace. Shall we go to the other one now ?
Mr. Mandel. On page 172 of the same book :
One night at dinner the Russian airman, Mazuruk, proposed a toast to the
modernization of China. Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification.
Mr. Morris. Will you identify who Goglidze is ?
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Goglidze was the head of the whole far-eastern
area. He was a Georgian who was said' to be a close friend of Stalin.
I do not know that there is anything further to say about him except
he was the top man in that part of the world.
Senator Ferguson. A Communist?
Mr. Wallace. I did not conduct an investigation.
Senator Ferguson. You assumed that? I did not ask you whether
you conducted an investigation.
Mr. Wallace. I assumed everyone with me was a devoted Com-
munist in the very highest graces with the Politburo.
Senator Smith. That Georgian you were talking about was Georgia,
Russia, and not Georgia south of Carolina.
Mr. Wallace. Maybe for purposes of the record, if you do not object
to these interpolations, that everybody designated by the Russian
Foreign Office to come with me must have been not merely a Com-
munist but a man whom they had double checked as being the very
best kind of a person to send with me.
Senator Ferguson. For propaganda purposes?
Mr. Wallace. For all purposes. One for this, one for that and
the other. That is to be expected.
"Wlien any man goes to any foreign nation you expect that.
Senator Smith. Just like we would send good Democrats if we
wanted to show off here to some stranger.
Mr. Mandel (reading) :
Goglidze immediately suggested a logical modification : "May China remain
in the war." Without victory over .Japanese militarism, China could hardly
have the necessary freedom for modernization. At dinner, after our return
from China, Goglidze offered a significant toast to "Owen Lattimore and John
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1329
Carter Vincent, American experts on China, on whom rests great responsibility
for China's future.
Then, on the next page, 173, I read one more excerpt. _ The future
of Japan was the topic of discussion which John Carter Vincent wants
initiated.
'"^^Hiat should be done with Japan after the war ?" he asked.
"The same as with Germany," one Russian present replied.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Wallace, do you consider this toast of suffi-
cient importance that you must have made a memorandum of it at the
time that it was made ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
I may say that insofar as I can find in my memorandum the word
^'significant" was not mine. It was Steiger's.
Senator FerCxUSON. You approved the script, and outside the word
"significant"
Mr. Wallace. They were not in my notes.
Senator Ferguson. You were impressed at the time this Russian
was proposing a toast?
Mr. Wallace. I may say Goglidze made three or four other toasts,
one to me, one to Roosevelt, and they went the rounds. It was one
of those regular Russian situations where you toast everybody under
the sun.
Senator Ferguson. That is to enable you to consume the vodka?
Mr. Wallace. I had begged off on that. I may say.
Mr. Sourwine. In line with Senator Ferguson may I read two ques-
tions of the executive testimony and ask Mr. Wallace to reaffirm them
here?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. SouRAViNE. This episode had been discussed and Mr. Morris
said to the witness : "Can you recall that episode?"
Mr. Wallace had stated :
I am sui"e this is taken directly. I am sure Goglidze gave just exactly that
toast.
Mr. Morris said:
That quotation is from notes you gave Steiger?
Mr. WALI.ACE. It must have been.
Mr. Morris. Do you recall the episode?
Senator Ferguson. It happened, did it not?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; it happened.
Mr, Wallace. That is all quite accurate. I did not put on the word
"significant."
Senator Ferguson. It impressed you this Russian Communist was
toasting these two men in relation to their work?
Mr. Wallace. As he did everybody else.
Senator Ferguson. Wliy did you not then put in your book the
other toasts ?
Mr. Wallace. Because I didn't know about this hearing.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the only reason ? Do you think if you
thought there would have been a hearing here you would have put the
other toasts in ?
Mr. Wallace. I think in all fairness — I would say the other toasts
ought to have been put in. If it were going to be a documentary
affair, the whole thing should have been included.
1330 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
There were a vast number.
Incidentally, Goglidze did this very subversive thing. He toasted
the reelection of Roosevelt. It was a terrible kind of thing to do,,
but he toasted his reelection.
Senator Ferguson. I do think there is some significance to this
particular toast. Here was a man in Eussia that was toasting men in
relation to their work in China. I am going to ask you whether or not
he included in the toast that he proposed for you anything about your
work in China ?
Mr. Wallace. I do not remember that he included about my work
in China. I think his toast to me was : "May Mr. Wallace come to
Moscow after the war."
I came back with, "May you come to Washington after the war."
Mr. Morris. Was that selection of the toast for the book your
selection or Steiger's selection?
Mr. Wallace. Steiger's. It was not my selection.
Mr. SouRwiNE. May I offer, as we have before, a short quotation:
from the executive testimony ?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The question was addressed to you, Mr. Wallace:
Did you transcribe in your notes the text of all the toasts, 20 or 30 toasts given
that evening?
Mr. Wallace. No.
You were selective about it and you put this one in your notes so it must have
impressed you at the time as being of some significance?
Mr. Wallace. It must have.
Mr. Wallace. There were several other toasts I put into my notes.
Mr. Morris. You agree this was the significant one?
Mr. Wallace. Steiger thought so.
Mr. Morris. Do you agree you also thought it was significant on
the basis of what Mr. Sourwine just read ?
Mr. Wallace. That is neither here nor there because I have verified
there were other toasts.
I wasn't positive at that time. There were other toasts.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, do you know what was meant by the
expression "on whom rests great responsibility for China's future"?
Mr. Wallace. I can't read his mind.
Mr. Morris. You do not know what he meant ?
Mr. Wallace. Of course not. Wlio knows what anybody means at
one of these toasting affairs ?
Mr. Morris. You testified that was a significant toast.
Mr. Wallace. It is significant that Steiger selected it. That is the
significant thing, and that he put the word "significant" in. I think
that is significant. What it proves, I don't know.
Senator Jenner. I would like to have the executive hearings read
on this whole thing about the toast, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. If you could tell at what hour of the evening these
coasts were given, that might give some insight, too.
Senator Jenner. The first part you read, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Wallace. I will venture to say I was the only one there that
would remember.
Senator Smith. Let him read that part.
Mr. Sourwine. I read from page 40 of the executive hearings :
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, there is just one point I would like to ask you about
in this work. On page 172 you make reference here to a dinner at which Mr.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1331
Goglidze, an intimate friend of Stalin, offered a significant toast to "Owen
Lattimore and Jolin Carter Vincent, American experts on China on whom rests
great responsibility for China's future."
Can you recall that episode?
Mr. Wallack. I am sure this is taken directly. I am sure that Goglidze gave
just exactly that toast.
Mr. MoRBis. That quotation is from notes you gave Steiger?
Mr. Wallace. It must have been.
Mr. Morris. Do you recall the episode itself?
Senator Ferguson. It happened, did it not?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; it happened.
Mr. Morris. Can you recall anything more about it?
Mr. Wallace. As I remember it, we had been in China and we were trying
to get back to the United States as fast as we could. We had to go through
Soviet Asia to get back. The moment we touched Soviet Asia a Russian had
to be aboard. They wouldn't allow an American plane to go across there without
a Russian aboard. Also, they wanted to bid us farewell. They had accom-
panied us as we had gone across Soviet Asia. That is described here in this book.
Now we were leaving and this was a sort of farewell, bidding farewell, and
Goglidze gave this toast.
Senator Ferguson. Was he a friend of Lattimore and Vincent?
Mr. Wallace. He was.
Senator Eastland. You do not know whether he was a prior friend?
Mr. Wallace. That is not a complete transcript of what I said.
The stenographer must have failed to take down part of what I said.
Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add something ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I remember this quite clearly. Maybe you get
it from an expression in the words, but I know you have the inference
very strongly when you spoke that Vincent and/or Lattimore must
have known Goglidze before. Maybe that appears subsequent in the
testimony. I am not sure.
Senator Ferguson. I think you told us that before.
Mr. Wallace. I said no, I did not mean that he had known them
before. There is no indication whatsoever that Goglidze had known
them before. Perhaps that is covered later.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Go ahead, sir.
Senator Jenner. Let him testify and we will go ahead with the
record.
Mr. Wallace. I just merely wanted to say there was no evidence
whatsoever they were friends except insofar as when you travel in
the same plane for some time you naturally engage in friendship as
anyone would in the give-and-take conversation.
If you do not mind my continuing with this, I would say it was very
natural. Wlien I was going through Soviet Asia I was relying continu-
ously on John Hazard, and paying no attention to either Owen Latti-
more or Jolin Carter Vincent. When I was going through China,
going along the border — we came across Sinkiang — I was paying a
great deal of attention to Owen Lattimore. I looked on him as an
expert.
As we went further, it was Jolin Carter Vincent.
As far as the Russians were concerned, Lattimore and John Carter
Vincent were with me to handle Chinese matters. It was altogether
appropriate I should look on them as Chinese experts.
Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, there was no indication
he had known them prior to the time that you met ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
1332 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Therefore, anything that he was saying about
them was in prior knowledge, because nothing happened at the meet-
ing which would indicate that he would use this language?
Mr. Wallace. There is no indication whatever that either Latti-
more or Vincent had known Goglidze prior to the time of my trip.
Senator Smith. Mr. Sourwine, resume, if you will, please.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace was speaking :
Now we were leaving and this was a sort of farewell, bidding farewell, and
Goglidze gave this toast.
Senator Ferguson. Was he a friend of Lattimoi'e and Vincent?
Mr. Wallace. He was.
Senator Eastland. You do not know whether he was a prior friend?
Mr. Wallace. It is possible.
Mr. Wallace. Did I say that?
Senator Jenner. Let's hear the record, and then you can talk.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
Senator Ferguson. Did he include you in the toast?
Mr. Wallace. In all of these Russian dinners they give about 30 toasts.
I am sure he must have given me a toast as well.
Senator Ferguson. It appears that he joined these two in a significant toast.
I wondered how he left you out of that significant one.
Mr. Wallace. I can't say.
Senator Ferguson. That indicated to me that he was a friend of theirs, that
he had known them before.
Mr, Wallace. The preceding part there, I am sure, is Steiger's phraseology,
that is the introduction to that I am sure is Steiger's.
As I say, I didn't write any of this book except the agricultural part and a
little of the introductory passages. So that while this, I am sure, took place
as described, I suspect the whole truth would indicate there were many other
toasts. I may not have mentioned them to Steiger, but I know this one took
place.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to ask one thing. This toast was "on whom
rests great responsibility for China's future." What did Lattimore have to do
with the future of China?
Mr. Wallace. Let me tell you about Lattimore, so far as I could observe him
on this trip. He was spending all his time in the plane sweating excessively,
and he sweats very easily, and reading Chinese classics out of which occasionally
he would read something, and when we were over ground we went over parts
where he had walked on foot, he would tell us about that.
When there would be a museum he was always on hand with the archeologist.
He was looked on as a very great expert in the history of China and the
relationship of the Chinese tribes with the Chinese agriculturalists. He may
have been looked on by Goglidze as a man of far greater importance than he was
on the trip. I don't know as to that, but Lattimore did speak a little Russian
and Goglidze might have felt a little closer to Lattimore on that account.
I think probably you are reading more into that than is warranted.
Mr. Morris. You have to concede, Mr. Wallace, that Goglidze did consider
him an important person?
Mr. Wallace. This toast would indicate it.
Mr. Morris. And a person on whom rested the responsibility of China?
Mr. Wallace. That may be what Goglidze believed, but Goglidze believed a
lot of things, as Russians often do.
I do want to make this completely clear. I am not appearing here on behalf
of any person or any organization or any party. I am not associated with any
person or party or organization, and I have no intention of becoming associated
with any. I think that ought to be very clear, that I am not here to defend
anybody and I am not here to criticize anybody or any organization or party.
Senator Smith. Mr. Wallace, at the time that toast was given you did not give
it any particular significance?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't ; no. I don't know why Steiger picked it up out of my
notes.
Senator Jenner. In the light of recent events, how would you interpret that
toast, rather accurate or not?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1333
Mr. Wallace. So far as I know, Lattimore had no particular — I just don't know
about recent developments. I haven't had the benefit of your hearings. I haven't
asked for any in regard of me. I don't know what the hearings showed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you transcribe into your notes the text of all the toasts, 20
or 30 toasts, given that evening?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. SouKWiNE. You were selective about it and you put this one in your notes,
so it must have impressed you at the time as being of some significance?
Mr. Wallace. It must have.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, in connection with our testimony here, the testimony
of Mr. Budenz, you released a report you had given to President Roosevelt some
time back.
Then lie went on to another matter.
Mr. Wallace. I think that is substantially accurate.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, shall we go on, or shall we have a break ?
Senator Smith. Let us go on for a while.
Mr. Wallace. I would like to clean it up before lunch.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, did you make a report to President Roose-
velt after you returned from this trip ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. If you are starting on that, could I read this
statement ? This gives it more or less seriatim.
Mr. Morris. I would rather you answer the questions if the chair-
man will agree.
Senator Smith. You can ask the question and if Mr. Wallace wants
to put this in, he can.
Mr. Wallace. I did receive some assurance from the chairman in
regard to reading this statement.
Senator Smfih. He wants to ask some specific questions first.
Mr. Wallace. I made a report face to face with President Roose-
velt on July 10, 1944.
Mr. Morris. Did you make a prior report?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; a cable prepared in Kunming in June 26, 1944,
and flown over the Hump and then sent by cable from New Delhi
on June 28, 1944, to President Roosevelt.
Mr. Morris. Were these classified reports ?
Mr. Wallace. The one that was sent by cable was classified simply
because it had been sent over the air. I think it had top secret, or
something like that, on the top. I did not get the text finally until
sometime in August 1944.
That particular document I sent to President Truman. It has the
date of the receipt and the various things at the top.
Mr. Morris. You say you sent that from Kunming ?
Mr. Wallace. That was prepared in Kunming and taken from Kun-
ming— probably it was prepared in Kunming on the twenty-sixth and
was sent from New Delhi on the 28th of June 1944.
Mr. Morris. Why did you send it from New Delhi and not from
Kunming ?
Mr. Wallace. You could not.
Mr. Morris. Wliy?
Mr. Wallace. You couldn't get it to the United States.
Mr. Morris. There was no transmission facility ?
Mr. Wallace. That was the Army's judgment as to the best way to
get it.
Mr. Morris. So you say the Kunming cables were classified but the
report to the President was not ?
1334 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. That was my own document. I would liave been
the one who would have classified it. I do not have any marking
on it saying that it was classified. It was a confidential report. I
had been sent as a Presidential emissary. I did look on it as a secret
document. I did not actually mark it as such, although I was Vice
President of the United States.
I was not doing that kind of thing. This was a very special report
■directly to President Roosevelt. I looked on it as a secret document.
It was not released and apparently not sent by President Roosevelt to
the State Department.
Mr. Morris. This was July 10 ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Wlien did you first release it ?
Mr. Wallace. Senator O'Conor wrote me in December of 1949 ask-
ing for a copy of this. Apparently there had been some agitation
going on about the report. I do not think he mentioned the agitation,
but he just asked for it. I promptly mailed it to him in December
1949.
Then the agitation became stronger.
I think Senator Ferguson referred to a report which he understood
was in the War Department. As a result the reporters called me and
asked did I know anything about such a report. I said yes, I had sent
such a report to Senator O'Conor and they could doubtless get it
from him.
Then the report was published.
Mr. Morris. So it is your testimony that the report was made public
for the first time in December 1949 when you released it ?
Mr. Wallace. It was not actually made public at that time. It was
sent to Senator O'Conor at that time, in December 1949. I did make
some comment when the white paper came out expressing surprise that
my report was not included.
Mr. Morris. Where did you make that comment ? Is there a record
of that?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I expressed it to some newspapermen.
I think it was printed somewhere in the press rather inconspicuously.
Mr. Morris. Do you know of a publication called the Far East Spot-
light, which is published by the Committee for Democratic Far East-
ern Policy?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Morris. Do you know the Committee for Democratic Far East-
ern Policy?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have introduced into the record a
citation by the Attorney General showing that the Committee for
Democratic Far Eastern Policy is a subversive organization and Far
East Spotlight is the publication of that committee.
I would like to call Mr. Wallace's attention to a copy of this pub-
lication date July-September 1949. On page 5 of that publication,
Mr. W^l^^ce, there is an article by you m which you quote rather
•extensively from the report.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1335
Mr. SoTjRwiNE. Mr. Morris, that is an article which purports to be
by Mr, Wallace as far as this record shows now. It has not been estab-
lished as yet as by him.
Senator Smith. Let IVIr. Wallace see that.
Mr. Wallace. I can say this : I don't remember ever preparing any
article of this sort. ISIaybe some reporter came in and asked me the
questions that are listed. These are the views I held in 1949.
Mr. MoRPJS. You mean that is something done without your ai^-
thorization ?
Mr. Wallace. It sounds to me like some reporter came in and asked
me questions. That is what it sounds like.
Mr. Morris. It is what professes to be your by line.
Mr. Wallace. It is put in the form of questions. "Question," and
then "Mr. Wallace." It sounds like some reporter had either mailed
in a series of questions or had come in for an interview and I had
dictated it to him.
Mr. Morris. It could have been a Communist reporter?
Mr. Wallace. I don't have the slightest idea.
Mr. Morris. You will note in your answer to the first question you
quoted extensively from this report we have been discussmg.
Mr. Wallace. I quote a few sentences from it. I don't know
whether this is before or after the white paper. Yes, it is after.
I had expressed already, I may say, somewhere in the press, the
regret that the white paper had not included my report, and I think
had substantially used these same sentences elsewhere.
Mr. Morris. You have testified you did not release this report until
December 1949. This is a publication, a Communist publication,
July-September 1949 and it quotes extracts from your report.
Mr. Wallace. The extracts they quote are this :
Chiang, at best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the
intelligence or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar
China will be brought forward by evolution or revolution and it now seems more
likely the latter.
That is the only quotation from the report. I think that I did give
substantially this quotation elsewhere in the press. That is my recol-
lection, that I think I expressed a question mark as to why the State
Department had not included. That is the extent of the quotation.
I think you must admit it is not a very extensive quotation from my
report.
Mr. Morris. It was made available to the Communist publication.
Mr. Ball. I would like to call attention that quotation is from the
July 10 report which is the one INIr. Wallace made directly to the
President and which he has testified he did not classify.
Mr. Morris. I think the record will show that. It has been clear all
along.
Mr. Wallace. Could I say this : To the best of my knowledge this is
the first time I ever saw this publication; to the best of my knowledge
I knew nothing about the antecedents of the man nor the organization
that asked me those questions.
I can say this is the kind of thing I would be saying at this time if
I were asked the questions.
1336 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. You have written other articles for that publication?
Mr. Wallace. Not that I know of. I have no awareness of it what-
soever. It is the first time I ever saw the publication.
Mr. Morris. There is the Spotlight for April 1948, Mr. Wallace.
They .print your statement there in its entirety.
Mr. Wallace. 1 was never aware of writing for this publication.
This publication to which you call my attention has a heading "The
following statement was issued by Henry Wallace through the Na-
tional Wallace for President Committee in New York on February 23,
1948." It is quite possible this other series of questions was prepared
by somebody else and issued generally and only printed by this organi-
zation.
Mr. Morris. The Spotlight of December 1949, January 1950, on its
masthead, lists you as a recent contributor.
Mr. Wallace. I suppose they are referring to this ; I don't know.
Mr. Morris. At least they considered it a contribution.
Mr. Wallace. I don't know a thing about it.
Mr. Morris. I would like to have that masthead in the record.
Senator Smith. Let Mr. Wallace examine it first.
Mr. Wallace. Have you been able to find in going over the issues
of the Spotlight as to whether there is any other communication that
purports to be from me ?
Mr. Morris. We will do that. The record will show the result.
Mr. Wallace. I assume you must be referring back.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you offer for tJie record that first volume of the
Spotlight which you discussed ?
]Mr. Wallace. Somebody offered it, I think.
Senator Jenner. It has not gone in.
Senator Smith. You want this to go in also ?
Mr. Morris Yes. •
Senator Smith. All right, without objection they will be made part
of the record.
(Documents referred to were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 339 and
340," and are as follows :)
Exhibit No. 339
What Next in Asia?
(By Henry A. Wallace)
(The leader of the Progressive Party, who as Vice President of the
United States headed a special mission sent to China by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944, answers three questions by Spotlight.
He evaluates the white paper, sketches future possibilities, and recom-
mends democratic policy goals with regard to China and the rest of
Asia.)
Question. — The State Department's white paper on China says repeatedly, in
reports dating back to 1944, that the Chiang Kai-shek government has been cor-
rupt and unwanted by the Chinese people. It also concedes that the Communists
have brought "modern dynamic, popular government." Secretary of State
Acheson's letter of presentation says "nonetheless we continued, for obvious
reasons, to direct all aid to the Central (Chiang) Government" and intimates
that future United States policy will be directed toward the overthrow of the
new coalition government about to be formed in China. What accounts for this
contradiction?
rNSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1337
Mr. Wallace. As long as the administration and the bipartisan leaders of our
foreign policy are obsessed by hatred of Soviet Russia and determined to pur-
sue the cold war they will always find themselves in the contradiction you
point out. In the name of supporting and extending democracy, we have con-
sistently supported antidemocratic governments. In the name of opposing in-
terference in the internal affairs of nations, we have consistently interfered our-
After I visited China in 1944, I reported to President Roosevelt : "Chiang, at
best, is a short-term investment. It is not believed that he has the intelligence
or political strength to run postwar China. The leaders of postwar China will
be brought forward by evolution or revolution, and it now seems more likely
the latter." Everyone who knew anything about China knew this.
Mr. Acheson admits that what has happened was inevitable because of the
corruption, the backwardness, the reactionary nature of Chiang's regime.
The Chinese Communists are triumphing because they offer land reform and
other basic social changes needed by the Chinese people. They would be win-
ning even if the Soviet Union did not exist. To call their victory a victory for
Soviet imperialism is of course typical of the incredible hypocrisy that per-
vades our national leadership today. As long as the bipartisan leaders identify
all movements of social reform and change with Soviet foreign policy, we will
find ourselves being allied with forces of reaction all over the world and we
will incure the enmity of people everywhere.
Question. — Secretary Acheson's statement as to future policy in Asia indi-
cates that the United States will back and arm a Pacific pact, including the rem-
nants of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, as requested by Philippine President Qui-
rino on his visit to Washington. Could such a pact succeed? Would it accord
with the interests of the American people?
Mr. Wallace. I certainly do not believe that a Pacific pact will succeed any
more than the Atlantic pact will and I most emphatically believe both to be con-
trary to the interests of the American people. All the shipments of arms in
the world won't give the people of Asia tools to cultivate their lands with, or
food to feed their families with, or clothes to hide their nakedness. Yet tools,
food, clothes are what the Asiatic peoples desperately need, not tanks and guns,
A Pacific pact is supposed to halt aggression and strengthen democracy. Ac-
tually, of course, it will weaken democracy. It will saddle the impoverished
men and women of the Pacific with armaments programs they can ill afford.
It will stimulate the real aggressor — poverty. It will thus increase discontent,
which will in turn spur more arms shipments to the Pacific and divert more of
Asia's resources to military use. It will thus engender a vicious circle that will
defeat the very ends a Pacific pact is ostensibly supposed to gain.
If the administration really wanted to see Asia prosper — and wanted to serve
the cause of international peace — it would immediately propose and back to
the limit a world development fund to be administered by and through the
IJnited Nations, to build up the economies and industrial potential of the na-
tions of Asia, and provide a huge market for American goods. It would cost
a fraction of what we and other nations are spending on the arms race. It
would serve the interests of the American people — and all the peoples of the
world.
Question. — Do you think the United States should apply a blockade and eco-
nomic boycott against the new China, as now seems certain? Or should it seek
diplomatic and trade relations with it?
Mr. Wallace. The only honorable and practical course first, is to establish
normal diplomatic relations with the new government as soon as it is stabilized,
and second, to enter into negotiations for trade as quickly as possible.
As I write this, there are over 5,000,000 unemployed in the United States.
China offers a huge potential market for our goods — offers a trade that can
mean jobs for American factory workers and maritime workers. West coast
shipping would get out of the doldrums. It would be good business for us.
And at the same time it would help stabilize conditions in China and make it
less difficult to carry out economic and social reforms so badly needed by the
Chinese people. The beneficial effects would be felt throughout the entire Far
East.
A blockade and economic boycott, on the other hand, would be both criminal
and stupid. It would create needless misery both in China and here at home,
and would contribute immeasurably to the instability which the administra-
tion theoretically wants to end.
1338 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Exhibit No. 340
Far East Spotlight
(A monthly report on United States policy and inteiyial events in China, Japan,
Korea, the Philippines, southeast Asia, and India)
December 1949, January 1950
EDITORIAL committee
Bernard Seeman Susan Warren
Elizabeth Selsbee Fred Zeserson
Ilona Ralf Sues
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Shuji Fujii
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Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, 80 East Eleventh Street,
New York 3, N. Y.
Subscriptions, $2 a year in the United States and Canada ; $3 a year abroad ;
single copies 20 cents.
Mr. Wallace. I may say at that time, and for sometime prior to
this, I was very greatly concerned that the United States would become
embroiled in war with China.
As a matter of fact, that went back for several years prior to this,
that we would become embroiled in a war supporting the Chiang Kai-
shek regime which I thought was on its way out and if we stepped in to
support it, we would be in grave danger of getting into war with
Soviet Russia.
I just did )iot want American boys to be spilling their blood in
China. I went all out to prevent that. My reason for getting into the
race in 1948, the Presidential race, was to do everything I could to
bring the issue of peace to the foreground.
I looked on the Asian situation as full of dynamite. Since then the
Forrestal diaries came out to give an indication of the atmosphere
that we had lived in since the fall of 1945.
You will find in November of 1945 Forrestal refers to a communi-
cation from Wedemeyer in which he indicates that as early as that
if we go all out for Chiang Kai-shek there is serious danger of war
with Soviet Union and we should consider it, and whether or not our
forces are adequate to warrant taking the risk.
That was the situation as described in the Forrestal diaries in
November of 1945.
Of course, that situation became progressively worse as time went
on. The possibility of supporting Chiang successfully became in-
creasingly improbable.
When I took my action then I was noc only concerned with the
danger of the lives of American boys, I wa s also under the belief that
it was altogether improbable that China and Russia could get together.
That was the belief in which I operated at that time.
Mr, Morris. Mr. Wallace, did anyone aid you in the preparation
of your July 10 report ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1339
Mr. Wallace. I have no recollection of anybody aiding me in the
preparation of the July 10 report.
Mr. Morris. So the wliole report is your report?
Mr. Wallace. That is my report.
Mr. Morris. What date did you issue that ?
Mr. Wallace. It was not issued ; it was given to President Roose-
velt face to face on July 10.
Mr. Morris. When did you arrive at Great Falls, Mont. ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember exactly; say along about the 7th
of July ; something like that.
Mr. Morris. Did you broadcast from Seattle on July 9 ?
Mr. Wallace. I did.
Mr. Morris. Where were you on July 10 ?
"Mr. Wallace. I was in Washington.
Mr. Morris. When did you prepare the report, Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Wallace. I prepared a considerable part of it at Great Falls.
I don't say that from memory, but it would
Mr. Morris. How long were you in Great Falls ?
Mr. Wallace. Two or three days, and then two or three days in
Canada.
Mr. Morris. Did you arrive at Great Falls on July 8 ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember the precise date. It is my recollec-
tion that I had several days in Canada and at Great Falls.
Mr. Morris. Do you remember making a speech in Seattle on July
9?
Mr. Wallace. I do.
Mr. Morris. It is your testimony that you prepared the report
sometime between your arrival in the country and
Mr. Wallace. I had been working on it for some time. I finished
it up in Canada and in Great Falls.
Mr. Morris. When you say you had been working on it for some
time, when were you working on it ? While in the air ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. There was a great deal of time in the air. I
happened to know the Seattle speech was written at Krasnoyarsk
because I ran across the handwritten copy of it the other day.
Mr. Morris. It is j^our testimony after your arrival in the United
States
Mr. Wallace. That I polished the thing up at that time.
Mr. Morris. When did you prepare it ?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say, sir. Obviously, I was sent there as a
Presidential emissary. It was the big moment of the trip, giving the
President the report.
Undoubtedly I liad been working on it for some time. I was polish-
ing it up in Canada and at Great Falls, Mont.
Mr. Morris. Can you testify whether or not anyone aided you in
preparing that?
Mr. Wallace. To the best of my recollection I cannot testify that
anybody aided me. I had a great variety of memoranda that had
been submitted to me. The one who influenced me most was Ambas-
sador Gauss.
Mr. SoURw^iNE. If I may break in, Mr. Morris, it may be that the line
of questioning is too much with regard to conclusion, and not specific
enough to do justice to the facts that you are trying to present to the
committee.
1340 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Preparation, for instance, encompasses a great many things.
Is it a fair assumption that at some time or another portions of this
report were written out by you in longhand ?
Mr. Wallace. I assume they might have been. I really don't know.
I did run across this Krasnoyarsk thing in longhand or the Seattle
thing, which was written at Krasnoyarsk.
I have gone through my records and I find nothing in longhand
on this.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I wasn't asking about your records; just your mem-
ory. Do you remember writing any of this report out in longhand?
Mr. Wallace. I must have.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you remember?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know specifically. I was utterly surprised
to see I had written the Seattle thing in longhand. If anybody asked
me about that, I wouldn't have remembered it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember, Mr. Wallace, whether any of
this report was written out on a typewriter ?
Mr. Wallace. I am sure it was.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you write any of it out on a typewriter?
Mr. Wallace. I think I did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Where did you write some of it out on a type-
writer ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you have access to a typewriter on the air-
plane coming across back to this country ?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't use a typewriter on the airplane myself.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Did you have access?
Mr. Wallace. I am not sure. There must have been a typewriter
there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether they did or did not have
one?
Mr. Wallace. I think so.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you use it ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did anyone else type any portions of this on a
typewriter on the way back ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Can you say no one did ?
Mr. Wallace. I can't answer.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean someone might have typed it?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do yon know whether any of it was typed before
you started back ?
Mr. Wallace. I would think it must have been.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether it was ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Let me illustrate how difficult it is to remember specifically on a
thing of this sort. There has been certain discussion as to what
transpired at a Cabinet meeting back in September of 1945. I have
called up one person wiio was there who certainly should remember
it and can't even remember the incident at a very important Cabinet
meeting. That illustrates what I mean. This is a man who is much
younger than I. That illustrates how impossible it is to remember
with accuracy, and how impossible it is to draw conclusions from
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1341
yesses or noes this way, that way, or the other way, no matter ho^^^
the questions are answered.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am not attempting to draw conclusions, nor am
I challenging your memory, sir. I am trying to assist it by asking
questions you might recall.
Was there eventually a typewritten draft of this which you could
and did go over?
Mr, Wallace. I presented a typewritten copy to President Roose-
velt. That is all I can say.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Certainly you know whether you went over that
typewritten copy before you presented it ?
Mr. Wallace. Of course, I did.
Mr. Sourwine. Then there was at that time a typewritten draft
which you went over ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
But you say "was there a typewriter on the plane."
Mr. Sourwine. That was a previous question.
Mr. Wallace. I sny I assume there was a typewriter on the plane.
Whether it was typewritten with a typewriter on the plane, or a type-
writer that was at Great Falls, or a typewriter that was at Great
Prairie, or at Edmonston, in Canada, or whether it was typewriter
that was available some place else, I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. I am sure we can get a little further along on this.
We have established there was a typewritten draft of the report which
you went over before you presented it to the President?
Mr. Wallace. Certainly.
Mr. Sourwine. That was a clean copy ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. You would not have presented one that was messed
up or a rough draft ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us where you got that clean copy ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you type, it yourself ?
Mr. Wallace. No ; I did not.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know who did type it?
Mr. Wallace. That was too clean a typing job for me. No, I can't
testify as to that. I don't know.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any idea as to who might have typed
it? '
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean that someone presented you with a clean
draft of a message, a report you were going to give the President of
the United States and you have not any idea where it came from ?
Mr. Wallace. That has happened perhaps 5,000 times in my Wash-
ington life.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace, do you recall whether there was any
prior draft, a rough draft of any sort, of this report?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall ever having seen a prior draft of it?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say.
Mr. Morris. Who was with you on the trip at that time, Mr, WaL
lace ?
1342 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. As I was saying, the people on the trip, and it was
the same personnel throughout except inside excursions in China
Mr. Morris. But the trip from Great Falls to
Mr. Wallace. The same people. You had John Hazard, Owen
Lattimore, John Carter Vincent, and the members of the crew.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, they left here and made the
whole trip with you ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. ijiey made the whole trip.
Mr. Morris. I hav; o more questions on that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I hu.v^e one or two more.
I don't mean to be unduly repetitious, but sometimes a memory will
come back if you try to think about it. I am sure it must be as in-
credible to you as to us that you have no memory whatsoever of
whether you saw a rough draft of the statement,^ or not.
Mr. Wallace. I do not think it is incredible in the slightest, sir.
I have been so active over so many years that with regard to a minor
matter of this sort, I see nothing incredible about it.
I would say it would be remarkable if I did remember. If you
were in a similar position — I judge you are about the same age as I —
and you were testifying, you would find yourself in the same situation.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am sure I am not asking you to testify beyond
your best recollection.
Mr. Wallace. I can't ; that is all.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This report was handed to the President on what
date?
Mr. Wallace. On July 10, 1944.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you any idea how long this report had been
in preparation ?
Mr. Wallace. I really can't say that.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Could it have been in preparation as long as 2
weeks ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say so.
Mr. Sourwine. Could it have been in preparation as long as 3
weeks ?
Mr. Wallace. That is pure supposition.
Mr. Sourwine. Could it, Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Wallace. You would have to consult the dates.
Mr. Sourwine. What dates do we have to consult ?
Mr. Wallace. The dates when I was in China. It could not have
been in preparation longer than June 20.
Mr. Sourwine. It could not have been in preparation longer than
June 20?
Mr. Wallace. That was, roughly, the day I arrived in China. I
began taking notes when I arrived in China.
Mr. Sourwine. You do remember the notes that you took. What
did you do with the notes as you took them?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you stuff them in a pocket, or hand them to
somebody to put away ? You kept your notes ?
Mr. Wallace. I did until I got this out of my system.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know where you kept them ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you have any particular place where you accu-
mulated your notes?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1343
;Mr. Wallace. I stuffed them away in a bag I had with me.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you remember at any time ever taking them out
of that bag ?
Mr. Wallace. I have no recollection at all.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You must have taken them out if at some time you
used them.
Mr. Wallace. Sir, I just don't know. Tho/ is all I have to say.
Your questions, no matter how they are phr? ?d, will get no other
answer, because I don't know.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I believe you, sir, but pardon me if I keep trying.
You will recognize that you must have taken the notes out of that
bag at some time.
Mr. Wallace. The answer to that is obvious.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Obviously you did? Is that true?
Mr. Wallace. I don't want to be impolite, sir. What are you
really getting at ? What are you trying to do ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am trying to find out if we cannot recapture one
fragment of your memory with regard to when and under what cir-
cumstances you began the preparation of the first rough draft of this
report from your notes.
Mr. Wallace. I just don't know.
Mr. SouR"\viNE. I was trying to establish if you recognize the fact
that you must have taken these accumulated notes out of the bag at
some time and perhaps you could remember where or when?
Mr. Wallace. I just don't know.
Senator Smith. Is it not possible that his secretary might have
taken them out? I have handed my bag to my secretary and then
when I got back to the office I had things taken out.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I was trying to avoid making suggestions as to pos-
sibilities.
Senator Smith. That is understandable to me.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Could it have been in preparation, this draft, all
the time from the time that you got to China until you presented it to
the President?
Mr. Wallace. Obviously it would be continuously in preparation.
The final shaping up, I would say, just looking at the time factor,
must have taken place in Canada and at Great Falls. That is not on
the basis of memory, but on the basis of time.
This whole thing is simply logical reasoning back on the basis of
time and not on the basis of memory.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is all I am trying to do, reason back.
Was it prepared subsequent to the Kunming cables, sir?
Mr. Wallace. I would say that part of it must have been. It might
have been that part of it was prepared at Kunming because I did have
some time there.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The Kunming cables, I think you have stated — and
I do not want to go into this fully — but is it not true in connection with
the Kunming cables you consulted with Vincent to some considerable
extent?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Could I get around to this statement pretty soon ?
Mr. Sourwine. Your statement shows you did.
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
22848— 52— pt. 5-
1344 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRwiNE. In that connection you have testified that with re-
gard to this report you did not consult anyone about it and no one aided
in the preparation of it?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was on that basis I was assuming it was pre-
pared after the Kunming cables.
Mr. Wallace. I don't mean to make an assumption if it is improper.
It does not necessarily follow.
Mr. SouEwiNE. You might have that report and had been working
on it all the time, but not consulted anyone when you were consulting
about the Kunming cables.
Mr. Wallace. It is quite possible.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Although the report follows and summarizes?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. After all, there is quite an extended discussion
of what took place in the Province of Sinkiang.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you made a real effort to recall any circum-
stances about that report that you could along the line of the ques-
tions ?
Mr. Wallace. I have given you all that I can.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You made a real effort to recall and you can't ?
Mr. Wallace. I just don't know.
Senator Smith. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. The cables seem clear to you at the present time
as to how they were prepared ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. That was a very dramatic moment. I have had
conferences with Mr. Alsop with regard to that and have verified my
memory by consulting with him. I first consulted with him at the
time Mr. Kohlberg wrote me in August 1950, with regard to it. I
called up Joe Alsop at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You had your memory refreshed on the Kohlberg
letter?
Mr. Wallace. My memory had been very abundantly refreshed
because of this correspondence with Kohlberg and by calling up Joe
Alsop, and Joe Alsop is a younger man than I.
The Kunming thing occupied a more important part in his life than
mine. That was a high point, to be sitting in with the Vice President
and working with him. No doubt his memory is very accurate in that
respect.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did he have memoranda when he came to you in
relation to refreshing your memory ?
Mr. Wallace. When I phoned him with regard to Kohlberg's letter ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. I didn't see him face to face at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You talked on the phone ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Recently has he had any memoranda to refresh your
memory on
Mr. Wallace. I don't think so. He was so much an intimate part
of that whole China picture for so many years, I don't think he needed
my memoranda.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you consulted Owen Lattimore in relation to
this?
Mr. Wallace. Not at any time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have you consulted Vincent?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. Not at any time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Hazard? .
Mr. Wallace. Not at any time with regard to this. Yes, with regara
to another point. rr^i • t,
Mr. SouRwiNE. So, you have consulted just one. That is why you
have a clear memory on the cables?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I have had abundant check and cross-check on
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did not try to check with anyone about the
message to the President? , ■, t i ^ ^
Mr. Wallace. I understand that Owen Lattimore and John Carter
Vincent have testified or written that they had nothing to do with it.
I don't know just how correct that is. I don't know whether it was m
the press or where. I saw it somewhere.
Mr. Sourwine. So there will be no false implication, what you mean
is you have no idea how true it is whether they so testified ?
Mr. Wallace. I really don't know whether they so testified. It was
in one of the newspaper columns. I saw it stated that John Carter
Vincent had written somebody, probably Kohlberg, saying he had not
taken part.
Mr. Sourwine. But it has
Jklr. Wallace. I have no recollection of John Carter Vincent work-
ing with me on this report.
^Ir. Sourwine. Or Mr. Lattimore?
Mr. Wallace. Or Mr. Lattimore.
Mr. Sourwine. You had testified no one worked with you ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I have no recollection.
Mr. Morris. You do recall they were on the plane?
Mr. Wallace. They were, definitely.
Mr. Morris. With respect to the Kunming cables about which you
have a vivid recollection at the time of their preparation, what about
those ?
Mr. Wallace. That was a rather dramatic occasion, because it was
at Kunming after talking with General Chennault that I appreciated
how terrifically serious the Chinese situation was.
Mr. Morris. Was it July 10 you did not consider that report serious?
Mr. Wallace. The big point of the trip was the call to action. I
was there on a military mission essentially.
Wlien I sent that statement, I was suggesting very specific action
that I thought could save the military situation. The report of July
10 was more or less a narrative, a rather simple narrative discussion
of where we went and what we found.
It is a travelog kind of thing. I have been engaged in travelog
descriptions ever since 1909. I have written them up for the papers,
gone here and there. This is largely a travelog thing, except the con-
clusion.
There was a specific suggestion with regard to how the Kuomintang
government could have been saved if liberal elements, not Communists,
were brought in.
It is rather a simple kind of report. All j^ou need is to have some-
body give you the spelling of the Chinese names.
Mr. Morris. Is it your testimony that the contents of the Kunming
cables were dictated by you ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
1346 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. Who aided you in the preparation of those cables?
Mr. Wallace. There were two men that were present, Joe Alsop and
John Carter Vincent.
Mr. Morris. Did Joe Alsop aid you in the preparation of those
cables?
Mr. Wallace. He was using the typewriter. I verified that from
him.
Mr. Morris. Was he the amanuensis ?
Mr. Wallace. He was chiefly an amanuensis. He suggested some
changes in phraseology.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You were not dictating to Mr. Alsop for him to take
down verbatim; were you?
Mr. Wallace. I would not say absolutely verbatim, but it was one
of those situations where you would go a sentence and stop and discuss.
As I testified in executive session, the three of us batted back and
forth for quite a bit. It was a serious thing, and we were determined
to do everything possible for the war effort.
I was inspired by the dilemma in which Chiang Kai-shek had found
himself in his request that I intercede with Roosevelt.
Afresh from that impact with the additional impact from General
Chennault — I was facing a war situation that was going bad and
something had to be done about it at once. It was the kind of thing
that tends to stir up your memory. My memory is not so very good
on things that far back; so, I did talk to Joe Alsop about it in 1950.
I talked to him about it in September of this year.
Mr. SouRwiNE. All I am trying to get is the distinction between
these two kinds of dictation to a man at a typewriter. I don't mean
in either case to ask you if you said these actual words, but I want
to find out which of these two patterns you followed :
After this had been batted back and forth, which you say, "All
right, I know what we are going to say. Now take this down," and
then you would dictate a sentence ?
On the other hand, would you say something like this: "We are
all agreed on that. Tell him so-and-so" ?
Mr. Wallace. It would be more nearly the latter, I would say, in
all probability.
Mr. Sourwine. What you were doing was deciding as to substance
rather than dictating the words which followed one another?
Mr. Wallace. That may be carrying it a little too far, but it is
more in that category, I would say. You can consult Mr. Alsop with
regard to that.
I may say Mr. Lattimore, to the best of my knowledge, never knew
this cable was sent.
Mr. MoRRTs. Exactly what role did John Carter Vincent have at
this episode?
Mr. Wallace. As I testified in executive session, he was present.
He did not initiate the idea, to the best of my recollc'^tion. The initia-
tion came from me. He did engage in the conversation. He did
engage in batting it back and forth.
Mr. Morris. Wliat did he say ?
Mr. Wallace. I can't say. There is no possible way by which I
can remember a conversation of that sort. It is utterly impossible.
All I can say is this: Sometimes in a situation of this kind it is
easier to remember, you might say, the flash of an eye or the attitude
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1347
of a face than any words. I can say that I gathered it from his attitude
and I can't remember a single solitary sentence, a phrase, a fragment
of a phrase, but I gathered it from his attitude.
It would just be that I can just remember the flash of his face that
this is the thing to do. "Let's go, boys." That is roughly the feeling
I had about it.
Mr. Sour WINE. I have just three question more.
Is it the substance of your testimony that you can't point to any
particular paragraph or any particular idea in these cables and say
that was Mr. Vincent's idea ?
Mr. Wallace. No, or that it is Mr. Alsop's idea, or mine. It would
be impossible to separate it out on that basis.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it true you can't point to anything in the cable
and say Mr. Vincent was against that ?
Mr. Wallace. That is true.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it because he was against anything, or is it
because what was in the cable was something that met the joint appro-
val of the three of you that were there?
Mr. Wallace. I would say it is something we talked out and agreed
to.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In other words, he did not disagree to anything in
the cable?
Mr. Wallace. I have absolutely no recollection of anything he
disagreed to in the cable or
Mr. Sour WINE. Yes?
Mr. Wallace. I was going to say is there any other question?
Could I get to work on this statement ?
Mr. Morris. I have some questions in connection with this. I would
like to take the passage in the Kunming cables which reads :
But the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with
prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.
Do you know whether John Carter Vincent agreed with that ex-
pression ?
Mr, Wallace. I think my general statement is the only statement
I can make.
Mr. Morris. We have to talk in concrete terms.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Wallace has testified there wasn't anything in
the cable Mr. Vincent disagreed with. They talked it out.
If there was disagreement, they made adjustments. There wasn't
anything in the cable Mr. Vincent disagreed with; is that correct?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Senator Smith. Mr. Wallace, when that cable was sent, did you
carefully read the last draft of the cable, if there was more than one
draft ?
Mr. Wallace. Of course, That was a part of it. This was continu-
ous hard, sweating work.
That is what this one was. It was to meet a great emergency. I
can't emphasize how great the emergency was felt at that time.
Senator Smith. I was wondering whether or not you said to Mr.
Alsop, "Here is what we agreed upon," and prepared a cable and
whether thereafter there was any change in the language of the cable
that was finally sent.
Mr. Wallace. This was something I was an intimate part of.
1348 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Morris. In connection with that sentence which I read, do you
testify that is an anti-Communist statement ?
Mr. Wallace. I think it might save time if we go from the executive
session in which I say point after point this is factual, then at the
finish say this is definitely anti-Communist.
It was not prepared with the idea that it was anti-Communist at the
time. It was prepared at the time with the idea of saving a war
situation.
We were not thinking about that. We can say definitely today that
the concluding sentences of that Kunming cable were definitely anti-
Communist, and we can say that the other sentences are factual. That
is what I so testify.
If you want to include the executive-session hearings at this point,
I think it would save time, so I could get on with the reading of my
statement.
Mr. Morris. There were six points here. I would like to bring them
out. You can lay stress on any one. I would like to find your attitude.
The first is [reading] :
But the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with
prejudice that I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.
Mr. Wallace. The same answer as in the executive hearing.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.
Mr. Wallace. The same answer as in the executive hearing.
Mr. Morris. That is npt significantly anti-Communist or pro-Com-
munist ?
Mr. Wallace. The same answer as in the executive hearing.
The Chairman. What is it ?
Mr. Wallace. The answer I gave in the executive hearing to all
of these preliminary sentences. The answer was: This is a factual
statement.
Mr. Morris. You don't care to characterize it as an anti-Communist
or pro-Communist statement ?
Mr. Wallace. I simply say it is a factual statement.
Mr. Morris. Without characterizing it?
Mr, Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
With regard to the economic situation, there is little that we can do, and the
Chinese appear incapable of coping with it.
Mr. Wallace. That is a factual statement.
Mr. Morris. Then you mention the rising lack of confidence in the
Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership of the KuOmin-
tang.
Mr. Wallace. That is a factual statement.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
The foregoing picture has been drawn on the basis of the best available infor-
mation to show you how serious the situation is.
Mr. Wallace. Factual.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least a semblance of a
united front necessary to the restoration of Chinese morale and to proceed
thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1349
Mr. Wallace. A factual statement.
That had reference, of course, to the military. I was not there
to have anything to do with establishing a coalition government be-
tween the Kuomintang and the Communists.
Mr. Morris. You wanted a coalition of military forces?
Mr. Wallace. It was a question of interchange of military in-
formation and a united effort against the Japanese; this is all fac-
tual stuff. It does not have anything to do with anti-Communist or
pro-Communist. It is simply factual.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That statement by itself on its face could not have
been factual. It is an expression of opinion; is it not?
Mr. Wallace. What does it say ?
Mr. SouEWiNE. You said "it should."
Mr. Morris (reading) :
It should be possible to induce Chiang to establish at least a semblance of a
united front necessary to the resoration of Chinese morale and to proceed
thereafter to organize a new offensive effort.
Mr. Wallace. I would call it a factual statement. If you want
to call it opinion, all right. It looks like a factual statement.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was the view you held on the basis of the factors
you were familiar with?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
I thought it was possible.
Mr. Morris. Next here it says :
As I took leave of Chiang he —
•
Chiang Kai-shek —
requested me to ask you to appoint a personal representative to serve as liaison
between you and him.
Then you go on to recommend.
Mr. Wallace. To Chungking. Did you read it correctly. I took
leave of what ?
Mr. Morris (reading) :
As I took leave of Chiang, he requested me to ask you to appoint a personal
representative to serve as liaison between you and him. Carton DeWiart
occupies somewhat the same position between Churchill and Chiang. In my
opinion a move of this kind is strongly indicated by the politico-military
situation.
An American general officer of the highest caliber, in whom political and
military authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that
operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close
contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not
enjoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political
consideration. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake the
assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence, but he should
not be removed from his present military position.
The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's
confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political
as well as military actions; (2) command all American forces in China, and (3)
bring about a full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts.
It is essential that he command American forces in China because, without this,
his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China
with a ri.2:ht to deal directly with the White House on political questions, or China
may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.
Without the appointment of such a representative you may expect the situation
here to drift continuously from had to worse.
I believe a representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east
China is finally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it
degenerates too far.
1350 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
While I do not feel competent to propose any officer for the job, the name of
General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during
his visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.
Do you contend that is an anti-Communist recommendation ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Morris. Of all the statements here that is the one you contend
is anti-Communist ?
Mr. Wallace. I contend so far as action was concerned, the whole
effect of the cable was definitely and conclusively anti-Communist
because it suggested the replacement of Stilwell.
Mr. Morris. That is not necessarily a replacement. The man you
proposed could be a subordinate, you say.
Mr. Wallace. But with complete liberty with regard to political
action in China which is the key to the whole situation.
Mr. Morris. Did you contend that is an anti-Communist act ?
Mr. Wallace. I do most profoundly so contend.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether or not the Communist Party
through its official publications protested the removal of Stilwell ?
Mr. Wallace. I am not an expert on the Communist Party. I do
not read their publications and don't know what they are up to.
Mr. Morris. Have you not set yourself forth as an expert here when
you said John Carter Vincent did not object to this so he couldn't
have been a Communist ? Do you not by that very fact set yourself
up as an expert ?
Mr. Wallace. No. Let us put it this way: Mr. Budenz has
testified
Mr. Ball. May I interrupt for a moment? It seems to me that
question is directed to things which are in Mr. Wallace's statement
which is not yet in the record.
Senator Smith. We are asking about it. We are not going to pre-
clude him from putting in the statement.
Mr. Ball. The form of Mr. Morris' question indicated that Mr.
Wallace has testified to things which he has not testified to, because
they have not been put in the record.
Senator Smith. It is the committee's privilege to ask questions.
We are not precluding Mr. Wallace from giving answers.
Mr. Wallace. This will be a repetition of what I have in my state-
ment, if you don't object.
Senator Smith. It may be. I think the committee should have
the right to ask you in what form they wish the questions to be
answered.
Mr. Wallace. There have been witnesses before the committee who
have testified with regard to what the Communist attitude was at that
time. When I said I was not an expert on Communist attitude in
1944, I was speaking advisedly. I am not an expert on Communist
attitude in 1944; have never claimed to be an expert on Communist
attitude at any time. I just don't know because it is such a wavering
kind of line.
The only word I can take as to what Communist attitude in 1944
was is testimony by Mr. Budenz who indicates that the Communist
attitude in 1944 was to tear down Chiang Kai-shek. That is his
testimony.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1351
I Scay that what I recommended in terms of action, and this was
the only thing effective in terms of action and the only way in which
there could be expression, was through Roosevelt in terms of action.
The only thing I recommended in terms of action to Roosevelt was
an action which built up Chiang Kai-shek and went against, judging
from the testimony of Budenz, what was the Communist line at that
time.
Again, I say I am in no sense an expert on the Communist line.
Mr. Morris. You do not know, then, what the Communist attitude
was with respect to the items we read in the Kunming cables ?
Mr. Wallace. I was sent specifically, specifically instructed by
Roosevelt not to get in touch with Communists. 1 was sent on a
misison to Chiang Kai-shek; not to the Communists.
So I don't know what the Communists stood for, whether they were
Chinese or Russian or American, in 1944.
Mr. Morris. Therefore, you must testify that you do not know
whether or not the recommendation set forth in the Kunming cables
was or was not consistent with Communist policy ?
Mr. Wallace. I have to take, except insofar as Mr. Budenz so
testified — I am accepting him as the expert. It may be later on we
will discover that the Communists were strong for building up Chiang
Kai-shek. It is quite possible you will discover that later.
You can't tell about the turnings of the Communist line.
Mr. Morris. If you are accepting him as the expert, he has testified
this Kunming cable is not an anti-Communist document.
Mr. Wallace. I am accepting him as an expert in his field of
competence, and not in his field of incompetence.
Mr. Morris. I don't understand the distinction.
Mr. Wallace. He was trained for many long years in teaching the
authoritarian dictatorship of the Communist Party, and ought to
know the Communist Party, and that when he spoke there he spoke
as an authority and when he spoke on my Kunming cable, he spoke as
a man completely without knowledge and authority.
Mr. Morris. He was the editor of the publication setting forth the
Communist view on it at the time ?
Mr. Wallace. I am accepting his testimony as to what he said the
Communists wanted with regard to Chiang Kai-shek. I will proceed
to show in my statement that Mr. Budenz was in error, very definitely,
when he said things in regard to my cable. I will say he was imposing
on the high dignity of this committee when he testified as he did.
Mr. Morris. Testified to what ?
Mr. Wallace. When he testified to the effect that my cable was
not anti-Communist in its effect. Could I be allowed finally to read
my statement?
Senator Smith. Right in that connection there are two or three ques-
tions that I would like to ask you. I think you can answer very quickly.
In connection with Mr. Budenz' testimony, I assume you are in
sympathy with the over-all objective of this committee's activities in
tracking down Communists in the Government if there are any?
Mr. Wallace. Of course. I agree completely that the world situa-
tion as it is, it is a very important function indeed.
1352 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. Do you think that is a field within which the com-
mittee ought to operate to secure such evidence as it can ?
Mr. Wallace. Of course.
Senator Smith. Do you feel now from published reports and in-
formation you have there are any Communists or Communist sympa-
thizers in America? Is there any doubt in your mind about that?
Mr. Wallace. They seem to have gotten into various places. They
even got into the Manhattan project, if you may remember. They have
a capacity to get around that is altogether astounding and which has
been well demonstrated it seems to me by documented evidence.
Senator Smith. I am asking these questions manifestly for the pur-
pose of establishing the good faith of your mind and what you feel
in regard to this committee's activities.
You feel that these Communists, as such, as you have just mentioned
should be tracked down, if possible ?
Mr. Wallace. Certainly. If there is real trouble going to break out,
there is no question as to where their allegiance will lie.
Senator Smith. There is no question that this committee, if it can
be of assistance, should attempt to keep that sort of people out of
government ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I agree.
Senator Smith. When we call people as witnesses either by subpena
or voluntarily on their part, you feel we should hear whatever a wit-
ness is testifying to under oath ?
Mr. Wallace. I hope so.
Senator Smith. In that connection, if a witness should come here
and testify under oath and it later turned out he did not tell the truth,
you do not think that should be any reflection upon this committee or
its members ?
Mr. Wallace. No; I don't. I just feel that the committee has per-
haps been imposed on.
Senator Smith. That goes back to the efforts that the committee
has made to take testimony in executive session to test witnesses be-
fore the open session and to protect a person who might be innocent.
You agree on that ?
Mr. Wallace. I do, sir.
Senator Smith. You, of course, realize always that the committee
cannot hear but one person at a time, and it takes a good deal of time
on each person ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Senator Smith. Do you have any personal complaint against the
committee either for its subpenaing you or for its failure to hear you?
Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, I wrote Senator Ferguson some-
time in early September. I had quite a little correspondence with him
in which I indicated if there was any way in which I could be of
service to him personally or through the committee, I would be glad
to do so. I was a little bit surprised to receive a subpena on my farm
directing me to be at Foley Square on 18 hours' notice. That is the
only point at which I felt that I was a little bit up against the gun,
because I had a personal situation that was very difficult to meet.
At that time I may say I was assured that it would only take a half
or three-quarters of an hour to take my testimony.
Senator Smith. You were talking to an optimist.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1353
Mr. Wallace. Then a little later I talked to Mr. Sourwine, and he
was utterly cordial. This was about midnight. At that time there
were only 8 hours separating me from the necessity of catching
a train, and those were hours of sleep.
Mr. Sourwine was so cordial and so completely agreeable that I
should have the necessary time to get counsel that I have no complaint
against the committee at all, although I had some uneasy moments
the evening of October 3 when I was trying to arrange my affairs to
see whether or not I could get down to New York City the following
morning at 11 o'clock.
Senator Smith. I did, too, but I was scheduled to hold that hearing
and could not go.
Mr. Wallace. So I frankly have no complaint against the commit-
tee except this one, and that was a passing minor irritation.
Senator O'Conor. It does seem to me Mr. Wallace has several times
emphasized that there should be given an opportunity to him to put a
statement in. I think that should be granted.
Senator Smith. We have told him that this morning.
Senator O'Conor. I think he should if there has been extensive
interrogation. He should read the statement.
Senator Smith. We assured him this morning that would be done.
Senator O'Conor. I did understand him to say he did want to get
along with it now.
Senator Smith. The question was whether or not the plan of exami-
nation was going to be followed first, because he had a certain line
prepared. Then Mr. Wallace would have a chance to put this in.
Then the committee would wish to properly call Mr. Wallace back,
or give him a chance to come back on anything.
Mr. Wallace. It would save expense if we can complete it now.
Mr. Morris. We have laile 6 of the Senate Committee on the Judici-
ary which reads:
The committee shall, as far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing
before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony at
least 24 hours before iiearing and to limit their oral presentation to brief sum-
maries of their argaiment.
I would just like to call attention of the chairman to that rule.
Senator Smith. Is that rule applicable to witnesses that the com-
mittee subpenas or to witnesses that offer to come here?
Mr. Morris. Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. The rule is intended to be applicable to voluntary
statements. The witness subpenaecl is here to answer questions and
does not have a vohuitary statement.
Senator Smith. Is that not the reason we waived the rule as to
this statement, so that it could be put in today rather than at a later
hearing ?
Mr. Soura\t:ne. That rule of the committee as the chairman knows,
stems from the requirement of the Legislative Reorganization Act
in section 133 (e) that each standing committee shall, as far as prac-
ticable, require all witnesses appearing before it to file in advance
written statements of their proposed testimony and to limit their
oral presentation to brief summaries of their argument.
The committee fixed 24 hours under a sort of de minimis rule that
anything less would not be the filing in advance that was contemplated
by the statute.
]^354 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
The rule has been waived by the committee. It is a question of
what is desired.
Senator Smith. I thought it should be because we subpenaed him
to come here. Therefore, he was not coming, while no doubt he would
have of his own volition. The statement which he has, while not
meeting that rule, it seems to me we were acting quite properly in
waiving any rule about 24 hours so he could offer this statement.
Senator O'Conor. I do not think the committee wants to be in the
position of precluding or in any sense of stopping the witness from
presenting it. I think he has answered very fully. I think he should
be given opportunity to proceed.
Mr. SouRWiNE. If I may make a further statement since this state-
ment is in the form of a press release, and I presume will be released
through the press, or has been, perhaps he should not be interrupted
for questioning.
If you desire to have it read instead of placing it in the record,
that is. If we did it, it would spoil the continuity of it. The state-
ment would not represent precisely what he testified to.
If he wants the statement to represent what he testifies to, the
committee should let him read it without interruption.
Mr. Morris. May I, for the record, point out the unfairness of the
failure on the part of witnesses to comply with this rule. As counsel
and Mr. Mandel as research director, we have the obligation of ex-
tracting or refuting some of the statements there.
I have not read the statement. I would like to be in a position
to answer if any follow-up questions are asked or to introduce any
refutation of the facts that Mr. Wallace has gratuitously set forth.
Mr. Wallace. I might say, Mr. Counsel, that this follows much the
line of the statement that I released the other day, but it brings in
also reference to Mr. Budenz.
Mr. SouRwiisTE. Since that statement has been mentioned, if the
chairman will indulge me for just a moment, I would like to combine
a statement and a few questions to you.
There has been a great deal of criticism of this committee in the
press and otherwise for failing to permit the previous statement to
go in the record. I think in fairness to the committee there should
be an understanding of what the situation was. If I misstate anything,
I ask you to please call my attention to it.
When we approached the noon hour, or the hour of recess, you
called attention of the committee to the fact that you had a state-
ment and you would like to put it in the record. Is that correct ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It was stated by you or your counsel that the state-
ment had already been given to the press for release at the conclusion
of the hearing?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. It was at that point that a number of the members
of the committee who were familiar with the history of your request
that the session be made public instead of executive, and the chair-
man's telegram to you denying that and saying that it was to be
executive — it was a number of the members of the committee who
were familiar with that history who then expressed the view that
since you had come there with a statement which had already been
sent on its way to the press to be released as what took place in execu-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1355
tive session that the statement should not then and there be permitted
to be put in.
Is that a fair statement ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Subsequent to that it was found it actually had not gotten out to
the press, and I met with counsel after the meeting,
Mr. SouRwiNE. You advised the committee of that fact at the end ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Ball. I advised the committee because I called my office to
make sure that it had been delivered or to ascertain definitely whether
or not it had been delivered to the Senate Press Gallery.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was it your understanding, in connection with hav-
ing advised the committee it had not been delivered, that you intended
to convey the idea to the committee you had stopped it and would
not release it?
Mr. Ball. No. I have conveyed, and we have looked at the record
because I was very much surprised afterward there was some indica-
tion that the committee felt I had made a promise on Mr. Wallace's
behalf in that regard.
I don't have the exact words of what I said here — yes ; here they
are:
For the committee's information— and I have not had an opportunity to tell
Mr. Wallace — I checked with my office. I found they were on the way with the
statement up here. I have recalled them, and the statement has not been
released to the press.
I certainly did not intend by that to give any assurance to the com-
mittee that the statement would not be released to the press after I
had an opportunity to consult.
Mr. SouRwiNE. At that time at the tail end of the hearing and up
to that time, the committee had no reason to think but that if this state-
ment went into the record would subsequently be released as Mr. Wal-
lace's statement to the committee in executive session ; is that correct ?
Mr. Ball. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. Counsel and I met, Mr. Ball and I, for some time
that afternoon to decide whether or not to then release it to the press.
This was along about 4 o'clock. At that time we had no assurance
there would be an open hearing; and, because of the feeling there
might not be an open hearing and because certain things had been said
about me along the line you mentioned in opening up the hearing, I
felt my only chance, knowing the way the press works when filings
are hot, to get certain information into the press was to make the re-
lease then.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I did not intend to say anything that might sound
critical of your issuing the release. That is not my province.
Mr. Wallace. I don't want our action to impugn the good faith of
the committee.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I was attempting to justify the committee action,
at least to explain on the record the committee's refusal to permit the
previous statement to go into its executive record.
That is the whole purpose.
Mr. Wallace. It seems to me we are in accord as to the facts.
Mr. Morris. Did you not promise at the termination of the last
hearing that you would not release this statement after the hearing?
Mr. Wallace. No. I don't have any recollection.
1356 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Ball. I have no recollection of any such promise. In fact, I
have very definitely in my mind not making such a promise until I
had an opportunity to consult.
Senator Smith. The record will show what was said.
Mr. Morris. No. This statement I refer to was made after the ter-
mination of the record.
Mr. Wallace. It had to do with what we would say to the news-
papermen at the door.
Mr. Morris. That no statements would be made.
Mr. Wallace. I asked you to accompany me. I told them that I
could not say whether or not there would Jbe a subsequent statement.
The newspapermen can probably deny or confirm this.
Senator Smith. It did not seem to me that the release of it was any-
thing of great moment, because Mr. Wallace had a right to say what
he wished to the press.
I realize Mr. Wallace never had it occur to him that he was going to
be in executive session.
Mr. Wallace. I was not fully aware of the very serious way in
which you are approaching the whole technique. I knew in a general
way about it, but I had not been fully cognizant of your method of
approach.
Air. SouRWiNE. For the record, I believe I should state that the
executive record shows that I stated then what had taken place pre-
viously, to wit, that Mr. W^Hf^ce's attorney had inquired of me with
respect to this matter and had been told in response to his inquiry that
the committee hoped and expected that its witnesses vvould respect
the executive character of the hearings, but that there was, of course,
no way in which the committee could compel that kind of action.
Mr. Wallace's attorney, so the record shows, indicated that was a
con-ect statement and he accepted it as made.
Mr. Wallace. We changed the top heading. I felt I was quite
justified in putting it out that afternoon because it then appeared very
clearly this had not been presented before the committee.
You have the exact headirg there. I felt the heading took care of
the proprieties of the situation.
Mr. S:)URwiNE. You made it very clear it was a statement which had
been offered to the committee and the receipt of which had been re-
fused, and perhaps in a short paragraph you did not have space to
explain why.
Mr. Wallace. Now could I get on with this?
Senator Smith. It is now 1 : 25. What is the pleasure of the com-
mittee?
Senator O'Conor. It may be he thinks it should go in at this junc-
ture for possible press release or other purposes. I would think there
ought to be opportunity given to the witness to put it in now.
Mr. Wallace. JNIaybe you could hear me in relays so that you can
get lunch.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Have copies been given to the press?
Mr. Ball. Yes.
Senator O'Conor. Would it be in order to consider it having been
introduced in full so it may be possible to release it?
Senator Smith. You may wish to read it and interpolate.
It ought to be read so that the committee's counsel, who has not had
a chance to read it, so he can make such notes as he goes along, but
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1357
with the understanding the committee's counsel may have the right
to examine this and ask further questions. He has not had a chance
to see it.
Mr. Wallace. Maybe counsel could spell each other.
Senator Smith. The point is whether or not there was something
in here that they would have to do a little research on before they
could ask you what they deem would be proper questions.
Mr, SouRwiNE. We could better do research during a recess than
while sitting here.
Senator O'Conor. That is the reason I suggested if the whole state-
ment were put in in toto and then take a recess, then counsel could
interrogate.
Mr, Wallace. Could we get back fairly early ?
Senator Smith. We will recess until 2 : 15,
(Thereupon, at 1:30 p. m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at
2 : 15 p. m. same day.)
AFTERNOON' SESSION
Senator Smith. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Wallace, you may proceed now with your recital of the state-
ment.
Mr, Wallace, On several occasions in the past few months this
committee has heard testimony in public session from a man named
Louis Budenz, who was, I understand, a leading American Commu-
nist, On August 23, 1951, Budenz testified that a mission to China
which I undertook in 1944 at President Roosevelt's request was "fol-
lowed by the Communists with a great deal of interest in discussions
in the Politburo."
According to Budenz' testimony it was pointed out in these Polit-
buro discussions that I "was more or less under good influences from
the Communist viewpoint" because I was accompanied on that mis-
sion by Mr. Owen Lattimore and Mr. John Carter Vincent, "both of
whom were described as being in line with the Communist viewpoint,
seeing eye to eye with it,.and that they would guide [me] largely along
those paths,"
Subsequent to this testimony I wrote to President Truman enclos-
ing the two reports that I had made to President Roosevelt with
regard to my mission. After the Wliite House had released those two
reports, Budenz discussed them before this committee on October 5,
1951.
In the course of his testimony Budenz characterized those reports
in various ways, but all with the same implication. They were, he
said, "in accord with the Communist policies at that time." Again he
said, "these messages, in the light of the ]:)eriod, were what the Com-
munists wanted presented." The "document," according to Budenz,
"gives aid to the Communists in the policies they were forwarding at
that time."
Since these remarks are coupled with the statement that "the Polit-
buro was very pleased with the fact that Lattimore and Vincent were
present," inuenclo is clear that I was somehow influenced by
one or both of those gentlemen to follow the Communist line, I sboll
discuss these and other charges fully in the course of my statemprt.
I am grateful to this committee for permitting me to appear this
afternoon in public session in order to state the true facts concerning
1358 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
my mission to China. From these facts it will be apparent to anyone
that, far from following a line favorable to the Communists, my miS'
sion resulted in recommendations to the President which, if promptly
followed, would have been most harmful to the Communist cause in
China in 1944 as defined by Budenz. From these facts it will be
apparent that the accusations which Budenz has made about my
mission constitute a grave slander.
This committee is quite rightly concerned about the loss of influence
which the United States has suffered in the Far East, and about the
peril to our security in that part of the world from a Communist-
dominated China under the direct influence of Russia. I am testifying
before you this morning as a man who in another time of great peril
presided over the most powerful body in the world, the United States
Senate. It was during my tenure as Vice President and President of
the Senate that war was declared against the Fascist powers and that
the United States put forth the most magnificent war effort that any
nation ever demonstrated. I had an intimate part in that effort.
As Secretary of Agriculture I proposed the legislation that made it
possible to build up enormous supplies of food and cotton in the ever-
normal granary.
As Secretary of Agriculture I initiated the trade of a part of our
cotton for a large amount of rubber in 1939.
As Vice President I was asked by President Roosevelt to use the
prestige of my high office to straighten out tangles in our production
effort during the period just prior to our entry into the war.
I became Chairman of the Supplies, Priorities, and Allocations
Board during the critical period when we were converting our auto-
mobile facilities to the all-out production of tanks and airplanes.
In 1941 President Roosevelt asked me to head what later became the
Board of Economic Warfare. This Board had a large part to play in
the control of exports, the stimulation of imports needed in the war
effort, and the selection of the most vital bombing targets in enemy
lands.
In 1943 I was asked by the President to make a good-will trip to
Latin America to stimulate the maximum production of strategic
materials which we needed.
I cite tliis record not from vanity — although I am proud of the
part which I was able to play in the war — but to show the background
for the mission to China which I undertook in the spring of 1944.
President Roosevelt suggested that mission. The President had
long been concerned over the militaiy situation in China, and we had
watched it progressively deteriorate. In the spring of 1944 it was
especially necessary that nothing happen which would aggravate the
Allied military situation in any part of the world.
All of our effort was then being concentrated on the landings in
Normandy. Those landings, which were to be attempted at the be-
ginning of June, represented the central point of a strategy for which
the western allies had been long preparing. They represented not
only the fulfillment of our military build-up but also the answer to
Marshal Stalin's persistent request for the opening of a second front.
In view of the way Russia has behaved since the war and of the
way Soviet communism is now menacing the peace of the world, it is
difficult for us to think back clearly to the summer of 1944. At that
time, however, everyone concerned with our military effort recognized
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1359^
that we needed the full cooperation not only of our western allies but
of the Russians as well if the great gamble that was to begin on D-day
was to succeed. We needed to do everything possible to insure that
the Russians would maintain their pressure on the eastern front so
that they would continue to impose the wastage which was beginning
to strain both German manpower and German war production. The
possibility of a separate peace between Russia and Germany was a
nightmare that haunted the dreams of everyone responsible for fight-
ing the war.
It was in the context of this world situation that the President
asked me to undertake a mission to China. He wanted me to discuss
directly with Gen. Chiang Kai-shek the factors which were permitting
the Japanese to make such tremendous advances into eastern China.
In preparation for the mission, I first talked with Secretary Stimson
and General Marshall, since the purposes of the mission were primarily /
military.
Secretary Stimson described the Chinese situation as the thorniest
problem he had and stated that there was a serious mix-up between
various members of the Soong and Chiang families. Burma was the
worst front that our Army had. He was deeply concerned about the
graft which resulted from the black market and the way in which our
airports were built.
General Marshall was somewhat more optimistic. He also spoke,
however, of the graft in the construction of our airpoi-ts as well as
of the antagonisms within the chief families of China.
Upon completing these conversations, I spoke with Secretary Hull,
who indicated much the same concern as had Secretary Stimson and
General Marshall. He recommended particularly that I rely on
Clarence E. Gauss, who was then our Ambassador to China and in
whom he had great confidence.
At Secretary Hull's request I also talked with Dr. Stanley Horn-
beck, a far eastern expert in the State Department, as well as with
Dr. Isaiah Bowman, a world-famous geographer, who was then adviser
to the Secretary of State.
In my farewell meeting with President Roosevelt a few days before
I left, he placed great emphasis on solving the problem of inflation and /
on getting both sides in China to concentrate on fighting the Japanese
instead of each other. He said he would be glad to sit in as a friend
to get both sides together ; all that he wanted was results in terms of
fighting the common enemy. He did not suggest that I try to bring
about a coalition government between the Chinese Nationalists and
the Communists; in fact, he asked me not tO' see the Communists at
all, since a visit by the Vice President of the United States might be ,
misunderstood as indicating that our countiy favored the Communist
cause.
He did urge, however, as did Isaiah Bowman, that every effort be
made to bring about a settlement of pending differences between China
and Soviet Russia as soon as possible in order to prevent Soviet Russia ^
from having a pretext for taking over domination of China after the
war. It was with the background of these instructions, which were
chiefly military, that I went to China.
Accompanying me on my China mission was Mr. John Carter Vin-
cent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, who was assigned to the
22848—52— pt. 5 8
1360 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
mission by Secretary Hull to represent the State Department. Also
accompanying me was Mr. Owen Lattimore, of the Office of War Infor-
mation, who was assigned by and at the suggestion of Mr. Elmer Davis,
then head of OWI.
If I may interpolate here, it is my recollection that Mr. Owen Latti-
more's name was first brought up by President Roosevelt, who was
enormously interested in Mr. Lattimore's knowledge of the problems
along the 5,000-mile border between China and Russia, his knowledge
of the way in which the nomadic tribes wandered back and forth along
that border; and, as I remember it, President Roosevelt, who often
talked to me about this area of the world, mentioned at this time that
there were great potentialities for the future involved in any dispute
along that area.
It does happen to be the longest frontier between two nations of any
place in tlie world, and there are many ancient relationships there
about which very few Americans have first-hand information. That
is my recollection of President Roosevelt.
However, when I talked to Elmer Davis, he made it clear that Owen
Lattimore was loaned to me as a member of OWI and not of my staff.
He did not give up his status in OWI to go with me. He went as a
representative of OWI. That was made very clear by Mr. Davis.
I think the way it is here in the prepared statement it does not give
the complete picture because President Roosevelt was greatly interested
in Owen Lattimore's accompanying me.
Mr. Lattimore spoke Chinese and Mongolian and had a lifelong
acquaintance with China. The President had previously mentioned
liim to me favorably. As the OWI representative on the mission, Mr.
Lattimore was expected to assist our group in its relations with the
press. That would be in China, of course, and not in Russia.
In order to put what happened later in sensible perspective, I think
I should explain the situation that confronted me when I reached
Chungking. A political crisis some time earlier had concentrated all
influence and power in the hands of the backward-looking antiwestern
group of the generalissimo's followers. Ambassador Gauss empha-
sized to me at great length the dangers of this political development,
and how unfortunate it was that such modern-minded, pro-American
C hinese leaders as Dr. T. V. Soong were being entirely excluded from
the real conduct of affairs.
At the same time the Japanese had started a major offensive in east
Uliina. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the American commander in the
China-Burma-India theater, was wholly preoccupied with the cam-
paign in Burma. The Chinese armies being attacked by the Japanese
had received no American aid to strengthen them.
The Generalissimo complained to me that even the air support for
them was limited by General Stilwell's policies. There had already
beffun a series of shattering defeats of Chiang Kai-shek's forces which
were inevitably having sharp political repercussions that threatened
m the future to become violent. In the view of practically every
American and Chinese I talked to in China, the Generalissimo's gov-
ernment was already in serious danger.
I may add here this danger was especially underlined and empha-
sized when I reached Kunming.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1361
My conversations with the Generalissimo have already been reported
in some detail in the State Department white paper, but there are
two points which have a special relevance to Bndenz' charges.
Senator Ferguson. Might I inquire there as to whether or not when
you came back you reported those conversations with the Generalissimo
and filed them with the State Department ?
Mr. Wallace. I did not file them with the State Department, but
I did incorporate a copy of them with my July 10 report, which I
handed to the President on July 10, and it appears from the documen-
tation in the white paper that John Carter Vincent filed them because,
according to the white paper, he prepared the entire account of
conversations.
However, I may say that the last conversation is almost word for
word as 1 took it down. John Carter Vincent was not present on that
occasion, and I turned that memorandum over to John Carter Vincent
to incorporate with the other conversations.
Senator Fergusoist. Do you know how it came that the State Dspart-
ment did not get your report? If the President had your conversa-
tions with the Generalissimo and he turned them over to the State
l3epartment, do you know why the report was not turned over ?
Mr. Wallace. I am quite sure that Vincent turned over the conver-
sations directly to the State Department, and in all probability the
President did not turn over my copy of the conversations to the State
Department.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Vincent's assignment
required him to keep memorandums of your own conversations?
Mr. Wallace. There certainly wasn't any written document as
to what he was supposed to do and what he was supposed not to do.
In my conversation with Chiang Kai-shek it was obviously very
difficult for me to keep a record because I was doing the speaking.
Therefore, it worked out perfectly naturally.
As to w^hether I told him to do it, I don't know, but it must have
been that I did ask him to keep a record while I was engaged in the
conversation. It is the only thing that could have been done.
Senator Ferguson. He kept the record rather than for you after
the conversation to write up a memorandum ?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Ball. Mr. Wallace has testified with the exception of the last
conversation with the Generalissimo, which occurred, as explained
in the statement, in the car going to the airport where John Carter
Vincent was not present.
Mr. Wallace. That is with the exception of the last memorandum
which from the standpoint of future action was the most important of
all the conversations.
Senator Ferguson. I think at one time you expressed surprise that
your report to the President had not been in the State Department.
Mr. Wallace. Yes; I did. It didn't get into the press very widely,
but I did express surprise that it hadn't gotten to the State Depart-
ment. The first knowledge I had that it got to the State Depart-
ment, that it was finally in the hands of the State Department, was the
letter I received from Dean Rusk on December 27 of 1950 in which
he said he understood this was in the Secretary's office.
1362 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Now do you know where that copy came from ?
Mr, Wallace. I have no idea where it came from.
Senator Ferguson. You did not furnish it ?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't furnish it; no. I was never asked by the
State Department to furnish it. The only request that came to me
for that specifically was the request from Senator O'Conor in December
of 1949.
Senator O 'Conor. I might say that you complied with that very
willingly and instantly when I did make the request of you.
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; of course.
First, as I look back, I think I must say that the Generalissimo and
I talked somewhat at cross purposes in our discussion of the Commu-
nist problem. In the win-the-war atmosphere of that time, it was
hard for me to believe that the Nationalists and Communists could
not at least exchange military information in order to defeat the Japa-
nese, just as the Western Allies were working with the Russians al-
though representing opposing political philosophies. I had in mind
the sort of thing President Roosevelt had talked to me about; ex-
changes of intelligence, combined efforts against Japanese forces, and
the like.
The Generalissimo, on the other hand, must have assumed that
military cooperation was impossible without political cooperation, to
which he was strongly opposed. Hence, on this point, as I wired
President Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek seemed to me imbued with
prejudice. I could not see at that time why he was opposed to re-
forming the common Chinese military front against the Japanese
which had existed at the start of the war. That is, the Chinese-Japa-
nese war.
Second, and most important, as my cable indicates, the General-
issimo said to me very frankly that he lacked confidence in General
Stilwell while he had high confidence in General Chennault. His
stated reason for his lack of confidence in General Stilwell was Stil-
well's poor understanding of political problems.
•In any case, it was very clear to me, from the tone and language
of the Generalissimo, that he and Stilwell could not cooperate. It
seemed to me further it was an unmanageable situation to have an
American commander in China who did not enjoy the Generalissimo's
confidence and could not achieve friendly cooperation with him. The
military situation in China was already critical.
In fact, Chiang Kai-shek gave me the impression, also indicated
in my cable to the President, of hardly knowing which way to turn.
This greatly increased the importance of having an American com-
mander in China who could win the confidence that Stilwell had not
won, and could genuinely help the Generalissimo in the hard times
through which he was passing.
When the Generalissimo took me to the airport at Chungking, he
and I were alone in the car with Mme. Chiang, who served as inter-
preter. He spent the entire hour — it might have been a little longer
than an hour — while we were together giving me a personal message
to President Roosevelt. His mind worked with great clarity, and I
took down his words most faithfully ; they are found as he gave them
to me, as nearly as the speed of my pencil could permit, on page 559
of the white paper.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1363
So far as action is concerned, the altliogether significant part is
item 9 on page 559, which gives Cliiang Kai-shek's views on June
24, 1944, as to how Eoosevelt could help him.
Senator Ferguson. Could I just inquire now, Mr. Wallace, as to
whether or not you know how that particular memorandum in re-
lation to your conversation while you were with the Generalissimo
alone, and which you handed to the President, got into the white paper,
and your report did not ?
Mr. Wallace. The white paper reported all the conversations I had
with Chiang Kai-shek. I dictated, I presume to Owen Lattimore,
anyhow I put in Owen Lattimore 's hands — I don't mean Owen Lat-
timore; I mean John Carter Vincent's hands — as quickly as I could
after this' ride to the airport exactly what took place on the ride to
the airport so he could include it in the report which he would later
make to the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. If you were reporting that kind of conversa-
tion to the State Department, then why didn't you file a copy of your
report to the President with the State Department?
Mr. Wallace, They were two altogether separate things. The re-
port to the President was a summary of the trip, and this was a series
of conversations with Chiang Kai-shek on the diplomatic level, which
were properly the property of the State Department. I suppose you
€0uld quibble and say this was in a little different category than the
other diplomatic conversations, but all I can say is that I did not so
regard it at the time, and I immediately, as fast as I could, passed
it on to John Carter Vincent to include it in the other conversations.
Chiang Kai-shek wanted a contact man with the President who
could handle both political and military matters'. He criticized Stil-
well and praised Chennault, as he had before.
With these thoughts in mind I went on to Kunming, where John
Carter Vincent and I were the guests of General Chennault. General
Chennault's simple outline of the dangers and threats of the Japanese
offensive in east China further drove home the critical nature of the
situation.
I resolved, therefore, to send an immediate message to the Presi-
dent, briefly reporting on my talks with the Generalissimo, describing
the crisis in China, and suggesting corrective action. The best cor-
rective I could think of was to provide the Generalissimo with an
American commander in China who would really work with and
support him. Hence it seemed to me necessary to recommend the
relief of General Stilwell.
On June 26 at General Chennault's house I went over the whole
problem with John Carter Vincent and Joseph Alsop, whom General
Chennault had assigned to act as my escort. In the course of a long
evening of discussion the three of us batted the whole problem back
and forth. With the wholehearted concurrence of both Alsop and
Vincent, I decided upon a cable to the President suggesting that
General Stilwell be replaced in command in China.
Also, with their concurrence I decided that the new commander in
China ought to be given political authority as the President's per-
sonal representative. The Generalissimo had asked for this, and it
seemed to me that the American commander must have this direct
authority from the President in order to obtain Chiang's full con-
fidence. Vincent went along with this view.
1364 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Might I discuss with you this last paragraph ?
Did you ask Vincent for his suggestions on other matters ; for instance,
in relation to your report to the President ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember whether I did or not. It is quite
possible I might have asked for suggestions. I would think I would,
but I don't remember.
Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss with Mr. Alsop any of the other
problems besides the removal of General Stilwell ?
Mr. Wallace. With Alsop I discussed fully and completely the
whole military situation in the area for which General Chennault was
' responsible. I had very extended conversations with Mr. Alsop.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Alsop was assigned as an escort?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. What was his rank at the time?
Mr, Wallace. The committee asked that before, and I didn't remem-
ber. I have inquired since, and I find he was a lieutenant.
Senator Ferguson. You felt free to discuss with a lieutenant, Mr.
Alsop, this important problem of the removal of a general from the
theater in China?
Mr. Wallace. I have never been a stickler for rank, sir. Hig rank,
so far as I was concerned, was as an escort assigned to me by General
Chennault, and it appeared — and this is the altogether important
thing — that he had the complete confidence of General Chennault.
Senator Ferguson. Did you consult with General Chennault as to
the removal of General Stilwell ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't think I did.
Senator Ferguson. Did you consult any other general ?
Mr. Wallace. I am sure I didn't consult any other general. This
was too delicate a matter to consult with generals.
Senator Ferguson. I was wondering on this delicate matter why
you consulted with a lieutenant. I should like to have an explanation
of it.
Mr. Wallace. The explanation is very simple. I had known Alsop
before. He was the escort assigned by General Chennault. He en-
joyed the complete confidence of General Chennault, and his presenta-
tion was succinct and made sense to me. That was what I wanted.
Obviously this was the kind of thing you just simply couldn't talk
about outside the smallest possible circle, and I did not.
Now Mr. Alsop may have passed the information on to General
Chennault, but to the best of my knowledge I didn't say a word to
General Chennault about it, and to the best of my recollection General
Chennault said nothing in any way impugning or discrediting Gen-
eral Stilwell.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that the only military
man consulted and the only State Department man consulted outside
of the Chinese were Mr. Alsop and Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. You did consider this a very important matter?
Mr. Wallace. I considered it a top-secret matter.
Senator Ferguson. Did you consult with Mr. Owen Lattimore
about it ?
Mr. Wallace. No ; to the best of my knowledge he never knew about
this until it was released in the press this September.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1365
Senator Ferguson. Was it your conversation with the Generalissimo
in the car alone that led you to the conclusion you should look into
this matter about the removal of General Stilwell?
Mr. Wallace. That was the completely dominating factor, rein-
forced by the increasing seriousness of the military situation which 1
found when I came to Kunming.
First was the very human need of the Generalissimo, as expressed
on the way to the airport, as I described it in the last memorandum in
the white paper and, second, was the fact that the military situation
was even more serious than I thought, as developed by General Chen-
nault at Kunming.
So I felt that there was no time to lose, and I moved into action as
fast as I could.
Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Vincent and Mr. Alsop agree on what
should be done about General Stilwell?
Mr. Wallace. I think you were absent when we went over all of this
this morning.
Senator Ferguson. I do not want to cover it if you did.
Mr. Wallace. I think we went over all of it this morning. I in-
dicated we batted it back and forth and arrived at a unanimity of
opinion, and I remember no exception which either one of them took
to the proposals.
Senator Ferguson, I just want the record to show that I had a con-
ference with the House this morning and was unable to be present.
Mr. Sourwine. There was testimony this morning by Mr. Wallace,
in response to questioning, that there was nothing in this cable that
Mr. Vincent objected to in any way, that whenever there was an
objection they would talk it out and square it up, and it did not go in
if there was any objection to it.
Senator Ferguson. I will read the record.
Mr. Wallace. I was reluctant, however, to suggest the replacement
of Stilwell without offering someone who could fill his place. My
first notion was to recommend General Chennault, in view of the Gen-
eralissimo's avowed confidence in him and the impression he had
made on me.
Vincent raised no objection to this proposal. It was Alsop, a mem-
ber of Chennault's staff, who spoke against it. As I recall he offered
two main reasons for not recommending Chennault : ( 1 ) Chennault
could not be spared from his job in Kunming of directing the air
effort which was then the sole support of the hard-pressed Chinese
armies, and, (2) the name of Chennault, who was unpopular in the
Pentagon, would never be approved by the Army staff and would
only raise prejudice against my recommendation to replace Stilwell.
These seemed vSound objections.
Finally, I decided to suggest General Wedemeyer as a man for
whom the Generalissimo had expressed admiration, and as a logical
candidate in view of his record and position as deputy commander in
the Southeast Asia theater.
Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Alsop explain what the Pentagon's
objection was?
_Mr. Wallace. He probably didn't use any phraseology of that
kind. I can't recall any phraseology. It was just merely probably
some such phrase as "It would raise hell in Washington" or something
to that effect. This is what it meant.
1366 INSTITUTE OF. PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. This was tlie substance?
Mr. Waixace. This would be what it would mean.
Senator Ferguson. Did it impress you that this would be a valid
objection?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; it did impress me that it would be a valid ob-
jection.
Senator Ferguson. In other words, if the Pentagon did not want '
him
Mr.WALi.ACE. It just simply was not the wise thing to do.
Senator O'Conor. May I interrupt to ask you there if the sugges-
tion as to General Wedemeyer's availability and desirability was first
made by you ?
Mr. Wallace. No; I don't think it was made by me. I found out
from someone that he was agreeable to Chiang Kai-shek. As I have
previously testified — I don't know whether it was Chiang Kai-shek
himself, whether it was T. V. Soong, whether it was Joe Alsop — but
all I remember is that somebody told me, and I think it appears in the
cable, that he was persona grata to Chiang Kai-shek. From whom
I obtained the information I can't say.
Mr. Alsop may have some recollection on that. I don't think I
have asked him on that particular point, but he may have some recol-
lection.
Senator O'Conor. I knew you had previously expressed some doubt,
but I thought you had possibly refreshed your recollection on it.
Mr. Wallace. No; I don't know. It could quite possibly be Mr.
Alsop. I knew it couldn't get outside of this circle because of the
delicacy of the situation. That circle would be the Generalissimo,
T. V. Soong, Madame Chiang, and Joseph Alsop. It couldn't have
been outside of that circle. I don't believe it could.
I might possibly include Clarence Gauss in that circle, also, with
whom I had a very confidential relationship, but I can't say as to
that, and this is just merely reasoning in retrospect and not on the
basis of memory.
My cable was sent from Kunming that evening, and relayed from
New Delhi to Washington on June 28. It was not shown to, or dis-
cussed with, anyone except Vincent and Alsop.
This is the story of the Kunming cable which comprised my main
action recommendations to the President. It is significant that
Buclenz in comm.enting on my June 26 cable, has studiously refrained
from referring to what was by far the most important recommenda-
tion of that cable — the removal of General Stilwell from command in
China.
That recommendation was made, as I have shown, almost wholly on
the basis of a complaint by Gen. Chiang Kai-shek. The recommenda-
tion that Stilwell's successor be a personal representative of the Pres-
ident was specifically in response to the Generalissimo's request.
If my recommendation for the removal of General Stilwell, made
as a result of the Generalissimo's request, was following the Communist
line, then the Generalissimo was himself following the Communist
line in making that request. This illustrates the utter absurdity of the
testimony which Budenz has given.
Biidenz has testified that "the Communists were very much opposed
to General Chennault and didn't want him in the picture at all."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1367
However, as I have shown, I initially proposed to recommend the ap-
pointment of General Chennault as General Stilwell's assistant and
this proposal was concurred in by John Carter Vincent who, Budenz
implied, was influencing me to follow a Communist line. It was only
after considering the advice of a member of General Chennault's own
staff, Mr. Alsop, that I eliminated the Chennault proposal.
I thiiik anyone who reads both of my reports must conclude that
I was interested only in winning the war and that I felt the Gen-
eralissimo must be supported in order to accomplish this. My sec-
ond report, dated July 10, 1944, was made to the President on my
return to the United States. To the best of my recollection I con-
sulted no one in the course of its preparation although I did study
various memoranda which had accumulated on my trip.
In that report I emphasized specifically not only the views of Am-
bassador Gauss, but the views expressed to me by T. V. Soong. Soong,
as this committee knows, was always a great friend of the United
States, and was subsequently Premier of China under the Gen-
eralissimo; he was certainly not in any way pro-Communist.
In my report I stated that Soong was "quite outspoken, saying that
it was essential that something 'dramatic' be done to save the situation
in China, that it was '5 minutes to midnight' for the Chungking Gov-
ermnent." Without being specific he spoke of "need for greatly in-
creased United States Army air activity in China and for reformation
of the Chungking Government." He said that "Chiang Avas be-
wildered and that there were already signs of disintegration of his
authority."
Budenz has testified that my criticism of the Generalissimo's gov-
ernment was in accord with the objectives of the Communists. He
implies that the sending of any indication to Washington that the
Generalissimo "was incapable of controlling the situation for a long
period of time" was one of the central objectives of the Coimnunists,
who wanted to use this as an opening wedge for a coalition government.
Budenz suggests that anyone who criticized the Generalissimo's gov-
ernment to Washington was thereby furthering the Communists' ends.
This is nonsense. Anyone who knew anything about China at that
time — and this included General Chennault — was aware that if the
Generalissimo's government were to be saved from ultimate and total
collapse that government had to be reformed drastically and without
delay. The best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist
take-over, was to let it continue in its state of physical and spiritual
anemia.
It was in recognition of this convinction, wliich I shared with al-
most anyone who knew anything about China at that time, whether
American or Chinese, that I set forth at the end of my July 10 report a
"possible policy line relative to liberal elements in China."
As a part of that line of policy I advocated support of Chiang com-
bined with support of a new and more liberal coalition to which I
hoped Chiang would then swing over in the best interests of the
Chinese people, as well as the best national interest of the United
States.
The political coalition which I recommended that we foster in
China was not a coalition with the Chinese Communists, but a coali-
2368 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tion, recruited from within the area controlled by the Chungking
Government, consisting as I put it, of —
progressive banking and commercial leaders of the K. P. Chen type, with a
competent understanding both of their own country and of the contemporary
western world; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not
limited to perpetuation of the old landlord-dominated rural society of China;
and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither sub-
servient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasanti-y.
Generals of this type are named in the earlier part of the report — Gen-
erals Chen Cheng, Chang Fa-Kwei and Pai Chunghsi.
It is significant that, in the years which have passed since then, not
a single one of them has deserted to the Communist cause. Indeed,
General Chen Cheng is now prime minister of tlie Nationalist Govern-
ment on Formosa.
My intention was to lirge American support for a return to power
of the more modern-minded, pro- American Nationalist leaders whose
loss of power had been so much deplored by Ambassador Gauss during
my talks with him in Chungking.
While it is all too easy to second-guess events, I feel that if the
course of action which I recommended in my cable had been promptly
followed, the situation in China would have been improved.
I feel further that the policy which I recommended in my letter
offered the best hope for strengthening the position of the Nationalist
Government of China and preventing the kind of "political vacuum"
which, as I warned the President in my report, would be "filled in
ways which you will understand." By that I meant, of course, a
Communist take-over.
I refuse to believe that members of a great and powerful body, the
most distinguished legislative body in the entire world, can possibly
fall for testimony that it was following the Communist line to recom-
mend that Stilwell be replaced by Wedemeyer in 1944. Never have I
seen such unmitigated gall as that of this man in coming before a
committee of the United States Senate to utter such nonsense. I say
it is an affront to the dignity of a great and honorable body, over which
I had the honor of presiding for 4 years.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, as personal representative of President
Roosevelt, having visited Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was it nec-
essary for you to follow out the recommendation of Chiang Kai-shek
to the President of the United States ?
Mr. Wallace. Was it necessary for me to ?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. Obligatory ?
Mr. Morris. Characterize it any way you want.
Mr. Wallace. I don't think it was obligatory. I think it was com-
mon sense to pass on to the President the cry of one of our leading
allies in time of need.
Mr. Morris. Were you doing anything more than that when you
made that recommendation that General Stilwell be removed ? Were
you doing anything more than relaying the recommendation or desire
of the Generalissimo to the President ?
Mr. Wallace. I can say this. I was deeply moved, as I stated in
the hearing before the executive committee, by the cry of a man in
deep trouble. I may not have put it exactly that way, but that is
essentially what I say. I was deeply moved by the cry of a man in
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1369
^eat trouble, and I was moved to start in to help liim as soon as
possible.
If you say I am doing this pro forma, I would merely say if I were
doing it pro forma, would! have moved with such exceeding speed?
I would say that I moved with really exceptional speed to get this to
the President, so I would say it was going beyond, shall we say, in
view of the difficulties of communications existing out there, it was
going beyond the action of simple duty. It was really moving with
speed and impetus.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, did the Communists object to the recom-
mendation that General Stilwell be removed ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know what the Communists did during this
period.
Mr. Morris. Did they object to his actual removal ?
Mr. Wallace. I have no idea.
Mr. Morris. Is it not the heart of your contention that anyone who
did not object to the removal of General Stilwell must necess^ily have
been a non-Communist. Is that not your whole case, Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Wallace. Well, I am just going by Budenz's testimony. He
claims that the Communists were not opposed to Wedemeyer at the
time.
Mr. Morris. We are talking about General Stilwell's removal.
Mr. Wallace. Yes, Stilwell's removal. I will say that I have found
out recently that they were definitely and clearly opposed.
Mr. Morris. How did they oppose it? Will you give us the evi-
dence, Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, I can give you the evidence. I don't know that
we have it with us, but that can be obtained, that they clearly and
definitely opposed it.
Mr. Morris. Is that not the whole issue ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, I think that is the whole issue; and I think that
ought to be put in the record.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think you have that in writing?
Mr. Ball. Yes; we can supply that.
Mr. Wallace. I have asked Mr. Ball to get the full evidence along
this line because it is the very heart of the case.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose at that point? I
don't mean to stop Mr. Morris from anything he has to introduce, but
it does seem it might be suggested for the record that the question of
determining who was or was not a Communist on the basis of an act
or acts which might have been performed at a specified time, while it
may be pertinent and relevant, is not the whole question.
There were two prongs of the question which is raised with regard
to possible influence over Mr. Wallace, and in justice to Mr. Wallace I
believe it should be pointed out that the question on the first part is,
**Was Mr. Wallace influenced by anybody?" And that question has
to be answered before you can ask the question whether he was in-
fluenced by a Communist or any other political viewpoint.
I should also think, in justice to Mr. Wallace, that the testimony
so far shows very clearly that Mr. Wallace has stated repeatedly that
John Carter Vincent did have a part in the formulation of these
cables, that it was thoroughly discussed with him, that when he raised
objection the thing was talked out and the cable eventually contained
nothing to which he did object; and, therefore, it would seem perfectly
1370 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
clear that there was influence, that Mr. John Carter Vincent did have
a part in this whole thing.
Is that not correct, sir?
Mr. Wallace. John Carter Vincent undoubtedly had a part in the
discussion of the cables.
Mr. SouKwiNE. Right.
Mr. Wallace. As to just what part he had, all I can say is that I
remember we continually batted back and forth what was to go into
the cables. Whether he objected to anything, he might remember.
I don't remember of his objecting to anything.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Wallace, this removal of General Stilwell
was of such importance that you took it up immediately instead of
waiting to come back to the United States?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And this cable that you sent would be secret and
would go through the Army communications?
Mr. Wallace. It did.
Senator Ferguson. Was it coded or not ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; it was coded.
Senator Ferguson. W^ith the State Department code or somebody
else's ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I suppose it might have been in Army
code. I don't know anything about that. The only reason I know
it was coded is because when I came to send the document to President
Truman I found it so stated.
Senator Ferguson. Did you keep a copy of it?
Mr. Wallace. I think I have a copy, but this one is the one appar-
ently that was received by me from the War Department in August
of 1944.
Senator Ferguson. Is this cable in the white paper ?
Mr. AVallace. No.
Senator Ferguson. It is a secret document ?
Mr, Wallace. It was so marked at the time, I believe.
Senator Flrguson. Is it still a secret document ?
Mr. Wallace. I wouldn't think so under the circumstances.
Senator Ferguson. It came through the Army?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; it came through the Army.
Senator Ferguson. So, they knew you were recommending the re-
moval of a major general in a theater?
Mr. Wallace. Somebody in New Delhi may have learned it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; it came through their cable. Their trans-
laters here would catch it.
Mr. Wallace. Of course, I was not particularly aware at the time
as to how it would be transmitted. I learned it after the fact.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. You were recommending with the advice
of Mr. Alsop and Mr. Vincent the removal of a major general in a
theater ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And outside of Chiang Kai-shek you had no
other military advisers except Mr. Alsop, who was then in the mili-
tary?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. You were doing that through the chamiels of
the Army. Now, did you assign your reasons in this cable?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1371
Mr. Wallace. Well, it is spelled out in the closing part of the cable,
if you care to read it.
Senator Ferguson. I assume this cable is a copy from your file ?
Mr. Wallace. This comes from what I transmitted to the Presi-
dent, and I believe the White House must have had this mimeographed
directly from my files ; yes.
I say in the closing part of this cable, after describing the seriousness
of the situation :
An American general oflScer of the highest caliber, in whom political and mili-
tary authority will be at least temporarily united, is needed. It appears that
operations in Burma make it impossible for General Stilwell to maintain close
contact with Chiang. Furthermore, Chiang informed me that Stilwell does not
enpoy his confidence because of his alleged inability to grasp over-all political
considerations. I do not think any officer in China is qualified to undertake
the assignment. Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence, but he
should not be removed from his present military position.
The assignment should go to a man who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's
confidence to a degree that the latter will accept his advice in regard to political
as well as military actions, (2) command all American fox'ces in China, and (3)
bring about full coordination between Chinese and American military efforts.
It is essential that he command American forces in China because, without this,
his efforts will have no substance. He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China
with a right to deal directly with the White House on political questions, or China
may be separated from General Stilwell's present command.
I think that gives the reasons.
Senator Ferguson. Have you stated in the record what these po-
litical considerations were about which you are talking?
Mr. Wallace. So far as the record in 1944 is concerned, the closest
I came to it is referring to the vacuum that will exist in case the deteri-
oration continues, the vacuum which I stated in 19-44 would "be filled
in ways which you will understand." That is so far as the record in
1944.
Do you want something in addition to that ?
Senator Ferguson. Yes ; I do along this line. General Stilwell and
the Generalissimo did not agree on political questions. Now, what
was that political question ?
Mr. Wallace. General Stilwell believed that more could be gotten
out of the military effort against the Japanese if the Chinese Commu-
nists received a considerable percentage of American arms.
Senator Ferguson. So, there was a question there of communism?
Mr. Wallace. Chiang felt that was a political matter.
Mr. Sour"\vine. As you testified here, sir, in your prepared state-
ment :
At the same time the Japanese had started a major offensive in east China.
Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, the American commander in the China-Burma-India
theater, was wholly preoccupied with the campaign in Burma. The Chinese
Armies being attacked by the Japanese had received no American aid to
strengthen them. The Generalissimo complained to me that even the air support
for them was limited by General Stilwell's policies. •
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did that represent a direct complaint from Chiang
to you?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. But there was this question of aid or no aid to
the Communists involved in the removal of General Stilwell?
Mr. Wallace. I may say that when a Vice President goes into
a foreign land and Americans with different points of view approach
1372 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
the Vice President they are very cautious in saying anything against
the opposing point of view, and to the best of my recollection no
one attached to General Stilwell said anything against General
Chennault, and nobody attached to General Chennault said any-
thing against General Stilwell. I didn't learn much in China about
this situation. I have learned it after the fact for the most part.
I got a glimmering of it from Chiang; but, so far as the Ameri-
cans in China were concerned, they were exceedingly polite.
Senator Ferguson. Going back to the political question
Mr. Wallace. I got a glimmer of that before I went out there, I
may say, just a glimmer of it from someone who called on me. This
was a gentleman who was associated with T. V. Soong, who tipped
me off, who knew a little about it.
Senator Ferguson. But the question was involved as to the amount
of aid or the nature of the aid to be given to the Communists?
Mr. Wallace. In retrospect it seems to me that was the issue, but
I think I will have to say that was chiefly in retrospect.
Senator Ferguson. Was that question discussed with Mr. Vincent ?
Mr. Wallace. No; I have no recollection of it. As I say, it is
in retrospect that I have this knowledge.
Senator Ferguson. Did you not discuss with John Carter Vin-
cent the question of why they wanted to remove General Stilwell?
Mr. Wallace. I have no recollection of any such conversation.
Senator Ferguson. Then, how could he aid you in the question
of the removal of General Stilwell if you did not tell him why he
was to be removed ?
Mr. Wallace. As I have said, this whole thing came from my
initiative growing out of my conversation with Chiang Kai-shek, and
I got into action as soon as I possibly could after I left Chiang
Kai-shek.
After I had the conversation with him, I left that afternoon for
Kunming. The next day, the 25th — I was getting briefed by Chen-
nault on the 25th — and then I got into action at the earliest possible
moment, and it wasn't on the basis — frankly, it was on the basis
of who Chiang could get along with to do a job. That was the
basis.
There was no need for John Carter Vincent — John Carter Vin-
cent may have said something. I have no recollection of what it
was, not the slightest.
Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out what you told Vin-
cent. Did you not tell him the political question involved between
Stilwell and the generalissimo was that of the furnishing of supplies
or equipment to the Communists ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't think I even knew it at the time. I am sure
I didn't know it.
Senator Ferguson. Your wire indicates a political question.
Mr. Wallace. The Generalissimo had said— and you will find it,
I think, in the last part of the conversations — whether it is in there
or not, he had said that he had no political confidence in Stilwell.
Now, I didn't know at that time, I am sure, what was the basis
of his lack of confidence, and so far as I could remember I did not
inquire as to the basis of his lack of confidence. I took the words
down. This is what I took down; this is practically verbatim, from
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1373
what the Generalissimo said on the way to the airport: "Stilwell
has improved but has no understanding of political matters."
Senator Ferguson. You did not question him on what those politi-
cal matters were?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Senator Ferguson. So, really, Avhat you consulted Mr. Alsop and
Mr. Vincent about is how Chiang Kai-shek did not want this man
as the general in the theater, were you to recommend his removal and
the replacement by another general ?
Mr. Wallace. I didn't see how the Generalissimo and his forces-
could get results in cooperation with the Americans unless he had
someone in whom he had complete confidence, not only in military
matters but in political matters.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did the name of Wedemeyer come-
into the conversation or into the analysis?
Mr. Wallace. Obviously, if I was going to recommend someone^
to carry out these three specifications, to fulfill them, I, knowing how
Roosevelt's mind worked, felt it essential to have another name. That
is always in govermnent ; if you suggest dropping someone, you have
to have a name.
So, I turned around to get a name. Whether I had been given that
name earlier or whether I got it from Joe Alsop, I can't positively
say, but anyhow the name was there, and it was the only name, I may
say — after Chennault's name was eliminated in the manner I de-
scribed— it was the only name that any of us could think of. That
is the name we put forward.
Senator Ferguson. What was Wedemeyer's assignment at that
time ?
Mr. Wallace. Well, he had been a deputy with Stilwell, I believe.
I have forgotten what he was at that specific moment. It can readily-
be ascertained.
Senator Ferguson. Had you met him?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know him ?
Mr. Wallace. I have never met him. I have a close friend in Des-
Moines who went to West Point with him, who thinks very highly
of him. But I had never met him.
Senator Ferguson. Was he in the Chinese theater at that time?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; he had been. I already so stated. You see, I.
have already stated [reading] :
Finally, I decided to suggest General Wedemeyer as a man for whom the-
Generalissimo had expressed admiration, and as a logical candidate in view,
of his record and position as deputy commander in the Southeast Asia theater.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think you raised the name of Wede-
meyer first?
Mr. Wallace. I would very much doubt it, because I didn't know
him.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think Mr. Alsop did ?
Mr. Wallace. It would seem to me it was either Mr. Alsop or the
Generalissimo or Mme. Chiang or T. V. Soong.
Senator Ferguson. Your message on what was said by the General-
issimo on this question of Stilwell when you were riding in the car and.
otherwise did not mention the Wedemeyer name ?
1374 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace, No ; it didn't mention the Wedemeyer name.
Senator Ferguson. Would that not indicate that he did not mention
it?
Mr. Wallace. It df'^ps not necessarily.
Senator Ferguson, l^ou say you were rather accurate in taking that
down at that time ?
Mr. Wallace. I said as fast as the speed of my pencil permits. I
wouldn't claim I could take down everything that was said in a car
going to the airport. I did it as fast as I could. That is, it is impos-
sible to swear absolutely where I got the name Wedemeyer, but it
would be my impression I got it from Alsop.
Senator Ferguson. From Alsop?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; but I do not exclude the other possibility.
Mr. SouRWiNE. There is one thing that might help on that, Mr.
Wallace, in line with Senator Ferguson's question. If you had asked
the Generalissimo who he would like in place of Stilwell, that would
liave been something that you would have noted down because you
would have had your pencil poised for it when you asked that question.
Mr. WALLACE. I am sure I did not ask a question of that sort of
Chiang Kai-shek because I would have looked upon it as an exceed-
ingly improper question to ask of the Generalissimo.
Senator Ferguson. But, Mr. Wallace, you were asked to remove a
man aud the principal ground was that he did not agree with the
Generalissimo, and now you are asking that that man be removed from
his high position, a major general.
Mr. Wallace. I wasn't asking that he be removed from his position
as major general.
Senator Ferguson. Major general in the theater.
Mr. Wallace. That he be removed from his position of running
things in China.
Senator Ferguson. You are recommending a man to fill a position
where you did not know whether or not he was in the good graces of
the Generalissimo. Is that not a fact?
Mr. Wallace. I state in my cablegram that I am informed he is
persona grata with the Generalissimo.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that information?
Mr. Wallace. This is what it says in the cable.
While T do not feel competent to propose an officer for the job, the name of
General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his
visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.
Senator Ferguson. That indicates it was not your idea; somebody
else recommended him?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Where did you get the information he was
friendly to the Generalissimo ?
Mr. Wallace. I have given you all the information I have and I
can't give you any more.
Senator Ferguson. Was it the same person who recommended him,
would you say?
Mr. Wallace. Not necessarily, but I just simply don't have further
recollection. I can't say; I don't know.
Mr. SouRwiNE. As a matter of fact, the only person whom Chiang
indicated as perhaps acceptable in place of Stilwell was General
Chennault, was it not?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1375
Mr. Wallace, You see, he wasn't asking for the replacement of
General StilwelL All these people were exceedingly proper.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Of course.
Mr. Wallace. And he wasn't asking for it, but he came as close to
asking for it as he could and observing thf ordinary diplomatic
proprieties.
Mr. SouRWiNE. He made it clear to you that ae would like Stilwell
replaced? ^ . ' . .
Mr. Wallace. In interpreting diplomatic proprieties, he was ob-
viously asking for the replacement of Stilwell, but he didn't do it.
Mr. Sourwine. Did he not also come as close as he could within the
proprieties to suggesting General Chennault as Stilwell's replace-
ment?
Mr. Wallace. It might be. As a matter of fact, it would seem to me
from my cable that must have been true, because the first person that —
well, I mentioned Chennault as the person who would naturally come
to mind. I went into the question of Chennault as the man when I got
there and, as I say, Mr. Alsop demurred.
Mr. Sourwine. I realize that, but I was asking my question not on
that basis, which is corroborative evidence, but on the basis of your own
statement which shows that Chiang spoke to you of his distrust, if I
may use that word, which is not perfectly descriptive of General Stil-
well, and in the same breath, almost at the same time, the same occa-
sion, praised Chennault. Since he was not directly asking for Stil-
well's removal or replacement, did you not take it that his expressions
with regard to Chennault in the same breath were an indication he
would favor Chennault as the successor ?
Mr. Wallace. I undoubtedly did take it in that sense.
Senator Ferguson. I just wanted to know if the Generalissimo
recommended in effect Chennault.
Mr. Wallace. Yes, I would interpret it that way, that he would
have been very happy if Chennault could have been the man.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, and then you were suggesting someone
to be removed because he was not agreeable to the Generalissimo.
Then on the say of Mr. Alsop — as I understand it, that was the only
objection made to Chennault — you recommended another man whoui
you had not discussed or do not remember discussing with the Gen-
eralissimo. Is that a fair analysis?
Mr. Wallace. No, I don't think it is an analysis.
Senator Ferguson. What is wrong?
Mr. Wallace. I make it very clear in the cable that Wedemeyer
was persona grata with the Generalissimo. That is a very impor-
tant point to observe. That is in the cable, that he is persona grata
with the Generalissimo.
Senator Ferguson. There are only three people you could have
gotten that from, the Generalissimo, Mr. Alsop, or Mr. Vincent.
Mr. Wallace. Or Mr. T. V. Soong.
Senator Ferguson. T. V. Soong. Now can you recall where you
got it?
Mr. Wallace. I think the probabilities would be Mr. Alsop, but I
can't swear to it.
Senator Ferguson. The same man that recommended that they
do not appoint his superior officer, who was Chennault at the time?
'22848— 52— pt. 5 9
]^376 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. Mr. Alsop may have talked to General Chennault
about it, but I don't know anything about that.
Mr. Sour WINE. Could it have been Mr. Vincent who first sug-
gested General Wedemeyer's name?
Mr. Wallace. My recollection would be that Mr. Vincent had
nothing to do with that. My recollection is that he did not object
to anything, of Mr. Wedemeyer's name.
Could I continue ? I think you started out by saying that I would
not be interrupted.
Mr. Morris. I am sorry; I thought you had finished the testi-
mony.
Mr. Wallace. No, I mean the reading of the testimony; Senator
Ferguson was not here at the time, and the chairman suggested that
I read through, and have these questions afterward.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You have finished, have you not?
Mr. Wallace. That is right ; I have finished. I beg your pardon.
Senator Smith. There could be a second edition of that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, when the Senators are through
questioning for a moment, I have a list of questions that will take
about 10 minutes, that I would like to pursue.
Mr. Morris. May I introduce at this time the official Communist
reactions to the removal of Stilwell? Would you consider that
pertinent at this time ?
Senator Smith. Yes; unless what Mr. Sourwine had ought to
come ahead of that.
Mr. Sourwine. No; Mr. Chairman, the offer of it and the intro-
duction makes no difference in regard to my questions.
Mr. Morris. Will you read the two reactions of the Daily Worker
to the removal of Stilwell ?
Mr. Mandel. The New York Times registered the relieving of Stil-
well on October 29, 1944. We thereupon looked through the Daily
Worker subsequent to that. The first reference to the Stilwell recall
occurs in the Daily Worker on November 1, 1944, on page 8, in an
article written by Joseph Starobin who is the leading writer of the
Daily Worker on foreign affairs, in a section headed "Stilwell's re-
call."
He says the following :
Stilwell's recall is sensational because it cracks open the dismal story of what
has really been happening in China.
now, further, he says :
I disagree with Brooks Atkinson of the Times in only one respect.
on the same page of the Daily Worker is an article quoting Brooks
Atkinson's reaction to the removal, and Brooks Atkinson is critical
of the removal.
Now, this is the statement of Starobin in reference to Brooks Atkin-
son's article :
I disagree with Brooks Atkinson of the Times in only one respect. To him
Stilwell's withdrawal was a mere negative action, leaving Chungking to stew
in its own mess. But I see out of this negative act something basic and positive
and decisive for all of Asia.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1377
Then in the Daily Worker, somewhat later, is an article by Frederic.
Vanderbilt Field, dated December 2, 1944, on page 7, in his Today's
Guest column. He says :
At the time of General Stilwell's recall, a press reported reliably, in my opinion,
that the United States had conveyed to the Chinese Government three condi-
tions for effective coalition warfare against Japan. These were, first, that the
Chinese high command undei'take a thorough reorganization of its armies in
order to make them effective fighting units ; second, that the military effort of
the Kuomintang and Communist-led armies be unified and, third, that an Amer-
ican be named commander in chief of all allied forces in China. What is the
status of these conditions — not ultimate, for coalition warfare? I believe that
the first two remain intact and that progress is being made to carry them out.
As to the third, we know only that there was a breakdown of the particular
person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and that President
Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There is no indication
that the general proposition of an American commander has been refused.
Senator Smith. Where is that from ?
Mr. Mandel. That is from the Daily Worker, December 2, 1944, by
Frederick V. Field.
Mr. Wallace. Gentlemen, I would like to make this comment, that
any statement with regard to Stilwell, as far as I am concerned, should
go back to the period with which I am concerned, which is in June of
1944, and not in October or December of 1944; that the Communist
line changes very rapidly, indeed; that the Communist line — and I
gather this not from the Daily Worker, but from a Washington paper
quoting the Daily Worker — the Communist line in early 1944 was
strong praise of the clear-headed men of Wall Street; so the line
changed in many very imusual ways, and I would like to reserve the
right to introduce into the record material which my counsel has
found with regard to what the Daily Worker was saying at the period
under consideration, which is June of 1944 and not October of 1944.
Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that ?
Mr. Morris. Those are a few days after the removal of Stilwell.
Mr. Wallace. But you see, I was recommending Stilwell's removal
in June of 1944, and it actually took place, not because of my recom-
mendation, but for other reasons, in the late fall of 1944. I think, in
view of these very rapid twists and turns in the Communist line, that
it is important at this time, in view of the fact that this is, introduced
into the record that certain other material be introduced into the record
that my counsel has found in the Daily Worker, earlier in the year.
I think it is important, in view of the many twists and turns that
the Communists take to present not only one presentation — because
you can get anything — you can get from the Communists this : Tliat
the Chinese Communists, that is, you can get from the top command
in Russia, that the Chinese Communists, at this period, were brigands,
robbers and Fascists, and that the only hope was in Chiang Kai-shek.
Now, the question is: Wlien was that turn? It is an in-and-out
proposition continually, all the time, and you cannot put your finger
on them. You take just merely one of their presentations, it means
nothing.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, you must admit the only time you get a
comment on the removal of Stilwell was when he was actually removed.
1378 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
• Mr. Wallace. With regard to that, I would simply say this : that
at that time the war was coming to its concluding phase, that their
supreme purpose was to do everything they could to save Russian lives.
I think that was what animated the American Communists, was to
save Russian lives ; that in order to save Russian lives, they would go
to very extreme lengths to promote the maximum unity and they might
conceivably come out very vigorously, once it was a fait accompli, for
what they previously opposed very, very strongly — and we will intro-
duce evidence as to that — they did not want this, after it was a fait
accompli, because they were so eager to save Russian lives, they would
say "Yes, sure, this is fine."
I think you have to keep this in mind in analyzing anything of this
sort. It is the over-all picture, not isolated material which you can
give out.
My attorney seems to be uneasy.
Mr. Ball. I was just going to suggest, in commenting on Mr.
Morris' statement for the committee's benefit, that it is possible to find
in the Daily Worker around about the time that Mr. Wallace was in
China and when these decisions were made, so far as he was concerned,
comments with respect to General Stilwell, and I think that the
suggestion that Mr. Wallace made is a very valid one, that there was
5 months or more to intervene here, and it was very possible for the
line to change materially.
But, in any event, we will submit the material.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have it here ?
Mr. Wallace. We do not have it here, unfortunately, but we will
be glad to give it to you.
Senator O'Conor. It is a fact that there were publications to indi-
cate that their policy was of a different nature, as of June or there-
abouts ?
Mr. Ball. There are publications which indicate a view of General
Stilwell.
Mr. Morris. That is not the point. It is General Stilwell's removal,
is it not, that we are talking about ?
Mr. Ball. I do not think you can disassociate those questions.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Ball, do you contend that the Daily
Worker
Senator Smith. Wait a minute. If you are going to examine Mr.
Ball, should we not swear him ? If his testimony is going on, should
we not swear him ?
Senator Ferguson. It is just a statement. I do not care if you swear
him.
Senator Smith. All right ; you may go ahead.
Senator Ferguson. I just want to ask a question.
Is it your contention that the Daily Worker back in June was for
or against Stilwell ?
Mr. Ball. From the investigations that we have made, sir, it would
indicate that they were in favor of General Stilwell. There is a ref-
erence— and I am sorry to speak without the material in front of me —
but there is a reference where they refer to him, I believe, as "Our
favorite American general." There are one or two other references.
Senator Ferguson. So back in June they were in favor of General
Stilwell ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1379
Mr. Ball. That would be the inference we would draw from it.
But we will submit the material to the committee, and the committee
can value it as it sees fit.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I have no objection to its submission. But per-
haps I should state for the record that the question of what the Com-
munists thought of General Stilwell prior to the time of Mr. Wal-
lace's recommendation cannot have very much to do with Mr. Wal-
lace's state of mind at the time, since he has testified that he did not
know at that time what the Communists thought of General Stilwell.
Is that not correct, Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. I think that is true, that he did not know what
they thought, at least, that did not influence you ?
Mr. Wallace. No ; that did not have influence.
Mr. Morris. And may I point out that the issue is the removal of
Stilwell, and not what the Communists thought of Stilwell.
Senator Smith. Do you have some questions that you want to ask ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I do have some questions.
I would like first to pick up the thread and find out what happened
to Mr. Lattimore. Where was he when the Kuoming cables were
written ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know where he was. Maybe Mr. Alsop would
remember. But he wasn't with us.
Mr. Sourwine. We will ask Mr. Alsop when he comes on as a
witness.
Mr. Wallace. He may remember.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you recall whether Mr. Lattimore absented
himself from your party before you got to Kuoming?
Mr. Wallace. I really don't know that. Usually he was with us,
but he might, because of the fact that the OWI had an office in Chung-
king. He might have stayed over.
Mr. Sourwine. He did come back with you in the same plane,
though ?
Mr. Wallace. In the same plane, yes — and usually he was with us.
But he did have some special duties in connection with the OWI in
Chungking.
Mr. Sourwine. I think you have testified that in regard to the
Kuoming cables, you did not consult Mr. Lattimore and you do not
think he knew about them ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Mr. Sourwine. That is true ; even though Mr. Lattimore was a man
who had been praised to you by the President, whose choice for this
mission to accompany you on this mission, you think was the Presi-
dent's initiation ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And you did not consult with him with regard to it?
Mr. Wallace. No. The President's reference to him was as a
specialist on this northern border.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes.
Mr. Wallace. And the tribes that wandered back and forth along
that northern border of China. I did not look upon him as a political
adviser, but merely as an adviser with regard to that one situation.
Mr. Sourwine. You are primarily making the point, are you not,
1380 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
that Mr, Biidenz was wrong when he stated or implied that you were
influenced by Communists on your mission ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; I do so state.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, there were only two men whom Mr. Budenz
mentioned in that connection, were there not ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Lattimore and Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. SouRwiNE. With regard to Mr. Lattimore, the essence of your
contention is that he could not have influenced you because he dicl not
have anything to do with this matter, is that correct ?
Mr. Wallace. That is correct.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, in regard to Mr. Vincent, are you willing to
let the record stand as it is on the question of whether he influenced
you in connection with these cables ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; I think it is correct to let the record stand as
it is.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have any personal knowledge as to whether
Mr. Vincent is or was a Communist ?
Mr. Wallace. None whatsoever. That is, as I said in executive
hearing, I am not here on behalf of any Person, any organization, any
party, or in criticism of any person, any party, or any organization.
I am very glad to have no connection with any of them.
Mr. Sourwine. I have a few questions which leave that point, Mr.
Chairman, if I may be indulged for a moment.
Just running through this statement as it stands, first, Mr. Wallace,
who, if anyone, helped you in the preparation of this statement that
we have here ?
Mr. Wallace. This here ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; the one you offered and read today.
Mr. Wallace. Well, I typewrote out the first draft of this myself
up at the farm, and then I came down and yesterday went over it with
Mr. Ball, and we spent, I would say, the greater part of yesterday
working on it. I had, in my particular draft which I had made at
the farm, I had not dealt with the material that was in the release of
the other day, and so Mr. Ball and I addressed ourselves to the prob-
lem of combining the two, because we thought there should be intro-
duced into the record only one statement, and not an effort to intro-
duce the other statement which had been released to the press. That
is the account of how this was formed.
Mr. Sourwine. Did Mr. Alsop assist at all in the preparation of
this statement ?
Mr. Wallace. No ; in no way whatsoever.
Mr, Sourwine. Did he see it before it was released ?
Mr. Wallace. Not so far as I know.
Mr. Sourwine. In the previous statement that you had with you,
which was denied admission, did Mr. Alsop assist in the preparation
of that ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know whether he did or not. Do you know ?
Mr, Ball. No ; we consulted him on questions of recollection. You
consulted him and talked to him.
Mr. Wallace. Well, now, I don't Imow whether it was on this
occasion or not. I remember I was much interested at one time or
another with Mr. Alsop in finding out just what became of these
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1381
Chinese generals, and this banker, and so on. I really had quite a
curiosity about that, and I wanted to look into that.
Mr, SouKwiNE. I wondered if you had asked Mr. Alsop's advice
about the release, or about what should go into the release, or about the
timing of the release, or anything of that nature?
Mr. Wallace. I don't think so.
Mr. Ball. No ; I will take the responsibility for that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you consult in connection with either of these
two releases, or assist in connection with either of these two releases,
assisted by anyone connected with the Institute of Pacific Relations,
so far as you know ?
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Jumping to another point, you made the comment
here a moment ago, some little time ago, when you were reading from
page 7 of your statement, after you had read this sentence :
As the OWI representative on the mission, Mr. Lattimore was expected to
assist our group in its relations with the press.
you had made the comment out of context of the statement : "that was
in China, not in Russia."
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, why did you make that distinction?
Mr. Wallace. Just simply because there wasn't any press in Russia.
Mr. SouRWiNE. They did not have newspapers?
Mr. Wallace. Well, they had newspapers, but I mean it is sense-
less to think that anybody could contact the press in Russia, in the
sense in which we think of press contacts in the United States. In
China it was another matter.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The press relations that Mr. Lattimore was han-
dling, then, were with the local papers, and not with the papers back
in the United States?
Mr. Wallace. It was working through the local OWI office, as I
remember it, with the Chinese press.
Mr. SouRwiNE. The OWI did not have any office in Russia, did
they?
Mr. Wallace. I would be quite sure they did not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether or not Mr. Lattimore spoke
Russian ?
Mr. Wallace. As I testified in executive session, I think he spoke
some, not much. I would call it archeological Russian. In one case,
of rather stumbling along with Russian, it was with the director of
an archeological museum, at Minisinsk, and I think what he did was
to take a scientific word and put a "ski" on the end of it. But in the
scientific realm it is quite possible, because there is a sort of interna-
tional language there, if you have just a little fragment of informa-
tion to get along. I don't know how well he spoke it, but that is the
one time when I remember that he seemed to get something out of
an old lady who was directing the museum.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You do regard Mr. Lattimore as a scholar?
Mr. Wallace. I do regard him as a scholar, and it may be that he
knows Russian better than I think.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Your statement about taking words and putting a
"ski" on the end was a jest?
Mr. Wallace. No ; I mean to say that when you are dealing with
scientific matters it is easier to get along than you realize.
1382 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. But Mr. Lattimore would probably have known the
proper archeological terms for anything that he wanted to discuss?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know as to that. But, at any rate, he seemed
to get along with this old lady, after a fashion, and to tell us that this
is from the Bronze Age, and so on.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In your statment on page 10 you have this sentence
at the top of the page :
With these thoughts in mind, I went on to Kuoming, where John Carter Vincent
and I were the guests of General Chennault.
Where did you go to there from ?
Mr. Wallace. From Chungking. As I remember, we left there in
the early afternoon and got there some time that same day.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mentioned that John Carter Vincent and you
"were the guests of General Chennault." That seems to imply that
Mr. Lattimore was not with you.
Mr. Wallace. I just don't know. Mr. Alsop may have recollection
on that point. I just don't know. It is just simply because of the fact
that it was John Carter Vincent and I who had this conference with
Alsop, and I don't know what happened to Mr. Lattimore at that time,
Mr. Sourwine. On page 14 of your memorandum, sir, near the top
of the page again, by coincidence, you say —
The best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over * * ♦
that is, the Chiang regime — ■
best way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over, was to let
it continue in its state of physical and spiritual anemia.
Now, by "physical anemia" I take it you mean lack of material, lack
of supplies, and that type of thing?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. And by "spiritual anemia" what do you mean?
Mr. Wallace. I mean that as a result of this very great lack of
supplies, as a result of their weak budgetary and currency situation,
there was an enormous inflation which so deprived the ordinary leader-
ship in a local way of the means of life, that they had lost, that they
had become so preoccupied with the terrific problem of keeping alive
that they were begining to lose their will to fight. They had been in
the war for 7 years, and the situation which these people, who ordi-
narily would be leading in the local community, had become so im-
poverished that the spiritual lifeblood had been veritably sucked out
of China.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean the whole thing, then, reverts back pri-
marily to that lack of physical material ?
Mr. Wallace. There is always a relation between the spiritual
and the physical which you cannot separate.
Mr. Sourwine (reading) :
The hest way to insure its ultimate collapse and a Communist take-over, was
to let it continue in its state of physical and spiritual anemia.
It was in recognition of this conviction, which I shared with almost anyone
who knew anything about China at that time —
and so forth.
So I take it that it is a fair conclusion that it was your feeling that
it was true that the best way to insure the collapse of the Chiang
regime was to let that physical and spiritual anemia continue?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1383
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now, what was there in your recommendations,
in your July 10 report, which was designed to alleviate that physical
anemia ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember. Have you got the July 10 re-
port? I would say the chief thing probably had to do with
Mr. SouRWTNE. Were you recommending additional supplies to be
furnished by us to the Chiang regime ?
Mr. Wallace. You might look over there and see whether it is in
that report.
I can say this : that I had, before I went over there, and I am not
sure whether I was able to follow this up afterward — I know I was
able to, to some extent, later on — I had gone into the question of sub-
stituting C-54:'s for C-4:7's, because I had discovered that one C-54
would carry seven times as much goods as one C-47.
We had been using C-47's over the hump, and I had been informed
that 1 month's output of C-54's in the United States would carry as
much in the way of goods as the entire Burma Road.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Pardon my interruption, sir ; but, if you please
Mr. Wallace. And I had pushed on that particular front. Now,
as I say, I don't remember to what extent I had pushed before I went
over, or to what extent afterward. Is there anything in here on
that?
Mr. Ball. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Please.
Mr. Wallace. Yes, sir ; go ahead.
Mr. 'SouRWiNE. Mr. Wallace, if you do not mind, instead of asking
Mr. Ball if there is anything in it, we can refer to this — I want to
make this clear, sir. I do not mean to contend about anything that
you may have done before, but I am particularly interested in this
particular time.
You have a paragraph here — it is your own voluntary statement —
you have said that you felt that the best way to insure the ultimate
collapse and a Communist take-over of the Chiang regime was to let it
continue in its then — ^you have said —
it was in recognition of this conviction, which I shared with almost anyone who
knew anything about China at that time, whether American or Chinese, that I
set forth at the end of my July 10 report a "possible policy line relative to
liberal elements in China."
I am trying to find out what there was in that possible policy line
which was a recommendation by you for the alleviation of the Chiang
regime.
Mr. Wallace. Just a little earlier — I would call attention to this
paragraph, that we should bear constantly in mind that the Chinese,
a nonfighting people, have resisted the Japanese for 7 years ; economic
hardship and uninspiring leadership have introduced something akin
to spiritual and physical anemia.
TTiere is a widespread popular dislike for the Kuomintang Govern-
ment. There is also strong popular dislike for the Japanese and the
confidence in victory.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think that answers my question ?
Mr. Wallace. It didn't give a specific program with regard to
C-54:'s.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you hear the question, sir ?
1384 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. Yes; I heard the question. But this is, really, in
the main, in the nature of a travelogue, and a suggestion for political
action, and not a detailed — this particular report is not a detailed
discussion of economic methods of alleviating the difficulty in China.
I am not saying that this is the proper place to engage in that dis-
cussion. It was something that was close to my heart and on which I
did take action. But it is not in this report to any greater degree
than merely the recognition that there was an economic problem.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Wallace, I have not picked out a portion of
your report at random and asked j^ou what was inckided in it. I am
asking you about the portion of the report in which you, yourself, in
your own statement, have directed attention, in connection with your
statement, about what was the best way to insure the collapse of the
Chiang regime.
Mr. Wallace. I may say that I am very proud of this report.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am not attacking the report, sir. I am asking
you, since you have said that it was in recognition of your conviction
that the best way to insure the collapse of the Chiang regime was to
let it continue in its then present state of physical and spiritual
anemia — in view of that fact, and your statement that it was in rec-
ognition of that conviction that you set forth at the end of your July
10 report a possible policy line relative to liberal elements in China,
what there was in that policy line, if anything, that was designed to
relieve or alleviate the state of physical anemia ?
Mr. Wallace. All right. Let's read over this possible policy line :
Our policy, at the present time, should not be limited to support of the Govern-
ment. It is essential to remember that we have, in fact, not simply been sup-
porting Chiang, but a coalition headed by Chiang
Mr. SouRWiNE. From what are you reading ?
Mr. Wallace. Possible policy line relative to-
Mr. Sourwine. From the end of your July 10 report ?
Mr. Wallace (reading) :
but a coalition headed by Chiang and supported by the landlords, the war-
lord group most closely associated with landlords, and the Chiang group of bank-
ers. We can, as an alternative, support those elements which are capable of
supporting a new coalition, better able to carry the war to a conclusion, and
better qualified for the postwar needs of China. Such a coalition was to be of
progressive banking and commercial leaders of the K. P. Chen type, with a
competent understanding, both of their own country and of the contemporary
Western World ; the large group of western-trained men whose outlook is not
limited to perpetuation of the old landlord-dominated rural society of China ;
and the considerable group of generals and other officers who are neither sub-
servient to the landlords nor afraid of the peasantry.
The emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting
both military aid and economic aid and by the formulation and statement
of American political aims and sympathies, both in China and in regions
adjacent to China. The future of Chiang would then be determined by Chiang
himself. If he retains the political sensitivity and the ability to call the turn
which originally brought him to power, he will swing over to the new coalition
and head it. If not, the new coalition, in the natural course of events, will
produce its own leader.
This statement is a very clear cut answer to the question that you raise.
While the point I was making about getting more C-54's on the run
over the Hump, it would have been of some help, it would have been
infinitesimal compared to the economic help that would have flowed
from this recommendation here.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1385
]\fr. SoTiRwiNE. That is v:\mt I wisli you would explain, the eco-
nomic help that would have flowed from this recommenation.
Mr. Wallace, Yes. As a matter of fact, this was the only way
in which you could get substantial economic help, because, and I
call your attention —
the emergence of such a coalition could be aided by the manner of allotting
both military aid and economic aid and by the formulation and statement of
American political aims and sympathies, both in China and the regions adjacent
to China.
Mr. SoTTRWiNE. That is a statement. If you please, sir, at that
point — is that not a statement that the method of allotting physical
aid could help to bring about what you call a coalition government,
a new group of some sort ?
Mr. Wallace. That is exactly the point that I am making.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is not the reverse, is it? That is not the •
statement that the new group will bring about more aid to China, is it ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes; definitely so, sir. And this I brought out in
some detail in executive session. I would call your attention to that
fact, that it would operate in this manner :
T. V. Soong apparently has lost out with Chiang and found himself
in a very perilous position in late 1943 and early 1944, because he had
been the spokesman of the Kuomingtang in the United tStates, and v
Chiang thought that he had not been able to bring the help to China
that he should have brought to China ; that America had not brou<Tht
the help to China, and, therefore, T. V. Soong was retired, practically,
from circulation and w^as in a very perilous situation, indeed, so
Ambassador Gauss told me.
So my proposition, as contained in the paragraph I have read,
clearly amounts to this : that the United States, in allotting the aid,
should build up the American-minded Chinese, the Western Chinese,
so that we would raise, in the estimation of Chiang, and, simultaneous-
ly, you would have China getting goods, but getting goods in a way
that would strengthen the pro-American element in the Kuomintang.
That enlightened element was the only element in the Kuomintang
that had the knowledge of modern industrial and financial forces,
as they operate in the economic field, to solve the very serious problem
in which the Generalissimo found himself.
I say that this is 100 to 1 compared with my other recommendation
with regard to C-54''s, important as that was.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think that this that you have read here,
and which you are now discussing, is a recommendation for additional
aid to the Chiang regime, additional material aid?
Mr. Wallace. I do, sir.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. You did so intend it ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Are you stating that you did not intend this as a
recommendation or diversion of some of the aid that otherwise would
go to Chiang to some new group ?
Mr. Wallace. No; this was to be Chiang heading the show, but
a pro-American show, and not an anti-American show.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Did you intend that some of the aid should be put
at the disposal of Soong, so as to build him up ?
Mr. Wallace. I am just using that as an illustration.
1386 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNB. Did you so intend ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say lie would be No. 1 on the list; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How would you have put the aid at his disposal?
Did you have any thought about that?
Mr. Wallace. It is one of those things that happened all the time
in China, that that was the way you operated. That is all there is to
that.
Mr. SouKwiNE. I am not familiar with how things operate in China ;
that is why I am asking you, sir.
Mr. Wallace. I am not an expert in the field, but it is quite a
system over there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You did contemplate that the aid would be put at
the disposal of Soong, and I presume others ?
Mr. Wallace. I would say pro-American Chinese.
Mr. SouEWiNE. That is a label.
Mr. Wallace. In the Kuomintang group.
Mr. Sourwine. Yes ; they were people who were not then in favor
with Chiang?
Mr. Wallace. They had fallen out of favor in late 1943 and early
1944.
Mr. Souewine, They were not in favor ?
Mr. Wallace. Not in favor.
Mr. Sourwine. You were going to place at their disposal some of
the aid available from America, instead of giving it to Chiang ?
Mr. Wallace. Is it the kind of thing that the State Department
does all the time.
Mr. Sourwine. Leaving that aside, it was the thing that you then
were recommending?
Mr. Wallace. Absolutely.
Mr. Sourwine. You were going to divert a portion that would
otherwise have gone to Chiang ?
Mr. Wallace. It is not "otherwise," it is the way the thing goes all
the time. People under Chiang operated under this all the time. The
question is, Who they would be.
Mr. Sourwine. You were going to raise a group within the
Kuomintang, who were at that time out of favor with Chiang ?
Mr. Wallace. That is right ; a more liberal group.
Mr. Sourwine. Or were placing available to them, or at their elec-
tion, a portion of the aid that America could furnish?
Mr. Wallace. That is my proposal ; yes, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. And are you testifying that it is your belief now,
and it was your belief then, that was a recommendation for increas-
ing the physical aid to China, the Chiang regime ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes; that is my contention, and if any real help
was to be brought to China, it was very vital that that be done.
Mr. Sourwine. And that is the only recommendation in here ?
Mr, Wallace. It is the all-important recommendation.
Mr. Sourwine. That is the only recommendation in this portion
that you have read here, this possible policy line, which you point to
as a recommendation for alleviating the physical anemia of the Chiang
regime?
Mr. Wallace. That is the all-important recommendation, sir.
Senator Smith. Is that all ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1387
Mr. SouR-vviNE. That is all on that point. I have one or two more
questions.
Have you testified, Mr. Wallace, that Mr. Alsop wanted you again
and again to print the Kuoming cables, or to release them ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know whether I testified that he did. I don't
know whether "again and again" is specifically the right phrase, but
several times he wanted me to release them.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did the question of releasing them on those occa-
sions— was it raised by him or by you ?
Mr. Wallace. Well, in the first place, when I first got in touch —
when Kohlberg wrote me, I think at this time I phoned Mr. Alsop
and he said, "Well, why don't you release the whole thing?"
Mr. SouRWiNE. Was that the first time Mr. Alsop had asked you
to release them ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; that is correct — in 1950.
Mr. Sour WINE. And subsequently, on other occasions, when he
asked you to release them, had you called him to ask him about it as
you did in the first case, or did* he call you or bring it up with you?
Mr. Wallace. The next time — the first time, Mr. Alsop had been
in touch with me, or I had been in touch with him since I left Wash-
ington in 1946, was in 1950, on the Kohlberg thing. Then, did he
call me or did I call him? I think he called me. Frankly, I have
been testifying so long that I can't be sure. I just can't be sure. I
mean, it is the kind of thing that, if I had some time off, I could verify
it. But whether I called him or he called me, right at the moment
I am just
Mr. SouRwiNE. But he did several times express the wish ?_
Mr. Wallace. He expressed the wish, and in the first instance I
passed on to him very much the same material I had passed on to
Kohlberg. I had not, I believe, in 1950, passed on to him the material
that I passed on to Kohlberg. He knew that I had done that with
Kohlberg, and so I read to him over the telephone. He must have
phoned me some time in early September asking if I could give him
that letter, and I read it to him over the phone. I can testify under
oath to this. I think that on that occasion tlie initiative did come
from him.
Mr. Sourwine. Now, Mr. Wallace, when you prepared the state-
ment which you used in connection with the release of the Kuoming
cables — that is, the statement that you sent to the White House — did
Mr. Alsop assist you in connection with that?
Mr. Wallace. Yes ; to a degree he did. I had especially wanted to
get in touch with Mr. Alsop with regard to the final outcome of some
of the generals, how they had finally turned out. That was my big
object in seeing Mr. Alsop. I saw Mr. Alsop on this occasion, and I
may say that Mr. Alsop did not have the slightest notion that I was
going to write it to the President.
Wliat Mr. Alsop was advocating was a press release, I believe.
Mr. Sourwine. Well, he was treating it as though it was not a re-
stricted document, but one that you had a right to release directly.
Mr. Wallace. Yes. Of course, in view of the lapse of time, I don't
think there was any breaking of any code, and that is the only thing
that the military was concerned with, I think.
Mr. Sourwine. You felt that the lapse of time gave you the right to
declassify it ?
1388 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Wallace. Yes. I felt that I would get in no trouble with it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Wallace. I wanted to, if there was to be a press release, I
wanted to get the benefit of Mr. Alsop's recollection, and again it was
very much the same situation at Kuoming.
Mr. Alsop had a typewriter, and batting back and forth, with my
taking the initiative
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you come down to where he lives, or did he come
up to where you live?
Mr. Wallace. No ; I came into New York. I met with him in some
hotel where he had a room. I don't remember the name of the hotel.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Wlio suggested the meeting and that you come up —
you or he ?
Mr. Wallace. Well, I think that my guess is that he suggested it,
but I wouldn't be sure. It might have been me, because I was very
much interested in how these various names turned out. I didn't know.
1 had no idea, because I had not maintained, you might say, a close,
intimate knowledge of China and the personalities of China after 1944.
I had no idea how these names had turned out, and I know that Joe had
maintained a very close and intimate relationship, and I very much
wanted to talk with him about it. So it might have been my initiative.
I might say at the moment I just can't say.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you discussed
Mr. Wallace. That is my interest with regard to these names.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Alsop, if I understand you correctly, initially
was thinking in terms of a press release, and it was your idea that it
should be sent to the Wliite House ?
Mr. Wallace. It was completely and exclusively my idea that it
be sent to the White House. I felt that that was the proper thing, that
the reports had been submitted to the White House.
Mr. Sourwine. When did he know that it was to go to the Wliite
House — after he got to New York or before he got to New York?
Mr. Wallace. He very much wanted to know what I was going to
do. I may say that the final draft I typewrote myself, to President
Truman, and I typewrote it several times, I played with ideas of
sending it elsewhere but finally decided on that. Joe did not know
that I had decided on that, and he had asked me to phone him as to
when I was going to release it.
So I phoned him and told him that I was going to send it to the
President.
Mr. Sourwine. In other words, what you had worked out with him,
and what he had typed out at your dictation in this hotel room in
New York was for the basis of a press release ?
Mr. Wallace. That is what he had in mind, and I revised it ma-
terially to put in letter form to President Truman.
Mr. Sourwine. When you were dictating, you said it was just as
to Kuoming. You were not dictating verbatim, word for word, but
just the gist for the ideas that were to go down ?
Mr. Wallace. That is right.
Mr. Sourwine. That is all I have on that subject. I will proceed
to another subject, Mr. Chairman.
What was Mr. John Carter Vincent's position at the time he was
designated by Secretary Hull to accompany you ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1389
Mr. Wallace. I think he was called head of the China Division in
the State Department.
Mr. Sour^\t:ne. He was a very important official in the State De-
partment ?
Mr. Wallace, He was head of the China Division, which, in view
of this trip, would mean that he was the top man.
Mr. SouRWiNE. And he was thoroughly conversant with Chinese
political problems ?
Mr. Wallace. I would assume he would be; otherwise he wouldn't
be the head.
Mr. Sourwine. He was recommended to you as such, let us say ?
Mr. Wallace. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine Now, Mr. Wallace, he was not
Mr. Wallace. He was assigned by the State Department, so I
assume that he had their complete confidence.
Mr. SouR^VINE. Why did the State Department assign him to you,
sir ; do you know ?
Mr. Wallace. I don't know the full sequence.
Mr. Sourwine. I mean for what purpose was he assigned to you?
Mr. Wallace. To accompany me on the trip.
Mr. Sourwine. He was not just to be a bodyguard, was he?
Mr. Wallace. No. I think in the first instance I wrote Cordell
Hull in March asking him to assign somebody, and he spoke of Am-
bassador Gauss; and later Vincent, as head of the China Division,
was assigned to go along with me.
Mr. Sourwine. When you asked him to assign somebody, why did
you want somebody to be assigned?
Mr. Wallace. I had found that in traveling in a foreign country
it is very useful in having somebody from the Washington office —
that is, the headquarters in Washington — to make contacts with the
American Ambassador in the field.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not want more than contacts? As a mat-
ter of fact, there are no tricks to this question. Did you not, as a
matter of fact, want the best advice you could have, want somebody
along that was more thoroughly familiar with the political situation ?
Mr. Wallace. Naturally I wanted to get all of the information I
could.
Mr. Sourwine. And it was for that purpose that Mr. Vincent was
assigned, was it not?
Mr. Wallace. You will have to ask the State Department on that.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not so assume?
Mr. Wallace. I assumed he was conversant.
Mr. Sourwine. Was he not there to be available for guidance if,
as, and when you wanted it?
Mr. Wallace. As I remember, in Secretary Hull's letter he urged
me to rely on the guidance of Ambassador Gauss, as I remember it.
Mr. Sourwine. He did not urge you not to rely on Mr. Vincent,
did he ? Nor imply it ?
Mr. Wallace. No; but he did mention Ambassador Gauss as the
man to consult.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you not feel that Mr. Vincent was there to give
you such advice as you would ask for?
Mr. Wallace. Undoubtedly. He was very helpful in many ways.
He did accumulate a very great variety of material. As a matter of
1390 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
fact, he sent over material to me before I went to China, and I might
say of the whole range of the political spectrmn.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And did he not continue to give you
Mr. Wallace. He did not try to influence my judgment, to the best
of my knowledge. Wliat he did try to do was to get all kinds of
material to me.
Mr. SouR^vINE. I did not ask you the question. I ask you if he did
not give you the benefit of his best judgment and of his knowledge
whenever you asked for it?
Mr. Wallace. He must have, but I don't remember. You would
have to ask John Carter Vincent as to whether he gave me the advan-
tage of his best judgment.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not ever ask him for anything?
Mr. Wallace. I don't remember any specific conversations. I don't
remember any specific conversations ; no.
Mr. SouRwiNE. All right, sir. We will pass that one.
This may seem somewhat off the course, but it is the last question I
have to ask here, Mr. Chairman.
Do you recall, Mr. Wallace, ever malking the point that the Mongols
and the Chinese did not get along because the Mongols were livestock
people and the Chinese were farmers ? •
Mr. Wallace. It seems to me I made that statement somewhere; yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It does not sound funny, does it ? I notice that we
had some laughs here; not by Senators, I might say.
Mr. Wallace. No. Well, I guess the newspaper people are laugh-
ing because they think it is funny that farmers of different occupations
should be fighting against each other; but it is true that that is a very
ancient warfare between the nomadic livestock people and the settled
agricultural people, and it was a key to a large part of what happened
in that western part of China, and it was a key to endless political
difficulties.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Wallace, can you tell us where you got your
information about the Mongols in that regard?
Mr. Wallace. That information came from Owen Lattimore, sir.
Owen Lattimore was a very great expert in that field. He spoke Mon-
golian, and he had walked over the ground himself on foot in Sinkiang,
and his observations with regard to those nomadic peoples in their
relationship to the settled peoples made complete sense to me because I
knew analogous situations in this country.
Mr. Sourwine. That is all, sir.
Senator Smith. Have you something else ?
Mr. Morris. No, sir.
Senator Smith. Do jou have anything?
Senator Ferguson. I wondered, Mr. Wallace, if you have checked
your statement, or any of your facts that you are giving us, with the
State Department?
Mr. Wallace. No ; I have not been in touch with the State Depart-
ment for any of this material.
Senator Ferguson. Or with Mr. Vincent ?
Mr. Wallace. Nor with Mr. Vincent.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Ball, if you will have the evidence relating to
the Communist reaction to Stilwell's removal, we will have that in
evidence.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1391
Mr. Ball. We will try to sencl it.
Senator Ferguson. I understand that that is on the point of what
they thought of Stilwell rather than on the question of the removal
in June. , i , ,
Mr. Ball. That is what I understand. We may not be able to have
it the hrst thing in the morning, because we have to have photostats
of the material made.
Senator Ferguson. How do you contend that that is in point here?
Mr. Ball. Because obviously the only contemporaneous evidence in
June as to what their reaction toward Stilwell's removal at that time
might be must necessarily be what they thought of Stilwell at that
time.
Mr. Morris. That is not the issue. The Daily Worker indicated
there that the question was a compromise. I think everyone gi'ants
that the Communists favored General Stilwell.
It is whether or not a recommendation and a concurrence of his
removal was an anti-Communist act. That is the heart of the issue,
Mr. Ball, and that is the evidence we would like to have.
Mr. Ball. I would suggest this, if I may, to the- committee: that
we submit the evidence, and it may be that we would like to submit at
that time a memorandum pointing out the relevancy.
Mr. Wallace. I would express the hope that you would see fit to
include it even if you yourself may register a dissent as to the
relevancy.
Mr. Morris. I want you to send it in.
Mr. Ball. We will probably not be able to do that until sometime
late tomorrow afternoon.
Mr. Morris. That is all right.
Senator Smith. Do you think that will be very voluminous?
Mr. Ball. Not very voluminous.
Senator Ferguson. You will photostat that?
Mr. Ball. Yes ; we will photostat the articles.
(The material referred to is as follows:)
Cleaby, Gottlieb, Friendly & Ball,
Washington, D. C, October 24, 1951.
Senator Pat McCarran,
Chairman, Judiaiary Coinmittee,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
Dear Senator McCarran : When Mr. Henry A. Wallace last appeared before
the Subcommittee on lliternal Security on October 17, 1951, some question was
raised as to the attitude taken by the Communist press in the United States
toward the dismissal of General Stilwell from command in China. At that time
I offered to produce for the attention of the subcommittee extracts from the
New York Daily Worker, showing how highly the Worker valued General Stil-
well. As I remember, I expressed the belief that those extracts would date
from June 1944, which was the approximate time of Mr. Wallace's visit to
China and of his cabled recommendation to President Roosevelt that General
Stilwell be replaced or removed from control of political matters connected
with Chiang Kai-shek.
I now find, however, that my recollection was in error and that there were
no significant references to General Stilwell in the Worker until his dismissal,
which occurred late in October 1944. The references to him in November 1944,
do, I believe, sustain the view tliat the initial reaction of the American Com-
munists to the news of General Stilwell's dismissal was one of shock and dismay,
which they subsequently moderated in order to make the best of a bad situation.
On reading the record of the testimony given by Mr. Joseph Alsop before your
22848— 52(—pt. 5 10
1392 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
subcommittee on October 18, 1951, in open ^ssion, I find that the relevant articles
from the Worker were offered by Mr. Alsop in the record, namely :
November 1, 1944, page 6, article by Starobin: Record, page 2839.
November 1, 1944, page 8, quotations from Atkinson : Record, page 2839.
November 4, 1944, page 8, article by Starobin: Record, page 2841.
November 4, 1944, page 9, article by Field : Record, page 2841.
November .5, 1944, page 4, article by Allen : Record, page 2841.
November 5, 1944, page S, article by Brovpder : Record, page 2841.
As these articles already have been pointed out to the subcommittee, no pur-
pose Vi'ould be served by our submitting them again. I understand that you
have available to you the issues of the Worker for that period, including the
full text of these articles as well as several others relating to General Stilwell's
recall. Mr. Morris, counsel for the subcommittee, referred to certain portions of
the November 1 article by Starobin and of the December 2 article by Field as
"the ofiicial Communist reactions to the removal of Stilwell" and "the two
reactions of the Daily Worker to the removal of Stilwell" (pp. 2650 and 2651,
respectively, of the typewritten record). Any implications from this that those
two fragments were the only Communist "reactions" would appear to be erro-
neous, since they must be considered in their context and together with such
other articles as Starobin's and Field's on November 4, 1944, and Allen's and
Browder's on November 5, 1944, as cited above.
In the course of these hearings it has been suggested that Amerasia may have
reflected the Communist line. While we have no independent information on
this question the committee may, in the light of these accusations, be interested
in an article in Ameiasia dated November 17, 1944, entitled "Stilwell's Recall."
In particular, I should like to draw the attention of the subcommittee to the last
page of the article (331), in which the editors of Amerasia, after setting out
what they believed should be the objective of the United States in China, wrote
as follows :
"These are the objectives of America in China. They are the objectives of
all liberal forces in China that have repeatedly urged Chiang Kai-shek to take
the lead in forming a genuinely representative government in order that Chinese
unity may be strengthened and that China may play a major part in the final
and decisive offensive against Japan and thus insure for herself a powerful
voice at the peace table. Finally, these are the objectives for which General
Stilwell worked unceasingly during liis 2 years of service in China. It may be
that he did not always present his case with the greatest possible tact, since
he was notably a 'direct actionist' and plain speaker rather than a diplomat.
But there is no question that he fought consistently for the best interests of
both the American and the Chinese people, and that his departure ivas deeply
regretted by all those Chinese leaders who ha4)e been working for a more lib-
eralized regime. No man has displayed greater confidence in the abilities of
the Chinese people and their armies, given proper training and equipment. No
man has shown a stronger conviction that the Chinese themselves must be
helped to play a leading role in winning their own war of national liberation.
The American Government could pay no better tribute to the Chinese people,
and offer no more convincing proof that it had their best interests at heart,
than to place General Stilwell in command of the American forces that will
ultimately land on China's shore to drive the Japanese from the continent of
Asia." [Italics added.]
Sincerely yours,
George W. Ball.
[From Amerasia — a Fortnightly Review of America and Asia, November 17, 1944]
Stilwell's Recall — The Future of American-Chinese Relations
The recall of Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell from the China-India-Burma front
and the resignation of the American Ambassador to Chungking, Clarence E.
Gauss, have served to focus widespread American attention on the serious internal
situation in China. In the flood of newspaper and radio comment evoked by
Stilwell's recall, the general American public has for the first time been made
thoroughly aware of the darker side of the picture as far as China's political and
military situation is concerned — a side long familiar to close students of the far-
eastern situation.
It was unfortunate that much of the publicity accorded to the return of General
Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss made it appear that some sudden and disastrous
crisis had arisen in China. And it was also unfortunate that some opponents
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1393
of the administration seized upon the Stilwell incident as proof that the Gov-
ernment was pursuing a dangerous and ill-conceived policy in China. Senator
Robert Reynolds, for example, accused the Government of playing two Chinese
factions "against the middle." Other antiadministration spokesmen sought to
put the blame on the shoulders of Harry Hopkins who was accused of interfering
with the efforts of Donald Nelson and General Hurley to persuade Chiang Kai-
shek to adopt measures for strengthening China's participation in the war. Even
Congressman Walter H. Judd, a long-time advocate of American-Chinese friend-
ship, promptly charged without qualiticatlon that Stilwell had delivered a White
House "ultimatum" to the Generalissimo which demanded that Stilwell be made
commander of all Chinese armed forces, and that consequently Chiang Kai-shek
very justifiably "blew up" and demanded Stilwell's recall.
Perhaps the most amazing examples of unsubstantiated reasoning on the
question of American-Chinese relations appeared in the November 13, 1944, issues
of both Time and Life. We recommend to the editors of these magazines that
they reread their own editorial comment in the May 1, 1944, issue of Life,
containing the following: "The first-hand report on China by Theodore H. White,
which begins on page 98 of this issue of Life, will shock a great many Americans.
It will especially shock those * * * who think of Cliina solely in terms of
her charm, eloquence, and idealism. * * * The White report is not .iust a
muckraking job. It is a balanced attempt by an able journalist who loves China,
to give a true picture of China and Its government today. * * * Perhaps the
most disturbing thing about White's report is the bitter chauvinism it reveals in
high quarters in Chungking. National unity has long been China's greatest
need. * * * But some Chinese have perverted it into a bitter contempt for
all foreigners. * * * We need China because she is a great potential force
for freedom and democracy in Asia. If China should cease to be that, and go
the way Japan went, we could not long stay friends. * * * The United States
cannot ignore the fact that if China's government should become a fascistic,
power-hungry, repressive, landlord's-and-usurers' government, it is all too likely
to get into trouble with Russia ; whereas a government which stands for freedom,
reform, and international cooperation is not. Under no circumstances would the
American people ever wish to be embroiled with the Soviet Union in a struggle
in which they would feel politically on the wrong side. But the freedom-loving,
progressive China which some of her leaders are still trying to bring to birth
would merit our support against the world. And it would need very little of it,
for it would have the support of every other peace-loving nation in the world."
Such a statement as the foregoing is in startling contradiction to the opinions
expressed in the pages of the same magazine of November 13, 1944. We know of
no facts that could justify such a sharp reversal. On the contrary, during the
intervening period an impressive number of foreign correspondents, American
military and political observers, as well as returned civilians have uniformly
added evidence that gives overwhelming support to Theodore White's May 12M
analysis and Life's editorial comment on it in the same issue. What has hap-
pened between May and November? Not even the editors of Life and Time can
play with impunity with news and comment that is not supported by even a sem-
blance of fact. They owe it to their readers and to the American people as a
whole to print the facts on which they base their change of reasoning and con-
clusions. Otherwise, it will be easier to give credence to Drew Pearson's report
published in his column of October l.">. in which Roy Larsen of Time is reported
"to be preparing to continue it [Time's] Russia-baiting policy, launched recently
with the attacks on Russia by ex-Ambassador Bullitt." According to Pearson:
"Word of this leaked out over a couple of highballs in a Washington hotel recenny
when Time's copublisher Roy Larsen conferred with War Production Board offi-
cials * * * of the paper branch. In a talkative mood, Larsen expounded
Time's plan to go out against Stalin and his reds." Such strategy would fit well
into Chungking's own aim of alienating the Soviet Union at all costs from
America and Great Britain in all matters pertaining to the Pacific and Asia.
To return to discussion of Stilwell's recall and the crisis in the American-
Chinese relations, all the facts in the case substantiate the conclusion that it was
not provoked by tactless and unskilled diplomacy on the part of the American
Government. Actually, as most of the thouu'htful newspaper comments pointed
out, the situation in China that led up to General Stilwell's recall was not a new
development, nor was it the product of unwarranted American interference in
China's internal affairs. At the risk of repeating much that has already appeared
in the pages of Amerasia, it is necessary to reexamine briefly the situation with
which General Stilwell was confronted.
1394 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Since 1940, a process of economic and military deterioration had been going
on in China that had seriously undermined her powers of resistance. In part,
this deterioration was tlie result of conditions that were beyond China's power
to control : the capture or destruction of her industries and railways, the block-
ade of her ports that cut her of£ from all sources of outside aid except that
which could be flown over the "hump," the hideous devastation wrought by a
brutal and ruthless enemy, coupled with the ravages of famine and disease, the
skyrocketing inflation resulting from the acute shortages of all forms of goods.
But this deterioration was also due in large measure to the fact that control
of the Chinese Government was monopolized by a small ruling clique represent-
ing the most conservative wing of tlie Kuomintang, China's only legal party.
This clique derived its power from the feudal-minded landed gentry who were
chiefly concerned with preserving the outmoded and oppressive agrarian system
that was their only source of power. Hence their spokesmen in the Govern-
ment were opposed to the extension of political democracy, to the development
of free industrial enterprise, and to reforms in the system of land tenure and
taxation. In other words, their desire to maintain a monopoly of political
and economic power made them adamant opponents of all measures that might
have served to mobilize the united support of the Chinese people in the war
against Japan.
The methods used by the ruling clique to suppress all political opposition are
now common knowledge, thanks to the detailed reports of such able observers
as Brooks Atkinson of the New York Times and many others : the widespread
use of secret police, the refusal to initiate democratic procedures, the suppres-
sion of freedom of speech and of the press, the toleration of hoarding and spec-
ulation on the part of the influential landlords and merchants, and the failure
to make effective use of even the limited supplies of materials and machinery
available in order to increase production. Mr. Atkinson describes the present
regime in Chungking as "a moribund antidemocratic regime that is more con-
cerned with maintaining its political supremacy than in driving the Japanese
out of China," and this opinion, which is shared by many other competent ob-
servers, does much to illuminate the basic cause of General Stilwell's inability
to cooperate effectively with the Chungking Government.
In the military sphere, for example, the reluctance of the Chungking regime
to undertake real popular mobilization, which would have required far-reaching
economic and political reforms, was reflected in a corrupt and tyrannical sys-
tem of conscription and the shocking maltreatment of many of the Govern-
ment's armies. Peasants were forcibly seized from their homes or fields and
impressed into military service, while those with sufficient funds or political
influence could easily buy immunity. The troops were very poorly fed, with
the result that in many cases they were compelled to plunder and pillage the
areas in which they were billeted. As a consequence of this maltreatment as
well as the poor quality of much of China's military leadership, the morale
of the armies deteriorated rapidly while the relationship between the troops
and the civilian population in some areas actually reached the point of open
conflict.
A number of important battles were lost in China as a result not only of
the Government's failure to supply the troops with adequate food or munitions
but also because of the active hostility of the peasants in the combat areas.
During the Honan campaign earlier this year, for example, when an estimated
50 to 75 thousand Japanese troops defeated and completely annihilated 700,000
Chinese troops under the command of General Tang En-po, the peasants had
been so enraged by the ruthlessuess with which Tang En-po's troops had col-
lected rice during the famine years that when the Japanese launched their at-
tack against Honan they organized guerrilla bands under the slogan "better
the Japanese than Tang En-po" and disarmed and sometimes killed many of
their own soldiers.
In addition to the generally lowered morale of the underfed, ill-equipped
Chinese armies and their failure to win the support of the of the civilian popu-
lation, China's military operations were still further handicapped by the mili-
tary blockade against the guerrilla areas of north China by approximately half
a million of the government's best armed and best trained' troops. This block-
ade, in effect since early in 1940, was perhaps the outstanding single piece of
evidence that the Chungking regime was thinking more of preserving its po-
litical and military power after the war than of driving the Japanese out of
Chma. The Chinese guerrillas, under the leadership of the Eighth Route Army,
had done a remarkable job in mobilizing the people for active resistance and
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1395
preventing the Japanese from establishing effective control in the areas that
their armies had overrun. Cut off from all sources of outside aid, including
the rest of Free China, and forced to depend almost entirely on munitions cap-
tured from the Japanese, they had managed to establish Chinese Governments
behind and between Japanese-held communication lines and garrison centers,
and to enlist the support of millions of partisan fighters and civilian militia.
The success of the guerrillas, however, was based on a program of popular edu-
cation and political and economic reform that was anathema to the Chungl\ing
bureaucrats because it involved democratic political procedures and agrarian
reforms designed to improve the condition of the peasants. All foreign visitors
to the guerrilla areas have testified to the fact that this program was in no
sense Communist, even though the Chinese Communist Party had taken the lead
in its formulation. On the contrary, they have reported that the guerrilla
leaders have no intention of seeking to establish a Communist system of govern-
ment in China, that they are completely loyal to the ideal of a national united
front with the Kuomintang and other political groups, that they recognize the
leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and that their program is designed
simply and solely to enlist the support of all sections of the population in the war
for national independence and to lay the basis for the development of a demo-
cratic and economically progressive nation after the war.
But to the landlords and bureaucrats controlling the Chungking regime, it was
obvious that the extension of such reforms throughout China would mean the
end of their monopoly of power. In their view, the growth of the guerrilla forces
to some 500,000 regular troops supported by 2,000,000 partisans and hundreds
of thousands of civilian militia did not represent added strength in the war
against Japan but a serious menace to their own power in the postwar period.
They therefore rejected all appeals from the border-region governments for the
formation of a coalition government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, for
a genuine mobilization of the Chinese people, and for a united effort on the part
of all China's armed forces against the Japanese. Instead they maintained a
rigid blockade of the guerrilla areas and began to save up munitions, supplies, and
troops for a final show-down with the Communists after China's allies had
attended to Japan's defeat.
STILWEIX'S STRATEGY
It was this situation that confronted General Stilwell when he arrived in China
in the spring of 1942 to take up his duties as chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek and
commander of American forces in the China-India-Burma theater. Stilwell had
previously spent more than 10 years in China. He had taken the trouble to learn
no less than 11 Chinese dialects. He knew and admired the Chinese people. He
was also convinced that the Chinese armies could and should be trained and
equipped to play a major role in the defeat of Japan on the Asiatic Continent.
In his view this strategy would not only be the quickest and most effective
method of achieving an Allied victory against Japan but would also serve to
unite and strengthen China so that she would be able to play her rightful part as
one of the four leading powers in the postwar world.
Starting from this initial premise that the Chinese armies must be aided to play
a more active part in the campaign against Japan, Stilwell's main objectives
were (1) to see that the best possible use was made of the limited resources that
China possessed, and (2) to get more supplies into China by reopening a land
route through Burma. From the outset, however, he encountered serious obsta-
cles— the principal one being the fact that the Chungking Government had no
desire to risk its armies in battle against the Japanese because it wished to save
them to insure its political power after the war. For this reason Chinese officials
were far more inclined to favor the strategy advocated by General Chennault,
commander of the United States Fourteenth Air Force. Chennault and his fliers
were naturally heroes to the Chinese for their work in defending Chungking and
other Chinese cities from Japanese bombings, their amazingly effective air sup-
port of Chinese troops, and their attacks on Japanese shipping and communica-
tions. An additional source of their popularity, however, was the fact that
Chennault believed that the main effort against Japan in China should be made
by air power, and therefore that the greater part of the limited supplies reaching
the China theater should be used to strengthen his air force. All he asked of the
Chinese was food and airfields, and he did not concern himself specifically with
the use which the Chinese made of their land forces. This strategy of relying
on American air power to do the job of defeating Japan in China was, of course,
entirely agreeable to the Chinese Government and received its full support.
1396 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Better to retain control of a devitalized and weak China, protected by a ring of
American bombers, than to risli losing coutrol of a strong and united nation
exerting all its energy in freeing itself from its enemy. Huch are tbe mental
operations of a landed bureaucracy fearful of losing power and distrustful of its
own people.
General Stilwell, on the other hand, believed that it was essential to im-
prove China's combat efficiency, reopen a road through Burma, and get China
back into the war as an effective fighting force. He viewed this as a purely
military problem, but it immediately compelled him to cope with delicate and
complicated political issues. In liis efforts to develop the Chinese armies into
an efficient and unified fighting force, he was confronted with the fact that
supplies intended for the fighting fronts were being diverted to the troops
blockading the guerrilla areas or were being hoarded for future use. The
blockade itself prevented American forces from making use of the highly
strategic areas controlled by the Chinese guerrillas and also served to im-
mobilize large numbers of Chinese troops that might otherwise have been
fightiug Japan. Stilwell was also handicapped in his efforts to reopen a supply
route through Burma by the failure of the British to undertake a large-scale
amphibious campaign or to give full support to his proposed land offensive.
The failure to undertake amphibious operations against Burma was generally
attributed to the lack of adequate shipping and naval strength, but it was also
known that the British autliorities were not overly enthusiastic about Stilwell's
idea of a land offensive because they did not w-ant to take Burma back with
the aid of the Americans and Chinese nor, for that matter, with the aid of the
Burmese, factors that would lessen British prestige and encourage Burmese na-
tionalist sentiment. British strategy was reported to call for the defeat of
Japan by naval and air power first and then the recovery of Japanese-occupied
territories without disturbing the internal political situation in those areas more
than was absolutely necessary. But despite the lack of British encouragement
General Stilwell fought his way back into Burma with the small American-
Chinese force which he had trained and equipped in India, thus demonstrating
his contention that the defeat of Japan by land was feasible.
General Stilwell was fully aware, however, that the internal political situation
in China constituted the most serious obstacle in his aim of revitalizing the
Chinese armies as an effective fighting force. He recognized also that unless the
internal disunity that was hamstringing China's war effort was replaced by a
genuinely united effort, the war against Japan would be greatly prolonged and
lives of thousands of American soldiers needlessly sacrificed. Consequently, he
had no alternative but to put the issue squarely up to Chiang Kai-shek as the
head of the Chinese Government and the acknowledged leader of all parties and
groups in China. *
Thus General Stilwell continued to urge that all China's fighting forces — the
guerillas as well as the Central Government's troops — be united in a single strik-
ing force against the Japanese ; that the blockade against the strategic guerrilla
areas be lifted ; that the United States be permitted to supply the guerrillas with
a minimum of equipment, and that steps be taken to establish air bases in the
guerrilla areas. In the political field. Ambassador Gauss also urged the need for
establishing unity and for measures to counteract the gi'owing opposition to the
Chungking regime that was developing throughout free China as a result of the
Government's dictatorial and repressive policies. The Ambassador is reported to
have suggested to Chiang Kai-shek that one means for allaying this jwpular
discontent and providing the basis for a united war effort would be the establish-
ment of a representative war council in which all groups would share responsi-
bility for the conduct of the war. This proposal, which seemed like a very work-
able compromise between the Yenan demand for a genuinely representative coali-
tion government and the Kuomintang's insistence on the maintenance of one-party
rule, was at first looked upon favorably by Chiang Kai-shek but was later rejected.
These negotiations between Stilwell and Gauss on the one hand and the Gen-
eralissimo on the other continued for almost 2 years, and a good deal of personal
bitterness was inevitably engendered in the process, as the requests of the two
American officials were repeatedly refused and Chiang Kai-shek came to feel
that the American Government was attempting to dictate Chinese policy. Finally,
an impasse was reached when it became obvious that it would be futile for
either of the two men to continue their efforts in the face of adamant opposi-
tion. General Stilwell was then recalled and Ambassador Gauss,' resignation
was accepted.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1397
AMKRICAN AIMS IN CHINA
It must be emphasized, however, that these two events do not mark a change
in American policy, nor do they prove that the United States Government is
now tacitly acquiescing in the existence of a regime in Chungking that does not
represent the Chinese r)eople and that pursues policies that are detrimental to
their interests as well as to our own. The American Government for some time
has hcen eagerly hoping for n cliange in the internal situation in China that
would place Chiang Kai-shek at the head of a united nation, that would
strengthen China's fighting powers, and that would enable her to emerge from
the war a strong and prosperous nation on which we could pin our liopes for
enduring peace in the Far East. To explore the possiblities of such a change,
such eminent administration spokesmen as Vice President Henry Walhice, War
Production Chief Donald Nelson, and Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley visited China
as the President's personal representatives. Mr. Wallace expressed, as clearly
as he could under the circumstances, the desii-e of the American people for a
strong, united, and democratic China, and specifically called attention to the
fact that no country "can be industrially sound or strong unless both its agri-
cultural technique and the agricultural part of its society are progressive and
prosperous" — a statement which may be construed as a direct criticism of the
economic policies of the Chungking regime.
Similarly, the chief pui-pose of Mr. Nelson's visit was to put the following
propositions before Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek: that the American Govern-
ment is eager to have China emerge as the leading power in Asia and is prepared
to give China extensive assistance in achieving this goal ; that xVmerica hopes
to see Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of this new and powerful China : and, third,
that American aid in achieving this position of primacy for Chiang Kai-shek in
China and for China in Asia must of necessity be contingent on a thoroughgoing
house cleaning in Chungking. Mr. Nelson apparently did not go into the political
aspect of this last condition but is reported to have indicated to Chiang exactly
what was meant as far as China's industrial organization was concerned. Pre-
vious to conferring with the generalissimo, Mr. Nelson inspected Chinese indus-
tries in and around Chungking. On the basis of these observation, he concluded
that the Chinese were making only partial use of the industrial equipment they
already possessed and that a higher rate of production had not been achieved
because of inefficiency', nepotism, and factional disputes between various cliques
within the Kuomintang. Mr. Nelson reported these conclusions to the generalis-
simo and declared that China could not expect any industrial equipment from the
United States so long as she was not making effective use of what she already
had. Chiang Kai-shek expressed amazement at Mr. Nelson's findings and invited
him to return to China as head of a newly established Chinese War Production
Board.
General Hurley's activities in Chungking have been less publicized, but it is
understood that he is working on the military aspect of the situation, presumably
with a view to persuading the Generalissimo of the importance of more active
Chinese participation in the war. The fact that General Hurley is still in
Chungking and that Mr. Nelson is returning shortly accompanied by a gi-oup of
experts in iron and steel production to aid in organizing a Chinese War Produc-
tion Board and stimulating Chinese industrial production is sufficient proof that,
though in one sense General Stilwell's recall represents a crisis in Ajuerican-
Chinese relations, it is not the disaster that some commentators have made it
out to be. It could only become a disaster if we allowed it to develop into a
wholly unwarranted anti-Chinese feeling in this country, overshadowing the
great debt which we owe to the Chinese people for their continued resistance to
our common enemy against far greater odds than we have ever been called
upon to face. Any wholesale condemnation of the Chinese would simply play
into the hands of those in the United States who favor a soft peace with Japan
on the grounds that Japan must be maintained as a balancing force in the Far
East, and who make good use of Chinese weakness and disunity to support their
argument.
It is true, of course, that Mr. Nelson and General Hurley are confronted with
the same diflBculties that faced General Stilwell and Ambassador Gauss. Unless
Chiang Kai-shek can be persuaded to broaden the political basis of his regime,
they will have to work within the existing bureaucratic framework and will be
faced with the same political obstacles.
It is reported, for example, that Mr. Nelson intends to recommend the appoint-
ment of Tseng Yang-fu as head of the proposed Chinese War Production Board.
1398 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Tseng, a graduate in engineering from the University of Pittsburgh, has
been Minister of Communications in the Chinese Government and has been offi-
cially responsible for the construction of airfields in China. He is also, however,
a classmate of Chen Li-fu and a prominent member of the highly reactionary CC
clique. One may legitimately ask how a program of increased industrial produc-
tion can be effectively carried out by a leading member of a bureaucracy that has
for so long deliberately stifled such efforts.
But despite these diflBculties Mr. Nelson's return to China holds out the promise
of an improvement in the basic situation that has disturbed American-Chinese
relations. For it is certain that a determined effort to stimulate industrial pro-
duction and curtail hoarding and speculation in essential raw materials would do
much to revive Chinese morale, check the disastrous spiral of inflation, and break
the paralyzing grip of the landed bureaucracy. It is to be hoped that in addition
to this measure on behalf of strenghtening China's economic structure, the Amer-
ican Government will send as our new Ajubassador to China- a high-ranking diplo-
mat of proven ability who will be able to contribute to a solution of the Chinese
political crisis by convincing the Chinese Government that, on the one hand, we
recognize China as an important independent power and that, on the other, it is
in China's interests as well as our own that she should participate more actively
in the forthcoming offensive against Japan.
The United States has no desire to dictate to the Chinese Government. We owe
a great debt to China because despite all hardships and handicaps she has
steadfastly refused to seek peace with Japan. We have no ulterior designs on
China ; all we want is that China shall emerge from this war a free, strong, and
friendly ally. But it is clearly the responsibility of the American Government
to do everything possible to ensure a speedy end to the war in Asia and to make
certain that the lives of American soldiers are not needlessly sacrificed. When
American forces eventually land on the coast of China, for example, it is impera-
tive that they find a friendly population, able and vdlling to give them strong
support. It so happens that the Chungking government at present has no control
over these coastal areas, but that the Chinese guerrillas have. Similarly, if our
Air Force in China is to operate effectively against Japanese industrial centers in
Manchuria and north China, it must have the use of bases in the guerrilla-con-
trolled areas in tlie north.
It is for this reason that American officials in China have urged and must
continue to urge that some compromise be reached between the guerrilla forces
and Chungking that will enable American arms and technical aid to be supplied
to all sections of China's fighting forces. It is for this reason that we may be
compelled to supply aid to the guerrillas, even without Chungking's approval, if
no such compromise is forthcoming. It is for this reason that we cannot allow
American supplies to be hoarded for use in a future civil war.
The task of the American Government is to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to
respond to the unanimous demand of all non-Kuomintang groups in China that
he become the leader of a genuinely united China instead of ruling in the name
of a single party. The New York Times in a recent editorial summed up the hope
of all sincere friends of China when it declared that, while we must and should
accept Chiang Kai-shek as the acknowledged leader of China, we can and should
"make it clear to Chiang that his prestige will be enhanced, not diminished, if he
takes certain steps : If he accepts American military guidance in return for
American military help ; if he throws the whole weight of his armies against the
Japanese instead of holding a great part of them inactive or on guard duty
against his political opponents ; if he makes a genuine truce with the Chinese
Communists ; if he consents to take into his Government members of the repre-
sentative groups and parties ; and if he permits the freedom of the press and of
discussion which is the only possible basis for the democracy to which he has
again and again pledged himself. * * * Peace in the Orient without a stable
and prosperous China is unthinkable. But it is time to speak frankly in the
interests of that stability, that prosperity, and tlie freedom without which neither
can be attained."
These are the objectives of America in China. They are the objectives of all
liberal forces in China that have repeatedly urged Chiang Kai-shek to take the
lead in forming a genuinely representative government in order that Chinese
unity may be strengthened and that China may play a major part in the final and
decisive offensive against Japan and thus insure for herself a powerful voice at
the peace table. Finally, these are the objectives for which General Stilwell
worked imceasingly during his 2 years of service in China. It may be that he did
not always present his case with the greatest possible tact, since he was notably
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1399
a direct actionist and plain speaker rather than a diplomat. But there is no
question that he fought consistently for the best interests of both the American
and the Chinese people and that his departure was deeply regretted by all those
Chinese leaders who have been working for a more liberalized regime. No man
has displayed greater confidence in the abilities of the Chinese people and their
armies, given proper training and equipment. No man has shown a stronger
conviction that the Chinese themselves must be helped to play a leading role in
winning their own war of national liberation. The American Government could
pay no better tribute to the Chinese people and offer no more convincing proof
that it had their best interests at heart than to place General Stilwell in com-
mand of the American forces that will ultimately land on China's shores to drive
the Japanese from the continent of Asia.
Senator Smith. Otherwise it might be possible to just flood the
record.
Mr. Ball. No ; it will be quite factual.
Mr. Wallace. I hope I will be absolved of any guilt of an endeavor
to flood the record today.
Senator Smith. Do you have anything else?
Mr. Morris. That is' all. Thank you very much, Mr. Wallace.
Senator Ferguson. By the way, did you want to put in any part
of that statement from the other day into the record, or did you in-
clude it?
Mr. Wallace. No ; that is included in here. I deliberately framed
this so it would be included.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Wallace, did you indicate in the executive session
the other day that you were going to make available the memorandum
in connection with the talk you had with Mr. Holland ?
Mr. Ball. Yes ; I have that here today. Mr. Wallace brought it
down. It is not a memorandum that Mr. Wallace made, but it is a
memorandum which was supplied to Mr. Wallace by Mr, Holland after
the conversation.
Mr. SouRWiNE. There are two memorandums that are to come to the
committee, are there not?
Was not one the memorandum that Mr. Holland gave you with
regard to certain portions of your pamphlet ?
Mr. Ball. No ; it is the testimony of the pamphlet, as I recall.
Mr. Wallace. That is the only one I have, at any rate.
Senator Smith. What is the other one ?
Mr. SouRWiNE. It just runs in my mind that Mr. Holland also fur-
nished him a memorandum about the testimony of Mr. Dennett, and
that he was going to furnish us with it.
Mr. Wallace. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did you not testify that Mr. Holland had furnished
you with a memorandum with regard to Dennett's testimony before
this committee ?
Mr. Ball. That is right ; and this is Dennett's testimony before the
committee with respect to the pamphlet. It combines both of those
things.
This is a memorandum criticizing Dennett's testimony with respect
to the pamphlet.
Mr. SouRwiNE. In other words, the memorandum that Mr. Holland
gave you when he came up to the farm is this, and there were not two
separate memorandums ?
Mr. Wallace. Just this.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is right ; I am sorry.
1400 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. That will be placed in the record.
(The information referred to is as follows :)
Comments on Wallace Pamphlet
(Dennett testimony, hearings, vol. 17. pp. 1763-1771)
1. Dennett himself states (pp. 1763, 1770-1771) that publication of a pamph-
let by Mr. Wallace was discussed in the executive committee and approved by
them.
2. The account of the origin of the pamphlet given by Dennett (p. 1763) and by
Mrs. Lattimore (testimony in executive session, quoted in Dennett volume, p.
1767) is incomplete. Dennett says: "Early in 1945 (error; he meant 1944) I
received word from the Washington office that Owen Lattimore believed that
Mr. Wallace might be willing to write a pamphlet * * *" Mrs. Lattimore
says the pamphlet "originated because Mr. Wallace, who was the Vice Presi-
dent of the United States, had become interested in the Far East, and had some
ideas about the Far East, and so the IPR thought it would be very interesting
to have a pamphlet written by him."
The genesis of the pamphlet goes much further back than this. For a long
time Miss Miriam S. Farley, the editor of the IPR popular pamphlet series, had
urged that several nationally known persons be invited to write pamphlets for
the series, with a view to promoting the sale of the series as a whole. In this
connection a good many names were canvassed, and two were finally selected :
Vice President Wallace and Mr. Eric Johnston. The selection was made on
two grounds: (1) both men were qualified to write on the subjects chosen; (2)
both were men whom the IPR was able to approach through mutual friends who
might be instrumental in persuading them to write.
The approach to Mr. Wallace was made with the aid of Owen Lattimore ; the
approach to Mr. Johnston was made with the aid of Benjamin H. Kizer, of
.Spokane. Mr. Wallace was asked to write on the post war far eastern policy
of the United States, and Mr. Johnston on the post war economic relations be-
tween the United States and the Far East. Both men accepted the IPR's in-
vitation. In Mr. Wallace's case the pamphlet was written and published. To
the IPR's regret, Mr. Johnston later found that he did not have time to write a
pamphlet, so this project did not materialize. Thus circumstances made it
impossible to carry out the original aim of publishing two pamphlets by men of
national reputation but representing different points of view.
3. During Dennett's testimony, Mr. Mandel, of the subcommittee's staff, read
the following quotations from the Wallace pamphlet :
(a) "Free Asia will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a
great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to
have become a freedom bloc in fact * * *" (p. 24).
This quotation is torn from its context in such a way as to completely distort
its meaning. In this passage, Mr. Wallace was drawing a contrast between the
countries of Asia which were independent, that is free, and tliose which at that
time were still under colonial rule. He recommended that the United States
encourage an orderly development toward greater self-government and eventual
independence for colonial peoples. This is made clear when the entire passage
is quoted :
"Whereas after the war we shall find Asia economically still largely in a stage
of primitive agriculture, politically we shall find it divided into two parts : Free
Asia and subject Asia. While Lincoln's phrase cannot be applied literally, yet
in the larger sense it is true that neither a country nor a region can indefinitely
continue to exist half slave and half free.
" 'Free Asia' will include first of all China and Soviet Asia, which form a
great area of freedom, potentially a freedom bloc which it is to our interest to
have become a freedom bloc in fact. It will include the Philippines, which has
been promised its independence, Korea, which has also been promised freedom
'in due course,' and Thailand, which though independent before Japan's conquest,
is one of the small countries which could probably not preserve its freedom except
as part of a larger structure of free nations.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1401
"Subject Asia or colonial Asia will inclnde the countries whose present rulers
have not yet committed themselves to definite dates for the emancipation of their
colonial subjects. If peace came tomorrow this would include India, the Dutch
East Indies, Burma, Malaya, Indochina, and a great many small Pacific islands.
"This large bloc cannot be described as 'antifreedom' but rather as 'not yet
having freedom.' It is to our advantage not to perpetuate this division but to
see an orderly process of transition so that the area of free Asia will grow and
the area of subject Asia continually diminish."
(&) "The Russians have demonstrated their friendly attitude toward China by
their willingness to I'efrain from intervening in China's internal affairs * * *"
(p. 28).
At the time Mr. Wallace wrote (1944) the Russians were not intervening in
CMna's internal affairs. The passage quoted by Mandel is immediately preceded
by a quotation from Dr. Hu Shih, former Ambassador to the United States of the
Chinese Nationalist Government, as follows:
"It is my sincere hope that the time will come when China and the Soviet
Union may work shoulder to shoulder not only in fighting a common foe, but in
all time to come * * *. The peace and prosperity of Asia demand such a
mutual understanding between these two great countries which comprise three-
quarters of the continent."
(c) The three other passages quoted by Mandel do not seem worth commenting
on. But it should be noted that the five short passages which he quotes, all of
which mention Russia, are not representative of the contents of the pamphlet,
which devotes only a small amount of space to Russia — approximately 3 pages
out of 43. The principal argument advanced in the pamphlet is in favor of a
program of economic aid to Asia, with main emphasis on agriculture. Many
other postwar problems are also discussed, including the colonial problem (see
above), the future of Japan, America's strategic needs in the Pacific, interna-
tional organization, etc. The entire text of the pamphlet was incorporated in
the record as exhibit No. 284. But at the public hearing Mandel quoted only
passages dealing with Russia, including one (see (a) above) which was com-
pletely distorted, but was picked up by many newspapers and thus gave the
newspaper public a completely false idea of the nature of the pamphlet.
Senator Smith. Do you have anything else ?
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have nothing more, sir. That was the last point
I wished to cover.
Senator SMrrn. Senator Ferguson ?
Senator Ferguson. No, sir.
Senator Smith. Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. No, sir ; we have nothing more.
Mr. Joseph Alsop is the next witness, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. We will extend to Mr. Wallace the same courtesy
we did to Mr. Alsop ; we will let him sit here and listen.
Mr. Wallace. I, unfortunately, have another commitment.
Mr. SouRWiNE. May I make this statement on behalf of Mr. Alsop :
It is my understanding that he wants to make a presentation of
some length in connection with which he would like to choose his own
order of comment.
I do not believe Mr. Alsop desires to have his testimony broken
into on the two sessions.
I do not know how long the committee intends to sit, but I suggest
consideration might be given, with the discretion here with Mr. Alsop,
to what courtesies might be extended to him in connection with his
testimony.
Senator Smith. It is 20 minutes past 4 now, and so far as I am
concerned, it is all right.
1402' INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
We will recess later. Wliat is your pleasure, Mr. Alsop?
Mr. Alsop. I would much rather appear tomorrow, Senator, be-
cause this is a most complex subject and unless you are prepared to
sit here very late at night, you will not be able to get the story into
the record as one story.
I would much rather recess, if I may.
Senator SinrrH. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Senator Smith. On the record. If there is nothing else, we will
recess until tomorrow morning at 9 : 30.
( Wliereupon, at 4 : 25 p. m., Wednesday, October 17, 1951, the
hearing was recessed until 9:30 a. m., Thursday, October 18, 1951.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC KELATIONS
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1951
United States Senate, Subcommittee To
Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws,
OF the Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. 0.
The subcommittee met at 9 : 30 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room 424,
Senate Office Building, Senator Pat McCarran (chairman) , presiding.
Present : Senators McCarran, O'Conor, Smith, Watkins, and Fer-
guson.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morns,
subcommittee counsel; and Benjamin Mandel, director of research.
Senator Ferguson (presiding). The committee will come to order.
You do solemnly swear in the matter now pending before this sub-
committee of the Judiciary Committee of the United States, to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr. Alsop. I do.
TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH ALSOP, ACCOMPANIED BY GANSON PURCELL
Senator Ferguson. You may proceed.
Mr. Morris. Do you have any evidence that bears on the inquiry
that is underway by this committee ?
Mr. Alsop. I have a substantial amount of evidence which I will put
in the record as I continue with my statement if I may.
Mr. Morris. Will you present the evidence to the committee?
Mr. Alsop. I have a statement, if I may proceed.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Chairman, I have come before you voluntarily to
testify that certain sworn evidence by Louis Budenz is misleading
and untruthful. This evidence concerned former Vice President
Wallace's trip to China in the spring of 1944 and the part played on
that trip by the State Department official, John Carter Vincent.
With your permission I will follow the orderly system which your
committee counsel suggested to Mr. Budenz on his last appearance
before you.
As Mr. Budenz analyzed the documents produced by Mr. Wallace's
mission point by point, I should like to analyze Mr. Budenz' testi-
mony in the same manner, setting forth what he has said under oath
against the actual facts as shown to me and shown by documents.
The basic statements by Mr. Budenz which I now challenge can be
very quickly summarized. In his first testimony before your commit-
1403
14:04c INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
tee on this subject of John Carter Vincent and Mr. Vincent's role in
Mr. Wallace's trip to China, Mr. Budenz stated affirmatively that Mr.
Vincent was "a member of the Communist Party at that time." •
He testified further that the Politburo of the American Communist
Party relied on Mr. Vincent, and again I quote Mr. Budenz, "to
guide Mr. Wallace largely along the paths", of the Communist Party
line during this trip to China.
In his second testimony given more recently Mr. Budenz added
that the Communist leaders were pleased with the Wallace mission.
Under questioning by you. Senator Ferguson, he expanded on this.
I quote:
Mr. Budenz. The Communist Party Politburo, from its vantage point, thought
that the Wallace mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided
and would end in the way they wished it would end. They have to appreciate
what that objective of theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular
period of time.
Senator Ferguson. Do you feel their objective was carried out?
Mr. Budenz. Absolutely. It was carried out.
On the basis of this testimony of Mr. Budenz, I have written to
your committee's chairman that Mr. Budenz was guilty of three un-
truths.
The first and basic untruth was Mr. Budenz's assertion that the
Wallace mission to China carried out a Communist objective. In
fact, it did the precise contrary.
The second untruth was that Mr. Vincent guided Mr. Wallace to-
ward any Communist objective. In fact, he did the precise contrary.
The third untruth was that Mr. Vincent was a party member at
that time.
The weight of contrary evidence is such as to make this undoubtedly
unsupported allegation inherently incredible. It is first necessary,
therefore, to examine Mr. Budenz's statement that the Wallace mis-
sion carried out a Communist objective.
Fortunately, this can easily be tested against the only important
results of the Wallace mission to China which are now upon the pub-
lic record. These results were a cable from Mr. Wallace to President
Eoosevelt sent from Kunming via New Delhi on June 26, 1944, and
a final report to President Roosevelt delivered by Mr. Wallace at the
TV^iite House on July 10, 1944.
In these two documents there is much historical and reportorial
matter which Mr. Budenz has seen fit to describe as pro-Communist
in character.
If the committee so desires, I am prepared to prove that in these
passages of his testimony Mr. Budenz has been guilty of gross distor-
tion and deception, but the really relevant and striking feature of these
two documents is not this historical and reportorial matter.
The really striking feature is the recommendation to the President
contained in the Kunming cable of June 26 that Gen. Joseph W. Stil-
well be dismissed forthwith from command in China and that the
command be given to Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
Mr. SouRwiNE. May I interrupt for just a moment?
Mr. Alsop. Certainly. I hope you will stop me at any time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am sure you made mention there you would offer
some proof if the committee so desired and you did not mean to imply
any question as to whether the committee wanted the full facts with
regard to what you are concerned with ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1405
Mr. Alsop. No ; not for 1 minute.
Senator Ferguson. The committee does want all the evidence.
Mr. Alsop. I hope you will feel when you have seen the evidence
against Mr. Budenz's basic assertions that you have very little doubt
he has deceived the committee with respect to this historical and
reportorial matter which is subordinate.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I thought it should be made clear that the commit-
tee desires all the testimony and evidence that you can give to throw
light on the situation.
Mr. Alsop, That was my only intention.
This recommendation for the replacement of General Stilwell by
General Wedemeyer was always regarded as the central and decisive
passage of this Kunming cable both by Mr. Wallace and by Mr.
Vincent.
I can so testify because I was present and took part in all the pre-
liminary discussions with Mr. Wallace and the accused man, Mr.
Vincent.
In his first testimony Mr. Budenz made no mention whatever of
this chief result of the Wallace mission. When recalled to the stand
to defend his previous testimony, Mr. Budenz oddly sought to show
that the nomination of General Wedemeyer was a pro-Communist act,
but again Mr. Budenz entirely passed over with no mention at all what
was really significant ; namely, the recommendation that General Stil-
well be dismissed from command in China.
This was the point that Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent discussed
longest and weighed most carefully. This recommendation to dis-
miss General Stilwell and not the nomination of General Wedemeyer
was the truly drastic step that Mr. Wallace took, and I think I can
show the committee that this recommendation to dismiss General Stil-
well in wliich the accused man, Mr. Vincent, participated and con-
curred was the heaviest blow to the Communist cause in China that
could be struck at that time.
Basically this was true because General Stilwell was strongly
gripped with certain attitudes highly favorable to the Chinese Com-
munist cause and because with his vast authority as theater com-
mander was able to give effect to those attitudes.
Since he is no longer here to speak in his own defense, I shall, if
the committee will permit me, try to develop what those attitudes
of General Stilwell's were from documents penned by General Stil-
well himself.
The series of documents begins in 1938.
The Chairman. Just a minute, Mr. Alsop. From what are you
reading ?
Mr. Alsop. I am reading from a presentation. Senator, which I
made in order to organize the evidence and which the committee
agreed yesterday I could read.
The Chairman. This committee ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, sir.
The Chairman, Who was present at that time ?
Mr. Alsop. Senator Ferguson and Senator Smith of North Carolina.
The Chairman. They agreed you should read this statement?
Mr. Alsop. Certainly.
Mr. Sourwine also agreed.
The Chairman. Without cross-examination ?
1406 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. No. I., 'te questions in the course of the presentation,
sir. . lir
The Chairman. ,i5fl"*^her you are running this committee or the
committee is runnir/jjtl i ilf is a matter to be determined very shortly.
Mr. Alsop. I am i. trying to run the committee in the least.
The Chairman. I Jiink you are. You are proposing to quote
something now that isn't in your statement and isn't your statement
at all. It is a hearsay matter. What are you going to do with that ?
Are you going to be cross-examined on it and, if so, how?
Mr. Alsop. I am not going to quote anything that isn't a public
document.
The Chairman. I understand you to say you are going to quote
from someone who is not here.
Mr. Alsop. I am going to quote from a series of public documents,
Senator.
The Chairman. I will let you go along a while, but I am going to
find out what is going on.
Mr. Ai^op. The series of documents begins in 1938.
The Chairman. Wliat is the authenticity of these documents?
Mr. Alsop. If you will wait, Senator, I will try and tell you.
The Chairman. I want to laiow where you got them before you
read them.
Mr. Alsop. This happens to be a House or Senate document.
The Chairman. On what number ?
Mr. Alsop. It appears in a publication by the Committee on Un-
American Activities of the House of Representatives, December 31,
1948.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Alsop. The series of documents begins in 1938 when General
Stiiwell was an obscure colonel assigned as an intelligence officer in
China. At that time he sent the War Department a commentary
on the situation after the fall of Nanking, which turned up, interest-
ingly enough, in Whittaker Chambers pumpkin papers.
In this document published by the House of Representatives which
I now offer as the first exhibit, Stiiwell wrote :
On the Chinese side only the Reds have a definite plan, the essence of which
is the adoption of guerrilla warfare on a large scale and the mobilization of the
masses. The Kuoniintang leaders have been forced to take notice, since they
can suggest nothing better, but they are not pushing the program in a whole-
hearted way because its success will mean the passing of power to the Reds.
In this Stiiwell report of 1938 you will notice what may be called
the germ of a military prejudice in favor of the Comnmnists and
against the Nationalists.
This germ, in turn, became a violent infection when General
Stiiwell was brought into sharp collision with the Generalissimo by
his wartime assignment in China.
From almost the beginning there were bitter disagreements between
the two men which ultimately generated a consuming hatred of
Chiang Kai-shek in General Stil well's mind as I shall now seek to
demonstrate in General Stilwell's personal papers, published by
William Sloane Associates in New York after being arranged and
edited by Theodore H. White,
The bulk of this publication consists of selections from General
Stilwell's diaries and letters arranged and organized by Mr. Wliite
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1407
under the guidance of Mrs. Stilwell. You can ^race the development
of General Stilwell's attitude
Mr. Morris. May the lecord show, Mr. Cha t ' an, that these docu-
ments are being passed around this morning ' they are being seen
by the Senators here and the staff for the first i.
The Chairman. Yes. The record may she 'if that is the fact.
That is the reason I am drawing attention, i am wondering what
this is all about.
Mr. Morris. It is completely without precedent we should take
documents in open session we have never seen in executive session.
The Chairman. It is without precedent we should be taking this
statement. I would like to know how this came about, by what
authority. We should have the documents before they are presented.
Mr. Morris. These were not mentioned in executive session.
Mr. PuRCELL. I beg your pardon.
The Chairman. AVho are you, please? Will you please sit remote
from the witness ?
Mr. PuRCEix. Yes.
The Chairman. When we want you to answer a question, we will
ask you.
Senator Ferguson. I understand these are just excerpts from this
book.
Mr. Alsop. It is marked in the book if there is any desire to check
as to the authenticity of the documents.
The Chairman. There will be a desire, of course. Why not?
Mr. Alsop. You can trace the development of General Stilwell's
attitude in these posthumously personal papers of his.
In June 1942 only a few months after taking command in China
General Stilwell was already writing in his diary that the General-
issimo was a —
stupid little ass and that tlie Chinese Government was a structure based on
fear and favor in the hands of an ignorant, arbitrary, and stubborn man.
About the same time in a letter headed "The Manure Pile," his name
for the Generalissimo's wartime capital, he wrote that:
This is the most dreary type of maneuvering I've ever done, trying to guide
and influence a stubborn, ignorant, prejudiced, conceited despot.
The first mention of the Communists appears in September of the
same year when he satirically summarizes a Chinese intelligence esti-
mate including the statement that :
The Communists are raising hell. One-third of the 49 armies in the north have
to oppose them.
This estimate he dismisses as "pure crap."
This is significant in view of Mr. Budenz' testimony in 1944 the
Communist line was "to end the blockade of the northwest."
Or, in other words, because these Chinese armies containing the
Communists in the north were to be used in some other manner.
Almost from the first General Stilwell maintained that by seeking to .
contain the Communists the Generalissimo proved he was not going
all out to "beat the Japs," and he endlessly badgered Chiang Kai-shek
to transfer these troops from the north down to the Burma forces in
the south.
L'2848— 52— pt. 5 11
1408 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In short, (Teneral Stilwell was hammering on tlie same theme some-
time before the Communists raised their slogan.
To go back to the documents, by January 1943, General Stilwell
was noting :
What a fight the Russians have made. The nation has obviously found itself.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have the quote from Budenz' testi-
mony ?
Mr. Alsop. I would have to look through it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you quote it there ?
Mr. Alsop. I think I accurately said what was the main slogan.
Senator Ferguson. Would you read it again?
Mr. Alsop. He testified on his second appearance on the stand that
the Communist policy was to end the blockade of the northwest, which
was their name for the Generalissimo's effort to contain the Chinese
Communist armies.
Senator Ferguson. It is that that you are answering?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
By January 1943 General Stilwell was noting :
What a fight the Russians have made. The nation has obviously found itself.
Twenty years of work and struggle. Results: Tough physique; unity of pur-
pose ; pride in their accomplishments ; determination to win.
This Soviet success he then compared with :
The Chinese cesspool, a gang of thugs with the one idea of perpetuating them-
selves and their machine.
And General Stilwell concluded angrily :
We are maneuvered into the position of having to support this rotten regime
and glorify its figurehead, the all-wise great patriot and soldier-peanut. My God.
Peanut was General Stilwell's customary name for the
Generalissimo.
In a note written in July of the same year General Stilwell achieved
his most complete collection of unflattering adjectives for Chiang
Kai-shek —
Obstinate, pigheaded, ignorant, intolerant, arbitrary, unreasonable, illogical,
ungrateful, grasping.
By 1944 when Mr. Wallace came to China the political note was
being strongly struck by General Stilwell. In an undated note placed
in 1944 by the editors of the Stilwell papers, the following appears :
I judge Kuomintang and Kungchantang (which is the Communist Party) by
what I saw : Kuomintang — corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words
and deeds ; hoarding, black market, trading with enemy.
Communist program
Mr. Morris. May I at this time ask you the relevancy of what you
are reading?
Mr. Alsop. This was the man being dismissed. It shows he was
not only hostile to the Generalissimo, but very friendly to the Com-
munists, if you will allow me to continue.
Mr. Morris. Has any witness before this committee said that Gen-
eral Stilwell was not friendly to the Chinese Communists?
Mr. Alsop. A witness before this committee has alleged that a Com-
munist objective was carried out by the dismissal of General Stilwell.
Mr. Morris. We had evidence
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1409
Mr. SouRwiNE. Just a minute, Mr. Morris. I would be very much
interested in having Mr. Alsop show the testimony on the point he
just indicated. I don't recall a witness testifying that a Communist
objective was carried out through the dismissal of General Stilwell.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz said
The Chairman. Let's get the record.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz said
The Chairman. Let's see what he said.
Mr. Alsop. I can read it.
The Chairman. I want the official record. I don't want your notes..
Mr. Alsop. Please give me the record and I will read it to you.-
Sorry, Senator. This is directly from the record. It will take me a
little time to find it.
The Chairman. All right, find it. If you had submitted your
statement before, we would not have had to take the time to find it.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Sourwine, with whom I discussed it, did not ask
me to do so, Senator.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Alsop, you told me you had no statement, that
you would have no prepared statement, you were simply woiking
from notes.
Mr. Alsop. I am.
Mr. Sourwine. But you cannot expect me to ask you for your notes.
You didn't tell me you had a statement.
Mr. Alsop. I have an orderly presentation which I was told I woidd
be permitted to offer.
This is page 2098 of Mr. Budenz' second testimony. Mr. Budenz
said, concerning the relationship of the Wallace mission to Communist
policy :
These documents are presented, as I said, are only part of what could have
been presented to this committee, and they confirm my contention, which was
the Communist Party Politburo from its vantage point thought that the Wallace
mission to Soviet Asia and China was being properly guided and would end the
way they wished it would end. "We have to appreciate what that objective of
theirs was, knowing their objective during that particular period of time.
Senator Ferguson. Do you feel their objective was carried out?
Mr. Budenz. Absolutely. It was carried out.
The chief results of Mr. Wallace's mission — —
The Chairman. Now, just lead your statement and never mind the
chief result of Mr. Wallace's mission. Wliat was your statement that
was challenged here by counsel ? Read your statement.
Mr. Alsop. Mj statement was that
Tlie Chairman. Read the statement.
Mr. Alsop. The record will have to be read back.
Tlie Chairman. You have the notes before you.
Mr, Alsop. I was not speaking from my notes. I was trying to
answer Mr. Morris' question.
The Chairman. When did you speak from your notes and when
not?
Mr. Alsop. It depends on whether I'm being questioned or not.
The Chairman. You were not being questioned.
Mr. Alsop. I was.
The Chairman. If you have a quotation, I will read back from
the record, or you read it from your notes. You are not going to
make ad libitum statements here and not have them challenged-.
1410 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. The stenographer will have to read back.
The Chairman. Very well. ^
(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)
The Chairman. You may proceed with your question, counsel.
Mr. SouRWiNE. It seemed to me that the witness had made a state-
ment concerning something which he said a prior witness before
this committee stated. I don't recall any prior witness who so stated
it.
Wliat he has read from Mr. Budenz's testimony is not what he
said a witness stated.
Mr. Alsop. Let me
The Chairman. Just a minute. Conclude your statement or your
question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I do not think Mr. Alsop should paraphrase what
a prior witness said when his specific purpose is to accuse the prior
witness of perjury before the committee.
I think in quoting what a prior witness said he should be careful to
quote exactly from the testimony before the committee.
Mr. Alsop. May I continue?
The Chairman. Yes, but you have your warning. Do not para-
phrase. You will not get it again.
Mr. Alsop. I have already given the extremely disagreeable de-
scription of the Kuomintang program. I now quote from General
Stilwell's description of the Communist program :
Reduce taxes, rents, interest; raise production and standard of living; par-
ticipate in government ; practice what they preach.
In another undated paper of the same period General Stilwell noted
that —
The mass of the Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible
hope of relief.
And in still another he wrote that —
The cure for China's trouble is the elimination of Chiang Kai-shek.
The committee will recall the enormous latitude conferred during
the last war on American theater commanders. I need hardly point
out to the committee that from the very first it was a positive danger
to the Generalissimo to have to rely for his American support on a
theatre commander who regarded him as a despot and a fool and
his government as a monstrosity.
I need hardly point out, either, that this danger to the Generalis-
simo had become extremely acute by the time Mr. Wallace and Mr.
Vincent reached China for this American theater commander to whom
Chaing Kai-shek looked for aid was actually calling for Chiang's
"elimination" and describing the Chinese Communists as the "only
hope of the Chinese masses."
It did not end there, however. Mr Budenz has testified that the
rather pale and moderate description of China's political-economic-
military crisis in 1944 contained in the Wallace cable was calculated
to "discredit the Generalissimo."
And that this cable, therefore, followed the Communist Party line.
In fact, however, if the Communists wished to discredi'^. Chiang
Kai-shek and shake American confidence in him. General Stilwell,
;the chief American representative in China, whose removal Mr.
Wallace recommended, was the ideal instrument.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1411
The attacks on Chiang I have quoted were not confided to General
Stilwell's diary alone. He never tired of describing the Generalissima
in the same terms to the highest officials of the American Government
whose sole important source of information on China he then was.
There were excellent reasons to believe, as the committee will later
see, that General Stilwell actually encouraged and instructed his staff
to denigrate and belittle Chiang Kai-shek in the same manner.
Furthermore, and this is the crucial point. General Stilwell had a
plan for giving practical effect to his preference for the Chinese Com-
munists which he was maturing just the moment when Mr. Wallace
reached China.
Senator Ferguson. Had you ever directly worked under Stilwell?
Mr. Alsop. No. I have known him rather well. I worked under
General Chennault, but I was fairly familiar with all the military
affairs of the theater because one of my assignments from General
Chennault was to know about them.
The Chairman. You did not work under him.
Mr. Alsop. I worked with him
The Chairman. You did not work under him ?
Mr. Alsop. I did not, but I was familiar with the theater plans.
The Chairman. Did you know his official records ? Did you have
access to them ?
Mr. Alsop. Senator, as you know
The Chairman. Will you answer my question? Never mind
evadins:.
Mr. Alsop. If you will permit me, I shall try to do so.
The Chairman. Did you have access to his official records ?
Mr. Alsop. I had access to some of his official records.
The Chairman. General Stilwell ?
Mr. Alsop. General Stilwell's telegrams were frequently repeated
to the Fourteenth Air Force as is usually the military custom.
The Chairman. You had access to them ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
The Chairman. Those were all ?
Mr. Alsop. No, because I knew members of his staff extremely
well.
The Chairman. And they gave you his official records? Is that
the idea you wish to convey?
Mr. Alsop. They did not, but they gave me extremely clear and
positive information about General Stilwell's policy line, Senator.
The Chairman. You got it from his subordinates ?
Mr. Alsop. I got it from his subordinates, and telegrams.
The Chairman. That is what you are testifying, what you got
from General Stilwell's subordinates? Is that what you are testi-
fying to under oath here ?
Mr. Alsop. I am testifying
The Chairman. Will you answer? Is that what you are testify-
ing to under oath ?
Mr. Alsop. I am testifying to information which I received from
many different sources.
The Chairman. I am talking about General Stilwell.
Mr. Alsop. My information from him does not come from his sub-
ordinates only. .It comes from different sources, from General
Chennault, from the Chinese. It comes from newspapermen with
1412 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
whom General Stilwell spoke very freely. It comes from many differ-
ent sources.
The Chairman. Just so long as we know where you are getting
this. That was the question propounded by Senator Ferguson.
Mr. Alsop. I am anxious to tell you.
General Stilwell had a plan for giving practical effect to his pref-
erence for the Chinese Communists which he was actually maturing
at the moment when Mr. Wallace reached China.
In Mr. Wallace's cable the committee will have noted that a Japa-
nese offensive was then inflicting disastrous defeats on the General-
issimo's armies in the east China area.
Senator Ferguson. Could you tell us whether or not anyone else
had sent the information which is indicated here to the Pentagon or
to the President about the conditions in China and General Stilwell's
attitude on those conditions ?
Mr. Alsop. I think I can give you a very interesting history on that
effort.
What actually happened was this: When the Japanese offensive
-commenced, General Stilwell's intelligence — we used to receive copies
of the intelligence report — described it as a rice raid. In its first
phase the offensive overran in 3 weeks the great and very rich Prov-
ince of Honan, completely destroyed the armies of Gen. Tankg En
Po.
Gen. Tang En Po had an estimated several hundred thousand Chi-
nese troops — I think I said in my executive session testimony 700,000.
I think that was rather high. It was nearer 400,000.
At any rate, it was one of the major Army groups of the Chinese
Nationalists.
They then came down to Changsha on the Yangtze River. General
Stilwell's intelligence was still treating this episode as minor. They
said the armies of Tang En Po had just fallen to pieces of themselves
and that anything that happened before Changsha would be a rice
raid.
The defender of Changsha was a Gen. Shueh Yueh. Changsha fell
and the Japanese began to drive south of Changsha toward the even
more vital area in Kiangsi Province.
The situation began to look veiy black. I was told at the time by a
member of General Stilwell's staff — General Stilwell, I should say,
during this period, was in Burma, and after the fall of Changsha the
intelligence reports took a completely different turn and the offensive
that had previously been treated as a rice raid became absolutely un-
stoppable.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Are you talking about intelligence reports returned
to Washington, returned to the Pentagon ?
Mr. Alsop. The circulation, unless I am very incorrectly informed —
I think I am quite correct — was that we would get one, the Delhi
headquarters would get one, and they would be forwarded to Wash-
ington.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Are you attempting to answer Senator Ferguson's
question as to whether this situation with respect to Stilwell's atti-
tudes, policies, and plans was reported to Washington?
Mr. Alsop. I don't think General Stilwell's plan was— Senator
Ferguson, if we have to read the record
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1413
Senator Ferguson. I am anxious to know if what yon say now
about Stilwell was all known and came to Mr. Wallace's attention and
it took from July until about November — am I right when Stilwell
was removed ^
Mr, ]MoRRis. Late October.
Senator Ferguson. Why we allowed a condition as you are describ-
ing here to exist in the Cliinese theater without him being removed
^te
without the effort of Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Alsop. I think I can explain that to you. I would like to do it
later. It is a rather major subject actually. I would like to finish
with these situation reports.
Senator Ferguson. You will explain that as to why they did not
act in W^ashington without Mr. Wallace's recommendation?
]Mr. Alsop. They did act in Washington.
Senator Ferguson. Without Mr. Wallace's recommendation?
]Mr. Alsop. No. They acted on this problem of the Japanese offen-
sive which you originally questioned me about.
Senator Ferguson. I was also questioning you about whether or not
Washington knew what was going on as far as our commander was
concerned.
Mr. Alsop. I don't think they clearly understood what was going
on. I can't testify to that as a matter of knowledge, naturally. I can
give you a fairly clear opinion.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether Chiang had given a mes-
sage to anyone else besides Wallace that he wanted Stilwell removed?
Mr. Alsop. Well
Senator Ferguson. Do you know that?
Mr. Alsop. Senator, if you want, I will tell you-
The Chairman. The question is : Do you know ?
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not Chiang gave any
word to anyone else other than Henry Wallace that he wanted Stilwell
removed ? Wallace indicated yesterday that Chiang wanted Stilwell
removed.
Mr. Alsop. He did not testify, Senator
The Chairman. Let's get back to Senator Ferguson's question.
Senator Ferguson. To your knowledge, did Chiang Kai-shek give
any words or any message to anyone other than Henry Wallace that
he wanted Stilwell removed ?
]Mr. Alsop. It is an extremely long and complicated story.
The Chairman. Answer it.
Mr. Alsop. Which I shall be glad to tell you.
Senator Ferguson. Is it a "Yes" or "No" answer, with an explana-
tion?
Mr. Alsop. The answer is "Yes," with an explanation.
The Chairman. Let us have the explanation now.
Mr. Alsop. It is long. It is as follows :
At the end of the Trident Conference in the spring of 1943 in Wash-
ington, at which General Stilwell had publicly abused the Generalis-
simo before the entire assembly of allied commanders, and Mr. Church-
ill and President Roosevelt. The Generalissimo naturally heard of
this incident. I think he probably heard about it from the British
who were probably trying to make trouble, requested Dr. Soong to
arrange with the President for the recall of General Stilwell, on the
grounds that the relationship was nonviable.
1414 IKSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
General Stilwell returned to Cliina after Trident, Dr. Soong
remained in Washington. He did arrange through Mr. Hopkins with
the President that Stilwell would be recalled if the Generalissimo
formally requested that he be recalled.
In October of 1943 Dr. Soong returned to Chungking to prepare
for the conference there at which Admiral Mountbatten was going to
take command in southeast Asia. He got there about 2 days after
Admiral Mountbatten.
At that time I was serving Dr. Soong as adviser. I was thoroughly
familiar with all the circumstances. He brought word if the Gen-
eralissimo presented a formal request rather than this informal
message through Dr. Soong, the President would immediately and
automatically recall General Stilwell.
In my opinion the President's purpose was to appoint General
Wedemeyer who had already been sent out as Deputy Commander
to Mountbatten.
The Chairman. Let me have that statement, that last statement,
just from "my opinion."
(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)
Mr. Alsop. I say that because Dr. Soong thought that at the time
and he was familiar with the atmosphere in the White House since
he had been negotiating this matter.
Senator Ferguson. Soong was of the opinion that Wedemeyer was
being sent there for the purpose of
Mr. Alsop. No, he was not being sent there for the purpose of, but
he was the most probable replacement.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Dr. Soong tell you that the President had in-
dicated that to him in any way ?
Mr. Alsop. No, he did not. He said he thought Wedemeyer was
the most likely bet if Stilwell was recalled.
Mr. Sour WINE. He was just expressing his own opinion?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, but it was an informed opinion.
Mr. SouRwiNE. But not based on anything the President had said
to him ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes. I have no idea how it was based.
Senator Ferguson. We have Wedemeyer out there and Soong.
You are adviser to Soong. What happened ?
Mr. Alsop. As you will find in General Stilwell's diary. General
Stilwell had made a personal alliance — I can find the passage for
you if you are interested — with Madam Chiang and Madam Kung,
who belonged to the opposite political faction from their brother, Dr.
Soong, and were reluctant to see him rise in power and influence to
the extent that he would have done if General Stilwell had been re-
placed by his arrangement.
The Chairman. Would you clarify your statement where you say
they belonged to different political factions? Please designate.
Mr. Alsop. It was a very curious situation in China. Madam Kung
was the most powerful single personality in the more conservative,
the more reactionary group in the Kuomintang.
Dr. Soong was the most important single personality in the more
progressive or more modern minded group.
^ Madam Chiang allied lierself with Madam Kung because she didn't
like Dr. Soong, and finally, Madam Sun Yat-sen, the fourth signifi-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1415
cant member of the family was, in fact, as it now turns out, a Commu-
nist Asian. She was ah'eady overtly a Communist sympathizer.
The family feuds of that particular family more or less summed
up the politics of China.
The Chairman. What relation were these ladies to each other,
sisters ?
Mr. Alsop. They were sisters.
The Chairman. All you have mentioned were sisters and they had
taken up with different political factions?
Mr. Alsop. That is correct.
The Chairman. They are following that same line?
Mr. Alsop. Madam 8un Yat-sen is now, I believe, a member of the
executive committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
The Chairman. How did she stand at that time as regards the
Communist Party and the Nationalist Party?
Mr. Alsop. You mean how did which one stand?
The Chairman. Did you mention which one belonged to the Com-
munist Party at tliat time ?
Mr. Alsop. Madam Chiang, Madam Kung, and Dr. Soong were
all very eminent members of the National Party; whereas. Madam
Sun Yat-sen was ostensibly a member of the Kuomintang. She was
officially a member of the Kuomintang which her late husband had
founded, but, in fact, she was a strong overt Communist sympathizer,
and as I say, has now turned up on the executive committee of the
Chinese Communist Party in Peiping.
General Stilwell had made an offensive and defensive alliance —
the event is described in his book — with the two ladies. Madam Kung
and Madam Chiang.
When Dr. Soong returned from Washington with this assurance
from the President that General Stilwell would be recalled in re-
sponse to a personal request, Madam Chiang and Madam Kung
started a tremendous family fight which went on for about 2 days in
the generalissimo's villa up on the hill.
I can recall Dr. Soong coming back from these sessions in a state
of complete exhaustion. Madam Kung and Madam Chiang, for rea-
sons of internal Chinese politics, maintained the position which was
not true as it turned out when General Weclemeyer was appointed,
that American aid for China depended on General Stilwell ; that he
had been so built up by the press as an American hero, that he had such
influence at the War Department, that all supplies and aid for China
would be cut off if the generalissimo presented this request for General
Stilwell's recall.
Senator Ferguson. What part of the press was advocating that
kind of idea ? Was it the Chinese press ?
Mr. Alsop. No ; the American press had built up General Stilwell as
a hero. The ladies said that "If you throw this American hero out
of command in China, you will become very impopular with the
United States and you won't get any aeroplanes and any guns, or any-
thing else."
Mr. SouRWiNE. Just to get the chronology straight, you knew at
this time of the President's assurance to Dr. Soong that if a request
were made personally by Chiang there would be a removal of General
Stilwell?
1416 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. I did, indeed.
Mr. SouEwiNE. That was at what time ?
Mr. Alsop, This was about the middle of October 1943. All the
Generalissimo had to do was send a simple telegram saying, I request
General Stilwell's recall." The Generalissimo was a very wise and
great leader in my opinion. He suffered from one defect, as I
had reason to observe myself, because I sometimes worked with him
also. He was completely unfamiliar with the Western World, and
he was impressed by this argument that Mme. Chiang and Mme. Kung
made.
However, at the end of the first stage of the family fight, which
was just before Admiral Mountbatten reached Chungking, he agreed
that he would support Dr. Soong and would present the request for
General Stilwell's recall.
When Admiral Mountbatten reached Chungking accompanied by
General Wedemeyer and General Somervell, he did present this^ re-
quest to General Somervell.
Senator Ferguson. What month?
Mr. Alsop. October 1943. This was done, if I recall the circum-
stances of the time correctly, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Gen-
eral Somervell, because General Stilwell was a friend of his, ex-
pressed regret that the Generalissimo felt that he could no longer
carry on with General Stilwell.
The ladies then rushed in and said, "Now, you see Somervell is for
Stilwell, too. It proves everything we have said."
They turned the Generalissimo around. Stilwell was then brought
in and made to promise the Generalissimo that he would obey him.
It was a rather humiliating scene about which Mme. Kung actually
boasted the next morning to General Chennault.
When General Stilwell gave the Generalissimo this promise, the
Generallissimo then sent for General Somervell, who was at dinner
at General Ho Ying-chin's, and told him not to send the telegram.
He did this without telling Dr. Soong. He called in Dr. Soong the
next morning at 9 o'clock. He told him then.
Dr. Soong objected bitterly. The Generalissimo was always sus-
picious of Dr. Soong, and then had a terrible fight with Dr. Soong.
He actually threw his teacup on the floor and broke it into quite a
number of pieces.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Pardon me, just for the sake of the record. You
say "actually." Were you there?
Mr. Alsop. No, but I saw Dr. Soong immediately afterward and
heard about it.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You are reporting what Dr. Soong told you?
Mr. Alsop. Yes. Naturally, I wasn't sitting under the table watch-
ing the teacup crash down around them.
This incident originated the greatest Chinese political crisis of that
month of October 1943.
Dr. Soong, being the leader of a more progressive group in the
Kuomintang which had been rising in esteem and influence, had now
quarreled irrevocably with the Generalissimo. Wlien he returned to
his house he was actually under a kind of modified house arrest; so,
during the ensuing months I was one of the very few people in Chung-
king who actually saw him at all, regularly. I used to go out for
walks with him because he was so lonely.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1417
Meanwhile, the Kimg group, which through Mme. Kung engineered
this coup, swept the board. General Ho Ying-chin overcame all his
opposition in the military machine so that General Chen Cheng, who
is now Prime Minister on Formosa, was dismissed from command;
but, according to a well-authenticated Chungking report, he was also
under house arrest.
The Bank of China, which was the biggest institution in China in-
dependent of the Kung banking group, was swept into Dr. Soong's
control.
The only opposition to the CC group in the Kuomintang headed
by Chang Chunnganu — he used a Cantonese spelling; I don't under-
stand the Cantonese — was stamped out. You had this tremendous
reactionary triumph in the Chinese Government of which in some
sense the Generalissimo was thereafter a prisoner because he had made
the wrong decision. He had committed himself into General Stil-
well's hands.
General Stilwell turned around and ceased to obey him himself
immediately after that event. They began quarrelling again right
away, as you can see in General Stilwell's diaries.
Meanwhile the success of these reactionary groups caused the most
serious demoralization in the whole Chinese governmental structure.
To give you one example of that, the commander of the defending
armies, the most important defending army in east China, General
Shueh Yueli, whom I have already mentioned, was a member of the
more modern-minded and progressive faction. He was detested by
General Ho Ying-chin.
According to our Intelligence, a month or so before the Japanese
offensive actually commenced. General Ho Ying-chin, who did not
have quite the power to dismiss General Shueh Yueh because he had
strong provincial roots, attempted to prepare for the dismissal of
General Shueh Yueh by cutting off all money and supplies from him.
So that these armies that were defending east China for the Gen-
eralissimo were cut off from money and supplies by the Generalis-
simo's own war minister at the moment when the Japanese attacked.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Are you proceeding with your own presentation?
Senator Ferguson. He is answering my question.
]\Ir. SouRwiNE. I just wondered what is the question.
Senator Ferguson. The question was this: Did Chiang Kai-shek
give notice to anyone other than Henry Wallace that ne wanted
Stilwell removed.
Mr. SouRwiNE. That is what I thought your question was. I was
trving to correlate it.
Senator Ferguson. I still remember my question.
I wonder whether or not I can get this in a couple of minutes.
I have to leave the hearing.
Up to that point he gave a message to Somervell. Somervell re-
turned it to him ?
Mr. Alsop. The most important message he gave was to Dr. Soong.
Dr. Soong received from the President a promise, if he asked for
his removal — Stilwell's removal — Stilwell would be removed.
He was then very, forcefully informed by the two ladies and was
induced not to request Stilwell's removal.
1418 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Having given way at this time and failed to carry out his agree-
ment with the President, he then no longer dared to ask overtly for
Stilwell's removal.
Furthermore, his adviser. Dr. Soong, having been driven from the
circle around him, had to stick to this information that they had told
the Generalissimo that General Stilwell was essential to them.
Therefore, General Stilwell, in a sense, made the Generalissimo
his prisoner.
Senator Ferguson. Then no message is given until Henry Wallace
really gets it in the car from the General in a personal conversation?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, and I think
The Chairman. Is that the answer ?
Mr. Alsop. I would argue
The Chairman. I don't want you to argue.
Mr. Alsop. In order to answer — I am trying to answer accurately,
if you will permit me to do so.
Senator, I think Mr. Wallace testified
The Chairman. Will vou just listen to the question?
Senator Ferguson. As far as your knowledge was concerned, was
that the first request ?
Mr. Alsop. I do not think it was a request. I think Mr. Wallace
testified, if you will recall, that the Generalissimo did not overtly re-
quest General Stilwell's recall. He indicated he would like General
Stilwell's recall.
Senator Ferguson. The substance was he wanted him out?
Mr. Aisop. That he did not like him.
Senator Ferguson. Is that the first really that you would consider
a request?
Mr. Alsop. That I know about.
Senator Ferguson. 1 have to go to conference.
The Chairman. I have to go to the same conference. I cannot get
anyone to come here. Everybody else is in some meeting or another.
It is imperative we be there, I do not know just what to do.
Senator Ferguson. It is so important we get this conference out.
The Chairman. There is going to be no recess if we do not.
Senator Ferguson. That is whv wp started early, thinking that we
could get someone to continue at 10 : 30. J
Mr. Alsop. Senator O'Conor said he could.
The Chairman. He has been notified.
Mr. Sourwine. I will call him again.
Senator Ferguson. I suggest you just recess to see whether or not
we have the other people coming in.
Mr. Morris. While we are waiting, may I ask a question ?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Morris. You realize the issue about Mr. Budenz' testimony is
simply this: Mr. Budenz has testified that the removal of Stilwell
wa? looked upon by the Communists as a wise compromise.
Therefore, the evidence that you produce about the Communists'
favorable reaction to Stilwell and his favorable response to them is
not in issue at all ?
Don't you realize that?
Mr. Alsop. I can't agree with your interpretation of Mr. Budenz'
testimony.
Mr. Morris. Will you read it, Mr. Mandel ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1419
Mr. Alsop. I am trying to show that the removal of General Stilwell
was something that no Communist in his senses could conceivably
have desired at the moment when Mr. Wallace recommended it.
Mr. Morris. You heard Mr. Budenz' testimony ?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz has testified on a whole series of points.
Mr. Morris. On this point?
Mr. Alsop. I would have to call your attention to quite a number
of other passages of Mr. Budenz's testimony. I do not agree with
your interpretation of Mr. Budenz's testimony.
I recall the testimony you refer to. It is one part of Mr. Budenz's-
testimony.
The Chairman. Just a minute. If I understand the situation cor-
rectly, this witness has publicly stated and privately stated that Mr.
Budenz has been guilty of perjury before this committee. That is the
reason for his presence here. He should state wherein Mr. Budenz
has been guilty.
Then he should state the fact that contradicts Mr. Budenz. Any-
thing else means just a running line of theory and opinion, and so
forth.
The whole situation should be boiled down to an issue. If Mr.
Budenz has lied, this committee wants to know it. We want to know
wherein he has lied, and we want this witness to state wherein he has
lied, because this is the challenging witness.
He has stated publicly, and that has been put in the record on the
floor of the Senate, that Mr. Budenz has been guilty of perjury, and
he has intimated that this committee has been guilty of subornation
of perjury.
Mr. Alsop. I do not intimate that.
The Chairman. It was in your column, and the Senator from New
York put it in the record.
Mr. Alsop. It was not intended to be in there.
The Chairman. It was, just the same.
I understand that Senator O 'Conor may come here. You may
proceed.
Mr. Morris. On page 2072 of Mr. Budenz' testimony, he quoted
from the Daily Worker. This is his testimony :
Then this is the important part I wish to call to your attention. He —
Frederick Vanderbilt Field writing in the Daily Worker of December
2, 1941—
mentions three conditions, but the third is the one important to the question
of General Wedemeyer :
"* * * as to the third, we Icnow only that there was a brealidown over
the particular person nominated as commander in chief, General Stilwell, and
that President Roosevelt wisely and quickly compromised on that point. There
is no indication that the general proposition for an American commander has,
been refused."
Mr. Alsop. May I go back in the record, INIr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. I don't have to read the record again. We just read the
portion, but I will do so.
Mr. Morris. You understand that Mr. Budenz there testified that
the official Communist reaction to Stil well's removal was that they
considered it a wise compromise.
1420 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Is it not implicit in that that the concession is someone is friendly
to the Communists ?
Mr. Alsop. I do not agree with your interpretation of Mr. Budenz'
testimony.
The Chairman. You do not answer the question, Mr. Alsop. You
argue and you go into long tirades of discussion, but the question is
propounded to you by the counsel and why don't you answer ?
Mr. Alsop. My answer to the question is I do not agree with Mr.
Morris' interpretation, or Mr. Budenz' interpretation.
The Chairman. But the record is read to you. Whether you agree
to it, or not, the record is read.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz has carefully in that part of the record
selected one article from the Daily Worker which appeared 1 month
after the dismissal of General Stilwell.
The Chairman. That is his testimony before this committee.
Mr. Alsop. I am challenging that testimony.
The Chairman. Yes. Now state the fact.
Mr. Alsop. If you will permit me, I shall bring a series of documents
to show
Mr. Morris. I quoted the December 2 Daily Worker. I have a
November 1 issue just 2 days after the dismissal all saying the same
thing.
The Chairman. Dwell on what you have already asked and ask him
if he contradicts that and why.
Mr. Morris. Yes.
The Chairman. This is a question of veracity here wherein the
veracity of a witness coming before this committee is challenged by
this gentleman.
Mr. Alsop. Senator, I am well aware of that. It is a point that I
hoped to come to later on.
Senator Smith. What is the question ?
Mr. Alsop. My understanding from Mr. Sourwine was that I would
be permitted to take up these points in the order in which they seemed
to me most logical.
Mr. Sourwine. Let us have that statement correct, if I may make a
statement, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. I had no understanding with Mr. Alsop. I was
present with Mr. Alsop at a conference between him and his attorney
in Senator O'Conor's office with Senator O'Conor, at which time Mr.
Alsop stated what he would like to do in the way of proceeding here,
and the substance of that was he would like to be able to proceed with
a presentation of his points, point by point, and that he would welcome
questioning as he went along.
It was my understanding that Senator O'Conor took the view that
was a reasonable way to proceed. I do not recall that I gave Mr.
Alsop any commitments. I am sure Senator O'Conor told him he
was expressing only a personal view and that the matter, if a point
were raised with regard to procedure, would have to be determined
by the committee.
Is that not reasonably accurate ?
Mr. Alsop. I don't think it is quite accurate. In fact, you asked
me whether I wouldn't prefer to be asked any questions. I said I
would welcome questions. You then suggested that the questioning
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1421
be limited until each section or to the close of each section of my
presentation.
Mr. Purcell, ^yho is here and who was present at this meeting will,
I am sure, recall that you said precisely that. I think it is immaterial.
I would like to come to Mr. Morris' point on which I have con-
siderable documentation.
Mr. 80URWINE. Mr. Morris asked you a question. Let's get back
to a starting point. He asked you a question based on Mr. Budenz's
testimony.
Mr. Morris. Do you realize that we know the witness, Louis Budenz,
has testified that the Communist looked upon General Stilwell's dis-
missal as a wise compromise?
Mr. Alsop. I do realize that.
I think when Mr. Budenz said so, he distorted fact, Mr. Morris.
I shall attempt to prove it to you, if you will permit me to do so.
I am now attempting to give my answer to your question.
Mr. Morris. Senator Smith, the witness here has just said that
Mr. Budenz has distorted the evidence. I think, therefore, we have
to go to the evidence. Therefore, we go to the Frederick V. Field
column of December 2, 1944, in the Daily Worker, and read it.
Mr. Alsop. I would like it to be read from the beginning.
Mr. Morris. Read any part you like.
Mr. Alsop. Could I have it ?
Mr. Morris. I think you have it here. There it is right there in
the record.
Mr. Alsop. That is the part of it Mr. Budenz chose to quote.
Mr. Morris. There is the whole article.
Mr. Alsop. I would have you note what Mr. Budenz chose to quote.
Senator Smith (presiding). I do not think that is answering the
question. We want to get the facts here. That is a matter of record.
If that is what he said, that is what he said.
"What do you want to say ?
ISIr. Alsop. I have a long answer to Mr. Morris' question.
Mr. Morris. If he distorted, the evidence being Frederick V. Field's
guest column in the Daily Worker of December 2, 1944
Mr. Alsop. Let me— —
Senator Smith. Just a minute. You are not going to run this show.
Mr. ]\IoRRis. If Mr. Budenz distorted the evidence, the evidence be-
ing Frederick V. Field's guest column, will you tell this committee how
he did it, using the evidence as the direct source ?
Senator Smith. That gives you full leeway. ^
Mr. Alsop. Senator, I mean Mr. Budenz distorted the evidence in
the sense he left out a whole series of other publications of the same
period in the Daily Worker which point in a different direction.
He even left out the beginning in his actual testimony. The article
itself is in the record. The beginning of this column which is :
I disagree with those who take an entirely pessimistic view regarding recent
developments in China.
That to me means that a great many members of the Communist Party
to whom Mr. Field was addressing himself were very much worried
about General Stilwell's dismissal and he was seeking to reassure them.
INIr. Morris. Reassure them what ?
Mr. Alsop. As to the significance of General Stilwell's dismissal. .
If you will permit me, I will try to give you the rest of my answer.
1422 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
There were 2 documents in the record on Mr. Budenz's side as to the
interpretation. There are 2 documents in the record which partly sup-
port Mr. Budenz's interpretation of the Communist response to Gen-
eral Stilwell's dismissal. These were the guest column of Frederici^:
Field written a month after the fact already quoted and an article on
page 8 of the Daily Worker, issue of November 1, 1944, by Joseph
Starobin.
I, myself, as a member of the columning trade would classify these
articles under a heading of our business which is, "Don't let's cry too
publicly over spilled milk."
I must tell the committee in publicizing these particular comments
on the dismissal of General Stilwell a quite remarkable degree of
selectivity was shown.
In point of fact the November 1 issue of the Daily Worker in which
the Starobin article already in the record ai:)pears, shows every sign
of being one of those rather frequent Worker issues when the Worker
is caught with its party line down, to use Mr. Luce's phrase.
On page 3 of the November 1 issue appears the UP dispatch from
Washington describing Stilwell's recall. On page 8 appears the
Starobin article already in the record, the theme of which is :
Stilwell's dismissal disclosed the scandalous state of affairs in China and
would therefore generate pressure for a Chinese coalition.
On the same page appear selections from Brooks Atkinson's very
critical report on Stilwell's dismissal in the New York Times, includ-
ing a paragraph implying the President did wrong to recall General
Stilwell.
Under the cartoon on the editorial page appears a far more im-
portant article again by Mr. Starobin. In this article, in the special
spot, where I am told readers of the Worker are taught to expect
to find the pure distilled milk of truth, Starobin expressed "grave
concern" about the dismissal of Stilwell, lauded the General and
called him "our favorite General."
We are to believe that the Communist leaders genuinely desired
the dismissal of their favorite General ?
1 suggest to the committee
Mr. MoKRis. Was that your remark or the remark from Starobin ?
Mr. Alsop. I ended the quote; "our favorite Gejieral" is the
quotation.
Mr. Morris. Read his testimony.
Mr. Alsop. My testimony says : "Are we to believe"
Mr. Morris. Read the record back.
(The record was thereupon read by the reporter)
Mr. Alsop. I was reading from my testimony.
Mr. SouRWiNB. Won't you read back that part just to see whether
you have "grave" in quotes ?
Mr. Alsop. "Grave" should not be in quotes. Nor did I put it in
quotes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It sounded as though you said he expressed "grave
concern".
Mr. Alsop. I used the word "concern".
May I continue ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1423
Senator Smith. Yes.
Tlie last observation yoii made was a matter of argument and not
a statement of fact. It seems to me we ought not to load down this
record with your conclusions, your arguments about the matter.
Rather, you should give us the benefit of the facts. If you will read
the last thing you said, it was clearly argument.
Mr. Alsop. It was my attempt to answer.
Senator Smith. Let's read back the answer just now at the end of
his answer, just the one last sentence.
(The record was thereupon read by the reporter, as follows:)
Are we to believe that the Communist leaders genuinely desired the dismissal
of their favorite general?
Senator Smith. We want the facts.
Mr. Alsop. That seems to me responsive to Mr. Morris' question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Before we go beyond that point, there is something
I think should be focused and that goes back to a previous colloquy
which I had with the witness.
I mean at a time when he had stated that Mr. Budenz had made the
assertion that the Stilwell dismissal was sometliing desired by the
Communists.
iVt that time the witness attempted to find that statement in Mr.
Budenz' testimony and it did not turn up in Mr. Budenz' testimony.
Now, the focus is on the question of whether the Communists de-
sired the dismissal of General Stilwell. Since Mr. Budenz never said
they did, I am wondering about the pertinency of this, particular testi-
mony. It seems the focus is off.
Mr. Alsop. I am trying to show the Communists very much did
not want the dismissal of General Stilwell.
IMr. SouRwiNE. Assuming you show it, what does it prove with re-
gard to your general thesis here ?
Mr. Alsop. It proves the main act of Mr. Wallace's mission in which
]\Ir. Vincent participated which Mr. Budenz has testified carried out
a Communist objective was something that the Communists did not
want and could not have wanted.
It seems to me very pertinent.
Mr. Morris. With particularity, Mr. Alsop, when he came to talk-
ing about the Stilwell release, he said that they looked upon the thing
as a wise compromise?
Mr. Alsop. There is a great deal more evidence I would like to put
in the lecord.
jMr. Morris. That is what we are waiting for.
You are reading now from the Daily Worker?
Mr. Alsop. I read from the Daily Worker.
Mr. Morris. Of November 1, 1044, the Starobin article?
]\ir. Alsop. There are a series of others.
Mr. Morris. That begins —
The sudden withdrawal of Gen. Joseph Stilwell from his Burma-China post
has won outstanding merit.
22848— 52— pt. o 12
2424 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. Yes, and read it on.
Mr. Morris. What part do you want?
Mr. Alsop. The part where it says, and I will read it for you :
An American general who got his four stars only last August, is removed from
SL theater which he knows well from a country where he has fought a successful
campaign, and Americans are concerned. They obviously have every right to
be concerned.
1 continue :
We don't know the facts, of course, but one more thing is significant. Vine-
gar Joe Stilwell had years of experience w^orking with the Chungking au-
thorities as well as the British India Command. He knows the situation
from the Burma-Southern China end of it. He has not been in the Commu-
nist area of China at all, yet he must have arrived at the conclusions very
similar to those our military mission in Yenan will reach. Something is rotten
in Chungking and that something stems from the blockade against Yenan —
which Stilwell was working very hard, may I interpose, to lift.
Then he continues
Mr. Morris. Does that not go to establish Budenz's testimony that
they looked upon it as a wise compromise ?
Mr. Alsop. It does not, in my opinion.
Mr. Morris. If something is a wise compromise, there are some ad-
vantages given up.
Mr. Alsop. Here he said :
You realize to what depths the corruption and political oppression have
driven free China. This is the heart of the problem. It will hardly be cured
by the withdrawal of our favorite American general, although this withdrawal
may precipitate the changes that are overdue in China.
Mr. Morris. Do you quote that in support of, or in opposition to ?
Mr. Alsop. I quote that in opposition to _Mr. Budenz' testimony.
I would like to continue with my analysis.
Senator Smith. I want you to say everything you want to say and
present the facts. I believe you say that Mr. Budenz perjured him-
self. Isn't that what you said ?
Mr. Alsop. I said he had not told the truth.
Senator Smith. You know he was under oath ?
Mr. Alsop. Perjury is a technical, legal matter.
Senator Smith. Anything that you want to say bearing on that
point, I want to give you full leeway, because you have made a se-
rious charge against Mr. Budenz. I want you to have full* chance to
vindicate yourself and to condemn him, if you can.
My remark was it seemed you make one statement of fact a quasi-
statement of fact and then you go into argument. The argument is
something we want to leave out of the record.
I realize there will be times when it is hard to distinguish.
In these cases where you are discussing the nature of the Commu-
nist Party line, it is practically impossible to leave the argument out
of the record.
Mr. Alsop. My interpretation of this November 1 issue of the
Worker is very simple. I suggested to the committee in this issue of
the Worker, having been caught without a clear party line, the editor,
Mr. Budenz, put in a little bit of everytliing all the way from the
Atkinson condemnation of Stilwell's dismissal to the main Starobin
article on the editorial page lauding General Stilwell, to the Starobin
article on page 8, in which he says that perhaps Stilwell's dismissal
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1425
might be a good thing, because it will blow the roof off in China and
force reforms.
Mr. Morris. Then at that point will you not concede that Joseph
Starobin is the authority in the Daily Worker and not Brooks Atkin-
son's news report ?
Mr. Alsop. Will you not concede
Mr. Morris. Will you answer the question ?
Mr. Alsop. I said "Yes." Will you not concede that the article on
the editorial page which describes General Stilwell as "our favorite
general'' is in Daily Worker usage a much more important article in
terms of instructing people as to the party line than the article on
page 8.
Mr. Morris. Should I be sworn, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Smith. I do not know that that is up to you to answer
that, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Alsop. This is a matter of common knowledge.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If I may interject, I think it will help, I hope it
will, because the issues are getting fogged. We have been down some
alleys a few times this morning, but perhaps I should say we have
been chasing upstairs to go after the little boys in the windows with
pea shooters when we should be marching on down the street with the
parade.
I would like to get this thesis of Mr. Alsop's laid out before us.
Mr. Alsop. Now that we have started this story, if I may interject,
I would just as soon end the issue of what the Daily Worker said.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am sure you would. I think this would be helpful.
Assuming that for the sake of argument that it is established that
the Daily Worker and the Communist Party did not desire the replace-
ment of General Stilwell, that would be one of the points you are
trying to establish ?
Mr. Alsop. That would be a very mild way of putting a point I am
trying to establish. I am trying to make the point that the removal
of General Stilwell which Mr. Wallace recommended, with Mr. Vin-
cent's concurrence, was the very last thing the Communist Party
desired.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am glad you stated it that way. Assuming the
removal of Stilwell is the last thing they desired, and assuming that
Mr. Vincent did have a part in the recommendations made by Mr.
Wallace in his Kunming cables, necessarily in order to establish, even
with those two facts, that Mr. Budenz was lying, you must also estab-
lish that it was the influence of Mr. Vincent which resulted in' the
removal of General Stilwell, or the recommendation for his removal.
Is that not correct ?
Mr. Alsop. I don't think it is quite an accurate way of putting the
situation.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Just a minute, sir. Suppose, Mr. Alsop, that the
decision to convey to the President the Generalissimo's desire that
General Stilwell be replaced had been made by Mr. Wallace. At that
moment, what would the Communist line have been?
Mr. Alsop. I think the Communist line at the time of Mr. Wallace's
recommendation to the President was quite opposite to Mr. Wallace's
recommendation in a most violent way.
I shall try to prove that.
]^426 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. I understand that. We have had no testimony from
Mr. Budenz that the Communist line was in favor of, or was not op-
posed to the removal of General Stilwell.
Mr. Alsop. We have had testimony from Mr. Budenz.
Mr. SouRWiNE. The record of Mr. Budenz
Mr. Alsop. May I finish my answer, Mr. Sourwine ?
We have had testimony from Mr. Budenz Mr. Wallace's mission
carried out the Communist objective under the guidance of John Car-
ter Vincent who was a member of the Communist Party.
I am trying to show the committee that it did not carry it out.
Mr. Sourwine. You are addressing yourself entirely on the assump-
tion that the particular Communist objective referred to was the dis-
missal of General Stilwell.
I am attempting to show there may be another possibility.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Sourwine, there may be another possibility. If we
could get to that in an orderly way, 1 would like to comment on it,,
if you feel it is necessary.
The subject before us is the heart of Mr. Budenz' testimony, which
is the Wallace mission "carried out" a Communist objective and again
I quote :
toward which Mr. Wallace was guided by Mr. Vincent who was a member of the
Communist Party.
I submit to you that it is quite irrelevant whether Mr. Budenz has
testified, or hasn't testified about the party line at the time that Mr.
Wallace was in China.
I feel further, if I may say so, that the Communist reaction to the
fait accompli of General Stilwell's dismissal does not give very much,
light on what the party line was at the time when Mr. Wallace made
his recommendation.
Mr. Sourwine. What difference does it make ?
Mr. Alsop. Since Mr. Morris has raised this question about the
Communist reaction, I think a distorted picture has been given. I ara
trying to correct that picture.
'Mr. Morris. I did not raise it. Mr. Chairman, will the record show
I did not raise it? It is Mr. Budenz' testimony that Mr. Alsop is-
endeavoring to challenge.
Mr. Alsop. It was brought into the hearing this morning by you.
Senator Smith. It seems to me that you are challenging the testi-
mony of Mr. Budenz. Manifestly the Chair does not know whether
Mr. Budenz told the truth or not. He was sworn here to tell the truth
just like you were sworn to tell the truth. I assume you were sworn
this morning. You challenge what Mr. Budenz said.
Can you not confine yourself to correcting what you say is an
erroneous statement by Mr. Budenz without a great deal of argument
and extraneous talk ? That is what I am interested in, the facts.
Mr. Alsop. When you are talking about Mr. Budenz' testimony^
he is not testifying as to fact, if I may say so. He has testified as to
the interpretation to be placed on the Daily Worker.
Mr. Sourwine. If Mr. Budenz has not testified as to fact, he cannot
be accused of perjury.
Mr. Alsop. In the specific passage that Mr. Morris has brought into
the hearing this morning Mr. Budenz sought to show by interpreting
an article in the Daily Worker that a certain thing was the fact.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1427
namely, that the Communists were not displeased by the dismissal of
General Stilwell.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Budenz did not attempt to show that, did he ?
Mr. Alsop. It is my understanding.
Senator Smith. You say you read Mr. Budenz' verbatim testi-
mony.
Mr. Alsop. I listened to it.
Senator Smith. Were you here the day he testified ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes ; I was, sir.
If it is agreed that the Communists were deeply displeased by the
•dismissal of General Stilwell, then I think we can drop this whole
subject.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Alsop and Mr. Chairman, if the Chair please
for just a moment now, the contention has revolved around a statement
made by Mr. Budenz which has been read by the witness several times
to the effect that on Mr. Wallace's mission he was guided by two named
persons, Lattimore and Vincent, and, by Mr. Budenz' statement,
that in the opinion of the Politburo they did their job well.
Mr. Alsop is attempting to challenge that on the grounds that a
specific recommendation as he interprets
Senator Smith. Let me ask right there; there is nothing in the
testimony that Mr. Wallace was knowingly influenced by them, is
there?
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, sir ; there was not, and that is the point.
Mr. Alsop. Senator, I put it to you, sir
Senator Smith. Let him finish the question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If you are challenging Mr. Budenz' statement that
the Politburo was satisfied with the guidance given Mr. Wallace, is
it not necessary, in order for you to successfully challenge that, to
show that there was nothing accomplished by Mr. Lattimore and/or
Mr. Vincent which was in favor of the Communists ?
Do you feel you can successfully challenge Mr. Budenz' statement
by showing that Mr. Wallace did something that was not in complete
accord with the Communist line?
Mr. Alsop. I think I can successfully challenge Mr. Budenz' state-
ment by showing that the chief result •
Mr. SouRwiNE. No, answer my question.
Mr. Alsop. I am trying to answer your question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You are not trying to answer it ; you are trying to
evade it.
Mr. Alsop. I am not trying to evade it. If you will allow me to
<:-omplete my sentence, I believe you will find I am trying to answer it.
Senator Smith. Will the reporter read the question back?
(The question was read back by the reporter.)
Mr. Alsop. I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that if you can show
the main result of the Wallace mission was a profoundly anti-Com-
munism act, you successfully challenge Mr. Budenz' evidence.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Not unless you show that everything Mr. Wallace
did was the result of the influence of Mr. Vincent or Mr. Lattimore,
If Mr, Wallace did anything independently on his own, if he was
not a complete stooge of the Communists or a Communist agent — •
and no one is alleging that and no one has alleged it — then what you
have just said is not the logical fact.
1428 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Vincent participated and joined in this recom-
mendation for the dismissal of General Stilwell. This was the extent
of guidance that Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace.
Mr. SouRWiNE. That is different testimony. If that was the com-
plete extent of the guidance Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace, then
you are coming around to the theory which was advanced, to wit^
that there was nothing accomplished which would have been pleasing
to the Communists.
Mr. Alsop. If you will excuse me, Mr. Sourwine, I am saying
what was accomplished with Mr. Vincent's participation and concur-
rence was profoundly displeasing to the Communists.
Mr. SouKWiNE. Put it this way : If Mr. Vincent through his influ-
ence on Mr. Wallace accomplished anything which was pleasing to the
Communists, then Mr. Budenz' statement cannot be said to be per-
jury. Is that not accurate ?
Mr. Alsop. Could you repeat that? You are getting so compli-
cated, Mr. Sourwine, I did not understand your question.
Senator Smpih. I am certain I do not understand either one of you.
Do you want the question read back, Mr. Sourwine ?
Mr. Sourwine. I do not desire it.
Senator Smith. Will the reporter read it back?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Alsop. I would not say tliat that was accurate because it is a
substantial disproof of Mr. Budenz' statement that Mr. Vincent
guided Mr. Wallace toward the Communist objective. The principal
guidance that Mr. Vincent gave Mr. Wallace was toward a profoundly
anti-Communist objective.
Mr. Sourwine. There was no named objective, was there, Mr.
Alsop?
Mr. Alsop. Well, Mr. Sourwine, what I am trying to show is that the
main result of Mr. Wallace's mission was profoundly anti-Communist.
I think if you will permit me to proceed with the presentation of the
very large quantity of documentation that I have, you will be con-
vinced.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you contend that Mr. Wallace's mission and its
results were controlled entirely and shaped entirely by Mr. Vincent?
Mr. Alsop. I do not so contend. I think Mr. Budenz grossly exag-
gerated in that report.
Mr. Sourwine. If Mr. Vincent did not control what Mr. Wallace
did, then nothing that Mr. Wallace did can be attributed to Mr. Vin-
cent's influence, can it ?
Mr. Alsop. That is a question to me, Mr. Sourwine ?
Mr. Sourwine. Yes, sir.
Mr. Alsop. I cannot possibly agree with that because Mr. Vincent
did in fact join in guiding Mr. Wallace or influencing Mr. Wallace
toward a profoundly anti-Communist act. This is the essence of the
whole situation.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I think it might be pertinent to bring
this out at this time since we are talking about Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Alsop, did you testify in executive session that Henry Wallace
was for a period of time the stooge of the American Communists ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes ; I have written that publicly.
Mr. Morris. Do you contend he was not a stooge for the Communists
at this particular time?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1429
Mr. Alsop. Because I saw him not being a stooge.
Mr. Morris. The time he was a stooge was a later time ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
May I proceed with this very complex presentation ? I am desper-
ately sincere. I completely believe in the committee's good faiths
These are very complicated facts, and miless they are presented in an
orderly manner, it is very hard for them to be related to one another.
I have made rough notes for the specific purpose of presenting it to th&
committee in the least time-consuming way possible.
Senator Smith. As I understand, Mr. Alsop, you requested to be-
heard by the committee ?
Mr. Alsop. That is correct.
Senator Smith. So I consider that to be slightly different from a
person we have subpenaed here to ask specific questions. Unless there-
are some questions from Senator O'Conor, we will let Mr. Alsop pro-
ceed in the way he wishes to proceed. Mr. Sourwine and Mr. Morris
can make notes of questions they want to come back and ask him
as on cross-examination.
Senator O'Conor. I quite agree, Mr. Chairman. I think that is-
the orderly way. I think it will enable us expeditiously to get to the
end. I did, however, understand Mr. Alsop to suggest himself that
he would welcome interrogatories at any time.
Senator Smith. I know, Mr. Alsop, in the first place if we are go-
ing to examine witnesses that we subpena to get precise facts from^
the committee's counsel has to do it in the way that seems the most
logical to him to bring out the facts that he wishes to ascertain.
B}^ the same token, when you come in asking to be heard we want
to give you a chance to express in your own way and as you deem
logical — whether in fact it is logical or not — to develop the facts you
are going to give us. It is perfectly all right with me and Senator
O'Conor. We do not want to load the record down with a lot of
extraneous arguments and conclusions. We want as near facts a&
can be given.
Mr. Alsop. I will attempt not to.
Mr. Morris. May I point out that tlie reason for my inquisition was
that Mr. Alsop is making frequent references to General Stilwell, and
with respect to that particular part of Budenz' statement that related
to General Stilwell, I wanted the testimony read into the record.
Senator Smith. I was not here when that took place. As I under-
stood, there was some question as to whether or not Mr. iVlsop was
referring to testimony actually in the record by Mr. Budenz.
Mr. Morris. That is right. When we talk about General Stilwell
we should address ourselves to Budenz' Stilwell testimony.
Senator Smith. All right, start from here.
Mr. Alsop. I have already shown. Senator, that on the basis of
General Stilwell's own papers, that at that time when Mr. Wallace rec-
ommended General Stilwell's dismissal, with the concurrence and ap-
proval of Mr. Vincent, with the encouragement, I might say, of Mr.
Vincent, General Stilwell believed that the only cure for China's
troubles was "to eliminate" Chiang Kai-shek and that he regarded
the Chinese Communists as "the only hope" of the Chinese masses.
This is General Stilwell's attitude which he was expressing to the
home authorities and which he encouraged his staff — to which I can
1430 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
testify from personal knowledge because tliey used to say they were
encouraged by him — to disseminate throughout Chungking, with
grave damage to the Generalissimo's prestige.
Furthermore, and this is the crucial point. General Stilwell, the
man whose dismissal Mr. Wallace recommended, had a plan for giving
practical effect to his preference for the Chinese Communists, which
was maturing just at the moment when Mr. Wallace reached China.
In Mr. Wallace's cable the committee would have noted that the
Japanese offensive was inflicting disastrous defeats on the Generalis-
simo's armies in east China and these defeats were weakening the
generalissimo's position. General Stilwell's plan was to exploit this
weakness of Chiang Kai-shek in order to extort for himself a further
great increase of power in China.
General Stilwell further intended to' use this increase of his own
power in China in order to give American arms to the Chinese Com-
munists. He went to very great lengths to further this plan of his to
increase his own power in order to arm the Communists.
I can recall, for example, an occasion in July when General Chen-
nault urgently asked General Stilwell for permission to divert 1,000
tons of Fourteenth Air Force ammunition and other supplies to the
hard-pressed, naked, and exhausted Chinese troops who were fighting
the Japanese in the eastern provinces.
General Stilwell's chief of staff replied after long delay that the boss
was working on a proposition which might give this spot (namely the
generalissimo's government) a real face-losing and concluded that
while this proposition was pending the Chinese armies could be
granted no aid.
I should interpose here. Senator, that I testify here from my own
knowledge. We were so astonished by this telegram refusing aid to
the Chinese armies in order to promote this proposition that we had
inquiries made in Chungking and we learned from official sources in
General Stilwell's staff that General Stilwell was planning to ask
for this great increase in power, that he thought he would be more
likely to get the increase in power if the generalissimo's position were
weakened by defeat and therefore he would not aid the Chinese
armies.
Senator Smith. Now were the Chinese ai-mies to which you refer
the Nationalist forces or the Communist forces ?
Mr. Alsop. They were the Chinese Nationalist forces.
Senator Smith. Very clearly ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes; and at that time they were engaged in a great
battle in east China against the Japanese, and the defeats in east
China, as Mr. Wallace's cables show, had gravely undermined the
political and economic strength of the generalissimo's regime.
I should say that when I quote this telegram I do so from memory.
I was so shocked at the exact language it stuck in my mind for these
7 years. I think it is verbatim. I suppose the War Department files,
if you dug through them, would show it.
That summer General Stilwell's prestige at home had been greatly
increased by his victory in Burma, while the generalissimo's stand-
ing had suffered greatly from the east China disaster, which General
Stilwell had in turn painted in the darkest light of the American
Government, placing the blame on Chiang Kai-shek.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1431
Thus, although President Roosevelt had always been uneasy about
General Stilwell's qualifications, as shown by his earlier willingness,
to recall him if the generalissimo so requested, the President was in-
duced in the summer of 1944 to ask the generalissimo to grant to Gen-
eral Stilwell the desired large increase in his powers in China.
Major General Hurley as was sent to Chungking as the President's
"personal representative" to secure Chiang Kai-shek's consent to this
increase in General Stilwell's powers.
Senator Smith, How do you know that last statement to be a state-
ment of fact? Were you there or is it something that Major General
Hurley said ?
Mr. Alsop. I was there. I heard about it from General Hurley. I
also heard about it later from Dr. Soong, who participated in the
negotiations.
Senator Smith. I am pointing that question to what you heard yes-
terday about introducing evidence here that is statements of some-
body that has not been sworn to by anybody. I want to make certain
that you did know about that to your own knowledge or sufficiently
close to your knowledge that we should accept it.
Mr. Alsop. Dr. Soong gave me a full account of what happened
at this time, and he was one of the participants in the negotiations
before I left China in 1945.
In the Hurley-Chiang negotiations the great sticking point was the
control of military lend-lease, for Stilwell needed to have full author-
ity over lend-lease distribution in order to be able to arm the Chinese
Communists.
A Stilwell diary entry, dated September 16, 1944, tells the story:
The Generalissimo insists on control of lend-lease, our stuff that we are giving
him. T. V. says that we must remember the dignity of a great nation, which
would be affronted if I controlled the distribution.
"I'' being General Stilwell —
Pat Hurley told him, "Horsefeathers. Remember, Dr. Soong" —
here he is quoting General Hurley —
"that is our property. We made it and we own it and we can give it to
whom we please." Hooray for Pat. If the Generalissimo controls distri-
bution, I —
again being General Stilwell —
am sunk. The Reds will get nothing. Only the Generalissimo's henchmen will
be supplied, and my troops —
here he was referring to the personal Chinese force under his general
command —
will suck the hind teat.
A few days earlier Hurley had succeeded in getting for Stilwell the
desired grant of great additional power, but a personal crisis between
General Stilwell and the Generalissimo fortunately blew up at the
last moment causing the Generalissimo to change his mind completely
and to ask the President for General Stilwell's recall.
I should say here that General Hurley, having finally observed
General Stilwell's real method of dealing with the Generalissimo, then
supported the request for General Stilwell's recall.
1432 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
On September 26, after liis recall liad been requested, General Stil-
•well wired the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and here I quote from the State
Department white paper, in which these papers do appear :
Chiang Kai-shek has no intention of making further eiforts to prosecute the
war. He himself is the main obstacle to the unification of China and her
cooperation in a real effort against Japan. I am now convinced the United
States will not get any real cooperation while Chiang Kai-shek is in power.
Later, after he had been dismissed and returned to Washington,
General Stilwell concluded his final official report to the War De-
partment by advising an American policy in China of —
■exerting pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to cooperate and achieve national unity
and if he proved unable to do this, then supporting those elements in China
which gave promise of such development.
Just which elements General Stilwell referred to may be guessed
from the curious appearance in the first issue of Johannes Steel's
fellow-traveling report on World Affairs of a letter that General
Stilwell wrote on April 16, 1946, shortly before he died.
In this letter General Stilwell declared that he itched —
to throw down my shovel and get over there and shoulder a rifle with Chu Teh.
For the committee's information, Chu Teh was the most conspicuous
Communist commander actually engaged in the civil war against the
Chinese Nationalists.
I no longer have this letter of General Stilwell's, which was origi-
nally included in the Steel report, although the committee's research
staff can no doubt secure one, but I offer for the record Johannes
Steel's commentary including the passage I have quoted, together
Avith the pertinent excerpts from General Stilwell's wire to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and a report to the War Department which appear in
full in the State Department's white paper; the pertinent excerpts
from the Stilwell papers including many which I have not burdened
the committee's time with; and a copy of Stilwell's intelligence re-
port in 1938 taken from the Whittaker Chambers' pumpkin papers.
These documents tell Stilwell's story succinctly, clearly, and ir-
refutably.
I must say to the committee in all honesty and frankness I do not
for one moment believe that the story these documents tell is one of
active conscious disloyalty to the United States. Here, Mr. Chair-
man, if I may, I am engaging in an opinion because I don't want to
blacken the name of a dead man.
There is a distinction too little made nowadays between disloyalty
and bad judgment. General Stilwell was a passionately loyal Ameri-
can, a brave leader of troops in the field, a man with many fine quali-
ties that commanded confidence from many different kinds of men.
His weaknesses, which did not appear on the surface wdien he was
selected to command in China, because Gen. Hugh Drum did not
want to go out, were an astonishing capacity for hatred and the worst
imaginable political judgment.
Because of his bad judgment. General Stilwell could see no Ameri-
•can interest in China except to use the Chinese to "beat the Japs," a
favorite phrase of his. Because he continually disagreed with the
Generalissimo on how the Chinese were to be used to beat the Japs,
he came to hate Chiang Kai-shek with a consuming hatred, which
is revealed in what he wrote p-bout liim.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1433
Because lie so hated Chianp; Kai-shek, because he imasrined the
Chinese Communists were really fighting the Japanese, and because
he could see no long-range American interest in China, he came to
Tvish for and even to work for the triumph of the Chinese Communists
in China, and in all this General Stilwell largely carried most mem-
bei's of his staff along with him, and again I feel they were completely
loyal, as theater commanders are apt to carry along their staffs in
wartime.
At the same time the committee must see from the evidence already
placed in the record that General Stilwell was an invaluable and in-
calculable and irreplaceable asset to the Chinese Communists. This
was the man whose dismissal from China was the main act of the
AVallace mission to China which is supposed to have attained the
Communist objective under the guidance of Mr. Vincent, who con-
curred in the recommendation that General Stilwell be dismissed.
Senator Smith. Mr. Alsop, with reference to the statements you
have made, if General Stilwell were living today, do you suppose he
would agree with your statements on that or deny them ?
Mr. Alsop. The damaging statements I have made on Stilwell are
taken from papers he has actually written. I think he would certainly
say he was a loyal American.
Senator Smith. Did he say he was working for the Communist
<?ause over there in China? Did he ever make that statement?
Mr. Alsop. Senator, he desired to arm the Chinese Communists,
and he wrote that the only cure for China's trouble, and here I quote,
^'was to eliminate Chiang Kai-shek," and he also wrote, and again
I quote, "the only hope of the Chinese mass was the Chinese
Communists."
You take it all together, and I think you have a very consistent
picture that should appeal to your legal mind.
Senator Smith. Do you have any evidence that he did anything
for the purpose of helping the Chinese Communists control China ?
Mr. Alsop. Senator, I think that offering to arm the Chinese Com-
munists and refusing to arm the Generalissimo is about as direct a
contribution as you could possibly make to that.
Senator Smith. That might have been because of his hatred of
Chiang Kai-shek. Sometimes you hate somebody so badly that you
are Avilling to do something against somebody you do not hate quite
as bad.
Mr. Alsop. I departed from my agreement with you, sir, to in-
dulge in commentary in order to say that General Stilwell in my
opinion was a passionately loyal American who did not understand
the political significance of this policy that he was developing.
Senator Smith. There were a great many other Americans, and
some very prominent ones, who agreed thatChiang Kai-shek was not
handling his forces or the supplies we sent him in a proper manner.
Mr. Alsop. It was all perfectly understandable except that I think
in the light of the record you have to agree that General Stilwell
Avas a very major Communist asset in China. That is the only point
I am trying to m^ake.
Mr. Morris. Which point, you understand, is not in issue here be-
cause it is conceded by all parties.
Mr. Alsop. There is further documentary evidence of a very im-
pressive kind for the position that I have put forward, Mr. Chairman.
1434 INSTITUTE or PACIFIC RELATIONS
I refer to a very remarkable letter from Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault
dated July 6, 1945, requesting General Wedemeyer to relieve him of
command in China.
I should like to give this letter to the chairman because it is a per-
sonal and unhappy letter, and it refers to a lot of ugly ghosts from
the past, and I don't think it ought to go in the record except where the
passages are pertinent.
Senator Smith. I would have to have counsel for the committee
to pass on whether or not there is anything pertinent here that ought
to be put in the record. Now I do not think you should offer it unless
you are willing to have the whole thing go in the record if it appears
pertinent.
Mr. Alsop. In that case I will withdraw it.
Senator Smith. I do not want the responsibility of saying whether
it should be put in or not.
Mr. Alsop. It is a sad document with much that is irrelevant to
this inquiry. As I understand it, your committee does not want a lot
of unnecessary personality.
If I may, since I drafted the letter for General Chennault, I would
like to testify as to the pertinent passages. Is that permissible ?
Senator Smith. I do not think it is unless you are going to offer
the letter for us to examine to decide whether or not we think there
are other pertinent passages. Manifestly if you are going to offer
one part, we ought to have a chance to see it and decide whether or
not another part is pertinent.
Mr. Alsop. Well, I withdraw it. I don't think it is necessary to
sustain the point any further that General Stilwell was of great value
to the Communists in China.
Mr. Morris. In that connection, Mr. Alsop, just to aid you in that
narrative, you wrote in the Saturday Evening Post of January 7,
1950, the following passage on page lY :
Throughout the fateful years in China, the American representatives there
actively favox-ed the Chinese Communists. They also contributed to the weak-
ness, both political and military, of the National Government. And in the end
they came close to offering: China up to the Communists, like a trussed bird on
a platter, over 4 years before the eventual Communist triumph.
Was Mr. Vincent one of the American representatives indicated
in that?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. John Carter Vincent had no part in this at all.
Mr. Morris. Who were the American representatives ?
Mr. Alsop. If you will read the rest of that article, you will find
that the article concerns General Stilwell almost exclusively, and this
was a description of General Stilwell's plan.
There is a very false impression that has got abroad that the State
Department and the representatives in the State Department had
very much influence on American policy in China. Actually they had
almost none.
I can recall Ambassador Gauss telling me— T am sure he was ex-
aggerating greatly, but it indicates the mood in which they lived —
that he sent a report every spring, and he sent them a message the
next January reminding them that he had been right, and that was as
far as he troubled to go because he knew it wasn't any use at all.
Mr. Vincent during this period under discussion was in China very
briefly or relatively briefly, to my knowledge — he may have been there
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1435
earlier — in the Chungking Embassy. He was removed and replaced
by Mr. George Acheson long before the Chiang-Stilwell relationship
had become absolutely critical. I think he left in the winter of 1943,
and 1944 was the crucial year referred to in this passage that you have
just introduced, which states more accurately than I can, giving testi-
mony in this manner, the real effects of General Stilwell in China.
Mr. Morris. "V^Hien you say the American representatives there, pre-
cisely whom do you mean ?
Mr. Alsop. I mean Stilwell and his staff.
Mr. Morris. Who was on his staff' ?
Mr. Alsop. General Stilwell had, I think, six staff's, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. To whom are you referring when you make the state-
ment ?
Mr. Alsop. I meant General Stilwell and his staff.
Mr. Morris. Will you name the staff ?
Mr. Alsop. I can't possibly name his staff. He had six staffs.
Senator Smith. How do you know his staffs were included in this
group if you did not know them ?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Chairman, I was there at the time.
Senator Smith. But that is a statement of fact that you made in
this article. Now Mr. Morris is asking you who were the individuals
to which you referred. Now I think that is something you ought to be
able to tell us.
Mr. Alsop. General Stilwell's chief staff officers in Chungking at
the time under reference were General Hearn, who sent the telegram
I have already quoted from about the proposition, and General Ferris,
who was a rather meaningless man. Most of them, Mr. Chairman,
were people — in fact, all of them were people — who simply did exactly
what General Stilwell told them.
Senator Smith. He is asking you who are the parties to which you
referred. I think that is a fair question. You have made a statement
in a written article in which you have said, "The American representa-
tives." Who are those persons to which you referred besides the ones
you mentioned ?
Mr. Morris. In aid of Mr. Alsop's memory, I should like to point out
on that same page, page IT, he points out that —
It resulted in political intelligence so bad that Stilwell's chief political adviser,
John P. Davies, Jr., once seriously accused the Generalissimo of traffic with the
Japanese, on the odd authority of the vice chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party, Chou-En-lai.
Therefore, you are clearly talking about political intelligence, are
you not ?
Mr. Alsop. I am not talking about political intelligence at all, Mr.
Morris. Your deductions are very far-fetched indeed. I am talk-
ing about the over-all effect of General Stilwell and his staff'.
Now that you have brought Mr. Davies in, if you will allow me to
say, the most gross injustice has been done to Mr. Davies and also to
Mr. Service, not in the sense of saying that their policy was wrong,
because I cannot say that their policy was wrong because I took the
lead in fighting it, and not in the sense
Senator Smith. Now are we going afield when we get into those
names and what they did? I think we had better stick to the subject
we have before us. I should like to have you tell Mr. Morris who
the persons are to whom you referred.
1436 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. I referred to General Stilwell and Ms whole staff, in-
cluding, of course, his political advisers.
Senator Smith. Now, can you tell us who they were ?
Mr. Alsop. His political advisers shifted from time to time. Mr.
Davies and Mr. Service were the chief ones.
Senator Smith. If you make a statement of that sort, do you not
think the men wlio were on iiis staff should have a chance to be called
here to say what they did ?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Morris made the statement.
Senator Smith. But it is your statement.
Mr. Alsop. It is a magazine article that I wrote some time ago. I
particularly did not want him to introduce Mr. Davies and Mr. Service
because that is a separate and very complex subject all of its own, and
I think they were also, like General Stilwell, passionately loyal but
mistaken Americans.
Now a man is not to be denounced as disloyal because he has made a
mistake. It is a very unpleasant thing. It is not relevant to tJie
inquiry.
Senator Smith. Did you not say in this article in the Saturday
Evening Post that —
The main contributors were Stilwell himself, John Davies, and probably
Davies' assistants, John S. Service and Raymond Ludden.
Mr. Alsop. Ludden was also one of his political advisers.
Senator Smith. Now can you think of any other names of those
on his staff that you referred to in this article i
Mr. Alsop. I referred to General Hearn and others.
Senator Smith. Who else?
Mr. Alsop. I referred to General Dorn. He was a strongly preju-
diced man. There was a whole series of them.
I think it is very unfortunate, Mr. Chairman, to bring these men's
names into this open hearing because I do not think they were dis-
loyal. I thought they were very mistaken. I testified I did not think
that General Stilwell, who completely dominated all of them, as dis-
loyal. I thought that he was mistaken. The source of their error
was General Stillwell's error.
Senator Smith. Do you not think there were more people with bad
judgment than disloyalty in all of these matters ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, but unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, these men have
been attacked as disloyal.
As long as their names are mentioned, I feel I must say to the com-
mittee I don't think they were disloyal. At the same time, it seems ta
me this inquiry is not germane to Mr. Budenz' truth or untruth.
Senator Smith. A lot of this is not germane, I think, in a lot of
testimony discussed.
"Were there any persons on Stil well's staff or any of his staff that
you would say were not misguided and who did have the right idea
about how to approach the problem in China ?
Mr. Alsop, There was General Merrill, who was a very wise and
able officer, who constantly tried to patch things up and never quite
succeeded in doing. There was a very brilliant leader of Chinese
troops in the field, Colonel Condon.
General Stilwell had a very curious habit of surrounding himself
by people who never disagreed with him at all. His intelligence officer
at the end of his service in China was Colonel Dickey. You didn't
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1437
liear much dissent from General Stilwell's views from members of
General Stilwell's staff. If you had heard it, they would have ceased
to be members of General Stilwell's staff as soon as it got to his ears,
and like all staffs everyone was telling tales on everyone else.
Senator Smith. That is true politically also.
Mr. Alsop. I agree this is an ordinary human trait.
May I continue, Mr. Chairman ?
Mr. Morris. May I point out the relevancy of this ? Mr. Alsop has
stated it was unfair to introduce his own writings at this open hear-
ing. Now the particular question I asked him was with reference to
the statement —
Throughout the fateful years in China, the American representatives there
actively favored the Chinese Communists.
I asked Mr. Alsop if one of the American representatives there was
John Carter Vincent.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Morris, you also brought out later
Senator Smith. Could you answer that question there?
Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent one of the American repre-
sentatives there?
Mr. Alsop. He was not one of those intended to be included under
tlie heading of this sentence torn from context that you have quoted,
Mr. Morris, and I think if you will read the whole article you will
find very clearly he was not so included.
INIr. Morris. So when you talk about the American representatives
you mean some American representatives ?
Mr. Alsop. What I mean — and it is not always possible to treat
an American magazine like a legal record — what I said was American
representatives who had power to influence events, people who did
something. I knew Mr. Vincent when he was charge d'affaires in
China.
Mr. Morris. He was not an influence ?
]\Ir. Alsop. He did not attempt to influence events when he was
charge d'affaires in China. General Stilwell had already taken over.
It was like heading into buzz saw, and he did not try to argue with
him.
Senator Smith. You mean then that if the whole article is read, it
would indicate you did not mean to include Mr. Vincent in tliat group.
Now I have not read the article, but can you tell us whether or not
there is anything in here to negative the idea that you included
Vincent along with the rest of them in there?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Vincent is not mentioned in the article, JMr. Cliair-
man. He was mentioned in a note which I appended to the orig-
inal
Senator Smith. You said a moment ago that if Mr. Morris had
read the wliole document he would see you did not mean to include
Mr. Vincent in this group. Now is there any mention of Mr. Vincent
one way or another in here ?
Mr. Alsop. There is no mention.
Senator Smith. Then he could not have been excluded any more
than have been included by name in there.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Chairman, I think if you read the whole article—
And I wouldn't recommend your boring yourself with sucli an old
publication— you will find that the idea is clearly stated in the article
that General Stilwell and his staff were the effective American repre-
2438 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
sentatives in China, and this passage refers back, of course, to that
expLanation that in wartime the theater commander and his staff were
the dominant and effective American representatives, and the Em-
bassy might just as well have been a ghost town.
Senator Smith. All right, let Mr. Alsop proceed uninterruptedly,
if possible.
Mr. Alsop. Such is the massive documentation of the true, im-
mensely far-reaching import of Mr. Wallace's recommendation to
dismiss General Stilwell in which Mr. Vincent concurred and joined.
We have already discussed. Senator, Mr. Budenz's attempt to show
that from a quotation from the Daily Worker — the only one that Mr.
]F3udenz himself introduced — appearing a month after the event of
Oeneral Stilwell's actual dismissal, and that the Communist Party
was not displeased by the replacement of General Stilwell by General
Wedemeyer.
Mr. Morris. You know, do you not, that yesterday we introduced an
item dated November 1, which was 2 days later?
Mr. Alsop. I am well aware of that. If you will have the record
read back, Mr. Morris, you will find that I specified that the Vander-
bilt Field column of December 2 was the only item introduced by
Mr. Budenz.
Mr. Morris. To complete the record, I am saying there was a
November 1, 1944, Daily Worker item introduced yesterday while
jou were here.
Mr. Alsop. I have already shown. Senator, that on the same date,
November 1, 1944, in another article in the Daily Worker, General
Stilwell was described by Mr. Joseph Starobin as "our favorite gen-
eral." And Mr. Starobin expressed grave concern about the dismissal
of General Stilwell.
If you will study the Daily Worker of this period — it is not an
agreeable study — I think you will find a sort of general conflict of
attitude toward the dismissal of General Stilwell which persists
for a considerable period of time.
There are a couple more Starobin articles in which he refused to
attack, in which he did not attack President Roosevelt for dismissing
Stilwell but again lauded Stilwell to the skies.
Then on November 4 there was a guest column by Frederick Vander-
bilt Field clearly showing the Communist attitude toward Stilwell.
It viciously attacked Governor Dewey's foreign policy and its touch-
ing climax is an imaginary speech by a Chinese soldier who is repre-
sented as sadly discouraged by the thought of Governor Dewey in the
Wliite House.
The soldier is made to inquire gloomily.
Will not Dewey inevitably be against the Stilwells, the Sonfns, the Madame
Sun Yat-sens, the patriots, who struggled for national unity whereby we may
fight against and defeat our common enemy?
There was also an article on this same line by Earl Browder himself.
I do not want to burden the record with any more of this dreary
stuff, which really genuinely fief.ms to me about the same as a debate
on how many angels can dance on the head of a pin, but there is a long
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1439
article by James S. Allen in the Daily Worker of November 5. This
man Allen states that "the most reactionary, imperialist, anti-Roose-
velt forces within the United States were responsible for General
Stilwell's recall," which was about the equivalent in the Daily Worker
saying that the professional murders could not have done worse.
Almost in the same breath Allen praises the mission to China of Mr.
Wallace, who recommended General Stilwell's recall. General Hurley,
who also recommended General Stilwell's recall, and Mr. Donald
Nelson.
I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that this suggests how much value
should be attached to Mr. Budenz's ex post facto exposition of these
peculiar Communist scriptures.
Mr. Morris. Did you say praised Henry Wallace's mission ?
Mr. Alsop. It praised Henry Wallace's mission, yes. It praised,
right after saying that the dismissal of General Stilwell was the work
of — I will quote again for you,
the most reactionary, imperialist, anti-Roosevelt forces in the United States.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you mean that shows that Allen did not know
what was going on ?
Mr. Alsop. I think it shows very clearly that Mr. Allen didn't
know what was going on.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who was Mr. Allen ?
Mr. Alsop. A regular writer of the Daily Worker, I assume a
member of the Communist Party.
Mr. Budenz testified that every article that appeared in the Daily
Worker was carefully reviewed and represented the party line in toto.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you think that Mr. Allen reflected the Commu-
nist Party viewpoint in his writings ?
Mr. Alsop. I believe Mr. Budenz testified that nothing appeared
in the Daily Worker that did not represent the Communist Party
viewpoint.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I ask you what you think. Do you think he re-
flected the Communist Party viewpoint in his writings ?
Mr. Alsop. I assume he did.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think he did ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Then you must admit that if that is true, the Com-
munist Party viewpoint at this time must have been the same as Mr,
Allen's, to wit, they had praise for Mr. Wallace. Is that not right?
Mr. Alsop. No ; I wouldn't attempt to dispute for one moment
Mr. SouRWiNE. Is that not substantially what Mr. Budenz testi-
fied to?
Mr. Alsop. It is not substantially what Mr. Budenz testified to. It
is only part of what Mr. Budenz testified to, and by far the least
important part, in my opinion.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, since we mentioned James S. Allen
here, there is another article in the Daily Worker of November 26 on
this particular point by James S. Allen.
Mr. Mandel, will you read the designated portions in the record?
22848— 52— pt. 5 13
1440 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Mandel. I read from tlie Daily Worker of November 26, 1944,
paj^e 3, by James S. Allen, the section marked "United States policy" :
Another very important factor is the continued pressure by the United States
for a positive solution of the crisis —
and in heavy type —
it is clear that the recall of General Stilwell did not mark the end of one phase
and the beginning of a contrary phase in American policy. If anything, the
unity policy is being urged more energetically than in the past. In his first in-
terview in Chungking General Wedfnieyer made it clear that his policy was the
same as that of his predecessor, General Stilwell. He emphasized the serious
threat of the Japanese armies in the south, called for unity of all the Chinese
fighting forces and their concentration upon fighting the Japanese and urged
Kuomintang-Communist unity.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Mr. Chairman, might it be pointed out for the rec-
ord that that passage is evidence only of what the Communists were
thinking, not of what the facts were.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, may that whole article and not just the
portions read by Mr. Mandel be introduced in the record ?
Senator Smith. I suppose it would be proper to introduce it since
the man's name has been brought into it, but again, as I pointed out,
as Mr. Sourwine suggests, as to whether or not that represents any
fact at all I do not know that it has any probative value. Anyhow,
we will put it in the record. It will have plenty of company there
with extraneous matter.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No, 341" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 341
[From the Worker, New York, November 26, 1944]
Chungking Must Make a Decision
(By James S'. Allen)
The changes in the Chungking Cabinet, announced Monday hy Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, are still far from the drastic reorganization required by the
crisis. But they do mean that the catastrophe now threatening China is loosen-
ing up and beginning to disrupt the stubborn alliance of reactionary forces which
hold the regime in its grip.
Chiang is impelled to move. The Cabinet shifts are in admission that changes
are necessary and possible. A real shake-up is in the oflSng. The advance of a
powerful Japanese Army into the heart of free China makes a basic change
hourly more imperative.
For China is on the verge of a catastrophe more serious than any which has
threatened during the Sino-Japanese War.
It took the kidnaping of Chiang in 1936 and the Japanese invasion in 1937 to
end the civil war and open the road to unity. The present disastrous crisis must
force a decided advance toward democracy and unity within China on a scale
which will turn the tide of war in Asia.
THE MILITARY THREAT
A well-equipped Japanese Army of 250,000 men has cut off the entire south
China coastal area from central China, established a continuous area of occupa-
tion from Nanking almost to the Indochina border, engulfed vital food-produc-
ing areas, taken coniuiand of strategic railroads and forced the bases of the
United States Air Forces far back into the interior.
And, most menacing of all, the Japanese now threaten Kweiyang, the capture
of which would cut the Burma Road on the way to Chungking. They are in a
position to completely isolate or launch a drive from a number of directions on
Chungking itself.
The Chungking regime is n'^w faced with a decision which it can no longer
postpone. This is the crisis from which there can be no turning back. It lives
I
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1441
as a completely revitalized force, or its dies clearing the way for a completely
uew government capable of rallying and leading tlie Chinese people to victory.
THE DEFEATIST TRIO
The recent changes in the Chinese Cabinet must be viewed with hope. They
are the advance rumblings of a political earthquake which will shake the whole
regime out of its feudal lethargy.
In his shifts, the Generalissimo put his finger on the three Cabinet members
who represent the most reactionary and retarding influences in China.
Gen. Ho Ying-chin, removed as War Minister but permitted to retain his post
as chief of staff, is the top man of the ancient war-lord clique which views the
Communists as the main danger, blocks every effort by able and progressive
generals to come to the fore in the war, and seeks to suppress every force within
fi'ee China working for democratic unity.
Ho and his generals are directly responsible for maintaining tlie blockade of
the Comnmnist-led armies and for inciting civil war against them.
As recently as August of this year his clique of generals was charged with
attacking the Eighth Route Army in Shansi Province, the New Fourth in Hupeh
and the People's Militia in Kwangtung, where they were harassing the new
Japanese advance toward Kweilin.
THE FEUDAL KINGPIN
H. H. Kung, removed as Minister of Finance, is the pivot in the Government of
the most reactionary groups connected with China's feudal agrarian economy.
As such he lias fiercely I'esisted every economic measure which would strengthen
China's industrial capacity for war or grant relief to the people from the run-
away speculation of his associates in foodstuffs and inflated currency.
Kung still retains his post as Vice Chairman of the Executive Yuan. The
Chinese War Production Board, which the Nelson mission is now attempting
to develop, is under the direction of the Executive Yuan.
THE CC CHIEF
Chen Li-fu, removed as Minister of Education, specialized in suppression of
the democratic elements within the Kuomintang and in free China. He is
leader of the notorious CC clique, which lias kept an iron hand on the Kuomintang
Executive. Through his secret police he has imprisoned thousands of democratic,
anti-Japanese leaders and terrorized progressive elements.
Chen is moved to the head of the organization department of the Kuomintang.
His place as Education Minister is taken by Dr. Chu Chiahua, himself educated
in Germany and a leader of a pro-Nazi group in China.
The new Finance Minister is considered one of Kung's satellites.
Outside of Gen. Chen Cheng, who becomes War Minister, no new force is
added in the Chungking set-up. General Chen, leader of the victorious Chinese
forces in the Burma campaign, is considered one of China's most able military
leaders.
At the least, the very shifting of the trio whose influence must be entirely
destroyed, serves to emphasize the direction in which further changes may be
looked for. The important thing is that military, political, and diplomatic
pressure is forcing the Generalissimo to acknowledge that change is necessary at
the top, and to begin to move.
MOKE ENERGY NEEDED
But he has to move much more energetically and in a more pronounced
democratic direction, and quickly.
In addition to the military imperative, a number of other important forces
converge at this moment to force a decision at Chungking.
The Cabinet shifts will not placate or in any way deceive the people and the
anti-Japanese forces. If anything, they will be encouraged by the new develop-
ment and press their demands more vigorously.
The unity program to save China was summed up by Lin Tso-han, president of
the northwest border region and Communist representative in the negotiations
with the Kuomintang which were broken off in October.
At that time, he declared in a letter to Kuomintang leaders that the only way
to rescue China from her crisis is to put an end to one-party dictatorship and
establish a coalition government to carry out thorough military, political, eco-
1442 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
nomic, and cultural reforms. He urged the immediate convening of an emergency
national conference of all anti-Japanese groups and parties to form such a
government.
The demand for a coalition government of this kind is shared by progressives
in the Kuomintang, the League of Democratic Parties, the anti-Japanese mili-
tary leaders within the central government armies and all popular forces.
The fact that General Chou En-lai has returned to Chungking to resume talk.s
for unity, together with the generalissimo's reiteration that differences will
continue to be solved through political means," bodes well in the present
situation.
UNITED STATES POUCY
Another very important factor is the continued pressure by the United States
for a positive solution of the crisis.
It is clear that the recall of General Stilwell did not mark the end of one
phase and the beginning of a contrary phase in American policy. If anything,
the unity policy is being urged more energetically than in the past.
In his first interview in Chungking, General Wedemeyer made it clear that
his policy was the same as that of his predecessor. General Stilwell. He
emphasized the serious threat of the Japanese armies in the south, called for
unity of all the Chinese fighting forces and their concentration upon fighting
the Japanese, and urged Kuomintang-Communist unity.
In fact, unity has become imperative also from the vie\\'point of the American
military contributions to the war. The Communist-democratic area of the north-
west is fast becoming the only safe area in which to base the Fourteenth United
States Air Force for attacks upon the Japanese held interior and upon Japan
proper.
An American military mission, headed by Col. Davis Barrett, is now in Yennan.
One can surmise that it is investigating just this possibility. But as long as
Chungkink maintains its blockade of the northwest it would be extremely difficult
to supply American air bases in that area.
Also consider the fact that Donald Nelson, now heading the war production
mission to Chungking, has just been given full Cabinet rank by President Roose-
velt. This serves to emphasize the importance which the President places upon
his mission and upon the policies which he conveys.
No one, in Washington or elsewhere, can now claim that he speaks with greater
authority and attempt to cancel the instructions from the ^Yhite House.
EFFECT OP NOVEMBER 7 VICTOEY
And to all this must be added another extremely vital fact. President Roose-
velt is eminently victorious in the elections, with a powerful popular mandate for
his foreign policies.
No one can now counsel Chiang Kai-shek to wait in the hope that a political
overturn in the United States would strengthen the hand of the reactionary and
defeatist forces in his Chungking entourage.
The elections show that the policies advocated by the administration before
November will be pursued after November. The Ho-Kunk-Chen trio is beginning
to feel the effects of that.
The sands are shifting in Chungking. The old, rotten props of the regime are
beginning to give way. A new resurgence of strength and unity, in the fate of
impending disaster, will save China.
Mr. Alsop. Let me say to you, Mr. Chairman, that it seems to me
the attempt to prove that the Communists liked the recall of General
Stilwell and his replacement by General Wedemeyer from articles
written before the event is a misleading attempt. But even in these
articles which have been put in, written after the event, I think you
can see a o^reat conflict of attitude as to this great event, great devel-
opment of the recall of General Stilwell.
I would like to submit to the Chair that the real response of the
Communist leaders was as follows : First, as indicated in the Starobin
article expressing concern and calling General Stilwell "our favorite
general," the Communist leaders were horrified and downcast by Stil-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1443
well's dismissal, this great asset which was a sure bird in hand was
lost to them.
Second, however, they were presented with a fait accompli, and
this fait accompli was also the handwork of President Koosevelt.
"Beat Dewey" was then the overriding party line, and this deterred
any criticism of the President's decision and even caused Stilwell's
dismissal to be blamed on "anti-Eoosevelt reactionaries."
Third and finally, the Field guest column belatedly told the leaders
to stop worrying about Stilwell's dismissal, indicating, incidentally,
that the Communists had previously been very worried indeed because
the Communist Party perhaps genuinely hoped that Stilwell's policy
really would be carried on in China as they kept assuring themselves
and their readers.
Here you have to consider the circumstances of the times Mr. Budenz
has also forgotten. First, the conservative press was teeming with
such anti-Chiang reports as that of Brooks Atkinson, which has been
introduced, and the President was subject to much partisan criticism
by the Republicans for bringing General Stilwell home.
Second, General Wedemeyer had said pro forma on taking com-
mand that he would carry on where General Stilwell left off, and even
before December 2 when Field wrote the column quoted by Budenz,
Major General Hurley had inaugurated the effort to promote a Chinese
Nationalist-Communist political coalition, which lie carried on for
many months thereafter.
In fact, however, the wartime turning point in China was the re-
moval of General Stilwell, the man who wished to eliminate the
Generalissimo and described the Chinese Communists as the only
hope of the Chinese masses.
Witli General Stilwell in command I would remind the committee
the Communists would have received American arms while the Gen-
eralissimo's armies got few or none. They would have been sup-
ported by our Government at home while the Generalissimo was villi-
fied by the American theater commander. Their claims would have
been recognized as just while the Generalissimo was pressured into
entering unequal partnership with them.
General Hurley, although he pressed for a coalition to avert civil
war, did not press for a coalition in the Stilwell spirit of wishing to
eliminate the Generalissimo, and General Wedemeyer in seeking to
invigorate the Chinese forces in order to beat the Japs showed leader-
ship that sent a new thrill of confidence, a strong surge of regeneration
throughout the whole nationalist structure.
With General Stilwell gone, the Chinese Communists' high hopes of
coming to power during the war, which in my opinion they would have
done if General Stilwell had not been dismissed, fell finally to the
ground.
Such are the documented facts of history. I leave it to the comniit-
tee to judge in the light of these facts whether a Communist dbjective
was carried out, as Mr. Budenz has testified, by this mission of Mr.
Wallace, wlio so strongly recommended the dismissal of General
Stilwell, with the concurrence and approval of the accused man, Mr.
Vincent.
It is not I who convicts Mr. Budenz of untruth ; it is the facts that
convict him.
1444 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I now come to the way that Mr. Vincent actually guided Mr. Wallace
and the manner in which Mr. Wallace was steered along the paths
of the party line, of which I was a witness. On this head, beside
giving the testimony I have briefly quoted from, INIr. Budenz elaborated
considerably when he returned to the stand. He said —
General Wedemeyer when he first came into public notice was not opposed by the
Communists. Indeed, the Communists felt that the compromise made with
Wedemeyer was a good compromise.
Again he said —
The Communists were very much opposed to General Chennault and didn't want
him in the picture at all. They thought Wedemeyer was a better choice.
Again he said —
They thought he —
referring to Wedemeyer —
was a good compromise since it excluded General Chennault.
It is downright startling to contrast this Budenz testimony with the
actual facts. When the Wallace party reached Kumming to visit
General Chennault, I was serving on the general's staff. I had known
]\Tr. Wallace before the war, and General Chennault therefore told me
to serve as Mr. Wallace's escort.
If I recall correctly, both Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent stayed in
General Chennault's house, where I also lived. At any rate, I was
with Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent almost continuously while they
v/ere visiting the Fourteenth Air Force except during Mr. Wallace s
rather frequent bouts of violent exercise — he was always playing volley
ball — when I was left alone with Mr. Vincent.
At this distance in time I cannot attempt to reconstruct every detail
of this episode, but I have, first, a general recollection that General
Chennault gave Mr. Wallace the customary VIP map talk on the
military situation. As a result of the Japanese offensive in east China,
the picture of the military situation was very dark and somber, and
Mr. Wallace seemed much impressed by the urgency of the military
problem.
Second, I have a general recollection that Mr. Wallace asked my
opinion of the political situation in China. I can recall making two
points: That the Generalissimo's Government was suffering gravely
from general demoralization resulting from the triumph of the reac-
tiouiiry faction of the Kuomintang in the internal political crisis in
October 1943; and, point 2, that the shocks administered to this al-
ready demoralized government by the terrible defeats in east China,
which I may say largely resulted from General Stilwell's military
policy, might well be enough to bring the whole structure down.
On the American role in the Chinese political situation I expressed
to Mr. Wallace approximately the views contained in the passages, in
certain passages from General Cliennault's letter in which General
Chennault, I should explain, took this line that the defeats in east
China were what undermined, or were at that time undermining, the
Generalissimo's regime and producing a serious danger of Communist
victory in China.
These were General Chennault's views at that time, as I knew be-
cause I was living in the house with him.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1445
I emphasize particularly the point that America could not hope to
shore up and strengthen the Generalissimo's Government unless the
American representatives in China were prepared to work with Chiang
Kai-shek at least on the basis of honorable equality. Again I had the
impression that Mr. Wallace was considerably impressed.
Third, I also have a general recollection of talking over the Chinese
situation with Mr. Vincent during one of Mr. Wallace's exercise pe-
riods. As nearly as I can bring it back, the conversation followed
much the same pattern as that with Mr. Wallace already mentioned, at
which Mr. Vincent in fact was probably present.
In these days I was obsessed by the risks we were running in China,
and I am afraid I had a tendency to repeat myself. At any rate, the
imj)ortance of this recollection of the talk with Mr. Vincent is that 1
remembered being pleased to find he agreed rather completely with
my own view that the Generalissimo had to be given someone who
would work with him, who would command his confidence, who would
genuinely seek to support him, if he wanted American interests in
China to be safeguarded by the improvement and strengthening of the
Chinese Nationalist Government.
Finally, I have a clearer recollection of the circumstances in which
the cable recommending General Stilwell's recall was decided upon
and drafted. Mr. Wallace, Mr. Vincent, and I were all together in
General Chennault's house. The subject of the crisis in China was
raised, and although I do not precisely remember what any single
individual said, I do recall very clearly the position taken bj^ all three
of us. This is natural in a long and complex conversation. You
don't recall quotations from each person, but you do know which side
each person was on.
I feel pretty sure for myself that I expressed the view that some-
body had better do something drastic about the crisis without further
delay in order to give the Generalissimo adequate military aid or we
would encounter a real disaster.
As I said, I felt very strongly about the problem in those days. At-
tempting to reconstruct the ensuing conversation as best I can, I think
it soon became apparent that Mr. Wallace had come from his con-
versation with Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking with the inclination
to feel that General Stllwell could not do the job in China but with no
decision to take any positive action.
I think also that the impression made on Mr. Wallace by General
Chennault's presentation of the urgency of the military problem had
strengthened this inclination that Mr. Wallace brought from
Chungking.
At any rate, there was a general discussion back and forth between
the three of us. I particularly recall that Mr. Vincent affirmatively
participated in the decision that concluded this discussion.
Senator Smith. Where was Mr. Lattimore all this time?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Lattimore there wasn't room in the house for, and
he lived down in Chungking, and we hardly saw him. He turned up
at the end.
Senator Smith. You three got together and left him out?
Mr. Alsop. Yes; I recall. I know he was there because I happen
to have a photograph that he took of me with a little Chinese baby
that was a sort of pet of the troops — General Chennault's chauffeur's
daughter, as a matter of fact.
1446 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
It was at the end of his time, and he was never with us at all. I
think he may have come to one luncheon or dinner with General
Chennault because I think I also recall sitting next to him, and I hap-
pened to be very interested in the history of the Chinese Empire, and
he did a remarkable learned turn about the Chinese tribute system,
which stuck in my mind, and that is the last time I had a serious talk
with him.
I particularly recall that Mr, Vincent affirmatively participated in
the decision that concluded this discussion between Mr. Wallace and
Mr. Vincent and myself, the decision in short by Mr. Wallace to take
action forthwith by recommending the dismissal of General Stilwell.
I remember this for a rather special reason. In the early part of
the discussion they had been talking about whether or not Mr. Wallace
should take this rather drastic step, and the objections to it were of
course canvassed. Mr. Wallace wanted to do it. Mr. Vincent
thought he ought to do it ; and, God knows, I thought he ought to do
it.
Then in the second part of the discussion there was this one point
that Mr. Wallace had a tendency to stick on, and I feared very much
that it would be raised and would prevent action at this time. In
brief, Mr. Wallace had not seen General Stilwell and was unable to
go to Chabua to meet him.
One of the points that worried Mr. Wallace most was the desira-
bility of recommending General Stilwell's recall without giving Gen-
eral Stilwell an opportunity to present his side, which he was unable
to do. Mr. Vincent was, after all, a bureaucrat. Bureaucrats don't
usually like drastic measures. And I remember thinking that, al-
though I knew very well what Mr. Vincent's position was, the usual
feeling that if you don't do anything at least you haven't made a mis-
take might well prevail and he would make a big issue of this matter
of Mr. Wallace's inability to see General Stilwell.
Instead of which, as I have said, contrary to my fears, he affirma-
tively participated in the discussion, and I think it would be accurate
to say encouraged Mr. Wallace in his inclination to send this message
to the President recommending General Stilwell's dismissal.
I also have a distinctly vivid recollection of the way in which Gen-
eral Wedemeyer came to be suggested as General Stilwell's
replacement.
Senator Smith. Now, just a minute. Did I understand you to say
that Mr. Wallace did not see General Stilwell or talk to him about
this matter?
Mr. Alsop. That is correct.
Senator Smith. About the China situation while he was there?
Mr. Alsop. General Stilwell was in Burma and inaccessible.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Morris see Da vies. Service, and Ludden?
Mr. Alsop. As far as I know, no. He could not have seen Davies —
yes ; he did see Davies, I am wrong. Davies was in Chungking with
an invitation from General Stilwell to go to Chabua; had been" sent
up for that purpose. He presented his invitation. I was present at
every conversation between Mr. Davies and Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Davies influence Mr. Wallace at all?
Mr. Alsop. He presented General Stilwell's invitation to go to
Chabua, which General Stilwell had ordered him to do. He fulfilled
his instructions, and that was about the net of what he did.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1447
Mr. Morris. How about Service and Ludden?
Mr. Alsop. They were not there. Ludden was at the consulate,
but Mr. Wallace did not see him, as far as I recollect. Service, I don't
know where he was — I believe in Chungking.
Senator Smith. Before Mr. Wallace's cables were sent, was there
anyone to talk to him on behalf of General Stilwell to give his side
of the picture ?
Mr. Alsop. He had seen General Stilwell's staff in Chungking, I
believe, Mr. Chairman, and it is in the record that the then head of
General Stilwell's staff in Chungking, General Ferris, had, I believe,
presented to Mr. Wallace the memorandum urging him to ask the
Generalissimo's permission to open an American military mission, a
liaison mission, at the Communist capital in Yenan ; and, if the usual
procedure was followed — I cannot testify to this from my personal
knowledge — General Ferris undoubtedly gave Mr. Wallace a presen-
tation of the military situation, because the first thing anyone did
with a VIP in those days was drag him before a map and tell him
where everybody was and who was doing what to whom.
Mr. Morris. Did Mr. Wallace go to Yenan ?
Mr. Alsop. No.
Senator Smith. The point I am getting at is whether there were
three or four of you there with Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Alsop. Three of us.
Senator Smith. Each of you trying to influence Mr. Wallace to
request General Stilwell's recall ?
Sir. Alsop. That is correct.
Senator Smith. Did Mr. Wallace talk with anybody who would
take opposite views as to General Stilwell's recall before he sent the
cable ?
Mr. Alsop. I wouldn't be able to testify as to that.
Senator Smith. So far as you know.
Mr. Alsop. I do know whom he saw in Kunming more or less, be-
cause I was with him all the time except when he was playing volley-
ball. He was in Chungking, you see, for some days.
Senator Smith. Did he not say yesterday that he did not discuss
his recommendations as contained in the cables with anyone else
except you three ?
Mr. Alsop. That is his testimony, but I cannot testify to that on
my personal knowledge.
I also have a rather vivid recollection as to how General Wedemeyer
came to be suggested for Stilwell's replacement. In brief, Mr. Wal-
lace's first idea was to recommend General Chennault, of whom the
Generalissimo had spoken t.o him highly and by whom he had been
much impressed.
I looked to Mr. Vincent, hoping that he might interpose some
objection to this suggestion of my own boss, but he went along with
Mr. Wallace. That is why I remember Mr. Vincent's view on this
thing.
So, it was left to me, who had served General Chennault since before
Pearl Harbor, to oppose General Chennault's nomination as com-
mander in chief in China. I had two reasons for doing so.
First, only General Chennault knew how to run an air force on a
shoestring. Our shoestring was getting very thin. In those days the
Fourteenth Air Force was the sole force in being to prevent thorough
1448 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
military disintegration in China. As Mr. Wallace later put it in this
cable, General Chennault was needed on the job he was doing.
Second, and more important, General Stilwell had gone to very-
great lengths to blacken General Chennault's name at the Pentagon.
Even if President Koosevelt decided to act on Wallace's recommenda-
tion, there was no hope at all that the President could ever persuade
the Army and Air Staff to put General Chennault in Stilwell's place.
General Wedemeyer, who had great influence at the Pentagon, later
I believe recommended General Chennault's promotion to lieutenant
general, and it was refused.
The recommendation to recall Stilwell was certain to make enough
row all by itself. If this recommendation was coupled with a nomi-
nation of General Chennault, the roof was quite sure to blow off.
Hence, Mr. Wallace's idea was self-defeating.
Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vincent accepted these practical arguments
of mine as being compelling, and thus it was I who "excluded General
Chennault," to quote Mr. Budenz, and meanwhile the alleged Com-
munist, Mr. Vincent, in fact approved the suggestion of this man
whom ''the Communists were very much opposed to and did not want
at all," to quote Mr. Budenz again.
With General Chennault out of the picture, General Wedemeyer^
whom I had seen in action when he visited Chungking in his then
capacity as Lord Louis Mountbatten's deputy, was at length decided
on. Thus Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable was at last roughed out in
this discussion with Wallace, Vincent, and me. We drafted it to-
gether. I had a typewriter in the house and did the typing.
After Mr. Wallace signed it, the cable was sent through the con-
sulate in Kunming, if I remember correctly. Mr. Wallace does not
know how it was sent, as far as I recall. I took the signed draft off.
This was the way the accused man, Mr. Vincent, "guided" Mr.
Wallace "along the paths" of the party line.
Again I ask the committee to weigh Mr. Budenz' wholly unsup-
ported testimony as to Mr. Vincent against these facts which I have
presented.
Again I say it is not I who convicts Mr. Budenz of untruth ; it is
the facts that convict him.
To document this account I have given this committee, I have also
consulted the memoirs of General Chennault and Mr. Willauer, who
in 1944 was a high adviser of the Chinese Government and is now
General Chennault's business partner. Naturally, I recounted to Gen-
eral Chennault everything that had been said and done as soon as I
found an opportunity immediately after the sending of the Wallace
cable. Mr. Willauer and I had worked very closely together when
1, too, was adviser to Dr. T. V. Soong in the previous period, and
when Mr. Willauer passed through Kunming that summer I also
reported what happened to him — in strict confidence, of course.
I now offer for the record telegrams to me from General Chennault
and Mr. Willauer, giving their best recollection of what I told them
long ago. I would like to read them.
Senator SMmi. Are those recent telegrams?
Mr. Alsop. Yes; they have just been received. The dates are on
them [reading] :
Reference your cable inquiring Wallace and Vincent attitude in Kunming
on subject replacement of Stilwell, I have following recollection : First, you told
I
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1449
me Wallace cabled F. D. R. recommending Stilwell replacement and I recall
Wedemeyer among candidates, and that he was only one currently available.
Second, I recall Vincent, assigned as political adviser to Wallace, constantly with
Wallace, must have concurred or had knowledge any recommendations cabled by
Wallace. At the time of Wallace visit, Stilwell was actively supporting prcgram
to rearm Communists and refusing Nationalists arms anywhere east of Salween
River on Burma Road front.
That was anywhere in China proper virtually. [Continues reading :]
When Wedemeyer finally replaced Stilwell, central China was lost to Japs and
Nationalist Government greatly deteriorated. Wedemeyer appointment and
policy thereafter revived National Government strength, political and military ;
and, if his policies had been implemented sooner and continued postwar, I think
there would have been no — repeat — no Communist conquest of China.
Chennault.
(The cable referred to is as follows :)
Cable From Maj. Gen. C. L. Chennault to J. W. Alsop
HoNQ KoNQ VIA CoMPACiFic, September 22.
Alsop, Washington, D. C:
Reference your cable inquiring Wallace and Vincent attitude in Kunming on
subject replacement Stilwell, I have following recollection : First you told me
Wallace cabled F. D. R. recommending Stilwell replacement, and I recall Wede-
meyer among candidates, and that he was only one currently available. Second,
I recall Vincent, assigned as political adviser to Wallace, constantly with
Wallace, must have concurred or had knowledge any recommendations cabled
by Wallace. At the time of Wallace visit, Stilwell wns actively supporting
program to rearm Communists and refusing Nationalist arms anywhere east
of Salween River on Burma Road front. When Wedemeyer finally replaced
Stilwell, central China was lost to Japs and Nationalist Government greatly
deteriorated. Wedemeyer appointment and policy thereafter revived National
Government strength, political and military; and, if his policies had been
implemented sooner and continued postwar, I think there would have been
no — repeat — no Communist conquest of China.
Chennatjlt.
That is General Chennault's commentary on this episode of Mr.
Wallace's cable.
Mr. Morris. Do you mean you introduce that in refutation of
something Mr. Budenz said ?
Mr. Alsop. I introduce that in support of my own evidence, if you
don't mind.
Mr. Willauer's wire (reading) :
Reference your cable, I recall visiting you at Kunming shortly after Wallace.
Because my responsibility as director. Far East —
there is a misprint in the telegram —
for CDS—
which was Cliina Defense Supplies —
remember my gratification because hope from info re Wallace and Vincent
attitude replacement Stilwell, who completely misunderstood logistics eco-
nomics supply problems into and within China. Cannot state Wallace-Vincent
attitude except second-hand—
that is from me —
but replacement of Stilwell by Wedemeyer overnight restored Chinese morale
and effectiveness and cut out most of previous pro-Communist attitude of theater
staff.
1450 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
(The cable referred to is as follows :)
Cable From Whiting Willatjer, Fokmek Adviser to Chinese Government, Now
Partner of Genervl Chennault, to J. W. Alsop
Hongkong via Compacific, September 22.
Youngman for Alsop, Washington, D. C:
Reference your cable, I recall visiting you Kunming shortly after Wallace.
Because my responsibility Director, Far East for * * * [garbled] remember
my gratification because hope from info re Wallace and Vincent attitude re-
placement Stilwell, who completely misunderstood logistics economics supply
problems into and within China. Cannot state Wallace-Vincent attitude except
second-hand, but replacement of Stilwell by Wedemeyer overnight restored
Chinese morale and effectiveness and cut out most of previous pro-Communist
attitude of theater staff.
WlIXAUEB.
These are relevant as indicating that this account that I have given
of this conversation in Kunming is not something that I have made
up or done anytliing to for this occasion. These telegrams show that
I told General Chennault and Mr. AVillauer exactly what I am telling
the committee, in 1944, and that seems to me relevant evidence.
Senator Smith. The telegram does show that Vincent was assigned
as adviser to Wallace and was constantly with him.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Willauer's telegram is chiefly interesting because
General Chennault's does not make it clear he absolutely knew from
me that Mr. Vincent joined and concurred, wdiereas Mr. Willauer's
telegram — which is very hard to understand because he saved money
on the cable — if you read it carefully, it does make it clear that he
knew Vincent's attitude as well as Wallace's.
Senator Smith. Now at the time General Stilwell was relieved was
that before or after General Marshall went to China on his mission?
Mr. Alsop. That was long before. General Stilwell was relieved
in October 1944 and General Marshall's mission, if I recall correctly,
began sometime in 1946 after the war.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You think this conference that took place between
yourself and Mr. Vincent and Mr. Wallace was the primary reason
for the eventual replacement of General Stilwell?
Mr. Alsop. No, Mr. Sourwine. Here we are talking about what I
can't testify to as a matter of personal knowledge. Bob Sherwood,
who prepared the Hopkins papers, has told me that Mr. Wallace's
recomm.endation helped to influence the President's attitude when the
issue of General Stilwell's recall finally became acute, which is when
the Generalissimo asked for General Stilwell's recall. There was a
considerable dispute in Washington at that time because Mr. Stimson
was inclined to support General Stilwell against the Generalissimo.
There was a discussion between the White House and Mr. Stimson,
which is recorded in Mr. Stimson's book, and the President after some
hesitation, because it was a very explosive thing to do, to remove an
American theater commander — and his policy always was to support
them — finally decided in favor of General Stilwell's recall.
I think it is fair to say that Mr. Wallace's telegram probably con-
tributed to that, but I cannot testify to that. In any case the question
is : Was Mr. Wallace's telegram, which was the main result of his mis-
sion, carrying out a Communist objective ?
Mr. Sourwine. In any event, you make this clear, that Mr. John
Carter Vincent did have material influence upon Vice President
Wallace.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1451
Mr. Alsop. I wouldn't say material influence. You would have to
define "material."
Mr. SouRWiNE. You said he did have a definite i3art in influencing
Mr. Wallace with regard to his recommendations in his Kunming
cables.
Mr. Alsop. Let me try to be more precise for you, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Vincent, if he had taken a negative attitude, could have prevented,
undoubtedly have prevented, sending of the cable. He took an affirma-
tive attitude. I do not think that Mr. Vincent's affirmative attitude
influenced Mr. Wallace as much as perhaps even my rather strong
Mr. Sourwine. Let us leave out degrees of influence. Is it your
contention that Vincent did influence Mr. Wallace ?
Mr. Alsop. I think it is fair to say that.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether Mr. Lattimore influenced Mr.
Wallace?
Mr. Alsop. I couldn't possibly testify as to that. I believe Mr.
Wallace testified he didn't discuss the subject with Lattimore. He
couldn't have done it in Kunming, at any rate.
Mr. Sourw^ine. Do you have any personal knowledge as to whether
Vincent was or was not a member of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Alsop. I have no personal knowledge.
Mr. Sourw^ine. Do you have any personal knowledge as to whether
Mr. John Carter Vincent was accepting in any way instructions from
the Communist Party ?
Mr, Alsop. I feel very certain he wasn't.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any personal knowledge whether he
wasn't ?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Sourwine
Mr. Sourwine. Please, I have oiily one more question. It is ob-
vious what the answer is.
Mr. Atsop. No ; I have no personal knowledge.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any personal knowledge as to what
the Politburo thought with regard to either the activities of John
Carter Vincent or the activities of Mr, Wallace in China?
]Mr. Alsop. We have the testimony of Mr. Budenz.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you have any personal knowledge? I know
we have Mr. Budenz' testimony.
Mr. Alsop. Obviously I wasn't in consultation with the Politburo.
Mr. Sourwine. The answer is "No," is it not ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes. It seems to me the question is irrelevant. I should
like to have that put in the record.
ISIr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, we should not be argumentative.
The record will speak for itself.
Senator Smith. I think it speaks for itself, all right. He said
"Yes,"
Mr. Sourwine, Mr. Budenz made a statement which IVIr, Alsop
has challenged the accuracy of. The statement concerned influence
on Mr. Wallace and how the Politburo regarded that influence, and
tlie statement also concerned whether Mr, John Carter Vincent was
a Communist.
Senator Smith, I understand Mr. Alsop says he had no personal
knowledge on either of those things. That is what you said, you
had no personal knowledge of either of those? Did you say you did
not have?
1452 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. I have no personal knowledge.
Mr. MoKRis. You did say that was not a pertinent question, Mr.
Alsop.
Mr. Alsop. It doesn't seem to me whether I have personal knowl-
edge of the inner workings of the Politburo is.
Senator Smith. I think you have ansv/ered it, and I think it is all
right if that is what you said. Mr. Budenz made a statement. As
I understood it, you challenged it, but now you say you did not have
any personal knowledge of it, so that leaves it just where it was.
Mr. Alsop. May I explain what I am trying to say, Mr. Chairman ?
I did not have, naturally, any personal knowledge of the inner
workings of the Politburo, but I did see Mr. Vincent, charged with
being a Communist Party member commissioned to guide Mr. Wallace
along Communist lines, actually guide Mr. Wallace toward the most
anti-Communist act that was done in China during my time there
until General Wedemeyer took command.
Senator Smith. That is your judgment about it?
Mr. Alsop. I think that is what the facts show.
Senator Smith. That is your judgment on that point?
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean what you just said is a statement of fact
in your opinion ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes ; and may I introduce for the record the attached
letter of General Wedemeyer, since my capacity to judge has been
challenged? You will see that he thought at any rate that I had a
very clear idea of what Communist interests were and weren't in
China while I was there.
Senator Smith. It is a very nice letter for you to use as a recom-
mendation. I would so agree at the time.
Mr. Alsop. Since you say what I say is a matter of judgment it
should be permitted
Senator Smith. When you make a statement that is your judgment
and understanding as to what the facts are. I said that is your
judgment. Somebody else might disagree. They might take a dif-
ferent viewpoint.
Mr. Alsop. I do think it is relevant, since the question of my judg-
ment is brought up, for me to offer such evidence I may have.'
Senator Smith. That is not about your judgment ; that is about your
enthusiasm for China.
Mr. Alsop. General Wedemeyer says here :
I felt you understood perhaps better than any other American in the China
theater at that time the full implications of the Communist movement, which
was active but which was at least held in abeyance by the policies of the
Chinese Nationalist Government.
Senator Smith. That has no place in the record. I said that was
your judgment, whether it was good or bad. I am not questioning
that.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I have one question here at this point.
Mr. Alsop. I think it is relevant to show what General Wedemeyer
thought my judgment was.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Alsop, I am going to read you a passage from
your article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of Jan-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1453
-nary 21, 1950, and ask you if you could testify to that statement today.
It is right in point.
General Marshall used all his vast influence to keep Stilwell in China despite
the generalissimo. This could only have meant an open Sino-American break.
But Harry L. Hopkins pointed out that a theater commander who was persona
non grata could hardly be forced upon an Allied chief of state. Hurley sensibly
advised that the Sino-American war effort could not well be conducted by two
men who were not on speaking terms. The generalissimo stood firm. In mid-
October, President Roosevelt at length consented to recall Stilwell and replace
him with Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer.
Would you testify to that statement today?
Mr. Alsop. If you add General Marshall to Colonel Stimson, who
was the active man in this argument with the White House but was
representing General Marshall's views, influenced by General
Marshall, this is a correct statement of what occurred.
Mr. Morris. You will testify to that ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Since you brought up General Marshall's name, Mr. Morris, I would
like to testify a little further on this subject, if I may.
Mr. Morris. Is this connection
Mr. Alsop. I had thought it was the committee's policy, when they
brought names in, to try to define and explain their role in common
justice to the individuals named.
Mr. Morris. I have one question in that connection. In view of
the statement of facts you present here, namely, that —
Harry L. Hopkins pointed out that a theater commander who was personna
non grata could hardly be forced upon an allied chief of state.
will you say that the Communists at that time, no matter how much
they liked General Stilwell, would have been desirous of an open
Sino-American break at that time ?
Mr. Alsop. I think they would have been perfectly delighted by an
open Sino-American break on this subject, Mr. Morris, and so would
anyone who studied the record. It would hand all of China over to
the Communists tomorrow morning.
Mr. Morris. Have you read the excerpt in the Daily Worker which
said the big policy at that time was to achieve unity to defeat the
Japanese? You said you went through the Daily Worker for that
period, Mr. Alsop.
Mr. Alsop. If we are going to go on discussing the Daily Worker,
I think I had better introduce expert evidence.
Senator Smith. The question is whether or not you read the state-
ment.
Mr. Alsop. I read the statement, but I should like to elaborate.
Throughout Mr. Budenz' testimony on this Wallace mission to
China there is also a farrago of distortions and misrepresentation
which I hope the committee will question me about later. I had best
confine my testimony to Mr. Budenz' actual untruths, of which the
third in my judgment is his statement that Mr. Vincent was a Com-
munist Party member.
Mr. SouRWiNE, You cannot testify with regard to that. You have
already stated you have no personal knowledge.
1454 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. Allow me to continue, Mr. Chairman. I am about to
state that.
Of course I cannot give the committee documentary evidence that
Mr. Vincent did not belong to the Commmiist Party. I do not know
what forms such evidence would take. Of course I cannot tell the
committee that I know as a matter of positive fact that Mr. Vincent
was not a Communist. No man can know what may be found in the
secret hearts of men, but I put it to the committee Mr. Vincent joined
and concurred in the most profoundly anti-Communist act that could
have been attempted in China at that time.
I say to the committee that the overwhelming weight of the evidence
is against Mr. Budenz and convicts him of untruth in this also.
Senator Smith. You are correct that you could not prove that he
was not a Communist, but Mr. Budenz, assuming he was truthful
when he testified that Mr. Vincent was a Communist, could come
nearer knowing if he himself was a member and they worked to-
gether than you could come near not knowing
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Chairman, you are a former president, I believe,
of the American Bar Association. What would be your judgment?
Unsupported allegation for which not one shred of documentary evi-
dence has been introduced stands on one side, and on the other side
there is a mass of documentary evidence that the man behaved in the
most contrary manner possible to that indicated by the unsupported
allegation.
Senator Smith. That is a matter of judgment, but if Mr. Budenz
knew for a fact that he and Mr. Vincent were Communists, that they
belonged to the same group, they swapped information, they consulted
about Communist matters, whatever they did — I am not saying what
is or is not because I do not know — but if Mr. Budenz said ne was,
people may not believe Mr. Budenz, you may not believe him and
others may not believe him, but that is some evidence, at least, that
Mr. Vincent was, according to what he said.
Mr. Alsop. I say the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against
Mr. Budenz.
Senator Smith. That is j^our judgment. It may be mine.
Mr. Alsop. I wish to end my testimony here, but there is what I
am afraid, what I regard as a rather darker side to this business,
which I think must be ventilated in view of the importance of determin-
ing the reliability of Mr. Budenz' numerous charges against other
American citizens.
In brief, in August 1950, Mr. Alfred Kohlberg, who is no doubt
known to the committee, wrote Mr. Wallace asking for a copy of his
report on China to President Eoosevelt. Mr. Wallace replied to Mr.
Kohlberg with a letter including the main substance of the Kunming
cable of June 26, 1944, and specifically the recommendation for the
dismissal of Stilwell, which I now offer to the committee. This is a
photostat that Mr. Kohlberg sent me.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Wallace did that on your recommendation,
Mr. Alsop? '
Mr. Alsop. He consulted me about it. I urged him to make public
the full text of the telegram, which he did not do.
Mr Kohlberg replied to Mr. Wallace on August 22, 1950, with a
friendly and somewhat confused answer, thanking him for his kind-
ness, stating that "the wisdom of your recommendations was quickly
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1455
proven by history," and ending by asking Mr. Wallace to do an article
for liis magazine, the Freeman.
Mr. Wallace has lent me a copy of this Kohlberg letter of August
1950, which I also offer for the record.
Finally, I offer a copy of a third letter dated September 14, 1951,
from Mr. Kohlberg to me. In this letter Mr. Kohlberg alleges that
in August 1950, immediately after complimenting Mr. Wallace on
the wisdom of his recommenclaton to dismiss General Stilwell, he
showed to ISIr. Budenz the Wallace letter, giving the substance of the
Kunming recommendations, including, of course, the recommenda-
tion to dismiss General Stilwell.
If this be true, if Mr. Budenz indeed gave his testimony before this
committee with full knowledge of the real outcome of the Wallace
mission to China, which he completely failed to mention in his first
appearance on the stand, I may add his case, in my judgment, should
be submitted to the Justice Department for appropriate action.
Senator Smith. That completes your statement ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Now we will recess. We have another Judiciary
Committee meeting at 12 : 30. I do not know how long we are going
to be there. We will reconvene at 2 : 30. I think we can be back by
that time.
(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the committee recessed to reconvene
at 2 : 30 p. m. of the same day.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
The committee reconvened at 2 : 30 p. m., upon the expiration of the
recess.
Senator Smith (presiding). The committee will come to order.
Mr. PuRCELL. Before the end of the morning session, Mr. Alsop
presented three letters, two written by Mr. Alfred Kohlberg and one
written by Mr. Henry Wallace, and asked that they be received in
the record.
I wanted to be sure they had been received.
Mr. Alsop. May I say. Senator, I regard these as important parts
of the record, because they have contributed greatly to my belief that
the case of Mr. Budenz should be investigated by the Justice Depart-
ment to see whether a charge of perjury exists.
Mr. PuRCELL. Have they been received?
Senator Smith. Was that while I was presiding?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
I have the original here.
Senator Smith. Is this the group of all of them, or just one?
Mr. Alsop. All.
Senator Smith. They will be received and placed in the record.
(Documents referred to were marked as "Exhibits Nos. 342, 343, and
344," and filed for the record.)
Exhibit No. 342
Mr. Alfred Kohlberg,
New York 18, N. Y.
Dear Mr. Kohlberg : I am pleased to acknowledge reception of your letter of
August 9. Right now I am so overwhelmed by correspondence and performance
22848— 52— pt. 5 14
1456 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
of my duties arouud the farm that it seems to be impossible to arrange to get the
necessary time to see you.
I was not aware that I am or had been a trustee of the Institute of Pacific
Relations. Certainly I never attended any meeting of the board of trustees.
It has been suggested in the press that you feel Owen Lattimore wrote my report
to President Roosevelt. Tliis is not true. Owen Lattimore has denied it under
oath and I deny it. Lattimore came along with me on my trip to China in 1944
because OWI felt there should be someone along to handle public relations in
China having to do with the press.
You might be interested in the following statement which I sent Roosevelt from
Kunming in late June of 1944 with regard to Chiang's desire to have a liaison
oflBcer who was more acceptable to him than Stilwell :
"Chennault enjoys the Generalissimo's full confidence but he should not be
removed from his present military position. The assignment should go to a man
who can (1) establish himself in Chiang's confidence to a degree that the latter
will accept his advice in regard to political as well as military actions; (2) com-
mand all American forces in China; and (3) bring about full coordination be-
tween Chinese and American military efforts. It is essential that he command
American forces in China because without this his efforts will have no substance.
He may even be Stilwell's deputy in China with the right to deal directly with the
White House on political questions or China may be separated from General Stil-
well's present command. Without the appointment of such a representative you
may expect the situation to drift continuously from bad to worse. I believe a
representative should be appointed and reach Chungking before east China is fin-
ally lost so that he can assume control of the situation before it degenerates too
far.
"While I do not feel competent to propose an ofl3cer for the job, the name of
General Wedemeyer has been recommended to me and I am told that during his
visit here he made himself persona grata to Chiang.
"I realize that my opinions are based on a very short stay and that the number
of people who could be consulted has necessarily been limited. In particular, I
regret not having been able to see General Stilwell and get his views."
Sincerely yours,
H. A. Waixace.
Exhibit No. 343
AUGUST 22, 1950.
Mr. Henry A. Wallace,
Farvue, South Salem, N. Y.
My Dear Mr. Wallace : I greatly appreciate your courtesy in responding to
mine of the 9th, and particularly for extract from your Kunming report. The
wisdom of your recommendations was quickly proven by history. Too bad that
your reports wei e omitted from the white paper and that the portion you quoted
to me was even omitted from the Summary Notes of Conversations on pages 551
and 5.^2 of the white paper, which give a very different impression of what your
attitude really was.
In Windows on the Pacific — Biennial Report of American Council Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1944-16, a pamphlet of 63 pages, the 1946 board of trustees is
listed on pages 3, 4 and 5. On page 5 I find "Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of
Commerce, Washington, D. C." You are also shown as trustee another year.
I am informed that the board met only annually and that a quorum consisted of
12 of the 50 members.
I am happy to have your assurance that Owen Lattimore did not write any of
your reports. I knew that he had so testified, but did not accept that as con-
clusive. I am quite sure that I have never stated that he did as a fact, but sug-
gested that he uiight have. I did this for several reasons.
1. In the fall of 1944 John Carter Vincent told me you did not write the
pamphlet published by I. P. R. earlier that year, over your signature, entitled, I
think. "Our Job in the Pacific."
2. State Department denial of the existence of your reports, both in the white
paper on page 549 and in the statement of Secretary Acheson in release No.
645 of August 24, 1949. Referring to Congressman Judd's demand that your
report "must be produced from wherever it is and published." Mr. Acheson then
states: "The Department reiterates in the plainest language that it does not have
in its files and does not know of the existence of any report of the nature sug-
gested by Mr, Judd."
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1457
The release by you, shortly thereafter, of part of your report revealed the un-
truthfulness of this statement. By putting 2 and 2 together, I thought it possible
that both Mr. Lattimore and the Department were not strictly truthful and sug-
gested the possibility that he had had a hand in writing your report, especially
as Mr. Vincent wrote me last fall that he had nothing to do with it and, in fact,
had never seen your report. As Mr. Hazard was not a China expert, this left
only Mr. Lattimore as the probable author or assistant in its preparation.
Now, however, that I have your assurance, I accept it without question and
only hope that any previous doubts and questioning may not have been taken as
conclusive.
One more item added to the confusion. General Hurley stated that in June or
July 1945 he received a cable signed "Grew" asking him to follow your report as a
guide to United States Policy in China.
This confusion leads me to the following suggestion for your consideration:
A new fortuightly magazine entitled "The Freeman" will appear in October.
I am lreasu\-er of the corporation. It will be the successor to "Plain Talk" but
in addition to the exposure of Communist activities will cover the field of com-
raent on current events and have articles on economics, art, literature, etc. It
may be called, in the popular jargon of the day, a magazine of opinion on the
"right."
My suggestion would be an article by you covering your reports from China.
While the reports are too long for full coverage, liberal quotations would be
useful. I buggest our magazine, because of its coloration, as the most useful
mediiun. 1 believe such an article would be useful to your countrymen in the
present far eastern crisis, and would tend to correct misunderstanding both of
your attitude and the importance of your part in our China policy.
While I am sure we would disagree on the China situation, it would be useful
to our country to shed as much light as possible. Long continuance of the present
policy of keeping facts and decisions from the public, particularly in the present
public war psychology, can only lead to disastrous consequences, I fear.
The editors of The Freeman have authorized me to make this suggestion to you
in the hope that you would consider it a service to your fellow Americans.
I beg to remain.
Very sincerely yours,
Alfbed Kohluerg.
Exhibit No. 344
September 14, 1951.
Mr. Joseph Alsop,
Washington, D. C.
Deab Mb. Alsop : In your column of September 5 you state you personally saw
John Carter Vincent approve Vice President Wallace's report to President
Roosevelt recommending the recall of General Stilwell from command in China.
In your column of September 12 you contend this proves that Louis Budenz
perjured himself when he named Vincent as a Communist. You state the Wal-
lace report is top secret and was unpublished until revealed by you.
1. This Wallace report was known to Mr. Budenz in August 19.50, as I showed
him the enclosed letter from Henry Wallace— that was 1 year before he testified
before the McCarran committee.
2. As per enclosed photostat of letter from Mr. Vincent, dated October 11,
1940, Mr. Vincent denies your statement that he participated in the Wallace
report.
3. Under date of April 18, 1947, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson
wrote Senator George, referring to a charge that Mr. Vincent had assisted in
the preparation of the Wallace report, as follows :
"Comment: Mr. Vincent was assigned by the Secretary of State to accom-
pany Mr. Wallace, the Vice President of the United States, on the journey men-
tioned. Mr. Vincent did not prepai-e or assist in the preparation of the report
and does not know what recommendations it contained. Mr. Vincent had never
met Mr. Wallace prior to the trip to China, saw him only a few times on official
business after their retiu-n, and has had no contact with him since his resignation
from the Government.*'
4. Mr. Wallace's several reports to President Roosevelt (he made at least
three) all sing the genei'al tune of "Chiang must go." In another letter to me
Mr. Wallace hinted that the report you quote was not sent from Kumming but
was referred to General Stilwell at New Delhi and dispatched from there.
1458 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
In short, the Wallace reports were pro-Communist, except for the recommenda-
tion for the replacement of Stilwell ; the real explanation of which you seem to>
miss. Furthermore, both Mr. Vincent and Secretary Acheson deny that Vincent
had anything to do with them. Yet on this flimsy evidence you charge Louis
Budenz, who testified from inside Communist knowledge, with perjury.
It is apparent that somebody is misstating the facts. Either you, on the one
side, or Vincent and Acheson on the other. Why not ask Wallace?
If I were a member of your "Bleeding Hearts, Inc.," seeking to cry "Witch-
hunt " I could not find a better example of a vicious charge, without factual
basis, than yours.
Very truly yours,
Alfred Kohlberg.
Mr, SouRwiNE. Before questioning Mr. Alsop this afternoon witli^
regard to his testimony this morning, I would like to find out what
this is.
I hold in my hand a statement. Maybe Mr. Alsop can tell us. I
think it is being passed out by you.
Mr. Alsop. That is correct. I told the chairman about it before-
I gave it to the press. I spoke to the committee from rough notes.
1 drew up a statement. The mimeograph people made a mistake here.
It is a simply coherent presentation of what I said this morning.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does it purport to be your testimony this morning ?
Mr. Alsop. It does not and I have so warned the members of the
press. Parts of it where I had prepared my notes carefully and read
directly from them do represent what is already in the record. Other
parts do not, obviously.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Does it represent or include any of the questions
that were asked you this morning ?
Mr. Alsop. No.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Nor any of your answers to those questions, except
where you followed a prepared text ?
Mr. Alsop. That is correct. It is my statement.
Mr. SouRWiNE. You said you didn't have a statement ; didn't you ?
Mr. Alsop. I said I was not going to make a statement to the
committee.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You said you had no press release.
Mr. Alsop. I said I had no press release at that time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. We now have one ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It does not represent your testimony this morning ?
Mr. Alsop. In part, it does.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It is a statement which includes portions of your
testimony this morning presented in the manner in which you desire
to ]Dresent it to the press ?
My. Alsop. It is a coherent "relation of the various points I was
attempting to make.
Mr. SouRwiNE. It doesn't represent a presentation in a manner in
which you do not desire to present to the press ?
Mr. Alsop. No.
Senator Smith. It is a statement without some of the testimony
mentioned this morning ?
Mr. Alsop. With some other, too.
Senator Smith. With some other ?
Mr. Alsop. There are some passages in there I did not get in the
record.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1459
Senator Smith. This is merely a statement to tlie press and not
intended to be a resume or statement of what you testified to before
the committee ?
Mr. Alsop. No.
Senator Smith. You started off : "Mr. Chairman and members of
Ihe committee."
Mr. Alsop. I warned the press this was an error.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Who made the error?
Mr. Alsop. I couldn't possibly tell you. I didn't make the
arrangements.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You mean you have no knowledge as to where this
was mimeographed?
Mr. Alsop. My secretary handles the mimeographing.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you have any knowledge as to where this was
mimeographed ? You just testified you couldn't tell us.
Mr. Alsop. If you will just be calm for one moment, I gave instruc-
tions that the thing be mimeographed as a statement.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Chairman, may I have a yes or no answer ?
Senator Smith. I thought he was going to answer.
Mr. Alsop. I gave instructions that the thing be mimeographed as
a statement, and the instructions were unfortunately not followed.
1 don't know what mimeogi-aphing company did it. I don't handle
those things.
Senator Smith. As I understand, Mr. Sourwine asked you if you
knew who mimeographed this statement that you are presenting.
Mr. Alsop. I think it is a company called Bowman. I don't choose
Avho mimeographs this.
Senator Smith. You made it clear the statement does not represent
a summary of the testimony you gave this morning in some portions
■of it?
Mr. Alsop. Some portions it follows, and others it includes other
things.
Senator Smith. It is sort of like a lawyer's brief. He mentions
his sides of the case that are most important.
Mr. Alsop. That is correct.
Senator Smith. Did you say you had another statement you wish
to make?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, sir; because Mr. Budenz — I wonder if I can bor-
row a copy of the record of Mr. Budenz's second testimony from Mr.
Mandel. I wonder if you have one without all of those documents in
it. I am afraid I will lose my place and lose them.
Wliere does the second testimony begin ?
The paging does not come out right with the copy Mr. Morris gave
me this morning. I wonder if you have that copy.
Mr. Morris. He wants the third.
Mr. Alsop. Tlie third on which the question of Mr. Wallace's mis-
sion came up. It was the one Mr. Morris gave me this morning. It
was a much thinner one than this.
Thank you, Mr. Mandel.
Mr. Budenz addressed himself to proving there was a pro-Com-
munist tendency in the part of Mr. Wallace's Kunming cable which
I joined in writing which did not relate to the recall of General Stil-
well from China.
1460 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
This was an historical and reportorial statement to the President
summarizing the main points of Mr. Wallace's conversation with the
Generalissimo and describing the situation in China as he found it
at that time.
Mr. Budenz first came to the passage at the beginning of the cable^
and I quote :
The discussion between the representatives of the Chinese Communists and
those of the Chinese Government are talcing place in Chungking, but the atti-
tude of Chiang Kai-shek toward the problem is so imbued with prejudice that
I can see little prospect for satisfactory long-term settlement.
Mr. Morris. Is that an anti-Communist expression, Mr. Budenz?
Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly not. It helps the Communists —
and so on.
On that point, Mr. Chairman, I think you have to put this state-
ment of Mr. Wallace's in its historical background in order to see how
misleading, in fact, it was.
The implication there was a pro-Communist tendency behind these
sentences which I actually wrote, I mean.
In the first place, you must remember that the Chinese Commu-
nists and the National Government had been in partnership in the
prosecution of the war against Japan and the Communist armies
iiad been employed under the direct command of the Generalissimo
from the outbreak of the war immediately after the Marco Polo
Bridge incident in about 1940-41.
At that time the partnership broke down.
In the second place, you have got to remember that Americans
in that period were a little bit naive about politics and that the pri-
mary emphasis was given in those days to winning the war.
The Chinese Communists at that time occupied a vital area of
China in the northwest. The B-29s which had just come into Chen-
doo, a great project that cost us $2 billion for bombing Japan, op-
erated exclusively over northwest China.
The Fourteenth Air Force operated very much over the northwest
of China. It was vital to have intelligence in the fullest measure
from northwest China.
It was also highly desirable from the standpoint of operations in-
side China to have a working military understanding between the
Chinese Communists and the Chinese nationalists.
To give you one example : Had there been such a working under-
standing even without any political liaison whatsoever, the Japanese
offensive, which I testified about this morning, which had to be
based in Peking and all the supplies which had to be carried down
through Communist territory, could have been impeded greatly by
Communist attacks on the Japanese supply lines.
There was nothing short of a great need for straight, simple mili-
tary cooperation. The Generalissimo at the time that Mr. Wallace
is reporting on had for internal political reasons on his own motions
inaugurated the talks with Communist representatives — I believe the
Communist representative was Chou En Lai — looking forward to
some kind of an understanding.
What ]\Ir. Wallace was really saying here was these talks were
going very badly. The reason they were going very badly was that
Chiang realized the political importance of dealings with the Com-
munists; whereas, most Americans, including, I must say. General
Chennault, could not see why the Communists and the nationalists
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
could not get together and work together on the straight militu
level as they had for, I think, 3 years, at the beginning of the war.
This phrase "imbued with prejudice" relates to that. I think it
is an unfortunately chosen phrase by hindsight, but I see nothing help-
ful to the Communists about it. It is a report of the situation, at
least so far as motive was concerned, and there was nothing helpful
to the Communists about it. It is a report of the situation as Mr.
Wallace knew it at that time.
Mr. Morris. Is it an anti-Communist declaration ?
Mr. Alsop. No; it is not anti-Communist. Mr. Wallace has not
contended, nor do I contend this reportorial part of the cable is
either pro or anti-Connnunist, except in one passage which I shall
come to.
The anti-Coimnunist part of the cable is the part where General
Stilwell's dismissal is recommended. I am attempting to refute Mr.
Budenz's testimony that this helps the Communists or was intended
to help them.
Senator Smith. In other words, Mr. Budenz said one way and you
said the other, based on your conclusions on the same language?
Mr. Als6p. Yes, but I was there when the thing was written, so
perhaps my evidence on the situation and its origination
Senator Smith. You know under the law any instrument is con-
strued against the man who writes it, so that will not do you any good.
Mr. Alsop. The second point Mr. Budenz makes is the sentence:
I emphasized to him the importance of reaching an understanding with Russia.
This goes on:
This was the first point in the Communist drive at that time in their literature —
et cetera.
A Sino-Russian understanding may well have been the first point in
the Communist drive at that time, but I can assure the chairman
from personnal discussions with Dr. T. V. Soong, who was Foreign
Minister of China, it was also one of the two or three first points in
Chinese policy. It was also a first point in American policy.
Obviously, if a Sino-Russian understanding could possibly be ar-
ranged, a great deal of trouble was bound to be avoided.
It seems to me Mr. Budenz might have put in some of those facts
when he commented on this passage in Mr. Wallace's cable.
I should add the Chinese desire for a Sino-Russian understanding
reached the stage a little earlier than this point where they tried very
hard to go around behind the back of the American Government and
make it a Sino-Russian understanding independently and on their own
without telling their people they were having negotiations with the
Soviet Union.
This was the Generalissimo's government that did it, and the Gen-
eralissimo, I was informed, although he did not tell me, was fully
aware of the attempt.
Senator Watkins. Where did you get your information ?
Mr. Alsop. From Dr. Soong, sir. He was Foreign Minister of
China.
Senator Watkins. Direct conversations?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, sir. I worked with, and even lived in the house
of Dr. Soong for very long periods of time. There was a very long
period when he was, owing to a political crisis which I testified about
1462 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
earlier this morning, under house arrest. He had very few other
people to talk to. He had no means of exercise, except to drive out of
Chungking a couple of miles, under guard, and walk up and down in
those rice paddies, those miserable paddies.
I used to be his companion. Consequently, he confided a great
many things to me, although I ^vas his close adviser, a great many
things otherwise he might not have told me. He was in great agony
of soul at that time.
Senator Smith. Where is he now ?
Mr. Alsop. In New York, sir.
There is just one more point here which I am having difficulty find-
ing. I cannot find the passage, but I think Mr. Morris will not dis-
pute it, that one of the main Communist aims was also to discredit
and undermine the Generalissimo. On this point he addressed him-
self to another passage of Mr. Wallace's cable.
Mr. BuDEiNrz. Thirdly, and I consider this very Important in view of vphat the
Communists were driving for at that time
Namely, to discredit and undermine the Generalissimo —
instability and tenseness characterized the political situation with the rising
lack of confidence in the Generalissimo and the present reactionary leadership
of the Kuomintang.
That again I thinlc very emphatically represents Chiang Kai-shek as incapable
of coping with the situation. This is expressed still further when it says Chiang
Kai-shek seems to be unsure regarding the political situation, bewildered regard-
ing the economic situation, and while expressing confidence in the army, dis-
tressed regarding military development. This is the picture the Communists
were trying to have presented of Chiang Kai-shek, as incompetent and incapable
of handling the situation. There is no mention here of the long struggle of
Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese
and so forth.
As a man who was there at the time and who saw all the intelligence
reports at least that were available to the Fourteenth Air Force, who
was in the very close touch by the nature of my duties with General
Chennault with the developments of Chinese politics, I want to assure
you that this was a rather pale and moderate reportorial description
of what was going on in China at that time.
You must recall that the Government of China in 1943, October
1943, had come into the hands, by an unfortunate crisis, of an extreme-
ly competent, excessively corrupt reactionary clique. They had played
a trick on the Generalissimo and had got power.
For the sake of the Senator here, who was not here this morning,
I will say that their character was symbolized by the fact that for
political and factional reasons, money and arms were denied to the
forces of the chief Chinese general in east China resisting the Japa-
nese attack because he belonged to the opposite faction.
Senator Watkins. Was that within their own party ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, the Nationalists. You had this terrible political
problem on the one hand, ^^•hich I may say the Generalissimo moved to
cure very shortly after Mr. Wallace left China.
On the other hand, you had these series of shattering military de-
feats. The whole armies in Honan, several hundred thousand men,
completely destroyed in a matter of 3 weeks.
Changsha, which is the great center on the Yantze, had fallen in a
matter of days. The Japanese driving south of Changsha to the vital
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1463
cities of east China and the air fields in east China of the Fourteenth
Air Force.
These disasters were sending through China a terrible surge of
disintegration and weakness. I can recall General Chennault, after-
going to Chungking and talking to the Generalissimo, coming back
and telling me how worried he was about the Generalissimo whom
he had admired more than any man because the weight of this burden,
the terrible situation which Chiang Kai-shek found himself in and
getting no aid from General Stilwell, was really telling on him.
I think Mr. Wallace's description was perhaps exaggerated, but
this was not Communist propaganda. This is a verbatim construc-
tion of the situation in China *as it existed at that time and it does
not tell half of it.
I would finally point out, Senator, that the aim of painting this
dark ])icture was to bring home to the President the great gravity of
the situation and, therefore, to induce him to replace General Stilwell,
take this last drastic action of replacing General Stilwell, so that
Chiang Kai-shek might have adequate aid and support in these des-
perate situations in which he found himself.
Senator Smith. Do you know whether or not there was anyones
advising with General Stilwell as to what was going on and that his
recall had been recommended?
Mr. Alsop. Recommended by Mr. Wallace?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. I wouldn't know that.
Mr. Morris. Is it your contention that that Kunming cable was a
document of such a nature that anybody concurring in the issuing
of that report would, ipso facto, be anti-Communist?
Mr. Alsop. Providing he knew anything at all about the situation
in China.
Mr. Vincent was Chief of the China Division of the State
Department.
Mr. Morris. Have you further testimony that John Carter Vincent
did concur in the issuance of that report?
Mr. Alsop. Not only concurred, but contributed.
Mr. Morris. Did you testify that the anti-Communist essence of
that report is the dismissal of General Stilwell?
Mr. Alsop. I do. General Stilwell was the chief asset of the Com-
munists in China, not because he was disloyal, because he hated the
Generalissimo and had no political judgment, followed certain policies
which assisted the Communists.
Mr. Morris. This morning we had read into the record three Daily
Worker articles that showed that the Daily Worker concurred in
the dismissal of General Stilwell. Haven't you, therefore, simply
testified that John Carter Vincent took the same reaction to the
Stilwell cables as the Daily Worker took?
Mr. Alsop. I have testified no such thing, Mr. Morris. If I may,
Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak to this point since it has been
discussed so much in regard to these Daily Worker articles.
In the first place, I would like to request that there also be
Mr. Morris. "What is there about the question ?
Mr. Alsop. Do I have permission to answer ?
Senator Smith. I think if you can answer the question he asked
you, if you understood the question.
1464 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Watkins. The answer did not seem to be quite responsive
to the question.
Senator Smith. Let us see if Mr. Morris can ask the question again,
or do you wish to have it read back ?
Mr. Morris. Read it back.
(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)
Mr. Alsop. May I attempt to answer, Mr. Chairman ?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. My answer is, I have not testified in that sense in the first
place.
In the second place I consider that Mr. Morris is making a very
misleading use of these Daily Worker articles. I would like to speak
to that point if the chairman will permit me.
Senator Smith. Certainly ; but as I understood Mr. Morris' ques-
tion it was rather simple. If the reaction on Mr. Vincent wasn't the
same as the reaction on the Daily Worker.
Is that not your question ?
Mr. Morris. They concurred.
Mr. Alsop. I consider the question is inherently misleading because
it addresses itself to so tiny a part of the truth that it is inherently
misleading.
I would like to address myself to this subject of these Daily Worker
articles, if I have your permission.
Senator Smith. We want you to come back after you have addressed
yourself to answer the question whether or not they did not concur in
the final conclusion regardless of what prompted them to do that. If
the Daily Worker and if Mr. Vincent did not finally have the same
reaction, that amounted to a concurrence, I mean.
Mr. Alsop. I think it can be shown they did not.
As to these articles, I think the first thing to remember they are
articles written after the fact.
The second thing, when the Communists were, much to their surprise
I am confident, confronted with this rather shattering fait accompli
of the loss of their greatest asset in China, namely. General Stilwell,
the question was : How were they going to respond to their loss ?
There are many other Daily Worker articles from which I quoted
which show they placed the highest value on General Stilwell at the
time even after he was actually dismissed and ceased to be of any
value to them.
One of them, for the information of the Senator here, described him
specifically as "our favorite general."
I submit first that this indicates what the party line probably was
at the time when Mr. Vincent concurred in the recommendation for
this dismissal of General Stilwell, which was some months earlier.
An active member of the Communist Party you can't feel somehow
would have gone to work and helped to arrange a Vice Presidential
recommendation for the dismissal of our favorite general.
In the second place, there is the problem of the nature of a Com-
munist reaction to an event after they are confronted with the fait
accompli.
On this point I have consulted Dr. Franz Borkenau, who is, with-
out any question, the greatest world authority on the International
Communist Party. If I am not incorrect. Dr. Borkenau was not only
a member of the inner group of the Politburo of the German Party,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1465
he was also an official of the Comintern itself and in short, one of the
really eminent figures in the Communist movement.
I believe on the whole that from the standpoint of the Communist
Party organization he was the most eminent single Communist wlio
has ever deserted. He has since occupied himslf with writing the
history of the world Communist Party.
When this point of the Daily Worker was raised here yesterday by
Mr. Morris in Mr. Wallace's testimony, I called up Dr. Borkenau,
who is now living a studious and retired life here in Washington, and
asked him about this matter. He said a great deal of documentxition
could be provided if need be and when the libraries were open, on the
way that the Communists handle a fait accompli, but that he could
give me just off the top of his head one example from the period under
discussion, namely, November 1944.
At that time there was a great crisis in France and Belgium. The
French and Belgian Communist Parties simultaneously threatened
on November 2, 1044, an armed i-ising if the Governments decrees, the
French and Belgian Governments, ordering disbandment of the Com-
munist militias that were then operating in France and Belgium were
carried through.
In Belgium the issue was so acute that the British troops actually
had to shoot armed Communist demonstrators carrying before them
women and children as a screen.
Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons commented that there
was no doubt that the Communist attempt to capture power had been
put down.
When the rising had been defeated, the Communist ministers who
had previously resigned from the cabinets in France and Belgium, and
had declared they would never return unless this project for disband-
ing the Communist militias was abandoned quietly walked back into
the cabinets with their hats in their hands and said, "Well, now let's
forget about the whole business."
That was what happened in France. I am not so sure about
Belgium.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How are you so sure about France ?
]Mr. Alsop. I have Dr. Borkenau 's information on it.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Did b.e tell you about the "hats in their hands"?
Mr. Alsop. If you wish me to document the story, I can do so in a
most extensive manner.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am ondeavoring to find out what efforts you made
to document. ViHiere did you get the stuff about "hats in hands"?
Mr. Alsop. You will recognize that was a figurative expression.
Mr. SouEwiNE. Yes. I do so recognize, but you were giving it as
testimony as to the matter of historical fact.
Mr. Alsop. I had assumed from your question that you had not
recognized it as a figurative expression. I should have thought any-
one would have.
They came back into the cabinet and were very glad to come back
into the cabinet.
Mr. SouRwiNE. How did you know that ?
Mr. Alsop. Because they said so.
Mr. SouRwiNE. To whom did they say it?
Mr. Alsop. Let's not dispute this matter. If you want any further
documentation, I can go to the Congressional Library and submit to
the committee the most extensive extract files of L'Humanite.
1466 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouKwiNE. This is the testimony to which you are testifying
under oath and it is not impertinent to ask you how you know about
it. It is obviously hearsay from Dr. Borkenau, but you have not stated
he told you that somebody told him.
Senator Smith. I think we had better limit the testimony or have
this gentleman come here and testify under oath on that particular
phase of it, since he is convenient to the committee in Washington.
Mr. Alsop. I am reluctant to drag him before you.
Senator Smith. I think he is making statements. They are state-
ments upon which we are supposed to base some credence and he ought
to come before the committee so that we might do what Mr. Sourwine
suggests.
One of the privileges is always to have cross-examination of a
witness who makes a statement. That is the only way you can get
at the final truth.
Mr. Alsop. May I withdraw Dr. Borkenau as my witness and offer
to substantiate any testimony in full from the files of the French
Communist newspaper, L'Humanite, which occupied toward the
French Communist Party the same relationship as the Daily Worker
does here.
Dr. Borkenau is not a young man. He is a studious man. He is
in no sense in public life. The whole story is told in the files of
L'Humanite.
Senator Watkins. You have copies ?
Mr. Alsop. They are in the Congressional Library.
Mr, Morris. The question before the committee is : Did the Daily
Worker concur in the dismissal of General Stillwell?
Mr. Alsop. If Mr. Morris will excuse me, the chairman has given
me permission to address myself to the problem of these Daily Worker
articles. I am trying to show the chairman what the Communists
do when they are confronted with a fait accompli.
An armed lising was attempted. The Communist ministers left
the cabinet. Their troops were involved. The rising was put down.
This is the Daily Worker's comment on the final result on November 4.
The whole thing happened very briefly. Communists were most
critical of the Government fearing that the achievements of the exist-
ence would be undermined if the old Vichy police were permitted to
take over the
Senator Smith. That is in France ?
Mr. Alsop. Our Daily Worker. Yes, what the Daily Worker is
to America, L'Humanite is in France.
Senator Smith. We have enough in China now.
Mr. Alsop. I am trying to say, sir, here you have Mr. Morris
bringing into the record articles which shovr Communist treatment of
a political fait accompli which they could not get over, around or
under.
I am trying to give you a parallel case in which they were again
confronted with the fait accompli, and which they responded to by
accepting it.
Senator Smith. This is a simple question, it seems to me, to answer.
Mr. Morris has asked you in effect, one, that the Daily Worker had
approved of the recall, or reacted favorablv to the recall of General
Stilwell.
Mr. Morris. That is right.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1467
Senator Smith. Two, that Mr. John Carter Vincent reacted favor-
ably to the recall of General Stilwell.
Is that not true from the evidence before us ?
Mr. Alsop. I do not think it is a true statement of the facts, sir.
In the first place, it is incorrect to say that the Daily Worker reacted
favorably to the recall of General Stilwell. They sought to pass off
the recall of General Stilwell as unimportant while giving clear evi-
dence at the same time by calling him "our favorite general" and in
other ways.
This was an event they greatly regretted.
Senator Smith. Certain people have called other persons "my fa-
vorite candidate for election coming up." They do not mean they
approve of them.
Mr. Alsop. Taken in conjunction with the rest of the evidence con-
cerning General Stilwell's value tothe Communists, I think you can
see why they called him "our favorite general."
Mr. Morris. AVlien you bring up the point about the Communists
considering General Stilwell their favorite general, you understand
that your testimony along those lines coincides exactly with Mr.
Budenz; do you not?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz did not read the Starobin article which
I introduced.
Mr. Morris. There is no question of what Budenz' thinking was in
regard to the favorite general of the Communists?
Mr. Alsop. My position on this is very simple. In the first place,
I think it is perfectly irrelevant what the Daily Worker said about
Stilwell's recall after he was recalled. The time Mr. Vincent con-
curred and joined in a recommendation for Stilwell's recall was in
June 1944. At that time Stilwell was an invaluable asset to the Com-
munists. I cannot believe that a Communist would have joined and
concurred in the recommendation for his recall.
Wlien the Communists were confronted with the fait accompli of his
recall, they produced a rather mixed reaction, as they frequently do,
and as Henry Luce says, "They got caught with their party line
down."
After about a month they shook down in the direction of passing it
off and said they hoped the Stilwell policies would be continued ?
Senator Watkins. Could they not have been rejoicing that General
Chennault was not chosen ?
Mr. Alsop. I have already testified that Mr. Wallace and Mr. Vin-
cent wanted to nominate General Chennault and I prevented them
from doing so.
Senator Watkins. Could not the Daily Worker have been happy
that Chennault was not chosen ?
INIr. Alsop. That doesn't appear in the Daily Worker.
Senator Watkins. All their motives possibly do not appear in the
article.
Senator Smith. You say Mr. Vincent approved of the recall of
General Stilwell?
Mr. Alsop. I say he concurred; joined and concurred in a recom-
mendation for it.
Senator Smith. I assume he approved.
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
1468 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Smith. Without a play on precisely the words. The Daily
Worker articles had been read, some of them. Not saying whether I
believe them, but some of the Daily Worker articles also approved of
Stilwell's recall if they were writing the truth there that they felt
that way.
Mr. Alsop. May I say I do not consider this is an accurate version
of the Daily Worker's reaction if you take all the Daily Worker
articles that were published together, put them down side by side.
Senator Smith. The point is, did not some of their articles approve
of Stilwell's recall ? Those that were read here?
Mr. Alsop. I cannot say that I agree with that, Mr. Chairman, be-
cause I do not.
Senator Watkins. Will not the record show whether they did or
did not, without having this witness trying to throw light one way or
the other?
Senator Smith. I think so.
Mr. Alsop. Since so much has been made of these articles, I would
like to have introduced into the record the other articles such as that
by Starobin, in which Stilwell is described as "our favorite general,"
and that Mr. Budenz rather conspicuously did not bring forward.
Senator Smith. That is sometliing you thought of he did not.
Mr. Alsop. I have them marked here.
Senator Watkins. Do we have the Daily Worker articles in the
record to which Mr. Alsop has been referring !■
Mr. Alsop. You have the Daily Worker articles in the record in
which it is contended — in my opinion, they do not — they sustain the
case of Mr. Budenz.
You do not have those which take an opposite line.
Senator Watkins. Do we have the articles that seem to be some-
what of a reaction one way or the other to the recall of General
Stilwell?
Mr. Alsop. You only have some of them.
Senator Watkins. I am asking the clerk. I do not think you prob-
ably know whether they do.
Senator Smith. Mr. Morris offered in evidence here in the testi-
mony certain editorials from the Daily Worker in which is the founda-
tion for the question that the reaction of the Daily Worker to General
Stilwell's recall was the same reaction that Mr. John Carter Vincent
had from Stilwell's recall.
Therefore, the idea that the Daily Worker or the Communists, were
glad of General Stilwell's recall. We do have some of those articles
in evidence, as I understand.
Senator Watkins. If there are any more of them that reflect the
attitude of the Daily Worker, as one member of the committee, I think
we ought to have them before us. I think the entire file of the Daily
Worker ought to be here because we can check on anything, then.
Senator Smith. That is right. Anybody that has any editorials
they wish to present, just name Ihem.
Mr. Alsop. I would like to have included in the record — I will
keep only to the relevant ones — the article by Joseph Starobin in
in what is well known to be the most important spot in the Daily
Worker.
Mr. Morris. Of what date ?
Mr. Alsop. November 1, 1944, page 6.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1469
Senator Watkins. What is that spot?
Mr. Alsop. It is the spot under the cartoon. I believe Mr. Budenz
liimself has written this is where the boys look to find out what the
milk of the truth really is.
Senator Watkins. Mr. Budenz has testified that this Daily Worker
is the telegraph line from Moscow to its followers here in the Unit^4
States. All of it is important, I guess.
Mr. Alsop. This is regarded as the most important part.
Mr. Morris Mr. Budenz himself has quoted from Mr. Starobin, so
there is no issue.
Senator Smith. Let him put in whatever he wants.
Mr. Alsop. I would like to have it stated for the record, Mr. Bu-
denz did not quote from Mr. Starobin. There was only one article
he put in. That was the article by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, pub-
lished over a month after General Stilwell's recall.
It was Mr. Morris, the committee counsel, who put in Mr. Starobin's
article.
Senator Watkins. The record will show for itself. It is hardly
necessary to tell what is in, and not.
Mr. Alsop. This is the Starobin article on page 6 of November 1.
Mr. Morris. This is the one that begins :
The sudden withdrawal of Gen. Joseph C. Stilwell from Burma-China has
won outstanding merit.
Mr. Alsop. That is the one that describes him as "our favorite
general."
Mr. Sour WINE. Could that whole article go in ?
Senator Watkins. Let us have them filed for the record.
Senator Smith. We will consider them by reference, so they can
be referred to and if any points come up, we can check.
Mr. Alsop. I would like to have in the record by reference the
selection of extracts from Brooks Atkinson's report on the Stilwell
recall in the New York Times which the Daily Worker republished
on that same day, November 1, on page 8, containing the paragraph :
Now General Stilwell has been forced out of China by the political system
that has been consistently blocking him and America is acquiescing in a system
that is undemocratic in spirit as well as fact and is also unrepresentative of the
Chinese people who are good allies.
Senator Smith. Was not that the view also expressed by many other
Americans that had no connection whatever with the Communists?
Mr. Alsop. Exactly.
Senator Smith. There was a great deal of sympathy for General
Stilwell and a great deal of feeling that it was not wise to replace liim
regardless of Communist or anti-Communist, or what not?
Mr. Alsop. Although it couldn't possibly make up for the recall
of General Stilwell, this was in the ejes of the Communist, a sort of
silver lining to the dark cloud of their loss because they had reason
to hope that pressure would be brought on Chiang Kai-shek because
of the public commitment.
There never could have been as much pressure as General Stilwell
brought.
Mr. Morris. In all fairness, you will want to call attention to Mr.
Joseph Starobin's article where he mentions :
I disagree with Brooks Atkinson of the Times in only one respect —
et cetera.
1470 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. That is the silver lining of the cloud. I call that whis-
tling in the dark.
I would also like to have included the article on the editorial page,
page 8, 1 think, of the issue of November 4, by Mr. Starobin, entitled
"China Regained," in which there is a great deal more praise for Gen-
eral Stilwell. The guest column of that issue, by Frederick Vanderbilt
Field, is on page 9, where Mr. Field speaks of the Stilwell's, the Sun
Fo's, the Madam Sun Yat-sen's, the patriots, who struggle for a na-
tional unity whereby we may fight against and defeat our hated
enemy.
I would like to also have included in the record the article by James
S. Allen on page 4 of the issue of November 5, entitled "The Hand of
GOP Reaction Helps Shape China's Crisis."
Stilwell's recall, writes Mr. Allen, and the crises revealed by it, are
at least in part the work of the most reactionary imperialist anti-
Roosevelt forces within the United States.
As I testified this morning, that is equivalent to saying it is a job
done by murderers in Daily Workerese.
I would like to have included in the record from that same issue of
November 5, 1944, the article by Earl Browder himself on the edi-
torial page, which is page 8.
Mr. Morris. Wliat is the date?
Mr. Alsop. It is called "Dewey Reveals His Foreign Policy," in
which Mr. Browder remarks:
His, Governor Dewey's lieutenants, have openly supported Chiang Kai-shek's
disunity of policy in China which brought about the recall of General Stilwell.
That is by implication a strong indication of displeasure.
I think those are enough to burden the record with. They should
also be enough to show that this final acceptance of the fait accompli
by Frederick V. Field or rather this tentative first article by Starobin,
could not in any way bear out what must have been the Communists
Party line relative to General Stilwell when Mr. Vincent joined and
concurred in recommending the dismissal of this general, who was, in
fact, the most invaluable asset the Communists in China had.
This I would also like to point out occurred 6 months prior to the
publication of these articles and before the fait accompli.
Mr. Morris. Do you have any direct evidence that John Carter Vin-
cent was a member of the Communist Party ?
Mr. Alsop. The chairman and I went over that this morning, Mr.
Morris.
In my opinion, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is against
it, but, obviously, as I cannot read the mind of another man, and I
don't know of any way to prove that a man by documents is not a
member of the Communist Party, I have no such direct evidence.
I would like to ask you : Can you think of any document except a
document over and above the document involving a very powerful
anti-Communist agent, that would disprove an allegation of mem-
bership in the Communist Party?
Mr. Morris. Should I be sworn ?
Senator Smith. No. I do not want to get you to swearing. We
have enough already.
Mr. Alsop. Let me put it to you. You might have a document show-
ing that Mr. Vincent was in the pay of the FBI as an agent to spy
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1471
upon the Communists, and it would be quite possible and anyone
who has any knowledge of intelligence procedures might know this
man was hired by the FBI to spy upon the Communists, but was a
double agent and was really working for the Communists and spy-
ing on the FBI.
It is a familiar intelligence procedure,
Senator Watkins. On this matter of evidence of whether or not
Mr. Vincent was a Communist, it is one of those things we are in-
vestigating as we go along. Whatever evidence there is against them
being a Communist, of course, we ought to receive.
As I understand, Mr. Alsop came here to contradict and impeach
the evidence given by Mr. Budenz. Mr. Budenz, as I understand
from his testimony, was in the inner workings of the American
Politburo or the American Communist Party which was in direct com-
munication with Moscow and under its control.
He testified from the inside this man was considered as a Commu-
nist. That was his evidence ; what he heard. I take it for granted it
would probably be assumed any man trying to represent the American
Government and at the same time being a Communist, was not going
to do a lot of things every day in the year to indicate he was a
Communist.
He was at least going to try to fool them some of the time. That
was one of the possibilities that may enter into the picture.
Senator Smith. Mr. Vincent should come here and challenge Mr.
Budenz's statement and say, " I am not a Communist." That draws
the issue.
One says he is, and one says he is not.
Senator Watkins. Mr. Budenz is only testifying from what was
considered from within the party, that he was one of their men.
No matter what the documents may show or what was said on the
outside, it is still possible he may be still telling the truth.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz' testimony goes further than you say. I
read it specifically.
Mr. MoKRis. Mr. Budenz, was John Carter Vincent a member of the Com-
munist Party?
Mr. Budenz. From oflScial reports that I have received, he was.
Senator Watkins. Within the party it was officially reported to him
he was.
Mr. Alsop. There is another grave aspect of this matter, Senator,
and that is Mr. Kohlberg has stated in a letter to me that Mr. Budenz,
when he so testified before your committee, had ])een made aware by
him, Mr. Kohlberg, that Mr. Vincent and Mr. Wallace had partici-
pated in this profoundly anti-Communist act.
It seems to me that it puts Mr. Budenz in a very peculiar position,
if he came before this committee and testified that Mr. Vincent was a
member of the Communist Party, that he guided Mr. Wallace toward
a Communist objective, at the same time suppressing the knowledge
which Mr. Kohlberg has written me that Mr. Budenz had, that Mr.
Vincent participated in this profoundly anti-Communist act which
was the main result of the Wallace mission.
Senator Watkins. You have a right to your conclusion. He is
testifying as a member of a secret organization that is supposed to
know members of the party.
22848—52 — pt. 5- 15
1472 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Speaking from what was given to liim then, what he heard, and
the official reports you have referred to, he came to the conclusion,
and so testified, that he was one of their members, a member of the
Communist Party. Whatever he did on the outside can be used one
way or the other and should be carefully weighed to determine
whether he was or was not a Communist agent.
The mere fact he did some things that would be contrary to the
Communist line would be some evidence, but it might not be the
controlling evidence in the end that he was anti-Communist because
spies and people who are Avorking that way, of course, will perform
many things to mislead the people with whom they are working.
We take that into consideration in weighing the evidence. It is
not an indication that Mr. Budenz was lying when he said from the
knowledge that he had, from the secret inner workings, the secret
meetings of the Politburo he got that information and he was cured.
I cannot say what you said contradicts what he has told us.
Mr. Alsop. There are certain other points you have to consider.
For example, these are that before Mr. Budenz had learned that Mr.
Wallace and Mr. Vincent had wanted to nominate General Chennault,
he testified before this committee on his second appearance on this
particular matter, that they were pleased with the nomination of Gen-
eral Wedemeyer for the specific reason that it had excluded General
Chennault.
This was proof this was a Communist act.
Senator Watkins. Before you leave this matter of General Wede-
meyer, did you know at the time General Wedemeyer's views on com-
munism and on what ought to be done over there to save the situation
from the Communists ?
Mr. Alsop. I knew General Wedemeyer was a very able and a very
far from pro-Communist officer.
Senator Watkins. Did you know what position he had taken on any
argument he presented ?
Mr. Alsop. I had reason to believe he was very dissatisfied with
General Stilwell's policies.
Senator Watkins. He may have been, but we asked in executive
session — and I think since Mr. Wallace has testified in public session
that I can refer to it — he said he did not know the views of General
Wedemeyer at that time.
Mr. Alsop. I, however, was in China.
Senator Watkins. He said he did not know. It may have been
from the Communist point of view they had someone who would be
fair to them and they were not disturbed.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Vincent, I think, would have known.
Senator Smith. Is Mr. Vincent still living?
Mr. Alsop. I believe he has just returned from Tangiers.
Senator Smith. He knows what he has said.
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Senator Smith. Wliy can he not tell the committee?
Mr. Alsop. I should imagine that would be the best evidence.
Senator Smith. I do not see any need of us fussing about whether
he was or was not a Communist, because we cannot determine that. I
think it is up to Mr. Vincent if he wants to come here to give us testi-
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1473
mony with such corroborating circumstances and documentary evi-
dence as he wislies. "We will certainly investigate it.
I do not see any need of us arguing about whether or not he was
a Communist.
What is the next, Mr. Morris ?
Mr. Morris. Is it not true you have stated in one of your columns
that Mr. Budenz has given untruthful testimony in connection with
John Carter Vincent being a member of the Communist Party, and
you use as a basis of that conclusion the fact that he did not so testify
last year before he came before the Foreign Relations Committee?
Mr. Alsop. I would like to see that column.
That is quite correct, nor did he before that committee.
Senator Smith. Did he say anything that was contrary to what he
said before us, or it was something he did not mention?
Mr. Alsop. It is a very peculiar part of the record I have studied
very carefully. Mr. Budenz was asked by Senator McMahon whether
John Carter Vincent was a member of the Communist Party. He
replied : "This is a serious charge," and that he did not wish to make
it without further consideration.
In other words, he was not at that time sure.
Senator Smith. No; that does not necessarily follow. He might
have been sure, but he might not have felt he should expose him.
Mr. Alsop. He said he was preparing a list of members of the Com-
munist Party.
Toward the end of these hearings Senator Lodge asked him if he
had prepared this list and urged him to present it to the committee.
He said that he was not ready with a list. He subsequently testified
before this committee that he told Mr. Morris privately on the phone
that Mr. Morris was a Reserve officer in the Naval Intelligence and
that, therefore, as one or two removes a part of the security apparatus
of our Government and that Mr. Vincent was a Communist at that
time.
That was not known to me when I wrote my column. I had only
available the public records in which he had been twice publicly asked
to name Mr. Vincent as a Communist, first directly, and, second, in
the form of a request for this list which as far as I know, he has never
yet produced.
Both times he had refused. Therefore, I wrote in my column what
was the literal fact that he had refused to identify Mr. Vincent as a
Communist before the Tydings committee.
Senator Watkins. A better word would have been "hesitated."
Mr. Alsop. He refused, sir.
Senator Smith. I see how a man might know a friend of his, or
somebody he knew, was a Communist, and yet not want to say so. He
might say, "Let somebody else do it." I can see how you donot want
to disclose about someone else unless it falls in line with your duty.
Anyhow, that was the basis of your statement?
Aff. Alsop. Yes.
' Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, at that time on that occasion of Mr.
Budenz's testimony, the committee directed that a letter be sent to the
Wliite House to ask if there was such a report in the intelligence files.
We received this morning a letter dated October 17, 1951, from Mat-
thew J. Connelly, secretary to the President. It reads:
1474 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Dear Senator McCarran : In response to your letter of October 5, 1951, in
which you requested a report concerning Mr. John Carter Vincent, said to have
been filed through the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District,
I wish to inform you that the files of the Navy Department have been checked.
The report to which you refer was dated May 1, 1950.
It then goes on to say I was the reporting officer. Mr. Budenz had
told me and I had made a report. I would like that whole letter in
evidence.
Senator Smith. Let us have the whole letter read.
Mr. Morris (reading) :
It consists solely of the statement that an unidentified Naval Reserve officer
had advised the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District that he
had received information to the effect that Mr. John Carter Vincent was a Com-
munist Party member. The source of the information does not appear, and no
evidence to support this assertion appears in the report.
The Reserve officer in question was subsequently identified on May 22, 1950, by
the District Intelligence Office of the Third Naval District as Lt. Commdr. Rob-
ert Morris, said to be special counsel to the Republican members of the Senate
subcommittee investigating charges of communism in the State Department.
Inasmuch as the Robert Morris who was responsible for this report on Mr.
Vincent appears to be the same Robert Morris who is now counsel to the Senate
subcommittee of which you are chairman, and inasmuch as the report does not
indicate that he revealed the source of his information or provided any evidence
to support it, it is suggested that you may wish to inquire of him as to his source
and the evidence which led him to initiate the report.
Very truly yours,
Matthew J. Connelly,
Secretary to the President.
That is evidence of the fact Mr. Budenz did make the report.
Senator Smith. It is received.
(Document referred to and read in full was marked "Exhibit No.
345," and filed for the record.)
Senator Smith. Is that referring to the incident Mr. Budenz tes-
tified to?
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Budenz is not mentioned, however, in this report.
Senator Smith. Is there anything else?
Mr. Alsop. No, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have some questions, Mr. Chairman, if it is all
right.
I would like to request that unless the witness or his attorney has
reason to believe that any of the questions are unfair or unfairly
phrased, that the witness be instructed to make his answers as respon-
sive as possible, or keep them down to a minimum. They do not al-
ways have to be a yes or no, but we are getting along in time here. I
would like to cover a little bit of area.
Mr. PuRCELL. May I make a statement?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. PuRCELL. I am sure the witness will reply as briefly as possible.
Wlien he is asked to answer yes or no, I am sure he will do that.
You understand yes or no answers do not always tell the whole
letory.
Senator Smith. I can understand how any commentator wants to
comment on something he is asked about. So we will excuse him for
that tendency, but we may have to hold you down to answering the
question.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1475
Mr. Alsop. I am willing to let you be tlie judge, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know, Mr. Alsop, whether Mr. Budenz, in
his official capacity as a Communist, ever had any official papers deal-
ing in any way with the status of John Carter Vincent ?
Mr. Alsop. I do not.
Mr. SouRwiNE. If he ever did have any such papers, did you know
what they contained, or what they might have contained?
Mr. Alsop. Clearly I couldn't possibly know if I don't know he had
any papers. I couldn't know anything about that.
Senator Watkins. The answer would be "No."
Mr. Alsop. I would say he has not produced such papers.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether the Communists fixed or set,
or had any objective for Mr. Wallace in connection with his visit to
Asia?
Mr. Alsop. I assume that the Communist objective was to support
their general program in Asia and Mr. Budenz testified at some length
on the subject. It sounded to me as though his testimony was tailor-
made to support his previous assertions.
Mr. SouRwixE. Do you know, Mr. Alsop, whether the Communist
Party fixed or set, or had any objective for Mr. Wallace in connection
with his trip to Asia ?
Mr. Alsop. I know nothing about the inner workings of the Com-
munist Party of the United States. I was in China at the time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know whether the Communist Party fixed or
had or set any objective for Mr. Wallace's mission to Asia?
Mr. Alsop. I will reply again : I know nothing about the inner
workings of the Communist Party in America in 1944, because I was
in China at the time.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you have an aversion to using the simple Anglo-
Saxon negative ?
(No answer.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. The answer is "No" ; is that not it ?
Mr. Alsop. The answer is what I have given, Mr. Sourwine, and
I would like to have it stand in the record.
Senator Watkins. I think the record will show when he analyzed
what it said, it was "No," but it was around and around.
Mr. Sourwine. It is not a direct answer to the question that was
asked.
Mr. Alsop. I presume if I confine myself to one sentence, that is
adequate.
Mr. Sourwine. If the Communist Party had any objective with
regard to Mr. Wallace's trip, do you know what it was ?
Mr, Alsop. I do not know about the inner workings of the Com-
munist Party, Mr. Sourwine.
Mr. Sourwine. If the Communist Party had any objective with
regard to Mr. Wallace's trip, and you have no knowledge of what such
an objective might be, or whether there was such an objective, can you
say whether such an objective, if there was one, was attained?
Mr. Alsop. Could I have that question read back ?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. These questions are so complex and so apparently ir-
relevant I want to understand them very clearly before I answer.
(The record was thereupon read by the reporter.)
1476 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sourwine has in that question used
the lan^uao;e what such an objective might be.
On that I do have some knowledge.
One of the objectives undoubtedly might have been and in the
greatest possible probability was to sustain General Stilwell who was
working at that time in such a way that if he had not subsequently
been dismissed, I think the record would show beyond doubt that the
Communists would probably have come to power in China before the
end of the war. That is my answer to that question.
Senator Smith. If that had happened, it could not have been any
worse than it is?
Mr. Alsop. I think it could have been substantially worse, because
at that time we were less well prepared for the situation that we find
lourselves in than we are now. I think Indochina^ Burma, and
Malaya would undoubtely have been swept into the vortex, sir.
Mr. Sourwine. You expressed the opinion that that question was
irrelevant. Do you recall liaving told the committee that one of the
three contentions of Mr. Budenz wliich you intended to prove false
was his contention that the AVallace mission attained the objectives
set for it by the Communist Party ?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Sourwine, I shall answer that question "Yes," but
I should like to add something to my answer if the Chairman will
permit.
Senator Smith. All right,
Mr. Alsop. I have attempted to prove before this committee that
nmiess the Communist Party is stark, staring, raving mad, which I
-assume it is not, they could not have possibly wanted anything but
the continuance in command of General Stilwell. He was their
greatest asset in Cliina. The sense of Mr. Budenz' testimony is that
a recommendation for the dismissal of General Stilwell, who was the
greatest Communist asset in China, attained, or, in fact, the actual
language is "Carried out the objective of the Communist Party."
I submit to you that this has some bearing on the assertion that I
have made.
Senator Watkins. We seem to have done very well without Gen-
eral Stilwell.
Mr. Alsop. I would like to say to you, sir, that General Wedemeyer
wlu) replaced General Stilwell, came very close to rescuing the situa-
tion, came very close to it.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Chairman, can I bring this back for just a
moment, with the permission of the witness ?
Senator Smith. All right.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Alsop, if you have no knowledge of any Com-
munist objective, if there was one, how can you testify that Mr.
Budenz swore falsely when he said there Avas an objective and that it
was attained ?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Sourwine, if you will examine the record, I think
you will find that I have repeatedly testilied I had no knowledge of the
objectives of the Communist Party in the United States. I had very
considerable knowledge, if I may say I had in some measure expert
knowledge of the objectives of the Communist Party in China, which
was the area to which Mr. Vincent's action related. I have as evidence
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1477
of this knowledge this letter of General Weclemeyer which I offered
for the record tliis morning, in which he states :
I felt that you understood perhaps better than any other Amerif^nn ju China
theator at that time the full implications of the Communist movement.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Mr. Chairman, is that letter evidence of what Gen-
eral Wedemeyer thought of Mr. Alsop?
I have no (iesire, and I am sure this committee has no desire, to
demean Mr. Al sop's knowledge on any subject.
I submit further that the witness' statement just now points up what
I said before tJiat his repetition of the statement that he knew nothing
about Comnuuiist objectives was not an answer to the particular ques-
tion which I asked, That is, because he is now qualifying in effect that
previous answer.
Mr. Alsop. I said, to quote myself, and I dislike having to do so
all this time, I knew nothing about the inner workings of the Comnm-
nist Party in the United States. I specifically wanted to put it that
way in order to give you an accurate answer to your question.
I knew very well the Communist objectives in China. In the inter-
national Communist movement, if it operates the way it is supposed to
operate, the Communist Party in the United States accepted the Com-
munist Party objectives in China and worked to further them.
As to that I cannot testify from personal knowledge. That is pre-
cisely why I so phrased my answer in the way you objected.
Senator Smith. Mr. Sourwine is askmg the question : How can you
testify to what Mr. Budenz said on that point if you had no knowledge ?
Is that not what you said?
Mr. SouitwiNE. That is the substance.
Mr. Alsop. Let me say I had a different kind of knowledge frora
what Mr. Sourwine specified, so I could not reply I had no knowledge.
I k]iew Communist objectives in China. I do not know the inner
workings of the American Communist Party. I assume it shared and
tended to promote the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party,
wliich were well known.
Senator Watkins. What you are giving is opinion evidence. That
is your judgment?
Mr. Alsof. No.
Senator Watkins. You do not pretend you were in the confidence
of the Communist regime in Moscow ?
Mr. Alsop. There were Communist representatives at Chungking.
Senator Watkins. Do you think they would tell you their exact
objectives?
Mr. Alsop. They were very frank about their objectives.
Senator Watkins. You think they could be believed ?
Mr. Alsop. As their objectives were to get American arms and to
force the Generalissimo into an unequal coalition with them, at least
you could believe they wanted to go that far.
Senator Watkins. I am talking about the long-range objectives.
Mr. Alsop. It was very clear to me that what they wanted to do was
to take power which they have now done.
Senator Watkins. It seems to me from what you have said it is
largely opinion evidence based on what you have read and seen and
heard.
1478 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
I mean the same kind of evidence you have been condemning in Mr.
Budenz,
Mr. Alsop. No, sir ; it is not opinion evidence. I saw Madam Sun
Yat-sen not so very long after General Stilwell had been dismissed.
She was, I suppose, a Communist agent in Chungking since she is now
a member of the executive committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
Senator Smith. She is a sister of Madam Chiang Kai-shek ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Senator Smith. They are working both sides of the street.
Mr. Alsop. They were on all three sides of the street.
Senator Watkins. That is the first time I knew a street had three
sides.
Mr. Alsop. Madam Sun Yat-sen lamented in the most vivid and
clearest language the loss of General Stilwell which she said would be
irreparable and specifically stated that all the projects that were being
matured under General Stilwell's regime would probably not go
through now that this change in command occurred.
Senator Smith. Let us get back to the question Mr. Sourwine asked
you, which was, in substance, as I recall, how can you say Mr. Budenz
had not correctly stated the aims or objectives of the Communist
Party, or whatever it was he was mentioning at the time, if you did
not have some knowledge ?
If you had no knowledge, how can you deny what he said ?
Mr. Alsop. I have been trying to suggest I had a different kind of
knowledge which also bore very directly on the question.
Senator Smith. I do not quite understand that answer.
Senator Watkins. It seems to me the questions and answers are
largely argumentative and matters of opinion. The committee will
have to decide on whatever facts we can get.
Mr. Sourwine. I am attempting to limit the questions to questions
which are not argumentative and questions which are those of fact.
If I can proceed with a few questions and have the witness answer
them briefly and succinctly, I believe I will be through.
I am not intending to argue.
I will go back to the beginning, if I may.
Do you recall having stated that one of the three points that you
intended to disprove in Mr. Budenz' testimony was that the Wallace
mission obtained the objective set forth by the Communist Party?
Mr. Alsop. I would like to have my testimony read on that point.
I don't think I phrased it just that way. I believe I said that it was
inconceivable that — well, I will accept that statement. All right, go
on. I think it is a slightly incorrect phrasing of what I did say.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you know whether the American Politburo ever
discussed or planned any objective for the Wallace mission for the
possibility of controlling or influencing the Wallace mission in any
way?
Mr. Alsop. I have no knowledge of the workings of the American
Politburo.
Mr. Sourwine. Is that a satisfactory answer to the committee ?
Senator Watkins. If that is the truth, that is a satisfactory answer.
Senator Smith. Is that not equivalent to "no" ?
Mr. Sourwine. Is it, Mr. Alsop ?
Mr. Alsop. I want it specified in the record I am talking about the
American Politburo.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1479
Senator Watkins. That is what the question is about.
Mr. SouRWiNE. On that point, Mr. Alsop, have you any fact not
already cited by you which you want to advance to the committee in
contravention to what Mr. Budenz said with respect to that particular
point ?
Senator Smith. Will you read that question back, please?
(The question was read back by the reporter.)
Mr. Alsop. May I inquire which point you are talking about?
Mr. SouRwiNE. Specifically the point that the Wallace mission ob-
tained the objective set forth by the Communist Party.
Mr. Alsop. No ; I have no further evidence on that.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall this morning, sir, stating that one of
the three points you intended to disprove was the assertion by Mr.
Budenz that this was — that is referring to the first point — because
the Wallace mission had been guided by John Carter Vincent and
Owen Lattimore?
Mr. Alsop. I don't understand your question. You will have to
read it back.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you recall that this morning you cited as one
of the three points of ^r. Budenz testimony which you would dem-
onstrate as false the statement that the Wallace mission attained its
objective, the objective set forth by the Communist Pary, because Mr.
Wallace was guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore?
Mr. Alsop, This question is so confusing I would like to reply
by suggesting that whatever I said this morning be just read back
into the record. I still do not understand the question. I don't
want to seem contentious.
Senator Smith. Let us have it again or have it read back.
(The question was read back by the reporter.)
Mr. SouRwiNE. I am content that the record should stand on that.
I do not mean to be contentious.
Mr. Alsop. I will attempt to answer the question.
Mr. SouRwiNE. I have a memory that you made three points this
morning in this order : You said that Mr. Budenz had testified falsely
in at least three regards, and you were going to demonstrate the false-
ness thereof — you named them — (1) that the Wallace mission attained
the objective set forth by the Communist Party; (2) because Mr.
Wallace had been guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Latti-
more; and, (3) that John Carter Vincent was a member of the
Communist Party.
Mr. Alsop. Let me correct you, Mr. Sourwine. What I testified to
this morning was that Mr. Budenz had said the Wallace mission had
carried out a Communist objective. I commented on that, that it
did precisely the contrary.
Mr. Sourwine. You mean what you are challenging is Mr. Budenz'
statement that the AVallace mission attained a Communist objective?
Mr. Ai^op. Exactly.
Mr. Sourwine, You say that that is false testimony because the
Wallace mission did not obtain a Communist objective?
Mr, Alsop. It did precisely the contrary.
Mr. Sourwine. Because it did not obtain a Communist objective?
Mr. Alsop. I repeat my previous testimony, it did precisely the
contrary.
Senator Watkins. It is the same thing.
1480 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. It is conceivable that the Wallace mission could
have obtained both Communist and non-Communist objectives in
different matters. The witness has pinned that point down to the
precise point which he wishes to argue, namely, that Mr. Budenz
was wrong when he said the Wallace mission obtained an objective
set forth by the Communist Party.
Therefore, the reverse is that he did not obtain any objective set
forth by the Communist Party.
Mr. Alsop. I believe that to be true, sir.
Mr. SouBwiNE. That is all I wanted.
Now the second point which we were discussing before was whether
you took issue with Mr. Budenz in his statement that Mr. Wallace
was guided by John Carter Vincent and Owen Lattimore.
Mr. Alsop, Toward the Communist objective.
Mr. SoTJRWiNE. Yes.
Mr. Alsop. I did not testify about Mr. Lattimore. I should like to
have that appear in the record.
In the second place, I said Mr. Vincent did not guide Mr. Wallace
toward the Communist objective. Again, he did precisely the contrary.
Mr. SoTJEWiNE. The third point of yours was that Mr. Budenz had
testified falsely when he said John Carter Vincent was a member of
the Communist Party.
Mr. Alsop. As to that, I said the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence was against it in view of the fact that Mr. Vincent joined and
concurred in striking the heaviest blow that could be struck the Com-
munist cause in China at that time.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Have you, Mr. Alsop, any additional facts beyond
those already testified to by you which you want to tell the committee
bearing on the question of Mr. Budenz' veracity in either of the last
two points ?
Mr. Alsop. I don't think it is necessary to add anything to the testi-
mony I have given already, Mr. Sourwine.
Senator Watkins. Why not make it broader and ask does he know
any other facts ? You ask, does he want to tell ? He may have some
he does not want to tell. I would like to make it broad enough to
cover anything he knows.
Mr. Alsop. Don't put the question in that form because I spent 4
years in China.
Mr. SouEwiNE. He has an encyclopedic knowledge.
Senator Watkins. I want to get at the truth.
Mr. Alsop. I was constantly in touch with tlie whole situation that
involved almost the history of the Chinese situation.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Alsop, during Mr. Wallace's testimony you may
remember that he testified with respect to your desire that he should
print the Kunming cables and suggested that we ask you about tliat
when you came on the stand, and with the record in that state I think
we should ask you : Is it true that you recommended to Mr. Wallace
on several occasions that he release the full text of or print the
Kunming cables ?
Mr. Alsop. I recommended to him on two occasions, Mr. Sourwine,
first when Mr. Kohlberg wrote him in August 1950 asking for the text
of the Kunming cables. On that occasion Mr. Wallace did not follow
mv advice.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1481
The second occasion was after Senator Lehman made something of
an issue of this matter in the Senate. I believe it was the Washington
Times-Herald sent Mr. Wallace a telegram of inquiry. Mr. Wallace
telephoned me and told me that he had this telegram of inquiry and
said he was considering putting out a statement giving the whole story
and that there were certain points, as he testified, relative to the
complex affairs of China that he was doubtful about.
I said, after all, since my columns had gotten him into this trouble,
I would go up to New York and talk to him. It seemed to be the
least I could do.
From there on it went on as Mr. Wallace testified except I did
urge him, of course, to get the whole story on the public record.
I thought it very proper that it should be.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I tliink you testified in executive session, and I
wish you would repeat in substance now, with regard to typing a text
out in a hotel room.
Mr. Alsop. It was the story that Mr. Wallace told yesterday. We
met in iny room at the Carlton House, and first of all discussed these
points that Mr. Wallace wanted cleared up, and he gave me an idea
of the sort of statement he wanted to make. I always travel with a
typewriter, being a newspaperman — in fact, I had just finished writing
a column when he turned up — and he wanted to get the thing written
there and then, so I sat down at the typewriter.
I don't like to use the word "dictate" because, as I told you, I can't
take dictation on the typewriter. He said what he wanted to say.
Broadly the language was his. Inevitably some of the connective
tissue was mine.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it correct at that time what he was dictating
generally and what you were putting down specifically was for the
purpose of a press release rather than transmittal to the White House ?
Mr. Alsop. As far as I can understand, testifying from my own
knowledge, I was not clear how he intended to use this statement of
the facts. I urged him to mal<:e it a press release.
Mr. SouEWiNE. What was Mr. John Carter Vincent's position at
the time he was designated by Secretary Hull to accompany Mr. Wal-
lace on the Asian trip ?
Mr. Alsop. I can't testify to that on direct knowledge, but I believe
he was Chief of the China Division, or whatever they called it at that
time, of the State Department.
Mr. SoTJRwiNE. Do you know the reason why he was designated by
the State Department to accompany Mr. Wallace?
Mr. Alsop. I don't know of direct knowledge. He would be the
obvious man to choose.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you think it is a fair assumption he was there
for the purpose of giving Mr. Wallace the best advice that he could
when Mr. Wallace asked for it and to give Mr. Wallace the benefit
of his knowledge and information with respect to China and Chinese
affairs ?
Mr. Alsop. I assume so : yes.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Do you know whether he did give Mr. Wallace such
advice?
Mr. Alsop. I can't testify to that except to the one occasion that I
observed.
1482 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouBwiNE. You were together a good deal, were you not, the
three of you ?
Mr. Alsop. We were together, Mr. Sour wine, but you know what a
VIP program is like, and if you had seen Mr. Wallace's tendency
toward violent exercise, you would know that the VIP program was
rather crowded.
Mr. SouEWiNE. I want to be sure I understand you.
Mr. Alsop. We were together, but there was ahnost always someone
else there.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Is it your testimony that excepting one instance you
did not during the time you were together see or hear Mr. Vincent give
Mr. Wallace any advice ?
Mr. Alsop. I would say I am not at all sure that Mr. Vincent was
not present when Mr. Wallace consulted me or rather asked my opinion
— I think would be a more accurate way to put it — as to the political
situation in China.
Mr. SouRwiNE. You say you are not sure he was not present ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes ; he probably was present. I can't say positively be-
cause my recollection is not exact. If he was present, I am sure he
joined in that conversation, but I have no recollection of it.
I will say this, though, Mr. Sourwine, he had no serious opportunity
to oifer Mr. Wallace advice exce])t for this very long time when we
were together at General Chennault's house.
Mr. Sourwine. When he did offer Mr. Wallace advice did Mr. Wal-
lace listen to him ?
Mr. Alsop. Very much because we were all there in the discussion
together.
Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Wallace gave him the respect you would expect
to be given under circumstances of that kind ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Mr. Sourwine. Do you think that the circumstances were such that
Mr. Vincent would have been expected to express his disapproval of
anything Mr. Wallace proposed, if he did in fact disapprove ?
Mr. Alsop. I very much fear that he would express his disapproval,
as I testified this morning, Mr. Sourwine, not because he was in any
way in disagreement with the desirability of getting rid of General
Stilwell but because he thought it might have been out of line or im-
proper for Mr. Wallace to take this rather drastic step and involve
him in responsibility for a reconmiendation which was impinging on
the military and might get the State Department in a row with the
War Department.
You know all those considerations that inevitably weigh on any
official's mind. He was not, however, moved by those considerations,
I am happy to say.
Mr. Sourwine. Can you tell us, Mr. Alsop, what part, if any, you
had in preparing Mr. Wallace's statement or statements before this
committee? Was your advice sought in regard to those, the press
release?
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Wallace saw me when he came down here, and we
talked. I couldn't say specifically that my advice was sought with
regard to the press release. We talked about the story that the press
release covered, as we had done before.
Mr. Sourwine. Did you talk about the advisability of issuing it?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1483
Mr. Alsop. I urged him to get the whole story on the record ; yes,
sir.
Mr. SouRWiNE. On the day that Mr. Wallace testified in executive
session, did you see him subsequent to his testimony ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, I did. Mr. Ball, his lawyer, said he had done a
good job, so I congratulated him.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And before he had issued his release ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes ; I did.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Was the release again the subject of discussion be-
tween you at that time 'i
Mr. Alsop. It was the subject of discussion between Mr. Ball and
Mr. Wallace.
Mr. SouRWiNE. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Alsop, do you know whether Henry Wallace visited
Madam Sun Yat-sen ?
Mr. Alsop. I believe he did. It appears in one of his cables, I think,
or some way or other.
Mr. Morris. Do you know how much time he spent with Madam
Sun Yat-sen?
Mr. Alsop. I don't know.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Madam Sun Yat-sen said any-
thing to influence him ?
Mr. Alsop. I couldn't possibly testify. I think all that appears in
the record is that she was a woman of great charm, which indeed she
was, I can assure you. She was much the more attractive of the three
sisters.
Mr. Morris. Apart from her political views ?
Mr. Alsop. Apart from her political views, which were not as
clearly apparent to the uninformed eye in those days as they are now.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Alsop, do you know whether John P. Davies con-
curred in the recommendation of Stilwell's removal?
Mr. Alsop. He knew nothing about it as far as I know, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Mr. John S. Service concurred
in the recommendations ?
Mr. Alsop. He couldn't have known anything about it because
he wasn't in Kunming.
Mr. Morris. Do you know whether Raymond Ludden concurred
in the recommendations ?
Mr. Alsop. I have no idea. I didn't discuss it with him.
Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce in the record
at this time, because of its relevancy, an article by Mao Tse-tuno- en-
titled "China Needs Democracy and Unity." The date of this is
January 1945, but it was written by Mao Tse-tung on June 12, 1944,
and it appears in Political Affairs, of January 1945.
I introduce it in the record to set forth the official Communist Party
view at that time with respect to the issue discussed today. It bears,
on the question that the Communist Party policy at that time con-
centrated on unity.
I would like to have it in the record at this time.
Mr. Alsop. Certainly I would like to put something further in the
record, Mr. Chairman, as a comment on this article.
Senator Smith. Have you identified just what part you want to go
in, Mr. Morris? Let us get that straight.
1484 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Morris. Mr. Chairman, it is only 2% pages. I would like the
whole thing to go in the record.
Senator Smith. All right.
(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 346" and is as
follows:)
Exhibit No. 346
[From Tolitical Affairs, January 1945 — reprinted from People's War, Bombay, August
20, 1944]
China Needs Democbacy and Unitt
(By Mao Tse-tung)
We publish here an important interview given on June 12 by Mao Tse-tung,
chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, to Chinese and foreign correspondents
visiting Yenan, the capital of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region. In
view of recent developments in China, it has special world significance, throw-
ing further light on the position of the Chinese Communist Party and on the
needed policies for effecting China's unity and liberation.
"I heartily welcome you all coming to Yenan. Our war aim is the same
as ever, and the same as that of the entire people of the world— to defeat
Japanese militarism, to defeat the Fascists. The whole of China, as the whole of
the world, is united on this issue.
"Your visit to Yenan coincides with the opening of the second front in Europe.
This is an historic moment for the whole world, because the second front will
have profound influence not only upon Europe but upon the Pacific and Chinese
theaters of war as well. China together with the rest of the world is anxious to
go forward, to achieve the final victory.
"All the anti-Japanese forces in China must now concentrate their entire efforts
on fighting the Japanese militarists side by side with this decisive offensive in
Europe. The present offers a great opportunity to us.
"You must all be very anxious to learn about the internal situation in China.
Here I shall speak a few words : the attitude of the Chinese Communist Party
toward Kuomintang-Communist relations has been defined over and over again
in the declarations and manifestoes of the Chinese Communist Party and its
•organs. I shall repeat them here again :
"The Chinese Communist Party has never wavered from its policy of sup- .
porting Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the policy of continuing the coopera-
tion between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the entire people,
and the policy of defeating Japanese imperialism and struggle for the build-
ing of free democratic China. This was true in the first stages of resistance.
This was true in the second stage of the war. This is also true today, because
this is and has always been the wish of the entire Chinese people.
"But China has draw-backs and they are serious ones. They can be summed
up in one phrase — the. lack of democracy. The Chinese people are badly in
need of democracy, because through democracy alone can the anti-Japanese war
gain strength, China's internal and external relations be put on a proper basis,
the victory of the war of resistance insured and the country be built upon sound
foundations. It is democracy too that can insure China's postwar unity."
Questioned by the correspondents, Mao announced that the negotiations be-
tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party have been going on
for a long time and he hoped that there would be fruitful results out of the
negotiations. He could add nothing new for the present.
As for the second front, he added :
"In future it will be seen that the repercussions of the second front are felt
in the Pacific as well. Apparently at the moment it might seem that its effects
on China are not direct. But China's problems have to be settled by the Chinese
themselves. The improvement of the situation outside by itself cannot solve
China's own problems.
"In order to defeat the common enemy, to achieve sound and peaceful inter-
nal relations and also sound and peaceful international relations, we hope that
the National Covcrnraent and the Kuomintang and other parties will carry out
a thoroughly democratic policy in different spheres. The whole world is in the
midst of the war. The war in Europe has entered a decisive phase, while de-
cisive battles are also approaching in the Far East.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1485
"But China is still in need of more democracy, which is necessary to further
the anti-Japanese war. Only through democracy can our resistance be strength-
ened. This has been proved by the experience of the U. S. S. R., U. S. A., and
Great Britain. The experiences in the past and particularly of the last 7 years
of resistance have also proved it.
"Democracy must be all-sided— political, military, economic and cultural, as
also in party affairs and internationally. All these spheres must be democra-
tized and everything must be unified. But this unity must be based on demo-
cratic foundations.
"Political unification is necessary, but only on the basis of freedom of press,
platform and organization. Only a government based on democratic franchise
can strengthen the political unification of the country.
"No doubt, unity in the military sphere is more necessary, but even this could
be achieved only on democratic principles. If there is no democratic life inside
the army, democratic relations between the oflBcers and men, between soldiers
and the people, and also between the different armies, then such armies cannot
be unified.
"As to economic democracy, what is meant is the introduction of an economic
system which is not based on restriction of production and lack of provision for
consumption by the vast mass of the people; but one which will give impetus
to further production and insure proper distribution and uniform consumption.
"And only democracy can promote the development of education, thought, the
press and the arts. This is cultural democracy.
"Party democracy means that there should be democratic relations inside the
party and among the different parties.
"I repeat that we are today badly in need of unity, but only the unity that is
based on democracy can be real and abiding. It is true for China's internal
problems, but it is equally true for the coming League of Nations. Only by dem-
ocratic unification can fascism be uprooted and a new China and a new world
be established. That is why we stand for the Atlantic Charter, and the dec-
larations of the Moscow, Cairo, and Tehran Conferences. And these are what
we expect of the National Government, the Kuomintang and other parties ana
other people's orcanizations.
"These aims are what the Chinese Communist Party itself is striving to
achieve. In our efforts to defeat the Japanese imperialists, we, the Chinese Com-
munists, have introduced a new spirit of democratic centralism in all our work.
"It is on this basis that we can build a new China, defeat our enemies and build
in the future sound and peaceful internal and external relations."
Mr. Alsop. Mr. Chairman, glancing briefly at this article, it relates
to an address of -welcome to the American liaison group going to
Yenan, which was the Communist capital. The testimony is already
in the record that Mr. Wallace was requested to establish this liaison
group by General Stil well's headquarters.
As an instance of the Communist view of General Stilwell at that
time in China, I may tell you that one of the very first results of
this liaison mission was a formal offer by Mao Tse-tung and other
Communist leaders to place their Communist armies under the per-
sonal command of General Stilwell.
T think that that is a necessary commentary on that article and in-
dicates very clearly that the dismissal of General Stilwell can hardly
have been in accord with any Communist objectives.
Senator Smith. You had seen this before, had you?
Mr. Alsop. I had read that article in Political Affairs.
Mr. Morris. I would like to say that my introduction of this in the
record was completely apart from the remarks made by Mr. Alsop.
Senator Smith. I think we understood. You wanted to put this
in, and he had something to say about it.
Mr. Alsop. I think it is a necessary commentary on the article.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Mr. Alsop, do you see any difference between testi-
fying you do not believe a man and testifying he is a liar?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, I see a considerable difference, Mr. Sourwine.
1486 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. SouRWiNE. With regard to Mr. Budenz, have you been attempt-
ing to testify you did not believe him or to testify that he is a liar?
Mr. Alsop. I am attempting to testify that he is guilty of untruth,
the language I wrote to the committee, and in the letter I wrote to
the chairman I called him a liar. I think he was.
Mr. SouRWiNE. Not because you disbelieve him but on the basis of
facts you brought to the committee ?
Mr. Alsop. The overwhelming evidence before the committee indi-
cates he lied on this occasion.
Senator Smith. Mr. Alsop, there are two or three questions I should
like to ask you.
Now if there are any Communists in America, you agree, do you
not, that they should be tracked down and exposed ?
Mr. Alsop. I do, fully. Senator.
Senator Smith. Now do you have any doubt in your mind that
there are at least some Communists in the country ?
Mr. Alsop. I have none at all, Senator.
Senator Smith. You have no doubt about it ?
Mr. Alsop. None at all.
Senator Smith. I believe Mr. Hoover said there are some 50,000
or more that he mentioned.
Mr. Alsop. Something on that order, I recall.
Senator Smith. Now do you think they should be ferreted out by
some Government agency, if possible ?
Mr. Alsop. I agree with you completely. Senator.
Senator Smith. Do you think that Congress as one arm of the
Government should make efforts to do that ?
Mr. Alsop. Senator, we are getting now into a question of my view
about proper
Senator Smith. This is very simple.
Mr. Alsop. I believe that Congress as one arm of the Government
should promote efforts to do that, but I doubt very much whether a
legislative body is well fitted, in view of the enormous burden placed
on the time of the Members by the business of legislation, to ferret
into a question so complex and so difficult as to the kind of questions
we have been discussing here.
Senator Smith. How would you do it if the legislative body did
not do it?
Mr. Alsop. I think I would possibly pass legislation either creating
an agency of a semijudicial nature or with some kind of semijudicial
adjunct that would be charged with doing it, or you could put it under
the FBI or in some other waj^, make it an expert task.
I don't mean to say for a moment that I impugn the motives of
this committee or the land of efforts that are being made. I just think
the other procedure is a better one.
Senator Smith. That would require activity by the legislative
branch of the Government?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Senator Smith. One way or another it has to be done by the
legislative branch ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Senator Smith. How do you approve of the system which we have
attempted to use here, of conducting executive sessions where we think
that an individual's name may be mentioned for the first time in con-
institute' OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1487
nection with some possible Communist activities in order that his
name may be protected unless there is real evidence?
Mr. Alsop. Senator, in that connection I want to make two con-
fessions, not just one.
First, I thought that the system was wrong until I experienced it.
In the second place, and this relates to something that Senator
McCarran said this morning, I also thought when I wrote my first
columns that the committee itself had had some part in encouraging-
Mr. Budenz to give what seemed to me demonstrably false testimony.
I would like now to say for the record that after seeing Mr. Budenz
in his second appearance on the stand, I think it was Mr. Budenz
that misled the committee and not the committee that encouraged
Mr. Budenz. I consider that Mr. Budenz is the only man who has
been in any way at fault in this matter.
Senator Smith. Now, you realize in that connection this committee
or any investigating committee cannot hear but one witness at a
time ?
Mr. Alsop. I agree with that.
Senator Smith. You were present during part of Mr. Budenz
public testimony ?
Mr. Alsop. That is correct.
Senator Smith. Now, as I recall, you were given the privilege of
testifying immediately following Mr. Budenz — were you not? — if
that suited your convenience.
Mr. Alsop. Yes, and I told Senator Ferguson that it would be im-
possible, or I indicated to Senator Ferguson that I wasn't ready,
and you can see the mass of documentation ; I couldn't testify in any
serious way at that time.
Senator Smith. So, you have no fault to find with the committee
hearing you today instead of some preceding day ?
Mr. Alsop. None at all.
Senator Smith. That was for your convenience as well as the
committee's ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Now, I believe you did refer in one of your articles,
which was read on the Senate floor by Senator Lehman, to the fact
that the committee was guilty of accepting demonstrably false testi-
mony. Now, you explained that a moment ago, as I understood.
Mr. Alsop. Yes. I would say this also. Senator: that it seems to
me that it makes the point that I made earlier against this kind of
procedure: that these facts as to the real outcome of Mr. Wallace's
mission were easily ascertainable by a properly expert procedure,
and this testimony, I feel quite confident, would then have not been
given; and it demonstrates, I think, the need for a larger expert
apparatus to do this work less in the glare of publicity and with more
attention to the background facts, which suggests the value or absence
of value of the testimony of a man who comes now very close to being
a professional informer.
Senator Smith. You realize — do you not — that the courts in ac-
ce^^ting testimony first have witnesses sworn ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes, sir.
Senator Smith. Therefore, the court has to rely upon the witness
being sworn and thereupon telling the truth ?
22848— 52 — i)t. 5 16
1488 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Alsop. I agree with that.
Senator Smith. That does not guarantee the accuracy or the truth-
fulness of the witness ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes ; that is true.
Senator Smith. You realize that is what this committee is attempt-
ing to do in swearing the witness ?
Mr. Alsop. I withdraw any criticism of the committee.
Senator Smith. You would not say that the committee was charge-
able because a witness swore falsely here ?
Mr. Alsop. I think the procedure is at fault and not the committee.
Senator Smith. You would not blame the committee if a witness
has testified erroneously or untruthfully here ?
Mr. Alsop. Let me put it this way, Senator : Your excellent system
of holding executive hearings is intended to avoid false accusations
against innocent persons. In the present case, in my opinion, a wholly
false accusation has been brought against an innocent person, Mr.
Vincent.
I do believe, with a different kind of procedure and with a larger
range of prior investigation and a lesser tendency to accept, without
inquiry, the allegations of a man who is by now almost a professional
informer, the background of the Wallace mission to China Avould have
heen looked into ; and, if Mr. Budenz had testified as he did, he would
have been subjected to more careful questioning, greater knowledge
being in the hands of the committee, and a different impression would
in the end have been made.
It is all a matter of procedure.
Senator Smith. You realize — do you not — that even in conduct-
ing hearings in executive session the committee has to be careful less
they be accused of attempting to suppress information on someone?
That is true ; is it not ?
Mr. Alsop. I agree with that.
Senator Smith. You agree generally that, where possible, where
there is reasonable basis, we may say, a hearing involving public
interest to such extent as this should be conducted in the open where
everybody interested could see it ?
Mr. Alsop. I agree.
Senator Smith. Now, I believe that Senator Lehman on the floor
of the Senate made some statements to the effect that some very grave
charges had been made against this committee and in effect said it
was a slander upon the Senate. Now, those were not your words;
were they ?
Mr. Alsop. No; I think they are a fair representation of what I had
written at that time, which I have now withdrawn because, having
seen Mr. Budenz in performance the second time, I am convinced the
fault was his and not the committee's.
Senator Smith. You do not subscribe to the statement made by
Senator Lehman on the floor of the Senate ?
Mr Alsop. Let me say, sir, I would have to qualify my reply to
that because Senator Lehman gave a perfectly accurate summary of
the articles which I then wrote, and Senator Lehman, if I am correct—
and I have read the record— did not in any sense take responsibility
tor the accuracy of my statements.
Senator Smith. I understood that.
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1489
Mr. Alsop. He asked instead for an investigation of their truth or
falsehood.
I have withdrawn the statement, withdrawn any implication that
the committee purposely encouraged this false evidence. I say now
that the man who is at fault was Mr. Budenz. So, I couldn't say that
Senator Lehman didn't accurately reproduce what I wrote, because
I think I was in error.
Senator Smith. Now, I have one other question, and then I am
through. Do you feel now, Mr. Alsop, that there is anything else you
Avish to say to this committee or any other evidence you wish to
introduce ?
Mr. Alsop. No, sir.
Senator Smith. Up to now ?
Mr. Alsop. I think we have covered the story very completely.
Senator Smith. I think you understood today, from what the chair-
man said, that if something else did develop which in your mind ought
to be presented, and that if you would let us know, we would be glad
to let you present it ? You understood that ?
Mr. Alsop. I don't mean there isn't a lot of evidence, but it does
seem to me the story is complete, and there is no use burdening the
time of this committee with repetition.
Senator Smith. Then you understand we will receive any other
evidence ?
Mr. Alsop. Yes.
Senator Smith. Now, do you have any complaint against the con-
duct of this hearing so far as you are concerned ?
Mr. Alsop. On the contrary, I think it has been most fair.
Senator Smith. Don't you forget your column is carried in my
home-town paper.
The committee will be in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(Wliereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m., the hearing was recessed until 10 a. m.
;Priday, October 19, 1951.)
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC EELATIONS
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1951
United States Senate,
Subcommittee To Investigate the
Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington^ D. C.
The subcommittee met at 11 :25 a. m., pursuant to recess, in room
424, Senate Office Building, Senator Arthur V. Watkins presiding.
Present: Senators Smith, Ferguson, and Watkins.
Also present : Eobert Morris, subcommittee counsel, and Benjamin
Mandel, director of research.
Senator Watkins. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke has been sworn in executive session.
I think it will be well to swear him again for this public session.
Senator Watkins. Do you solemnly swear the testimony given
in the matter now pending before the committee will be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr, Cooke. I do.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES MAYNARD COOKE, ADMIRAL, UNITED
STATES NAVY (RETIRED)
Mr. Morris. Will you give your full name and residence to the
reporter ?
Mr. CooKE. Charles Maynard Cooke. My permanent residence is in
Sonoma, Calif. The last 2 years I have been living in Formosa.
Mr. Moreis. What is your present military status, Admiral Cooke ?
Mr. Cooke. I am a retired admiral, United States Navy.
Mr. Morris. Wlien did you retire from the United States Navy?
Mr. Cooke. The 1st of May 1948.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, will you tell us what your present
occupation is?
Mr. Cooke. My present occupation is that I have just terminated
a tour of service as an employee of the Commerce International-
China, which has been furnishing technical services to the Chinese
in Formosa.
Mr. Morris. Is that an American corporation, Admiral Cooke?
Mr. Cooke. Yes.
Mr. Morris, Wliat was your position with that corporation?
Mr. Cooke. I occupied a position of coordinator of this group of
technicians that served in Formosa.
Mr. Morris. Who were those technicians, Admiral Cooke?
1491
1492 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Cooke. They were some retired officers, some Reserve officers,
some ex-officers of tlie services of the United States, and some enlisted
men, too.
Mr. Morris. They are all United States citizens ?
Mr. Cooke. Yes.
Mr. Morris. They were all employees of Commerce International-
China?
Mr. Cooke. Yes; CIC, as it is referred to.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, have you ever been in the employ of
the Chinese Govermnent?
Mr. Cooke. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. Admiral Cooke, I wonder if you will give us a brief
sketch of 3^our experience in the United States Navy for background
purposes ?
Mr. Cooke. At the time of Pearl Harbor I was commander of the
Pennsylvania^ and shortly after Pearl Harbor I came to Washington,
first as assistant chief of staff in charge of plans under Admiral King,
who was the commander in chief of the Navy.
Later I became deputy chief of staff, and later the chief of staff to
Admiral King, in which capacity I was serving when the war
terminated.
During that period I served as chief strategic and policy adviser
during the entire war to Admiral King and served with him in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, the Combined Chiefs of Staff meet-
ings, and the meetings of the heads of the governments around the
world.
During 1945, as the war was terminating, I participated in the
formulation of the policy of the United States regarding the Far
East.
Do you want me to go on with that ?
Mr. Morris. Yes ; I wish you would develop that briefly.
Mr. Cooke. And we recognized that the dominating power in Asia —
Japan was about to be defeated, and there was great danger that
Russia would move in. So our view was that the Chinese power had
to build up, that China had to be made a prosperous nation.
In carrying out that policy, we expressed our views or formulated
our views in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including the original drafting
of a law to reconstitute the Chinese Navy. China was about to end
up the war with a fairly good-sized army, somewhat of an air force,
and zero navy.
So it was the view of the Chiefs of Staff that the United States
should prepare legislation to build up their navy, in which I par-
ticipated in doing. About December of 1945 I terminated my duty
with Admiral King and proceeded to China in command "of the
Seventh Fleet, which was our fleet stationed in Cliinese waters, and
was in command of that fleet for about 2 years and 2 months.
During that period I was directly concerned with building up a
Chmese Navy under orders of the Navy Department and later in ac-
cordance with the terms of the Law 502. which was passed by the Con-
gress to establish a Chinese Navy, passed July 16, 1946, but formulated
before I had left Washington in general terms.
I was in command of all our combat forces in China after the de-
parture of General Wedemeyer about April 1946, which included our
marines in Tsmgtao, Tientsin, and Peiping. In February 1947 I
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1493
was called back to confer with the Navy Department and the State
Department about our policy regarding marines staying in Tsingtao.
At that time I also conferred with the President about the situation
out there. I proceeded back to China and completed my duty there in
February 1948. I was due to retire for age in 1948 and came back
and retired on the 1st of May 1948.
After retirement I was called on to talk about the situation in China
over various parts of the United States, which I did, until about Octo-
ber 1949. At that time the Chinese People's Eepiiblic was formed,
and on October 3 the Russians recognized it.
In my opinion the situation had then become extremely critical to
the United States in that there might be the loss of Formosa where
the Chinese Nationalist Government was moving, either preceded or
followed by recognition of Communist China, which from my experi-
ence that I had had dealing with the situation in the Far East for a
number of years would be very disastrous.
I had been recommending for a long period a military mission out
there, which was not established
Mr. MoRBis. This is now what year, Admiral Cooke?
Mr. CooKE. This is now after October 3, 1-949, when the Russians
recognized the People's Government of China.
Senator Ferguson. Where were you stationed then. Admiral?
Mr. CooKE. I was retired then. I had retired the Ist of May, and
I was living in California, and I proceeded east here to go into this
question of what could be done about that. So I went into the ques-
tion of the Chinese themselves hiring officers, retired officers, under
permissive action of the President.
Senator Ferguson. They had to have consent to waive the law
which prohibits that?
Mr. CooKE. The Constitution says that they must have the sanc-
tion of Congress. The sanction of Congress existed, but through the
discretion of the President.
Senator Ferguson. That is the point, that you had to get the Presi-
dent to exercise the discretion ?
Mr. Cooke. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. You did not have to, but the Chinese Govern-
ment if they wanted to have a mission of American people?
Mr. Cooke. Well, not necessarily the Chinese Government, Senator ;
just so it existed.
Senator Ferguson. It could not exist if somebody did not do it?
Mr. Cooke. That is right. Actually a recommendation to that
effect, that one be formed, was sent in to the State Department by
Mr. Pauley.
Senator Ferguson. Where were you when General Marshall went
on his mission in 1946 ?
Mr. CooKE. He went in 1945, Senator. I was just terminating my
duty with the commander in Washington, and shortly to proceed
myself — I arrived out there about a month after General Mai-shall.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see him in China ?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have any conversation with him ?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir ; I did.
Senator Ferguson. As to his mission ?
1494 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr, Cooke. I had to do with the general business of what the Navy
was doing. When I first went out there we were helping the Chinese
to establish navy yards there that would assist us in maintaining our
own ships on minor overhaul and repair; and then I had to do with
him in connection with the Anping incident. I had to do with him
in connection with the building up of the Chinese Navy itself, and I
liad to do with him in connection with the embargo and with our policy
in China.
Senator Ferguson. You would have to know what the policy was
in China in order that you might carry out your duties as an admiral
for the United States Navy ?
Mr. CooKE. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find out what our mission was ? If so,
what was it?
Mr. CooKE. Our general mission was to assist the Chinese in accept-
ing the surrender of the Japanese, to reconstitute a free China, a
strong China, and to avoid participating in fraticidal warfare.
Senator Ferguson. What were you to do with the Nationalist Army
in China ?
Mr. CooKE. Of course, I didn't have much to do with the Army
myself.
Senator Ferguson, As to the mission, your conversation with
General Marshall.
Mr. Cooke. I can say this, Senator. In the beginning I was work-
ing hard to reestablish the Chinese Navy. There seemed to be a little
bit vagueness about what we were to do with the Chinese Navy, and
General Marshall at one time asked me how did I know that it was
the policy of the United States to reconstitute the Chinese Navy. My
answer was that the Congress had passed a bill to that effect, and I
assumed it to be the policy for China. There was no further answer
to that.
Senator Ferguson. So that ended that?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What about the Army?
Mr. Cooke, There were no Army combat troops there, but there was
a sort of mission whose chief function was to advise the Chinese
Government about the establishment* of their Army command in Nan-
king, In other words, so far as I know, they participated in no opera-
tional advice to the Chinese Army,
Senator Ferguson, Did you know anything about the consolida-
tion of the Nationalists and the Communists in one government?
Mr, CooKE. Yes, sir.
Seantor Ferguson. Was that discussed with you ?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson,. What was said?
Mr, Cooke. I was more immediately involved in the operation to
bring Chinese divisions into the Chinese Nationalist Army. There
were about 20 divisions, as I remember it, of Communist divisions,
that would be brought into the Chinese Army, and to carry that out
there were American field officers established around the various parts
of China and an executive headquarters established in Peiping con-
sisting of the representatives of the Communists, the Nationalist
Government, and of the United States. That was under General
Marshall, and immediately under Mr. Walter Robertson who was a
INSTITUTE OF Jt-ACIFIC RELATIONS 1495
Minister representing the United States and stationed in Peiping.
Now I knew about this in general, and I got to know about it very
acutely in particular because we had marines in Peiping, supporting
them, we had marines in Tientsin. We moved supplies to support
this mission, and the marines, too, of course, from Tientsin to Peiping.
On the 29th of July 1946 our Marine convoy of trucks moving sup-
plies up there, guarded by 42 marines, was ambushed by about 600
Communists and 4 of them killed, including the officer in command.
Mr. Morris, They were under your command, were they, Admiral
Cooke?
Mr. CooKE. Their mission was to convoy supplies from Tientsin to
42 in the group.
Mr. Morris. What was their mission?
Mr. CooKE. Their mission was to convoy supplies from Tiensin to
Peiping to support the executive headquarters and our marines sta-
tioned in Peiping.
Mr. Morris. The executive headquarters were the National Govern-
ment headquarters?
Mr. CooKE. It was the headquarters established under the general
direction of General Marshall. It had Nationalist representatives,
Communist representatives, and United States representatives. It
was for the purpose of bringing these two armies together to form
a combined army, you might say, under the Chinese Government.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you not accomplish that?
Mr. Cooke. Never could get an agreement. Of course, it was not
under me, but there never was any agreement on it. The terms of it
w^ere never completely agreed to.
Senator Ferguson. You went there after Wedemeyer left?
Mr. Cooke. No, sir ; I went there before.
Senator Ferguson. How long after you got there did he leave ?
Mr. Cooke. About 3 months.
Senator Ferguson. About 3 months?
Mr. CooKE. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything about the supply of
ammunition to the Nationalist troops ?
Mr. CooKE. Yes. After he left, around the 1st of August 1946,
the supply was cut off.
Senator Ferguson. Why?
Mr. CooKE. Well, I didn't do it, and I can't say why.
Senator Ferguson. Did General Marshall ever discuss that with
you ?
Mr. Cooke. He discussed it in general without making too much
comment except that he made the observation to me that we, mean-
ing the United States, had armed the Chinese, and now we were dis-
arming them. In other words, we had undertaken to equip thirty-
odd Chinese divisions, equip them w4th guns and things of that kind,
and then we stopped the How of ammunition and made a complete
embargo, so we didn't supply it or wouldn't let them buy it for a
period of about 10 months, I believe. He just made that observation
to me, that is all. He wasn't called on to do it, but he did do it.
Senator Ferguson. It amounted to disarming them because they
were not getting the ammunition for the weapons we had supplied
them?
Mr. Cooke. That is right.
1496 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Wliat effect would the arming of the National-
ists have had as far as the Communists were concerned?
Mr. Cooke. Of course, the Communists were being very well sup-
plied in Manchuria by the Kussians from arsenals and from captured
Japanese guns and ammunition. We were practically certain that was
going on, and of course in our white paper reported from our diplo-
matic representatives in Moscow that it was going on.
Senator Ferguson. So we knew that the Communists were getting
arms and ammunition and also it was our policy, we put it into effect,
to put an embargo on the Nationalists ?
Mr. Cooke. Tliat is right.
Senator Ferguson. And General Marshall had told you that of
course that amounted to the disarming of the Nationalists ?
Mr. CooKE. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. There was no doubt about that, either?
Mr. Cooke. I must interject there ; whether General Marshall con-
sidered the Kussian and Japanese arms were going to the Communists
I don't know.
Senator Ferguson. But you said our Government knew it.
Mr. Cooke. Our Government knew it because I have now read it
since then in the white paper that it was reported to them ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. But the part that General Marshall told you
was that it amounted to a disarming of the Nationalists ?
Mr. Cooke. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, is that correct?
Mr. CooKE. Largely so ; yes.
Senator Ferguson. If a man has a rifle and he has no ammunition
for it, and you have the ammunition, you are disarming him, are you
not?
Mr. Cooke. You can't make it quite that. Of course, they had am-
munition on hand. It was gradually getting very scarce, and eventu-
ally to a point almost of desperation, but not immediately.
Senator Ferguson. So in effect in the end it disaraied them ; is
that it, or what are the facts ?
Mr. Cooke. Disarmament as far as our guns were concerned. They
had guns of their own manufacture they had been fighting the Japs
with, and they had their arsenals. They were still using their own
guns and their own ammunition, but the divisions that were equipped
with American guns were, as long as they used those guns, in effect
gradually disarmed.
Senator Ferguson. How many divisions were armed with American
weapons ?
Mr. Cooke. I can't answer that. The program was never completed,
and just what the actual number was I don't know.
Senator Watkins. Did you say a moment ago that there were thir-
ty-odd divisions?
Mr. Cooke. That was the program.
Mr. Morris. Was that Wedemeyer's program?
Mr. Cooke. It was formulated during his command, and he was
acting chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek.
Mr. Morris. Now, that program and that mission which was headed
by General Wedemeyer had the assignment of arming 39 Chinese
divisions ?
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1497
Mr. Cooke. I remember it was thirty-odd. It could be 39 ; yes.
Mr. Morris. Did that indude any Chinese Communist divisions?
Mr. Cooke. Not at that time.
Mr. Morris. So that was the policy in China when you arrived
there ; is that right, Admiral Cooke ?
Mr. Cooke. That is right.
Mr. Morris. Subsequent to that time the Marshall mission arrived
in China?
Mr. Cooke. No; the Marshall mission arrived there before I did.
Mr. Morris. Subsequent to General Wedemeyer's mission ?
Mr, Cooke. Well, General Wedemeyer was still there. There is
an overlap there. General Wedemeyer was still there. He was in
command of our ground forces up until about April 1946.
Mr. Morris. Will you explain the transition between the prevailing
policy of General Wedemeyer and the subsequent prevailing policy
of General Marshall?
Mr. Cooke. Well, after General Marshall's arrival there in De-
cember 1945 it is my opinion that General Wedemeyer was working
to support General Marshall's mission exactly the way he wanted it
supported. Now we actually moved troops, my ships moved troops
about, we had to take Japanese back to the mainland, and we moved
Chinese troops to receive the surrender of Japanese troops, and we
also moved some Chinese troops to Manchuria.
Senator Ferguson. Chinese Nationalist troops?
Mr. Cooke. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. When did the plan first arise to bring about a coali-
tion between the Chinese Nationalist armies and the Chinese Com-
munist armies? How did that develop, Admiral Cooke?
Mr. Cooke. I can't speak positively of that. My impression is that
that developed about January 1946.
Mr. Morris. You were in China at that time, were you not?
Mr. Cooke. Yes ; but I didn't have anything necessarily directly to
do with that.
Mr. Morris. But you did know that the plan was going on ?
Mr. Cooke, Yes.
Mr. Morris. The thing you are uncertain about is the particular
time when it commenced ?
Mr, Cooke. That is right.
Mr. Morris, Admiral Cooke, will you develop for us how that plan
of bringing about a coalition or merger between the Chinese Nation-
alist armies and the Chinese Communist armies was attempted ?
Mr, Cooke, There was an arrangement set up in negotiations be-
tween the Communists and the Nationalists and General Marshall to
bring in a certain number of Communist divisions into the Chinese
Government army. The proportion I am not sure of here, it may
have been 1 to 4, 1 to 3, or 1 to 2,
I did know, but I have forgotten the exact figures now. There were
United States Army officers stationed around various parts of China,
North China, where this would actually be implemented. We had
to do a certain amount of supplying them. Just the exact workings
of that I can't testify to.
Senator Ferguson. What instructions did you get from General
Marshall on that?
1498 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Mr. Cooke. I had nothing to do with that except to support it
logistically. It had nothing to do with the Navy at all, so I had
nothing to do with that, the actual implementation.
Mr. Morris. One of the consequences of that was an embargo, was
it not. Admiral Cooke ?
Mr. Cooke. Well, that is just a question of opinion. The embargo
eventually took place quite a bit later ; it had to do not necessarily
with just the armies, it had to do with the bringing of the two to-
gether, as I understood it, and the embargo actually operated as a
sort of pressure on the Nationalist Government to conform to the
recommendations that had been given them as to what they should
do.
I mean that is opinion here now. I didn't sit in the councils to know
the answer to that.
Senator Ferguson. But the embargo took place?
Mr. Cooke. The embargo took place definitely.
Mr. Morris. It is not yoBr opinion that the embargo took place?
Mr. CooKE. I know the embargo took place.
Mr. Morris. What was the nature of the embargo. Admiral Cooke ?
Mr. CooKE. The United States would supply no combat equipment
of any kind, including ammunition, and they wouldn't allow the
Chinese to buy any in the United States. Eventually I think they
bought some spare parts and maybe some transport planes, no combat
planes but transport planes like C-47's, and C-46's.
Mr. Morris. Will you tell us when this embargo went into effect?
Mr. CooKE. I can't tell you exactly, but it was about the 1st of
August, 1946.
Mr. Morris. How long did that stay in force ?
Mr. CooKE. Until the following May.
Mr. Morris. May 1947?
Mr. CooKE. Yes.
Mr. Morris. During the time that that was in force was the Chinese
Government able to buy any equipment in the United States ?
Mr. CooKE. Not so far as I know. I am fairly sure not.
Mr. Morris. Did the United States send any equipment to the
Chinese Government during that period?
Mr. Cooke. No combat equipment. Let me modify that. That is
a question that comes up here about delivery of this obsolete ammuni-
tion in Tsingtao in February of 1947, which is an item I can go into
if you wish me to do it at this time.
Mr. Morris. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. I would like to know.
Mr. CooKE. Of course, the number of marines in China gradually
decreased. They had ammunition there for carrying on combat
operations, much more than they needed, and some of it getting old
and beyond the standards acceptable to the United States. So, some
of this obsolescent ammunition in Tsingtao became due for disposal.
I didn't want to haul it through the town of Tsingtao in order to
load it on ships, and the only other way to dispose of it was just dump
it somewhere or to blow it up. Blowing up thousands of rounds of
ammunition is not a very easy thing.
So when I came back in 1947 to talk to the State Department here
and the Navy Department about the number of marines in Tsingtao,
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS 1499
the question also came up about this ammunition, as to whether to
dump it or not.
Senator Ferguson. How much was there of it?
Mr. Cooke. I can't remember, Senator. It was something that is
substantial.
Senator Ferguson. It is a large number ?
Mr. Cooke. It is a large number. It wouldn't run the Army a
definite period, but it was a substantia] amount. It was ground force
ammunition.
Senator Ferguson. Why did you not give it to the Chinese Na-
tionalists that had weapons in which to use it?
Mr. Cooke. I am going into that.
So, then, we had this conference with the State Department, includ-
ing General Marshall and Mr. Vincent.
Senator Ferguson. That is John Carter Vincent?
Mr. Cooke. John Carter Vincent.
Senator Ferguson. What was his position with the State Depart-
ment at that time, if you know ?
Mr. Cooke. He was the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs, the same as Mr. Rusk now is.
Senator Ferguson. You took it up with General Marshall. Was he
then Secretary of State ?
Mr. Cooke. He was Secretary of State. The Secretary of Navy was
there, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Marshall, Secretary
Marshall, and Mr. Vincent.
Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us about the conversation you
had?
Mr. Cooke. Yes. I was of the view that we should take it out there
and dump it and the Nationalists come and get it. They were desper-
ately short of ammunition then. I considered it would be good for
them to have it. Furthermore, I didn't think it was very practicable
to dispose of it in any other way. In the discussion that ensued Mr.
Vincent opposed that.
Senator Ferguson. What did he say ?
Mr. Cooke. He just said we ought to figure out a way to destroy it.
Senator Ferguson. And not give it to the Nationalists ?
Mr. Cooke. That is right. General Marshall recognized the
problem and said he considered it was a very difficult problem to de-
stroy it, and he approved my recommendation on it, which was carried
out.
Senator Ferguson. That was carried out ?
Mr. Cooke. Actually we designated a place there where we were
going to take it, and we told them we were going to put it tliore. We
didn't tell them we were going to give it to them, but we were putting
it in this place, and they did come and get it, and of course they did
use it.
Mr. Morris. Wliat was the date of that ?
Mr. Cooke. That was in February 1947.
Mr. Morris. Where did that conference take place ?
Mr. Cooke. In the State Department.
Senator Ferguson. Did Mr. Vincent assign any reason for not giv-
ing it to the Chinese Nationalists in the way you proposed ?
Mr. Cooke. He just indicated it was undesirable to do so.
1500 INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS
Senator Ferguson. Did anybody else in the State Departme^it dis-
cuss thi
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